



European Federation of National Institutions for Language

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Gerhard Stickel (eds.)

Stereotypes and linguistic prejudices in Europe

Contributions to the EFNIL Conference 2016 in Warsaw

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Preface

Since its foundation in 2003, EFNIL, the European Federation of National Institutions for Language, has discussed at its annual conference topics that have special relevance for a multilingual Europe and the linguistic situation of individual European countries. The aim of the conferences is to exchange relevant information and experiences between the members of EFNIL, as well as to stimulate and strengthen awareness of the linguistic diversity of Europe among policy makers, educators, journalists and the general public. With this goal, EFNIL holds annual conferences every year in a different country.

The 2016 conference was held in Warsaw at the Polish Academy of Science and was hosted by the Council for the Polish Language. The general theme was *Stereotypes and linguistic prejudices in Europe*. The General Assembly of EFNIL had selected this topic because of the influence that stereotypes and prejudices have had (and are still having) on the mutual perception of the various peoples and ethnic groups in Europe.

Since stereotypes have mostly been studied from a social psychology perspective, experts in this field were invited to present basic concepts and findings concerning national and ethnic stereotypes. Speakers from member institutions of EFNIL were invited to present reports on old and new stereotypes and prejudices concerning other countries and their citizens and groups within their own countries. As most of the members of EFNIL are linguists or philologists, special attention was paid to the verbal expression of stereotypes and prejudices in the various languages.

This publication presents the written versions of the contributions to the Warsaw conference. After the welcoming addresses and general statements of the host organisation, Polish officials and representatives of the Academy and the European Commission, there is a brief introduction to the conference theme. We then present overviews and general discussions of stereotypes and prejudices as seen from the perspectives of political geography, social psychology, comparative literature, history, socio- and ethnolinguistics. This is followed by ten reports on common stereotypes and linguistic prejudices in various European countries. The volume concludes with a report on a panel discussion with representatives of four EFNIL member institutes from the Nordic states on the stereotypes held in their countries. As in previous publications, a list of the member institutions of EFNIL is added.

The working languages of the conference were English, Polish, German and French. Most contributions or their parts are presented here in English. Several articles have brief abstracts in the native tongues of the various authors; by these means, we aim to give a clear indication of the rich linguistic diversity of European languages.

We would like to thank Joachim Hohwieler (Mannheim), Hilary Simpson (Oxford) and our EFNIL colleague Tamás Váradi (Budapest) for their efficient help in preparing all the various texts for publication both in print and online.

Przedmowa

Od czasu utworzenia w 2003 r. Europejska Federacja Narodowych Instytucji Językowych EFNIL omawia na corocznych konferencjach tematy, które mają szczególne znaczenie dla wielojęzycznej Europy i sytuacji językowej w poszczególnych krajach europejskich. Celem takich konferencji jest wymiana istotnych informacji i doświadczeń między członkami EFNIL-u oraz budzenie i wzmacnianie świadomości zróżnicowania językowego Europy wśród polityków, nauczycieli, dziennikarzy i ogółu społeczeństwa. W tym celu EFNIL organizuje swoje doroczne konferencje co rok w innym kraju.

W roku 2016 konferencja odbyła się w Warszawie; jej gospodarzem była Rada Języka Polskiego przy Prezydium Polskiej Akademii Nauk. Głównym tematem były *Stereotypy i uprzedzenia językowe w Europie*. Zgromadzenie Ogólne EFNIL wybrało ten temat ze względu na wpływ, jaki stereotypy i uprzedzenia wywierają i nadal wywierają na wzajemne postrzeganie różnych narodów i grup etnicznych w Europie.

Ze względu na to, że stereotypy badano przede wszystkim jako zjawiska z zakresu psychologii społecznej, eksperci z tej dziedziny zostali zaproszeni do przedstawienia podstawowych pojęć i ustaleń odnoszących się do stereotypów narodowych i etnicznych. Z kolei referentów z członkowskich instytucji EFNIL-u poproszono o omówienie starych i nowych stereotypów i uprzedzeń dotyczących innych krajów i ich obywateli oraz grup mieszkańców własnego kraju. Ponieważ zaś większość członków EFNIL-u stanowią językoznawcy i filolodzy, ze szczególną uwagą potraktowano słowne wyrażanie stereotypów i uprzedzeń w różnych językach.

Niniejsza publikacja zawiera pisemne wersje wystąpień z warszawskiej konferencji EFNIL-u. Po wypowiedziach powitalnych i ogólnych deklaracjach gospodarzy, przedstawicieli władz polskich, Polskiej Akademii Nauk i Komisji Europejskiej oraz krótkim wprowadzeniu do tematyki konferencji, zaprezentowane zostały przeglądy i ogólne omówienia stereotypów i uprzedzeń, oglądanych z perspektywy geografii politycznej, psychologii społecznej, literaturoznawstwa porównawczego, historii oraz socjo- i etnolingwistyki. Po nich następuje dziesięć referatów o pospolitych stereotypach i uprzedzeniach językowych w różnych krajach europejskich. Książkę zamyka sprawozdanie z debaty panelowej z udziałem przedstawicieli czterech, będących członkami EFNIL-u, instytucji z krajów nordyckich. Debata poświęcona była utrzymującym się wzajemnym stereotypom.

Jak w poprzednich tomach pokonferencyjnych, tak i w tym znalazła się na końcu lista instytucji członkowskich EFNIL-u.

Roboczymi językami konferencji były: angielski, polski, niemiecki i francuski. Większość tekstów lub ich części w tym tomie drukujemy w języku angielskim. Niektórym artykułom towarzyszą krótkie streszczenia w ojczystym języku autorów. W ten sposób chcemy także wywołać wizualne wrażenie bogatej różnorodności języków europejskich.

Dziękujemy p. Joachimowi Hohwielerowi (Mannheim), p. Hilary Simpson (Oksford) i naszemu koledze z EFNIL-u Tamásowi Váradiemu (Budapeszt) za cenną pomoc w przygotowaniu wszystkich tekstów zarówno do publikacji tradycyjnej, jak i w wersji online.

Vorwort

Seit ihrer Gründung 2003 behandelt EFNIL, die Europäische Föderation nationaler Sprachinstitutionen, bei ihren Jahrestagungen Themen von besonderer Bedeutung für das vielsprachige Europa und die sprachliche Situation der einzelnen europäischen Länder. Ziel dieser Tagungen ist es, relevante Informationen und Erfahrungen unter den Mitgliedern von EFNIL auszutauschen wie auch bei Politikern, Pädagogen, Journalisten und der Allgemeinheit das Bewusstsein für die sprachliche Vielfalt in Europa anzuregen und zu verstärken. Mit diesem Ziel werden die Tagungen jedes Jahr in einem anderen Land abgehalten.

Die Tagung 2017 fand in Warschau bei der Polnischen Akademie der Wissenschaften statt. Gastgeber war der Rat für die polnische Sprache. Das Thema war *Stereotypes and linguistic prejudices in Europe / Stereotype und sprachliche Vorurteile in Europa*. Die Hauptversammlung von EFNIL hatte dieses Thema gewählt, weil Stereotype und Vorurteile die wechselseitige Wahrnehmung der verschiedenen Völker und ethnischen Gruppen in Europa schon seit langem beeinflussen.

Weil Stereotype vor allem als sozialpsychologische Phänomene erforscht worden sind, wurden Fachleute aus diesem Gebiet neben anderen Experten eingeladen, ihre wichtigsten Konzepte und Ergebnisse zu Stereotypen und Vorurteilen vorzustellen. Vertreter der Mitgliedsinstitute von EFNIL wurden eingeladen, über alte und neue Stereotype und Vorurteile gegenüber anderen Ländern, deren Bewohner und zu Gruppen im eigenen Land zu berichten. Da die meisten Mitglieder von EFNIL Linguisten und Philologen sind, wurde besondere Aufmerksamkeit den sprachlichen Ausdrücken für Stereotype und Vorurteile in den verschiedenen Sprachen gewidmet.

Die vorliegende Veröffentlichung bietet die schriftlichen Fassungen der Beiträge zu der Warschauer Tagung. Nach den Grußadressen und allgemeinen Ausführungen von Gastgebern, polnischen Offiziellen, Vertretern der Akademie und

der Europäischen Kommission und einer kurzen Einführung in das Tagungsthema folgen Überblicksdarstellungen und generelle Erörterungen von Stereotypen und Vorurteilen aus den Perspektiven von politischer Geographie, Sozialpsychologie, vergleichender Literaturwissenschaft, Geschichtswissenschaft und Sozio- und Ethnolinguistik. Zehn Berichte über verbreitete Stereotype und Vorurteile in verschiedenen europäischen Ländern schließen sich an. Den Abschluss bildet der Bericht über eine Podiumsdiskussion der Vertreterinnen von EFNIL-Instituten aus vier nordischen Staaten über wechselseitige Vorurteile in ihren Ländern. Wie in früheren Veröffentlichungen enthält der Anhang eine Liste der Mitgliedsinstitutionen von EFNIL

Arbeitssprachen auf der Tagung waren Englisch, Polnisch, Deutsch und Französisch. Die meisten Beiträge oder ihre Teile werden hier in Englisch vorgelegt. Mehrere Artikel haben Abstracts in den Muttersprachen der verschiedenen Verfasser. Hierdurch möchten wir auch einen sichtbaren Eindruck von der sprachlichen Vielfalt Europas vermitteln,

Danken möchten wir Joachim Hohwieler (Mannheim), Hilary Simpson (Oxford) und unserem EFNIL-Kollegen Tamás Váradi (Budapest) für die tatkräftige Hilfe bei der Vorbereitung und Einrichtung der Druckfassung und der Online-Version.

Wrocław / Kraków / Mannheim

Anna Dąbrowska / Walery Pisarek / Gerhard Stickel

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Opening

Andrzej Markowski

Powitanie

Szanowny Panie Przewodniczący, Szanowni Państwo!

Serdecznie witam na dorocznej konferencji EFNIL-u. Jest wielkim zaszczytem dla Rady Języka Polskiego przy Prezydium Polskiej Akademii Nauk to, że kierownictwo EFNIL-u powierzyło nam organizację kolejnego spotkania naukowców reprezentujących wszystkie kraje Unii Europejskiej.

Temat tegorocznej konferencji – “Stereotypy i uprzedzenia językowe w Europie”, zaproponowany i zaakceptowany w czasie poprzedniego posiedzenia EFNIL-u, wpisuje się w krąg zagadnień najistotniejszych we współczesnym życiu społecznym. Nie jest to temat łatwy. Wyobrażenia zakorzenione w języku wpływają bowiem na nasze postrzeganie świata, na widzenie i ocenianie “innych”, różniących się od nas ze względu na przynależność narodową, status społeczny, poglądy polityczne, krąg kulturalny. Przedstawienie różnych stanowisk w tych kwestiach, wymiana poglądów, dyskusja powinny się przyczynić do lepszego rozumienia opisywanych i ocenianych zjawisk. A zacząć trzeba chyba już, od wyrażonego w definiowaniu, rozumienia pojęć, których językowy wyraz mamy w tematyce naszej konferencji. Określenie *uprzedzenia* jest niewątpliwie nacechowane negatywnie: jeśli ktoś jest do czegoś uprzedzony – to źle. Ale czy termin *stereotyp* też jest zawsze nacechowany ujemnie? Czy wszystkie stereotypy są złe? Czy niektóre z nich nie ułatwiają porozumienia? A może jednak tak nie jest, a to, co stereotypowe i wyrażone w języku – we frazeologii, paremiologii, nacechowaniu ekspresywnym słów – zawsze opiera się na nieprawdziwych wyobrażeniach i krzywdzących sądach? Mam nadzieję, że referaty, a zwłaszcza dyskusje po nich, pozwolą uściślić podstawowe pojęcia, będące przedmiotem obrad naszej konferencji, a także pokazać, jak są one rozumiane przez badaczy o różnych orientacjach metodologicznych.

Nie można nie docenić także tego, że coroczne spotkania na konferencjach EFNIL-u pozwalają na zacieśnianie kontaktów naukowych i towarzyskich uczonych całego naszego kontynentu. W czasie tych spotkań podkreśla się językową różnorodność w jedności Europy, uwypukla się rolę języków narodowych w historii i kształtowaniu kultury na naszym kontynencie. Tematyka tegorocznej konferencji szczególnie sprzyja temu procesowi, gdyż w każdym języku narodowym istnieje swoisty sposób oddawania stereotypów i nazwania uprzedzeń. Czy są tu też elementy wspólne różnym językom, to okaże się po zakończeniu naszych obrad.

Życzę nam wszystkim, by ta konferencja przyczyniła się do lepszego zrozumienia istoty i przyczyn stereotypów i uprzedzeń wyrażonych w różnych językach. Owocnych obrad!

Welcome address

I warmly welcome you to the annual EFNIL conference. It is a great honour for the Council for Polish Language at the Presidium of the Polish Academy of Science to have been entrusted with the organisation of this gathering of experts representing all the countries of the European Union.

The topic of this year's conference, "Stereotypes and linguistic prejudices in Europe", which was proposed and accepted at the last EFNIL meeting, is one of the most pressing issues in contemporary social life. It is not an easy topic, since the images embedded in language influence our perception of the world and the way we see and judge "others" who differ from us on the basis of nationality, social status, political opinions and cultural values. Presenting different points of view on such issues, exchanging these views and discussing them should contribute to better understanding of these phenomena. We should probably start by understanding the concepts included in the topic of our conference. The term 'prejudice' is definitely considered negative: if someone is prejudiced against something, it is wrong. Is then the term 'stereotype' considered negative as well? Are all stereotypes bad? Do not some of them facilitate understanding? Maybe it is the other way round and all the stereotypical images expressed in language – in phraseology, in paremiology and in the expressive marking of words – are always based on false concepts and unfair judgments? I hope that the papers, and especially the discussions that follow, will allow us to explore the basic terms that are the subject matter of our conference, and will show us how their perception differs depending on the methodological orientation.

The extent to which the annual meetings at EFNIL conferences strengthen academic and social contacts between researchers from all over the continent should not be underestimated. During these meetings, the diversity of languages within Europe's unity is underlined and the role of national languages in history and culture shaping is described. The topic of this year's conference lends itself particularly well to this process, as there is a specific way of expressing stereotypes and referring to prejudices in every national language. Whether there are elements that different languages have in common, we will see after our deliberations.

I hope that this conference will help all of us to understand better the nature and the causes of stereotypes and prejudices expressed in different languages. I wish you fruitful discussions!

Andrzej Duda

List powitalny Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej

Szanowni Uczestnicy, Organizatorzy i Goście tego spotkania! Panie i Panowie!

Z satysfakcją przyjąłem wiadomość, że XIV Doroczna Konferencja Europejskiej Federacji Narodowych Instytucji na Rzecz Języka odbywa się w Warszawie. To jedno z niewielu tego rodzaju forów służących wymianie informacji, opinii oraz doświadczeń w zakresie monitorowania i badań tak złożonej i dynamicznej rzeczywistości, jaką jest komunikacja językowa. Wspólny dorobek Federacji stanowi cenny wkład w integrację europejską, w rozwój wieloaspektowej współpracy kulturalnej między członkami Unii Europejskiej. Jestem przekonany, że rezolucja, którą podsumują Państwo obrady tegorocznej konferencji, także i tym razem będzie niezwykle interesującą lekturą.

Szanowni Państwo! Żyjemy w dobie żywiłowego rozwoju komunikacji elektronicznej. Ilość różnorodnych treści, które na co dzień wytwarzamy, przetwarzamy, odbieramy i przekazujemy, nie ma precedensu w historii. Jednak nowoczesne technologie niosą ze sobą również zagrożenia, czego przykładem wydaje się być ogromny nacisk na krótkość i prostotę przekazu oraz pewna deprecjacja wartości, jaką jest kultura kontaktu osobistego. Z kolei procesy globalizacyjne oraz problematyka współistnienia przedstawicieli odmiennych kultur rodzą szereg pytań dotyczących języka jako pomostu lub, przeciwnie, bariery i zarzewia potencjalnych konfliktów. Innym zagadnieniem, którego doniosłość jest dostrzegana także poza Unią Europejską, jest postępująca jurydyzacja stosunków społecznych oraz rosnąca rola języka prawniczego. A przecież to tylko niektóre z ważkich kwestii, którą podnoszą dzisiaj językoznawcy.

Dlatego też sprawne i poprawne używanie, ale też nadużywanie języka powinno być przedmiotem stałej, wnikliwej analizy naukowej – nienagannej metodologicznie, prowadzonej zgodnie z regułą obiektywizmu. Szczególnie ważnym tematem tych dociekań jest problem języka jako środka manipulacji, jawnej lub ukrytej agresji lub też jako wehikułu ideologicznej indoktrynacji. Cieszę się, że temat XIV Dorocznej Konferencji EFNIL, czyli stereotypy i uprzedzenia językowe w Europie, wychodzi naprzeciw realnym potrzebom i bolączkom, z którymi borykają się odbiorcy komunikatów medialnych, urzędnicy i petenci, użytkownicy mediów społecznościowych, czy wreszcie wszyscy, którzy chcą lub muszą dokonywać jakichkolwiek samookreśleń. Myślę, że pracując nad rozwiązaniami tych problemów warto poszukiwać złotego środka między dwiema postawami skrajnymi. Z pewnością istnieją takie zachowania użytkowników języka, w obliczu których bierność świata nauki, władz państwowych, organizacji ponadnarodowych

oraz opinii publicznej jest niepożądana. Z drugiej strony aktywna polityka językowa rodzić może pokusy, które chyba najdobitniej ukazane zostały w utworach George'a Orwella. Język jako narzędzie przemocy symbolicznej, jako źródło podziałów i antagonizmów, ale też język spętany arbitralnie wyznaczanymi kanonami poprawności politycznej, poddawany zabiegom w istocie propagandowym, to kwestie, na które wielu Europejczyków jest ogromnie wyczulonych. Chyba najbardziej dotyczy to Polaków i innych narodów europejskich, które wyzwoliły się z jarzma totalitaryzmu.

Ostanie pięć wieków polskiej historii, ewolucja od demokracji szlacheckiej do nowoczesnej demokracji parlamentarnej, a szczególnie doświadczenie okupacji przez nazistowskie Niemcy i komunistyczną Rosję – wszystko to sprawiło, że wolność, także wolność osobista, pluralizm opinii i swoboda ich wyrażania, należą do wartości, które Polacy cenią najwyżej. Pogodzenie tych wartości z działaniami promującymi dobrze pojętą tolerancję, pokój społeczny i wzajemny szacunek między obywatelami państw Unii Europejskiej jest zadaniem, od którego nie możemy się uchylić. Ufam, że prace podejmowane przez Radę Języka Polskiego oraz inne szacowne gremia naukowe zrzeszone w EFNIL okażą się tu nieocenioną pomocą.

Życzę Państwu owocnych, inspirujących obrad, a naszym gościom zagranicznym – wielu miłych wspomnień z pobytu w stolicy Polski. Serdecznie wszystkich Państwa pozdrawiam.

Welcome address of the President of the Republic of Poland

Dear Participants, Organizers and Guests of the meeting, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I was satisfied to learn that the 14th Annual Conference of the European Federation of National Institutions for Language takes place in Warsaw. It is one of few forums aimed at sharing information, opinions and experiences in the area of monitoring and research of such a complex and dynamic reality as linguistic communication. Joint achievements of the Federation constitute a valuable contribution to the European integration, to the development of a multifaceted cultural cooperation among EU members. I am convinced that the resolution which will conclude your deliberations during this year's conference, will provide an interesting reading also this time.

Ladies and Gentlemen, our era is marked by dynamic development of the electronic communication. The number of diverse contents produced, processed, received and transferred by us every day is unprecedented in history. However, modern technologies bring threats with them as well. This seems to be illustrated by a huge pressure on the shortness and simplicity of the message, as well as a certain depreciation of the value of face-to-face contacts. On the other hand,

globalization processes and coexistence of representatives of diverse cultures give rise to a series of questions about the language as a bridge or, on the contrary, a barrier and embers of potential conflicts. Another issue the importance of which is seen also outside the European Union is the progressing juridisation of social relations and a growing role of the legal language. And these are just a few of the crucial matters pointed to by linguists today.

Therefore, a skillful and correct use, but also misuse of the language, should constitute a subject of an ongoing, detailed scientific analysis – methodologically impeccable and conducted in line with the rule of objectivism. The subject of particular importance in this respect is the problem of language as a means of manipulation, of an open or hidden aggression, or as a vehicle of ideological indoctrination.

I am delighted that the subject of the 14th Annual EFNIL Conference, that is: stereotypes and linguistic prejudices in Europe, meets the real needs and maladies faced by recipients of media messages, clerks and customers, users of the social media, or last but not least, by all those who want or have to self-define themselves. I think that while working on how to solve these problems, it is worthwhile to look for the golden mean between two extreme attitudes. Surely, some of the existing behaviours of language users should not go unnoticed by the world of science, state authorities, supranational organizations, or by the public opinion. On the other hand, an active language policy may trigger temptations, which were presented, probably most clearly, in George Orwell's works. Language as a tool of symbolic violence, as a source of divisions and antagonisms, but on the other hand, language bound by arbitrarily defined canons of political correctness, made subject to propaganda tricks are all issues of great sensitivity for many Europeans. It probably concerns to the greatest extent Poles and other European nations who liberated themselves from the yoke of totalitarianism.

The last five centuries of Polish history, the evolution from the Noble's Democracy to the modern Parliamentary Democracy, and in particular the experience of occupation by the Nazi Germany and the communist Russia – as a consequence of all of that – freedom, including the individual one, plurality of opinions and the freedom of expression are among the values which Poles appreciate most highly. Combing those values with actions promoting well-understood tolerance, social peace, and mutual respect among the citizens of the EU member states is the task which we cannot evade. I trust that the works undertaken by the Council for the Polish Language, as well as other respectable scientific entities which are part of EFNIL, will prove to be of invaluable assistance in this respect.

I wish you, Ladies and Gentlemen, a fruitful and inspiring debate and to our foreign guests – many pleasant memories from your stay in the capital of Poland. My best regards to all of you.

Mateusz Werner

Powitanie

Szanowni Państwo, dostojni goście,

to ogromny zaszczyt dla mnie, że mogę dziś powitać Państwa w imieniu Narodowego Centrum Kultury, które jest partnerem Rady Języka Polskiego przy organizacji warszawskiej konferencji EFNIL poświęconej stereotypom i uprzedzeniom językowym w Europie. Korzystając z okazji i w związku z tematem przewodnim chciałbym zwrócić Państwa uwagę na szczególny moment, w którym się teraz znajdujemy. To jest moment, który Państwo dobrze znacie z wielu innych konferencji o podobnej randze jako stały element oficjalnego rytuału, kiedy osoby takie jak ja – przedstawiciele instytucji organizujących lub finansujących dane przedsięwzięcie, zabierają głos aby zaznaczyć swoją obecność pozdrawiając uczestników, podkreślając wagę zdarzenia, w którym biorą udział a czasem nawet dzieląc z zebranymi się jakąś własną refleksją. Powiedzmy sobie otwarcie: takie przemówienia jak moje, a zwłaszcza ten ich ostatni rodzaj, nie cieszy się szczególnym zainteresowaniem uczestników konferencji, którzy traktują go jako zło konieczne, stratę czasu odgradzającą słuchaczy od smakowitego poznawczo sedna wystąpienia merytorycznych. Mówiąc wprost, w powszechnej opinii przemówienia powitalne to banał i nuda, a wygłaszający je urzędnicy to w najlepszym razie zręczni retorzy, którzy przy pomocy okrągłych frazesów i komunałów starają się ukryć niedostatki intelektualne i brak oryginalnej myśli. O takich jak ja mówi się: “urzędasy”, “oficjele”, a to co mamy do powiedzenia kwituje się jako “mowę-trawę” albo “drętwą mowę”. Zastanówcie się drodzy Państwo, czy jednak opinia ta i jej słowne odzwierciedlenia nie są wyrazem jakiegoś trwałego uprzedzenia i czy nie stały się przykrym stereotypem, który zasługuje na zdemaskowanie i odważną dekonstrukcję?

Nie ma chyba lepszego miejsca, niż ta właśnie konferencja, gdzie w imieniu wszystkich krzywdzonych tym stereotypem urzędników mógłbym upomnieć się o poważną, naukową refleksję nad nim i jego krytyczny opis. Życzę Państwu owocnej debaty i gorących dyskusji.

Welcome address

Ladies and Gentlemen, Distinguished Guests,

It is a great honour for me to welcome you on behalf of the National Cultural Centre, which is a partner of the Council for the Polish Language in the organisation of the EFNIL conference in Warsaw on stereotypes and linguistic prejudices in Europe. Taking this opportunity, and referring to the theme of the conference, I would like to draw your attention to the particular moment where we are now. This is the moment that you know well from many other similar conferences as a standard part of the official ritual, when people like me – representatives of the institutions organising or financing the project – take the floor to mark their presence and greet the participants, stressing the importance of the event in which they are participating and sometimes even sharing some of their own reflections. Let's face it: speeches like mine, especially of the latter type, are not popular among listeners, who treat them as a necessary evil, a waste of time, separating the audience from the meaty intellectual core of the main talks. Frankly speaking, welcome addresses are generally held to be banal and boring, and the officials delivering them to be, at best, skilled rhetoricians using round platitudes and clichés to hide their intellectual shortcomings and lack of original ideas. People like me are called bureaucrats or officials and what we say is called in Polish “speech-grass” or “numb speech”. But I would like you to consider whether this opinion and its verbal articulation is not an expression of a persistent prejudice, and has become an unfortunate stereotype that deserves to be exposed and boldly deconstructed.

There is probably no better place than this conference for me – on behalf of all the officials abused by this stereotype – to ask for a serious, scientific reflection on it and its critical description. I wish you a fruitful debate and animated discussions.

Filip Majcen

Are all languages equal?

or

How the EU deals with languages

Your excellencies, professors, ladies and gentlemen,

It is my pleasure and honour to be with you here in Warsaw today, continuing the good tradition of the Commission's Directorate-General for Translation participating in EFNIL annual conferences.

1. Introduction

Let me first tell you a brief personal story (in my Polish).

Przed pierwszym przyjazdem do Polski w dwa tysiące dziesiątym roku próbowałem nauczyć się kilku wyrażen po polsku. I nie uwierzycie mi Państwo – pierwsze dwa zdania w moim podręczniku brzmiały:

La langue polonaise a la mauvaise réputation d'être imprononçable! En effet, il faut bien reconnaître qu'elle contient – malheureusement – des sons difficiles à articuler pour un étranger; quelle que soit sa langue maternelle.

Mimo tego nie poddałem się i dwa lata temu zacząłem chodzić na lekcje polskiego.

But what is a stereotype, and what is the truth? Despite my best intentions I haven't got very far with my Polish (as you could hear), although my mother tongue – Slovene – belongs to the same language family.

But does this have to do with my lack of talent, or with the fact that Polish is indeed difficult and hard for a foreigner to pronounce and write?

I guess prejudice and stereotyping are just part of human nature. And linguistic prejudices and stereotypes are no exception.

After all, languages are part of us, part of our personality. And also through languages we develop as human beings. As Federico Fellini said: "A different language is a different vision of life".

With its great linguistic diversity you can imagine how many visions of life we have in Europe!

When preparing for this conference, I asked colleagues in our translation departments for examples of linguistic prejudice in their country.

The Greek department came up with an interesting notion: it is assumed that the evolution of a language (and in particular of the Greek language, which has been spoken and written for thousands of years) leads to its deterioration. Therefore, some people – including scholars – argue that older forms of the language are more correct, more pure, more beautiful.

Is that true?

Another way of looking at prejudices and languages came from my Estonian colleagues. Estonians think that they are reserved. While other ethnic groups consider this a negative characteristic, the Estonians themselves rather appreciate it. So the word ‘reserved’ can have negative or positive connotations, depending on one’s cultural and ethnic background.

2. Linguistic prejudice – political aspects

And languages can have a strong political dimension, probably because language is part of a person’s identity, and because of the emotional link we have with languages, especially our mother tongue.

History is full of examples of linguistic prejudice, in the sense that certain languages were deemed ‘peasant’ languages, not suitable for academic writing.

While linguists now dismiss the idea that some languages are inherently better than others, among other people these stereotypes and prejudices still occur. And when taken to extremes, these can have disastrous consequences.

The EU has a different approach to languages and diversity: the EU is a ‘family’ whose diverse members have come together in the pursuit of common beliefs and objectives. The ‘family values’, based on the rule of law, consist of promoting tolerance and diversity, the fundamental values of democracy. While striving for European unity, multilingualism is an important expression of its diversity.

The Commission remains as committed as ever to the principle of multilingualism: we want to ensure that languages are preserved, that they develop further, and that citizens can access information in their own language.

3. The role of the EU’s language services in a changing EU

A multilingual organisation like the EU needs high-quality translation and relies on professional linguists, cooperating closely with experts in the member states, to keep it running smoothly.

Now more than ever, we need to redefine the EU, but also to be proud of what the Union has delivered.

One thing that cannot be denied is that our translators – among them some eighty Polish colleagues based in Luxembourg and Brussels – have always ensured

that citizens can inform themselves about the EU and communicate with its institutions in their own language.

At EU level, each of the 24 official languages has equal status: EU laws carry equal weight in each of these languages, regardless of whether they are big or small, old or new.

Some have declared the EU language regime after the 2004 and 2007 enlargements ‘economically unsustainable’ and have called for a reduction in the number of official EU languages, claiming that this would increase efficiency and reduce costs.

But this would not be compatible with the EU’s mission, which is a political one, founded on democracy, citizen participation and human rights.

Besides, the EU’s language regime, with its current 24 official languages, costs less than 1% of the EU’s budget. This cannot be defined as economically unsustainable.

Ladies and gentlemen, last week was marked by Jean-Claude Juncker’s State of the Union address before the Members of the European Parliament in Strasbourg, and by Donald Tusk’s letter to Heads of State or Government ahead of the summit in Bratislava where they reflected on the future of the EU. Nobody knows at this point what that future may look like.

Many things may change, but it is difficult to see a better alternative to our current language regime.

We will continue to work for a multilingual, diverse Europe, with realism and in the most cost-effective way possible, but always without prejudice.

Thank you for your attention!

Dziękuję za uwagę!

Elżbieta Frąckowiak

Welcome address

Dear participants and respected guests,

it is my great honour to welcome all of you during the opening ceremony of XIV Conference of the European Federation of National Institutions for Language. On behalf of the Authorities of the Polish Academy of Sciences (Co-organizer of the conference), I would like to wish you a successful scientific meeting in this beautiful place, a Mirror Hall of the Staszic Palace. The name of this place is originated from the famous Enlightenment person – Staszic – patron of our scientific Corporation (PAS). Stanisław Staszic (seen just at the portrait) – this brilliant man was a writer, a philosopher, a traveller, a priest and a politician but also interested in geology and geography; he was a pioneer of organic work and many reforms. As an extremely educated person, he was obliged to use a few languages.

It is a great pleasure to see in this particular place the representation of linguists of many European countries. The Federation of Language Institutions plays a significant role in promoting linguistic and cultural diversity in the European Union. Language, its correct use is our societal richness. Personally, being still an academic teacher I am suffering a lot seeing quite often a poverty of Polish language in written and spoken form. The young generation does not take care about correct language, frequently overuses mental shortcuts. In my opinion beauty of each language should be preserved, hence, the topic “language” is very actual.

This annual conference devoted to Language Institutions has a long-term tradition. It is already organised fourteen times. Last time, it took place in Helsinki on a topic “Language use in public administration”. This year a subject of the conference is „Stereotypes and Linguistic Prejudices in Europe”. I am sure that it will be an exciting event in the capital of Poland.

I wish you very fruitful discussions, new scientific contacts. Have a good stay in hospitable Warsaw!

Javier Hernandez Saseta

Welcome address

Ladies and Gentlemen,

First of all, I would like to thank the organisers of this meeting for giving me the opportunity to speak at the 2016 EFNIL Conference.

I am responsible for the Multilingualism and Interpreter training support unit at DG Interpretation, DG SCIC, at the European Commission. DG SCIC is, as you know, the biggest interpretation service in the world and together with my colleague Filip Majcen from DGT we are here to represent our institution.

When asked about what we could contribute to your debate, Mr. Stickel, our old friend, said to us that the most important message that we could send to this prestigious forum could be that, for the EC, multilingualism still matters. Gerhard, I can reassure you:

The European Union has always seen its great diversity of cultures and languages as an asset. Firmly rooted in the European treaties, multilingualism is the reflection of this cultural and linguistic diversity. It also makes the European institutions more accessible and transparent for all citizens of the Union, particularly through its translation and interpretation services, and this multilingual system is essential for the success of the EU's democratic system.

The EU's motto is unity in diversity. Cultural and linguistic diversity is embedded in the genes of the EU project and has always been taken for granted.

The first legal act that was issued concerned the use of languages. Regulation number 1 of 1958 – which has been modified at every enlargement – defines in its article 1 the official languages of the European Union, and at present, as you know very well, we have 24 official languages. Not once in the past 50 years has this principle been challenged or called into question.

The EU's multilingualism policy has 3 facets:

1. Striving to protect Europe's rich linguistic diversity.

Here is where stakeholders like EFNIL can help enormously with their experience and first-hand knowledge of the different realities of our countries and our languages.

- The European Commission works with national governments and interest groups of all kinds to establish shared goals, and supports their efforts, especially by encouraging the sharing of good practice in the field of the promotion of language learning;

- It also helps fund projects and partnerships designed to raise awareness of minority languages, promote their teaching and learning, and thereby help them survive.

2. **Promoting language learning.** The EU supports language learning because:

- better language skills enable more people to study and/or work abroad, and improve their job prospects;
- speaking other languages helps people from different cultures understand one another – essential in a multilingual, multicultural Europe;
- to trade effectively across Europe, businesses need multilingual staff;
- the language industry – translation and interpretation, language teaching, language technologies, etc. – is among the fastest growing areas of the economy.

3. The **third** facet is **multilingualism in the EU’s decision-making process.**

And here is where our two services derive their “raison d’être”, providing highly qualified professionals in order to facilitate communication inside and outside the EU Institutions.

Let me now move to the subject of the conference: linguistic prejudices and stereotypes.

What can we define as linguistic prejudice? We could consider linguistic prejudice as the unfair treatment of an individual based solely on the use of a language. This use may include the individual’s mother tongue or other characteristics of the person’s speech such as accent, use of syntax or vocabulary.

In fact interpreters, but also translators, are the first people to be confronted with linguistic prejudices.

And linguistic stereotypes? These are the sometimes inaccurate and simplistic generalisations about a group of speakers that others use to categorise them.

Here again, our colleagues in the booths in particular face temptation daily to think in terms of stereotypes about their customers.

My intention is to contribute to your debate just one idea: **linguistic professionals are the people that fight in their everyday work against these prejudices and stereotypes.**

I would invite you to pay a visit to one of the EU buildings where conferences take place. There you will see a big group of delegates, possibly with 28 different nationalities and 28 different cultural traditions and ways of speaking, trying to make themselves understood in 24 different languages. In fact, if someone coming from the outside world were to be projected into the middle of the meeting to have a look at what is going on in the room, he would be thinking of the tower of Babel, a place where communication is almost impossible.

And yet this is not the case. Thanks to the work of our interpreters and our translators communication *is* possible, so they can be considered, if you like, as the Anti-Tower of Babel service.

German is a very difficult language; Italian is a synonym for histrionics; and Spanish is a much spicier and funnier language than others because of the fiesta. Our colleagues could think of the languages – their work tools – in a very simplistic manner, in those terms.

But once those prejudices are overcome, once you have studied for years a language, its vocabulary, its expressions, its accents; once you have become acquainted with the culture of the country, the traditions, the social conventions and national references, all those things that as a professional you need in order to put the thoughts expressed in one language into another, making communication possible, you have become someone who can make linguistic barriers disappear, and with them linguistic prejudices.

What is interpreting, in fact? Interpreting is the art of enabling people of different mother tongues to communicate with one another in real time. Interpreting is about making communication possible among people that don't speak the same language and that are, by definition, full of linguistic prejudices.

As a matter of fact, interpreters play the role of mediator, a kind of go-between for people coming from different realities, from different ways of understanding the world. Interpreters are aware of the weight that words carry and they know that when they choose words, they can present a particular picture, a particular image of the world.

History, culture, way of life, philosophical principles and idiosyncrasy all contribute to this image of the world. Interpreters know that they are the ones in charge of fighting against prejudice. They are the best antidote against cultural or linguistic prejudices. The good interpreter will be the one aware of his or her role as linguistic and cultural mediator. The person able to reduce a very long and ornate speech delivered by a Latin speaker into a more comfortable and credible message for a listener of a Nordic language.

Interpreters, good interpreters, can carry their audience across a cultural divide. Their mission goes beyond the actual translation of the words. Given the cultural tradition and the history enshrined in languages, interpreting means moving beyond words and travelling from culture to culture. They are there to help the users of their services to cross the bridge between different universes and ways of understanding the world; they are there to contribute to eradicate linguistic prejudices and stereotypes.

Thank you very much for your attention.

Gerhard Stickel

Wstęp / Einführung / Introduction

Wielce szanowni Goście, drodzy Przyjaciele i Koledzy,

podczas ubiegłorocznej konferencji w Helsinkach przyjęliśmy z wielką radością propozycję naszego polskiego kolegi Walerego Pisarka dotyczącą przeprowadzenia tegorocznego sympozjum EFNIL w Warszawie. To właśnie dzięki olbrzymim staraniom gospodarza, którym jest Rada Języka Polskiego, możemy obradować w tej wspaniałej sali.

Moje podziękowania składam więc na ręce przewodniczącego Rady, pana profesora Markowskiego, dziękując za gościnę i serdeczne słowa powitania.

Nie chcę jednak dłużej męczyć Państwa moją polską wymową i dlatego też będę kontynuować moje przemówienie w językach, które nie tylko ja, ale również wielu moich kolegów zna lepiej niż język polski.¹

(Zunächst auf Deutsch. Dies wird den Sprechern anderer Sprachen auch eine Gelegenheit bieten, Ihre Vorurteile über die phonetischen Eigenschaften der deutschen Sprache zu prüfen oder zu festigen.)

Mein besonderes Willkommen gilt Herrn Tadeusz Deszkiewicz von der Kanzlei des Präsidenten der Republik Polen, der uns eine Botschaft des Präsidenten überbracht und verlesen hat. Wir fühlen uns sehr geehrt und sind dankbar für die

¹ Sehr verehrte Gäste, liebe Kollegen und Freunde, bei unserer Tagung vor einem Jahr in Helsinki haben wir mit großer Freude das Angebot unseres polnischen Kollegen Walery Pisarek angenommen, die diesjährige Tagung von EFNIL hier in Warschau durchzuführen. Dank der sorgfältigen Vorbereitung des Rada Języka Polskiego (RADA), unseres Gastgebers, können wir uns nun hier in diesem schönen Saal versammeln und arbeiten. Mein Gruß und Dank gilt deshalb zunächst dem Präsidenten des RADA, Herrn Professor Markowski, für die Gastfreundschaft und seine freundlichen Willkommensworte. Um Sie nicht weiter mit schlechter polnischer Aussprache zu belästigen, möchte ich in Sprachen fortfahren, die mir und vielen meiner EFNIL-Kollegen vertrauter sind.

Honourable guests, dear colleagues and friends, at our conference in Helsinki last year, we accepted with great pleasure the offer of our Polish colleague Walery Pisarek to hold this year's EFNIL conference in Warsaw. Thanks to the careful preparations of our host, the Council for the Polish Language (RADA), we can now assemble and work in this beautiful hall. Therefore, my greetings and thanks go first of all to Professor Markowski, the President of the Council, for his hospitality and kind words of welcome. In order to not offend you further with my bad Polish pronunciation, I would like to continue in languages more familiar to me and many of my EFNIL colleagues.

Willkommensworte des Herrn Präsidenten. Bitte, Herr Deszkiewicz, übermitteln Sie Herrn Präsidenten Duda unseren großen Dank für seine Botschaft. Wir können ihm versichern, dass die polnischen Mitglieder unserer Organisation mit uns vereint sind in dem Bemühen, zur Bewahrung der Nationalsprachen in Europa und der gesamten europäischen Sprachenvielfalt beizutragen.

Ich grüße auch die Vertreterin der Polnischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Frau Prof. Elżbieta Frąckowiak. Wir freuen uns, Gäste dieser ehrwürdigen Akademie sein zu dürfen, und danken Ihnen für Ihre Grußadresse.

Dankbar sind wir auch Herrn Dr. Mateusz Werner, dem stellvertretenden Direktor des Nationalen Kulturzentrums, für seine Unterstützung der Tagungsorganisation und sein heutiges Grußwort.

Mit Dank begrüße ich auch die beiden Vertreter der Europäischen Kommission, Herrn Filip Majcen, Direktor im Generaldirektorat für Übersetzung, und Herrn Javier Hernández Saseta, den Leiter der Sektion für Mehrsprachigkeit des Generaldirektorats für Dolmetschen. Als europäische Linguisten unterstützen wir schon seit langem die sprachpolitischen Initiativen der Kommission. In diesen schweren Zeiten, in denen die Kommission mit mehreren großen Problemen befasst ist, halten wir es für besonders wichtig, die Europäische Sprachenvielfalt als wesentliche Bedingung für die kulturelle Vielfalt Europas auf der politischen Agenda zu halten. Wir sind deshalb Herrn Majcen und Herrn Hernández Saseta sehr dankbar für ihre ermutigenden Worte.

Als besonderer Gast nimmt eine Vertreterin des Schweizer Instituts für Mehrsprachigkeit in Fribourg an unserer Tagung teil: Willkommen, Frau Dr. Coray. Wir hoffen auf eine engere Zusammenarbeit mit ihrem Institut.

Ich grüße auch zwei Kolleginnen vom Institut der koreanischen Sprache in Seoul, Frau Dr. Heewon Jung und Frau Dr. Hyejin Hong. Wir hoffen auf einen fruchtbaren Austausch von Informationen über die derzeitige Sprachenpolitik in Europa und Korea.

Unsere Konferenz hat offensichtlich auch das Interesse von Wissenschaftlern aus der akademischen Region gefunden. Ich grüße auch diese Gäste.

Und natürlich heiße ich auch die Delegierten unserer Mitgliedsinstitutionen willkommen. Eigentlich, liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen, sind Sie keine Gäste. Schließlich ist es unsere gemeinsame Tagung.

Lassen Sie mich nun eine kurze Einführung in das Thema dieser Tagung geben, und dies auf Englisch, um Teilnehmern (und Lesern), die weder mit Polnisch noch mit Deutsch vertraut sind, den Zugang zu erleichtern.

At our General Assembly in Helsinki, we decided the general theme of the next conference – “Stereotypes and linguistic prejudices in Europe” – in agreement with its Polish hosts. It is of course a delicate subject for two reasons, a scientific one and an emotional one. *Stereotypes* and *prejudices* are defined and used as terms in various ways by different sciences and schools of research. More

detailed and precise information on this is provided by some of the expert guest speakers who are taking part in our conference.²

As working definitions in EFNIL we agreed to use *stereotype* to refer to a generalising opinion or belief shared by members of a society (or part of it) concerning a group of people, or individuals as members of a group. We use the term *prejudice* to refer to the explicit validation of stereotypes. From a European perspective we concentrate within the context of the conference on opinions and beliefs common in our own countries concerning other countries and their people (heterostereotypes) and our own countries and their citizens, including minorities (autostereotypes). As linguists and philologists – as most of us are – we focus our attention on the verbal expressions of stereotypes and prejudices in our various languages. We know that languages are not only a way of establishing understanding and cooperation between human beings, but can also express contempt, detestation or even hatred towards other people. They are also the most important medium between members of our own society for transmitting prejudice against other people.

Stereotypes and prejudices concerning the languages spoken in other countries and our own national language(s) and its/their varieties – which are common in our countries – are an interesting special case. Stereotypical opinions about other languages certainly have an influence on the choice of foreign languages learnt at school and thus on the future of European linguistic diversity.

We learn from the experts that stereotypes can hardly be avoided, because they are a cognitive means of generalising and typifying which help us to structure our amorphous reality and to communicate about it. We should beware of them, because they are always simplifications. Prejudices, however – that is, stereotypes which express and spread negative attitudes towards other groups, including nations and their members – are dangerous. They hamper our encounters with real people, because they confuse our orientation both within our own society and towards other groups and should, therefore, be avoided.

This leads to the second reason why stereotypes and especially prejudices – independently of how we ultimately define them – are a difficult subject. Most of them are unpleasant or hurtful for those to whom they refer and who become aware of them. They cause misunderstandings, often antipathies, between different social groups, including European nations. They are, therefore, also relevant for us as members of different nations and could lead, even at a conference like this, to offence. Precisely because of that, we are taking a risk in presenting and discussing stereotypes and prejudices at this conference. Prejudices, their causes and forms, must be revealed and analysed, so that we can see through them and

² See the articles by Virginie Mamadouh, Bernd Six, Klaus Reichert, Hans Henning Hahn and Jerzy Bartmiński. I would like to take this opportunity to thank these guest speakers for their contributions to the conference and to this volume.

learn how to handle them. We hope that through this will not only gain scientific insights, but also contribute to improving communication and understanding between our nations.

In our preparation for the conference, we asked our members to take part in a small poll. We hoped to gain a broad preliminary overview of the stereotypes and prejudices which are widespread in our countries concerning other countries and their inhabitants, and our own countries and their inhabitants. Unfortunately, only one third of our members took part in this poll. Therefore, the answers to the questionnaire will not be summarised and presented here. Several colleagues who actively participated in the poll have extended and transformed their answers in their contributions to the conference. Their presentations are also recorded in this volume.

Reading the responses, I noticed among other things that stereotypical opinions and their corresponding expressions refer remarkably often to neighbouring countries and their inhabitants, or other regions and ethnic groups within an individual country. This is especially striking in the answers from countries or regions where the same language or closely related languages are being spoken, as for instance in Austria and Germany, the Netherlands and the Nordic countries. Apparently social and linguistic proximity is no barrier to prejudice. We learn more about this from our colleagues in their reports. It is, by the way, a familiar experience for someone who has lived in a rural area, where it quickly becomes obvious that especially persistent prejudices about each other are held by the inhabitants of neighbouring villages. As a layman in social psychology, I still do not understand the reason for this; I therefore look forward to hearing explanations from the experts.

In terms of methodological interest, I would also like to also mention the responses from our colleagues at the Polish Language Council. They, obviously, concerned themselves in detail with the linguistic expression of stereotypes and prejudices. To do this, they gathered detailed lists of collocations of names of countries and their inhabitants together with adjectival, nominal and sentential attributes; collocations that are in frequent use. In this way they have studied ways of expressing stereotypes that are widespread in their own society. As to the other answers to the little poll, the data exists in digital form. It will not be published at present, but can be made available for research purposes.

Two aspects of stereotypes and prejudices could not be sufficiently considered, in my view, in the preparation of the conference: the difference between old and new stereotypes, and experiences and projects in combatting prejudices. Concerning the history of stereotypes, it must be stated that some of them have been handed down for a long time from one generation to the next, often as part of a literary tradition, and still influence our attitudes towards other nations and their citizens. On the other hand, new stereotypes develop, perhaps because of new experiences with the 'others'. A German prejudice against France and the

French people is a prominent example. It was the stereotypical image of France as the arch-enemy (“Erbfeind”) that determined the attitude of my grandparents’ generation and that, fortunately, was replaced in due course after the last war by the new stereotype of the French as our best friends in Europe. Of course, neither the old nor the new stereotype was or is held by all Germans, but by a considerable proportion of them. It is certainly interesting and important to study how persistent such old stereotypes are and which of them are superseded by new ones, as in the German-French example. By studying this, we could also learn about the processes and means by which negative stereotypes, i.e. prejudices, can be successfully analysed and overcome. Therefore, I hope that in at least some of the contributions to this conference the aspects of the relative age of prejudices and the means to overcome them can also be discussed.

Let me now conclude this introduction with my best wishes for informative and stimulating presentations and discussions and with repeated thanks to our hosts, especially to Dr. Kłosińska and her colleagues and assistants. The conference has only begun, but you can judge from the fact that we all have come here that your preparatory work has been very successful.

Thank you, Merci, Danke, Dziękuję.

General reflections

Virginie Mamadouh

Europeans among themselves: Geographical and linguistic stereotypes

Abstract (English)

Stereotypes can be studied from the perspective of political geography and critical geopolitics as part of geographical imaginations, in other words those geopolitical representations that help us make sense of the world around us. They necessarily frame our perception of ongoing events, and inform our behaviour in our attempts to influence them. Europeans produce and reproduce images of each other, regardless of the specific nature of their relationships – violent or peaceful – and political changes. “Othering” is part and parcel of identification processes, and the stereotyping of other Europeans has not disappeared with European integration. This chapter discusses territorial and linguistic stereotypes, i.e. stereotyping based on place and/or language. It will pay specific attention to the use of stereotypes in popular culture, especially the comical use of stereotypes, as humour is a way to question images of the self and the other that are taken for granted, and to foster efforts to overcome group prejudice. Three cultural projects using stereotypes for European identity politics are considered in more detail.

Abstract (Nederlands)

Stereotypen kunnen worden bestudeerd vanuit het perspectief van de politieke geografie en de kritische geopolitiek als onderdeel van de geografische verbeelding, met andere woorden van de geopolitieke representaties die ons te helpen de wereld om ons heen begrijpen. Zij geven noodzakelijkerwijs vorm aan onze perceptie van de lopende gebeurtenissen en bepalen ons gedrag in onze pogingen deze te beïnvloeden. Europeanen produceren en reproduceren representaties van elkaar, ongeacht de specifieke kwaliteiten van hun relaties – gewelddadige of vreedzame – en politieke veranderingen. *Othering* is een essentieel onderdeel van identificatie processen en de stereotypering van andere Europeanen is met de Europese integratie niet verdwenen. Dit hoofdstuk bespreekt territoriale en taalkundige stereotypen, dat wil zeggen stereotypering op basis van plaats en/of taal. Het zal specifiek aandacht besteden aan het gebruik van stereotypen in de populaire cultuur, vooral het komisch gebruik van stereotypen want humor is een manier om vanzelfsprekende beelden van het zelf en van de ander te bevragen en bevordert inspanningen om collectieve vooroordelen te overwinnen. Drie pogingen om met behulp van stereotypen Europese identiteitspolitiek te bedrijven zullen worden behandeld.

Abstract (Français)

Les stéréotypes peuvent être étudiés sous l'angle de la géographie politique et de la géopolitique critique comme des éléments de nos imaginations géographiques, c'est-à-dire de

ces représentations géopolitiques qui nous aident à comprendre le monde qui nous entoure. Ils filtrent nécessairement notre perception des événements et informent la conduite à suivre dans nos tentatives de les influencer. Les Européens produisent et reproduisent des images qu'ils ont les uns des autres, quelles que soient les qualités spécifiques de leurs relations – violentes ou pacifiques – et les changements politiques. La production d'altérité fait partie intégrante des processus d'identification et les stéréotypes sur les autres Européens ne disparaissent pas avec l'intégration européenne. Ce chapitre traite des stéréotypes territoriaux et linguistiques, c'est-à-dire des stéréotypes basés sur le lieu et le langage. Il accordera une attention particulière à l'utilisation des stéréotypes dans la culture populaire, en particulier l'utilisation humoristique des stéréotypes, car l'humour est un moyen de remettre en question les images toutes faites de soi et de l'autre et d'encourager les efforts pour surmonter les préjugés collectifs. Trois projets culturels utilisant des stéréotypes pour la politique d'identité européenne seront examinés.

1. Introduction

In a recent guide to Europe for refugees by a group of photographers and journalists, published in Arabic, Farsi, English and French, refugees arriving in Europe are introduced to the new continent and to some ten individual states. One chapter on “what makes Europe Europe” presents the common features of EU countries, and stresses the importance of humour in European culture, as the heading of a text box plainly announces:

In Europe, everybody is somebody's fool. (AFAC 2016, 130)
(or in French “En Europe on est toujours le bouffon de quelqu'un d'autre”) (ibid., 131)

A selection of jokes follows: Belgians joking about the French, the French about the Belgians, the Swedes about the Norwegians, the Portuguese about the Spaniards, the Austrians about the Germans, the Greeks about the Albanians, etc. It ends with a joke about a linguistic stereotype.

And the Italians make jokes about [...] themselves. ‘What do you call an Italian with his hands in his pockets? A mute.’ (ibid.)

Highlighting these stereotypes is presumably meant to illustrate the kind of stereotypes (all negative, and mostly insulting the other country as dumb and stupid) that someone should be expected to accept without feeling offended. The authors stress that “telling jokes can help establish an identity” and is about teasing. Moreover it is telling that all the examples are about national stereotypes (not about race, religion, gender, sexual orientation, political ideology, age, profession, sport, etc.). Possibly this is related to the outline of the guide, which presents different states where refugees might eventually settle (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom); but most likely national identity is seen as a major anchor in the identity of Europeans, and stereotypes about national identities as part of European integration.

This paper also offers some thoughts about national stereotypes. It focuses on geographical and linguistic examples, revealing both the disciplinary background of the author (political and cultural geography) and the occasion for which it was prepared. It consists of four sections: the first on political geography and stereotypes, the second on national stereotypes, and the third on linguistic stereotypes, followed by an analysis of three vignettes: an art installation (*Entropa*) and two video adverts from the European Commission which attempt to use stereotypes in a humorous way to promote European identification.

2. Political geography and stereotypes

It is important to take stereotypes seriously as representations which we have of each other, both because they express the “taken for granted” knowledge upon which we act (often implicitly), but also – and perhaps primarily – because they are explicit interventions by which we engage with each other.

The study of national stereotypes has often been centred on the individual and their psychological and cognitive needs for generalisation and classification as a means of handling the world in which they function. From a social science perspective, the collective representations expressed and reproduced through stereotypes are more important. They contribute to the production and reproduction of collective identities, through both self-identification and ascribed identities. Stereotypes can be used in chauvinistic narratives to glorify the supposed qualities of one’s own group, or to belittle others because of their supposed deficiencies.

Stereotypes need not be negative; but negative stereotypes are problematic because they are used to justify prejudice, negative discrimination and exclusion, and to normalise such attitudes and their outcomes, especially their negative effects on others.

This paper deals more specifically with stereotypes associated with national groups, their languages, and their homelands. A preliminary step is to question the naturalness of national identities and national languages, but this paper will not attempt to assess the credibility or the usefulness of specific stereotypes. Instead it highlights examples of the ways in which such stereotypes are used in the context of European integration. Moreover it acknowledges the use of national stereotypes and their endurance, but also signals the emergence of European stereotypes pertaining to the EU as a whole.

The view from political geography and critical geopolitics obviously focuses on geographically based stereotypes, either because embeddedness into specific socio-spatial relations (implying localisation, connection or movement) is intrinsic to the stereotyping, or because the stereotypes frame specific socio-spatial configurations; specific places for example, or individuals associated with specific places.

Geographical imaginations – i.e. imaginations of the world and its inhabitants – consist of geopolitical representations produced, reproduced and circulated in

geopolitical discourses. They express specific configurations of the nexus between power and space, between geography and politics, underlining how power (regardless of the exact definition and understanding of power that is used) comes into being through spatial practices and how space can be an instrument of power but at the same time structures power relations, while it is in turn shaped by the outcome of these power relations. In other words, power and space are co-constitutive of each other, both materially and ideationally (Dodds 2007; Rosière 2007; Dodds et al. 2013; Agnew et al. 2015; Van der Wusten/Mamadouh 2015; Flint 2017 for introductions in different languages).

These geopolitical representations provide a diagnostic of the world as it is (especially its qualities and its flaws) and a prognostic of what is to come (especially threats and opportunities). Therefore they enable individuals and groups to draw conclusions for their own strategic behaviour (how to address danger and to seize opportunities). In that context, political geographers have been particularly interested in the geopolitical discourses that underpin national identities and geopolitical visions (Dijkink 1996).

Although critical geopolitics originally scrutinised academic representations of global politics reflecting national and imperial agendas — as well as policy documents, public speeches and press statements of state officials conducting the foreign policy of (generally powerful) states — academics have also acknowledged the importance of popular culture for the circulation of geopolitical discourses. Indeed the geopolitical frames produced, reproduced and circulated through the mass media are particularly important to generate legitimacy for specific foreign policy interventions. In foreign policy, as in other policy domains, politicians mobilise support for their political programmes, but also tend to frame their action in a discourse that resonates with the opinions of their electorate. In political geography we therefore distinguish formal, practical and popular geopolitics as three different but interrelated domains in which geopolitical representations of the self and the other (i.e. geopolitical imaginations) are produced.

These representations feature geopolitical maps of the world – maps of friends and foes, in which boundaries and dangers are spatialised. They also present a vision of one's own place in the world (mission) and of relations with others, for example the inclination of the US to act as a global policeman, the self-image of the Netherlands as a provider of development aid, or the projection of Canada as an international peace keeper. These geopolitical visions therefore reflect a specific understanding of one's own national identity and ambition for the future.

These maps (both metaphorical and literal) and visions have consequences (see Dodds 2003 and Agnew 2009 on Balkanism, for example). They inform our perception of events abroad and frame them as either threat or opportunity, or as relevant or irrelevant, and therefore shape the space for policy interventions. When an event is irrelevant to us, we need not intervene, but if it is relevant, if it threatens our interests or our values, we are prompted to react. But how we react,

the options that are considered and the decision that are taken will depend on the perception of the protagonists as friends or foes, as rational or irrational actors, of their motivation and of their inclination to negotiate compromises. Therefore stereotypes determine both which issues are on the political agenda and which remain obscured, which viewpoints are heard and which voices remain silenced, and which solutions are seen as reasonable and which are deemed unrealistic. Stereotypes can be functional, often self-serving, fostering national cohesion, making sense of the rest of the world through simplification, classification, labelling, othering and the reproduction of prejudice.

Some obvious similarities can be noted between such critical geopolitical approaches and other approaches in the humanities and the social sciences which are also centred on the social production of identities and representations. Think for example of the discipline known as imagology (Leerssen 2000; Chew 2006; Beller/Leerssen 2007; Bender/Gidlow/Fischer 2013; Baldassarre 2015). In all these studies, the veracity of the stereotypes is not particularly important; the aim is to research how they come about and how they are deployed. Nonetheless the very questioning of their origin and uses suggests that these stereotypes should certainly not be essentialised, as they are the results of social relations and are subject to changes.

Stereotypes in popular culture are particularly interesting because they reach a large public and can be used to mobilise support for specific policies rather than others, and to mobilise collective actions that require extensive monetary and human resources (like waging war). Literature, cinema, newspapers and school books are particularly important media. These media tend to be organised in national cultural vehicles or communication settings which are shaped by national cultural and political institutions – such as national languages, national education systems and national intellectuals and opinion leaders. In practice these public spheres are sometimes even smaller, since it can be argued that Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, Catalonia, Wallonia or Flanders (to name a few) are subnational communicative settings of their own, inside their respective states, with their own media institutions, political parties, public intellectuals and opinion makers.

One of the challenges for the emergence of European stereotypes is the absence of a European (that is, EU-wide) communicative arena. It is therefore difficult to identify the cultural production and circulation of representations that travel across the internal borders of the European Union.

The film *L'auberge espagnole* (2002) is one such audio-visual production. The film is also known under the Spanish title *Una casa de locos* (literally “a madhouse”) or the English title *Pot luck*.¹ (The idiomatic French phrase *auberge espagnole* refers to a place where you can only eat what you have brought with

¹ The film maker Cédric Klapisch is reported to have proposed *Europudding* for the English title but it was seen as too Eurosceptic (Brooks 2003).

you, while in English a potluck supper is a communal meal where guests bring their own food). It is a French film about the ERASMUS experience that has shaped millions of European students since 1987. The film is about Xavier,² a French student in Barcelona, and his co-residents, all ERASMUS students from different countries. The comedy is a coming-of-age initiation trajectory in which Xavier becomes a multicultural European. The film plays with stereotypes about national characters and with national languages, while offering a romantic account of the ERASMUS experience. It could be seen as offering a stereotype of the Europeanised student. It is no coincidence that the film is used for educational purposes in other member states (as shown by the study files available online for students of French) and that it has been widely scrutinised as a representation of the making of European identity (see for contrasting views Derakhshani/Zachman 2005; Ezra/Sánchez 2005; Amago 2007; Ousselin 2009).

Cartoons – like other visuals – are expected to travel easily, as they appear not to need translation like written or oral text, but this is a misconception; the connotations of drawings are often not as easy to grasp and to transpose to other contexts as we might expect. Tragic examples are the so-called Danish Mohammed cartoons that were circulated worldwide and fostered violent and deadly mobilisations in several Muslim majority countries (see Hussain 2007; Saunders 2008; Linkekilde 2010). Less tragic examples demonstrate the importance of contextualisation. Figure 1 features a drawing by Luz (Renald Luzier, a French cartoonist affiliated to Charlie Hebdo);³ it is entitled *Le rêve européen* (*The European dream*) and it represents a person dressed as a Ku Klux Klan member lighting a match (so ready to set something or someone on fire) in front of a fictional flag which combines the confederate flag – much contested in the USA as a symbol of the South or of a system based on slavery and racism – with the EU colours of blue with yellow stars. The bubble says *Les Grecs et les migrants dehors!* (*Greeks and migrants out!*). A Spanish audience or a Catalan audience in France will however see a capirote – the pointed hat used by some religious orders during Easter (black in Perpignan in France, but white in Valencia) – and read it possibly as a statement on the catholic roots of the European integration project.

² The film is now part of a trilogy: in *Les poupées russes* (2005) (*The Russian dolls*) Xavier is 30 and moves for his work to London and St Petersburg, and in *Le casse-tête chinois* (2013) (*The Chinese puzzle*) he is in his 40s and follows his ex and his children to New York.

³ Luz also drew the cover page of the first edition of *Charlie Hebdo* after the murder of the editorial team on January 7 2015. The page showing Mohammed's pardon was received with outrage in some countries and several people died in riots protesting against the satirical journal, in Niger for example.



Fig. 1: Luz: Le rêve européen

2.1 National stereotypes

Stereotypes play an important role in both geopolitical visions and national identities as they help to represent typical features of the collective identities of the self and the others involved. State building and nation building are key processes in the production of this kind of stereotype. Europeans have been experts at this, and stereotypes were widely used to mobilise European populations against each other in two World Wars in the last century, and in a rich history of episodes of both hot and banal nationalism (as Michael Billig aptly named less hot expressions of nationalism such as the everyday display of the national flag).

Stereotypes about others include the most basic action of using derogatory names for other groups. Think for example of *boche* and *Chleuh* in French, *mof* in Dutch, *kraut*, *fritz* and *jerry* in English and *szkop* in Polish, to list only a few used by Germany's neighbours. Interestingly, Wikipedia's English version (but not the other linguistic versions) features a page on these pejorative terms and their negative stereotyping under the heading *List of ethnic slurs by ethnicity* that is far from being complete or even accurate – there are for example no entries for the French or the Dutch (although many English expressions come immediately to mind: “going Dutch” or “a Dutch treat”, “a Dutch uncle”, “a Dutch wife”, “Dutch

courage”, “taking Dutch leave”, “a Dutch agreement”; but also “taking French leave”, “the French disease”, “a French kiss”, including some directly related to linguistic stereotypes like “double Dutch” or “pardon my French!”.

European integration was meant to overcome the worst and most violent expressions of these European nationalisms, but that could be done in two (contradictory) ways: either as a movement beyond these sorts of “us versus them” divisions, or as the upscaling of such narratives to the European level. The first implies that (national) stereotypes would become less and less important, the second that they would be replaced by a new kind of supranational nationalism, a Europeanism in which the European is the new “us”, and the non-European is the new “other”. The first would imply the building of some political architecture (possibly some state building) without national identity, the second some European nation building to complement the building of a European political union (as a federal state).

If any of this happens, stereotyping among Europeans should become less and less relevant and more and more benign, akin to the stereotyping of local and regional identities within states, such as the ideas about meridional people in France or Italy. Numerous examples show, however, that regional and local prejudices can be serious and enduring (think of Amsterdam vs. Rotterdam, Glasgow vs. Edinburgh, Madrid vs. Barcelona, Milan vs. Rome, etc.) and that the prejudice associated with certain social and regional varieties of the standard language remains strong, like the fact that people speaking French with a Marseilles accent are not taken seriously (Blanchet 2016).

The rest of this paper reviews some examples of stereotyping in Europe which demonstrate that national stereotyping remains strong and widely shared, but in a softened way and possibly complemented by emerging European stereotypes (for a collection of essays on changing Danish stereotypes amidst Europeanisation see Agger/Gentikow/Hedetoft 1990).

Pew, the American survey organisation, has polled the opinions of respondents in many countries since 2001, including that of Europeans about each other. In May 2013, in the midst of a financial, monetary and economic crisis (often labelled as the Euro crisis), the results of how respondents in selected European member states rank each other on positive and negative characteristics resonate with established stereotypes: trustworthy, arrogant, compassionate. The connotations are not unimportant in the midst of the crisis when the citizens of different member states entertain different understandings of it: the Northern Europeans blaming the Southern Europeans for their debt, the Southern Europeans blaming the Northern Europeans for their monetary and austerity policies. Being seen as hardworking or not, corrupt or not, can help foster or hamper solidarity between member states (see Table 1).

Stereotyping in Europe				
Who Works Hardest, Who's Corrupt				
<i>EU nation most offered as <u>top choice</u> as...</i>				
<i>Views in:</i>	Most Hardworking	Least Hardworking	Most Corrupt	Least Corrupt
Britain	Germany	Greece	Italy	Germany
France	Germany	Italy	Italy	Germany
Germany	Germany	Greece	Italy	Germany
Spain	Germany	Greece	Spain/Italy	Germany
Italy	Germany	Romania	Italy	Germany
Greece	Greece	Italy	Greece	Germany
Poland	Germany	Greece	Poland	Germany
Czech Rep.	Germany	Greece	Czech Rep.	Germany

PEW RESEARCH CENTER Q50aCOMBO, Q50bCOMBO, Q51aCOMBO, Q51bCOMBO.

Table 1: Stereotyping in Europe

(Source: Pew Global Attitudes Project 2012: *European unity on the rocks: Greeks and Germans at polar opposites*, 2. More details at www.pewglobal.org/2012/05/29/chapter-4-views-of-eu-countries-and-leaders/, last accessed January 2017)

Stereotypes are not only observable in periods of crisis. A widely circulated British postcard was produced by J Hugues Wilson (1995) in a period of relative prosperity and Euro-enthusiasm. It is a good example of the countless lists about typical features of Europeans. On this postcard

The perfect European should be...

cooking like a Brit, driving like the French, always available as a Belgian, as talkative as a Finn, as humorous as a German, as technical as a Portuguese, as flexible as a Swede, as famous as a Luxembourger, as patient as an Austrian, as controlled as an Italian, as sober as the Irish, as humble as a Spaniard, as generous as a Dutchman, as organised as a Greek, and as discreet as a Dane.

The list refers directly to stereotypes associated with the nationalities of the member states (15 at the time); it also hints at the stereotyped dysfunctionality of the EU, since it combines the worst from each participant (instead of combining positive stereotypes: humorous Brit, well-organised German, discreet Luxembourger, generous Irish, talkative Italian ...). Another reported example makes this stereotype about Europeanisation even more explicit:

What is the unified Europe going to be like?

Heaven if

The lovers	are Italian
The cooks	are French
The technicians	are German
The policemen	are English

And if everything is organised by the Swiss

Hell if

The cooks	are English
The policemen	are German
The lovers	are Swiss
The technicians	are French

And if everything is organised by the Italians.

(reported in Hidasi 1999,119)

National prejudices are often very much localised in the territory associated with the nationality they portray. The intimate connection between language, nation and territory is deeply entrenched in our thinking. Children have difficulty in accepting that Belgians do not speak Belgian, and we often forget whether Germany was named after the Germans or the Germans after Germany (to name just one example).

Popular culture provides interesting examples of the prevalence of prejudice and stereotypes. The Bulgarian artist Yanko Tsvetkov – a “true” European who has lived, studied and worked in Germany, the United Kingdom and Spain – has captured the attention of a wide public and the recognition of mainstream media in the US and in Europe (including the *BBC* and *The Guardian* in Britain, *Corriere della Sera* in Italy, and *Stern* and *Der Spiegel* in Germany) through his online *Mapping stereotyping* project (2009 onwards). Some of these maps have been published in a bestseller called *Atlas of prejudice* (plus sequels) and translated into several languages (according to the website of the author, into English, French, German, Russian, Spanish, Turkish, and Italian) and have sold over “100.000 copies worldwide”. (See also <https://atlasofprejudice.com/about-118cdc905692#.c5b6bbejg>)

Tsvetkov maps stereotypes by locating them on political maps. His maps include many maps of Europe “according to ...”. These maps are centred on one country and label the relevant neighbours through the eyes of that country. *Europe according to Poland 2010* (<http://alphadesigner.com/art-store/europe-according-to-poland-print/>) for example shows Poland and the remaining countries of Europe, but they are given a descriptive label: “Western Bully” (Germany), “Our Former Colonies” (Lithuania, Latvia, Belarus, and Ukraine) and “Eastern Bully” (Russia), and “Wrinkled Bully” (Austria). In the North: “Vodka Addicts” (Finland), “Investors” (Sweden), “Refrigerators” (Norway), “Canada” (Iceland) and

“Toys” (Denmark). In the West: “Gays” (the Netherlands), “Beer” (Belgium), “Pussies” (France), “Godless Traitors” (Great Britain), “Potatoes” (Ireland). In the South: “Sunbed” (Portugal), “Tomatoes and Bulls” (Spain), “Weirdos” (Switzerland), “Land of Saint Cathol” (Italy), “Drunks” (Czech Republic), “Big Sausages” (Slovakia), “Cool Dudes” (Hungary), “Gypsies” in Romania and “Beggars” in Moldavia, “Low Class Holidays” (Slovenia), “Crazy People” (Serbia) and “Kind of Boring” (the rest of former Yugoslavia), “Grandma’s Beach” (Bulgaria), “Hotels on Strike”(Greece) and “Minarets”(Turkey).

Using the same formula, Tsvetkov provides similar maps for many member states. They include *Europe according to France, Great Britain, etc.* (in 2009, 2010, 2011). But whether by a slip of the tongue or not, the titles of the newer maps shift from the viewpoint of the country to that of the nationals: *Europe according to the Germans, the Greeks, the Italians, the Spaniards, the Bulgarians* while more recent versions (with generally the same content) revert back to states: *Europe according to Germany, Greece, Italy etc.*, including smaller ones like Luxembourg and non-EU ones like Turkey, Russia, and the Vatican as well as views from outside Europe such as the USA and Latin America.

Some maps were made by zooming in on specific political actors within European states such as political parties (*Europe according to the British Tories 2011*) or individual politicians (*Europe according to Silvio Berlusconi 2011*, as well as non-EU ones like Putin and Trump). More recently, *Europe according to Marine Le Pen 2016* shows France with La Nouvelle Orléans (the French name for New Orleans, but also referring to the French city of Orléans and the cult of the Front National for Jeanne d’Arc, who was burnt there in 1431 and is honoured with a demonstration on the 1st of May to counterbalance the Internationalist and Socialist Labour Day). See <https://atlasofprejudice.com/europe-according-to-marine-le-pen-561dd32caa79#.ng1ryxboc> (posted in December 2015).

A more complex example is a satirical map of the future of Europe, based on the dystopian future envisioned by anti-Islamic nativist politicians: *Europe according to Anders Breivik 2024* in a blog entry entitled *Welcome to Eurabia: a chronicle of the impending Blitzjihad and the islamization of Europe*. See <https://atlasofprejudice.com/welcome-to-eurabia-a89bc72c3a71#.5gc7q7k44> (posted in January 2015, just a week after the Charlie Hebdo murders).

Tsvetkov’s ever-expanding collection of maps is posted on his websites <https://atlasofprejudice.com/all> and <http://alphadesigner.com/>. The concept offers opportunities for infinite variations. Tsvetkov has also applied it to past rulers and empires: *Europe according to the Ancient Greeks, Europe according to Charles V 1555, Europe according to Austria- Hungary 1914*, and to future scenarios: *Europe according to the future 2022*. I noticed only one map targeting a grouping not based on nationalities: *Europe according to gay men 2012* (<http://alphadesigner.com/art-store/europe-according-to-gay-men-print/>).

The maps feature several layers of stereotypes, as they map both the stereotypes associated with other states in Europe from a particular viewpoint, but also stereotypes about the viewer. A comparison of the maps highlights some stereotypes which are widely shared, while others are much more specific; it also highlights the relevance of certain neighbours and the irrelevance of others. These stereotypes reflect partly national character, partly foreign policy, partly position in the European project, partly interaction patterns (tourism, typical exports). The European Union as a project and its policies are also reflected in certain maps, for example in the view from the UK (as an awkward partner of integration) and from Greece (confronted with austerity measures). In addition a more global view of the EU is offered in later work on ways to tear Europe apart, featuring *20 ways to break Europe* into two or three macro-regions. In this case, the indicators range from cultural orientation (modern/classical or catholic/protestant/orthodox) through food (wine/beer/vodka or tomato/potato) and political orientation (revolutionary/traditional) to the economy (poor/rich or working habits) <https://atlasofprejudice.com/tearing-europe-apart-10d01e876eab#.swi99d7nc> (posted in December 2014). Here the state borders have disappeared and the European community as a whole – one single community but divided – is portrayed. Tsvetkov offers a similar series of maps of the cultural partitions of the US: *12 ways to break the US* at <https://atlasofprejudice.com/12-ways-to-break-the-usa-c44293ea8d17#.nalz13jfi> (posted in October 2015). But then again his map *Mainland USA according to common sense 2011* looks like the large majority of the European maps and features one stereotype for each federated state (see <http://alphadesigner.com/art-store/usa-according-to-common-sense-print/>). In the case of the US it is apparently not necessary – nor possible? – to make different maps with Mainland USA according to Californians, New Yorkers, Texans, Coloradoans, etc. – or are these maps still pending?

Alongside the obvious national stereotypes (some old and established, some contingent on present events) the maps sometimes also show clear stereotypes about the EU itself perceived as a bloc, as is the case on the British map where it is “the Evil Federated Empire of Europe” (in pink, like the British Empire used to be shown on school maps) (<http://alphadesigner.com/art-store/europe-according-to-britain-print/>) or the Greek map where it is the “Union of Stingy Workaholics” (in yellow, like the euro) (<http://alphadesigner.com/art-store/europe-according-to-greece-print/>) or the apparent view from nowhere called *Europe 2009* centred around the “Union of Subsidized Farmers” (in EU blue) (<http://alphadesigner.com/art-store/europe-in-2009-print/>) or looking ahead to 2022 when Turkey is still a EU candidate but the EU has moved east (covering Poland, the Baltic States, Belarus and Ukraine) and most of the 6 founding members of the European Communities have become Merckland (Germany, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Northern Italy) (<http://alphadesigner.com/blog/europe-according-to-future-2022/>).

The new media have clearly contributed to the exceptionally wide circulation and success of Tsvetkov's maps through his website and through sharing on social media⁴, but it should be stressed that neither the national stereotyping, the personification of countries, the mapping nor the wide circulation are new.

Early historical examples of musing about national characters are found in Julius Caesar's writing on the Gauls, or Herodotus on the people known to his contemporaries. In modern history we can think of the taxonomy of national characters by Jules de La Mesnardière (1642) (see Leerssen 2000, 272); the relations between climate and national character assumed by Montesquieu in *De l'esprit des lois* (1748) in his analysis of the impact of physical and human geography and the interaction between climate and culture producing specific political institutions; and Immanuel Kant's ideas about races (1775). See also overviews of national stereotypes among philosophers (Crépon 1996) and in popular culture (Dubost 1999; Duccini 2004, 2009; Leerssen 2000; Chew 2006; Beller/Leerssen 2007). The *Encyclopédie* of Diderot and D'Alembert featured an entry on national characters ("caractère des nations"):

Le *caractère* d'une nation consiste dans une certaine disposition habituelle de l'âme, qui est plus commune chez une nation que chez une autre, quoique cette disposition ne se rencontre pas dans tous les membres qui composent la nation: ainsi le *caractère* des François est la légereté, la gaieté, la sociabilité, l'amour de leurs rois & de la monarchie même, &c.

Dans les nations qui subsistent depuis longtemps, on remarque un fond de *caractère* qui n'a point changé: ainsi les Athéniens, du temps de Démosthène, étaient grands amateurs de nouvelles; ils l'étaient du temps de S. Paul, & ils le sont encore aujourd'hui. On voit aussi dans le livre admirable de Tacite, sur les *mœurs des Germains*, des choses qui sont encore vraies aujourd'hui de leurs descendants.

Il y a grande apparence que le climat influe beaucoup sur le *caractère* général; car on ne saurait l'attribuer à la forme du gouvernement qui change toujours au bout d'un certain temps: cependant il ne faut pas croire que la forme du gouvernement lorsqu'elle subsiste longtemps, n'influe aussi à la longue sur le *caractère* d'une nation. Dans un état despotique, par exemple, le peuple doit devenir bientôt paresseux, vain, & amateur de la frivolité; le goût du vrai & du beau doivent s'y perdre; on ne doit ni faire ni penser de grandes choses.

L'encyclopédie ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers (1751-1777, 2:666) (http://portail.atilf.fr/cgi-bin/getobject_?a.13:501:2./var/artfla/encyclopédie/textdata/image/) (see also Leerssen 2000, 273)

These national characters were also portrayed visually in this period, like the etching *Le secours de la paix aux nations opprimées par la guerre et la misère* (1648) which represents the different actors at the peace negotiations of Westphalia (<http://martinezd.wixsite.com/estampesmartinez/ecole-francaise?lightbox>

⁴ Including the circulation of the many of the maps translated into Chinese and reposted on the website <http://alphadesigner.com/press/mapping-stereotypes-translated-in-chinese/>.

=cvsp) (Duccini 2009 in <http://letteraturagrafica.over-blog.com/article-31799995.html>). Even more famous is the *Völkertafel*, an early 18th century painting from Steiermark in Austria portraying European peoples and their characteristics.⁵ The people listed are from the following nationalities: Spanish, French, Italian, German, English, Swede, Polish, Hungarian, Russian and Turkish or Greek (as one category). Qualities discussed include behaviour, national character, spirit, attribute, clothing, vice, illness, country, religion, animal, etc. There is nothing on languages, although linguistics is listed as the science associated with Poles, Latin with Hungarians, and Greek with Russians.

According to Barron (2008)⁶ the political cartoon map developed in the period between the 1848 revolution and the Franco-Prussian war (1870-71). The most famous (for their circulation at the time and their reproduction in studies) include:

- *Schröder's Rundgemaelde von Europa im August MDCCCXLIX* (Düsseldorf, Germany) (https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Rundgem%C3%A4lde_Europa_1849.jpg),
- *Kaart van Europa* 1859 by Emrik and Binger (Haarlem, The Netherlands) (www.geographicus.com/P/AntiqueMap/KaartvanEuropa1859-emrikbinger-1859),
- *Komische Karte des Kriegsschauplatzes* (Hamburg, Germany 1854),
- *Nouvelle carte d'Europe dressée pour 1870* by Paul Hadol (Paris, France) (https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_Hadol#/media/File:Satirical_Europe_in_1870.jpg),
also published in English as *Latest war map of Europe, as seen through French eyes, Map of Europe for 1870 prepared by Hadol*,
- The serio-comic maps by Fred W. Rose (London, England) such as *The serio-comic war map for the year 1877 by Fred W. Rose* (1877) (https://www.raremaps.com/gallery/archivedetail/6248/SerioComic_War_Map_For_The_Year_1877_By_FWR/Rose-Bacon%20&%20Co.html),
Angling in troubled waters, A serio-comic map of Europe by Fred W. Rose (1899) (<http://bibliodyssey.blogspot.nl/2009/06/satirical-maps.html>),
John Bull and his Friends, a serio-comic map of Europe by Fred W. Rose (1900) (<https://www.flickr.com/photos/bibliodyssey/3668664529/sizes/l/>),
- The maps of the twelve more important European countries (including England, Scotland, France etc.) as persons were drawn by Lilian Lancaster and brought together with verses for each country in a booklet entitled *Geographical Fun being Humorous Outlines of Various Countries* published in London in 1869 (see tweet about the book at <https://twitter.com/LoveArchaeology/status/511104925800357888/photo/1>),

⁵ See the paper of Hans Henning Hahn in this volume.

⁶ See also his website www.barronmaps.com/.

- *Humoristische Karte von Europa im Jahre 1914* (www.barronmaps.com/products/humoristische-karte-von-europa-im-jahre-1914),
- see for an overview of maps from different countries for that period (Briars 2014) (<https://www.theguardian.com/books/gallery/2014/jun/03/war-ww1-propaganda-maps-in-pictures>),
- *Hark! Hark! The dogs do bark!* By Walter Emanuel (London England 1914) (http://www.raremaps.com/gallery/detail/19907/Hark_Hark_The_Dogs_Do_Bark_With_Note_By_Walter_Emanuel/Johnson,%20Riddle%20&%20Co.html),
- *Europäische Treibjagd* by G Schiedermeier (1915 Regensburg, Germany).

The beginning of the Great War marked the transition from satire to propaganda, first in Germany and Britain and then to an even greater extent in Bolshevik Russia (again according to Barron 2008, 13).

Compared to the present day *Atlas of prejudice*, the visual images are much richer. Stereotypes are not only put in words on the map; in these satirical maps they are represented through images (a person or an animal) that embody the national character, and the shape of the territory of the country is even sometimes used to portray that character (see also de Barros Dias 2012 for anthropomorphic maps and Edney 2007 for maps of bodies and empires). They remind us that these national stereotypes are much older than modern nationalism; they emerged in the Middle Ages. *Nation* was originally the term to label students with the same birthplace at a medieval university, who used the same vernacular or kitchen language among themselves (as opposed to Latin, the lingua franca of European universities at the time). It was later broadened to people sharing the same homeland. Most of the national stereotypes only implicitly refer to the language spoken by the national group, but others more specifically target language itself.

3. Linguistic stereotypes

Charles V is often quoted as having said

I speak Spanish to God, Italian to women, French to men, and German to my horse.

(Misattributed to Charles Quint (1500-1558), <http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/c/charlesv142488.html>)

This stereotypes the various languages, suggesting that each is more suited for a certain activity than the others. The idea also suggests that this powerful man needed to master several languages to be able to rule such an empire. The linguistic stereotype about the political and diplomatic élite has changed a lot since then. English is now the language of the global elite. A series of pictures of the visit

to the White House by the partners of the heads of governments during the G8 summit in Washington on 19 May 2012 nicely demonstrates the point. In these pictures (and this was noted in the French media at the time), an interpreter can be seen speaking in the ear of Valérie Trierweiler (then the partner of the French president François Hollande) because she did not master English well enough to follow the conversation without a mediator. This was seen as a deficiency for someone in her position.

Even more telling is the campaign of the European Union to reduce the distance between its institutions and its citizens in 2013. The president of the European Council (then the Belgian Herman Van Rompuy) was active on the website *Debating Europe*,⁷ where the working language is English, and the slogan read *Ask me! Send YOUR questions to Herman Van Rompuy* – notwithstanding the other 23 official and working languages of the European Union and the languages that Van Rompuy is proficient in.

The Anglicisation of international exchange has also fed stereotypes linked to different ways of speaking English. No doubt native speakers of English have their ways of making fun of different varieties (Received Pronunciation, Irish, Australian, American etc.) and foreign accents. In the EU context there is arguably some tension between British English speakers and foreign speakers of English (International English, European English, Erasmus English). No doubt native speakers make fun of foreign speakers, but the latter also share stereotypes about native speakers of British English. Some representations focus more specifically on the hyperbolic politeness of the British, others on the oddity of certain idioms and the misunderstanding generated by British euphemisms, comparing *What the British say* with *What the British mean* and *What others understand* as shown in the Anglo EU translation guide published by the British daily *The Independent* in 2015 (see Table 2).

Stereotypes about each other's languages are common (think of the erotic power of the Italian-speaking lover as a gimmick in the 1988 British-American movie *A fish called Wanda*). Studies have considered various aspects such as the use of foreign languages in advertising, especially the association of certain languages with certain products and qualities, such as French and German with beauty and elegance or pragmatism and reliability respectively (Hornikx/Starren 2008) and the challenge of dubbing of linguistic stereotyping (Ferrari 2010), as well as foreign language teaching (Löschmann/Stroinska 1998).

⁷ See www.debatingeurope.eu/.

Anglo-EU Translation Guide

What the British say	What the British mean	What others understand
I hear what you say	I disagree and do not want to discuss it further	He accepts my point of view
With the greatest respect...	I think you are an idiot	He is listening to me
That's not bad	That's good	That's poor
That is a very brave proposal	You are insane	He thinks I have courage
Quite good	A bit disappointing	Quite good
I would suggest...	Do it or be prepared to justify yourself	Think about the idea, but do what you like
Oh, incidentally/ by the way	The primary purpose of our discussion is...	That is not very important
I was a bit disappointed that	I am annoyed that	It doesn't really matter
Very interesting	That is clearly nonsense	They are impressed
I'll bear it in mind	I've forgotten it already	They will probably do it
I'm sure it's my fault	It's your fault	Why do they think it was their fault?
You must come for dinner	It's not an invitation, I'm just being polite	I will get an invitation soon
I almost agree	I don't agree at all	He's not far from agreement
I only have a few minor comments	Please re-write completely	He has found a few typos
Could we consider some other options	I don't like your idea	They have not yet decided

Table 2: Anglo EU Translation Guide, *The Independent* 11 November 2015

(see www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/chart-shows-what-british-people-say-what-they-really-mean-and-what-others-understand-a6730046.html, accessed January 2017)

Much rarer are examples of humour around stereotypes regarding multilingualism. One outstanding example from popular culture is the take of the English stand-up comedian Eddie Izzard on languages and on multilingualism in his 1999 show *Dress to kill*.

“But, uh, in Europe we have 200 languages. Two hundred languages! Just count them! I know you won’t! But, uh but a total – 1 – languages. **And future generations of Europeans, I’m sorry Europeans, but we’re going to have to be bilingual. We are going to have to be, and English speakers hate this.**”

‘Two languages in one head? No one can live at that speed! Good Lord, man! You’re asking the impossible!’

‘But the Dutch speak four languages and smoke marijuana!’

‘Yes, but they’re cheating!’

Everyone knows marijuana is a drug enhancement, that can help you on track in field, to come – last in a team – of eight million, eight million other runners who are all dead.

I don’t know how the Dutch do it, but anyway – cause we’re going to have to learn! And the reason we’re going to have to learn is, one, for – being groovy, and just getting out there and doing it; but the second one, we just lose a lot of business, in Europe. In the rest of Europe.

Cause German people phone up and going, ‘Wir haben funf millionen Deutschmark, fuer die Auto –’ ‘Just fuck off, willya mate?! I thought he was speaking German, I told him to go away! I said I don’t know, something about funf millionen Deutschmark and I told him to get knotted! We don’t want any of his Deutschy Markys. We do?! We do want that?! Oh, I’m terribly sorry! Oh fuck, redial.’ Yeah. So, uh.”

(Eddie Izzard, 1999, *Dress to kill*, www.youtube.com/watch?v=1hJQsvoY6VU&feature=related; my emphasis)

Less flattering are the common representations of the European Parliament as a Tower of Babel (sometimes even “photoshopping” the building of the European Parliament in Strasbourg and the famous painting of the Tower of Babel by Brueghel, as in the blog post *Sinister Sites: The EU parliament* (<http://vigilantcitizen.com/sinistersites/sinister-sites-the-eu-parliament/>, 8 December 2008).

To some extent the EU institutions, allegedly the largest employers of interpreters and translators in the world, also play with the idea. For the 2010 Universal Exhibition Shanghai Expo, they published a YouTube video clip entitled *Do you speak European?* with Chinese subtitles about interpretation, prepared for a special exhibition “Do you speak European?” at the EU Pavilion, Shanghai Expo 2010 10-20 July (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Afk9hE7qptA>; see also a second video in Chinese with English subtitles *Interpreting for Europe & for China* <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pSW1jJotpWE>; both accessed January 2017). This is closely related to the stereotyping of monolingualism as the norm and the associated representations of bilinguals as freaks (see for example *Bilingual celebrities* on <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lzniYTLmFkc>, accessed January 2017).

Cities traditionally offer more room for linguistic and other cultural diversity (Pennycook/Otsuji 2015; King/Carson 2016). Nevertheless multilingualism is not necessarily welcoming. A few street signs exemplify that the acknowledgement of linguistic diversity can go together with prejudice.

First, take the Glasgow City Council sign spotted in a park, where the message in English is followed in translation in four scripts: Chinese, Bengali, Arabic and Hindi.

In the interests of hygiene and safety
members of the public are requested
to refrain from feeding the birds
as food debris attracts vermin

(Photo by Nicole Nau, August 2011, posted on <http://languagesindanger.eu/book-of-knowledge/multilingualism-and-language-contact/> (accessed September 2016))

Gaelic is not included, and is probably seen as redundant because Gaelic speakers are expected to read English, but the European languages of larger groups of migrants (Polish, French, Italian, Spanish etc.) are absent too, as if only migrants from outside Europe are unable to read the English text and need to be “educated” about this.

Another sign spotted in the Netherlands is more direct:

In Rotterdam spreken we Nederlands
(Dutch for “In Rotterdam we speak Dutch”)

This electoral poster of the main right-wing party VVD (the main party of the governmental coalition at the time) was used during the 2014 municipal elections in several cities. This testimony of distrust in the use of other languages than Dutch in the electoral campaign was interestingly enough contradicted by their counterparts in Amsterdam, who were circulating tracts in English to reach expat voters, although tracts and meetings in Turkish, Moroccan, Arabic, Portuguese or Polish for larger migrant groups were deemed inappropriate for fear of candidates being unaccountable in that other language, promoting a different agenda to the mainstream party in Dutch and developing clientelism with a specific migrant electorate.

Finally a picture of a bag with a printed text in Arabic script spotted in the Berlin underground went viral after it was tweeted on 16 August 2016 by the Berliner Nader al Sarras with the explanation that the text reads “This text has no other purpose than to terrify those who are afraid of the Arabic language” (<https://twitter.com/naderalsarras/status/765617240947458048>).

The bag was reported to have been manufactured in Haifa, Israel, where the same guilt by association affects Arabic (see https://www.buzzfeed.com/rosebuchanan/people-are-loving-this-companys-bags-using-arabic-script-to?utm_term=.ww5LdkGA1#.xmdxmGkoZ), showing how the complex configurations of local linguistic landscapes evolve across borders.

4. Stereotypes, identity politics and European integration

The final part of the paper deals with policies and how they harness stereotypes. It is well known that French educational policy, promoting French as the language of the French state and annihilating other languages on its territory (see Thiesse 1999), has used stereotypes to shame speakers of regional languages and push people (school children especially) towards monolingualism in the state language. French state schools – free and compulsory but linguistically particularly destructive – have campaigned against other languages through stereotypes associating these languages with poverty and filth:

In Brittany, school posters would typically state:

“Il est interdit

1. de parler breton et de cracher par terre”

“It is forbidden

1. to speak Breton and to spit on the ground”

In Alsace (regained from Germany) posters would promise

“C’est chic de parler français”

“It’s smart to speak French”

In the northern part of Catalonia, the motto painted on the wall of the school yards told you

“Parlez français, soyez propre”

“Speak French, be clean”

Stereotypes can instead be used in a humorous way, including in more formal circumstances than *The Atlas of Prejudice* discussed earlier. In this final section I would like to present three recent (European) examples of how stereotypes intervene in the representation of European integration (so both national and European stereotypes). All three are related to EU institutions, their communication with EU citizens and their attempts to foster some kind of European identity. All three use stereotypes tongue-in-cheek but with various degrees of success.

4.1 *Entropa*

The first is the exhibition *Entropa*, commissioned by the Czech presidency in 2009. It is customary for the rotating president of the Council of Ministers to commission a piece of art to be exhibited in the Justus Lipsius building of the Council in Brussels. The Czech presidency commissioned an art work from David Černý to reflect the slogan *Europe without barriers*.

The artist prepared an exhibition under the title *Entropa: Stereotypes are barriers to be demolished* (see also the press release of the Czech Presidency of the Council of the EU on 12 January 2009). This was a particularly important symbolic moment, since it was the first time the Czech Republic had held the presidency since its accession.

The installation – a construction kit of Europe, a gigantic plastic model to be put together like the models of planes, cars, motorbikes, ships and so on known as Airfix models in the UK, Heller in France, Revell in Germany, Italeri in Italy etc. – was presented as the collective work of 27 artists, one from each member state. According to Černý each member state was represented by a work of art by a national artist, based on stereotypes which other Europeans hold about their country. At the opening of the exhibition some of the works caused much commotion and even outrage among civil servants, diplomats, politicians and the general public in certain member states, and eventually there were formal protests. The discontent with the exhibits was deeply aggravated when it became clear that the artists did not exist, and that all the works had been created by Černý and his Czech team. The stereotypes became even less acceptable, since they were not self-inflicted caricatures but qualities ascribed from the outside. There were diplomatic incidents. In the end the piece for Bulgaria (an ensemble of squat toilets labelled Turkish toilets) was covered at the demand of its government (or “veiled”, as McLane 2012, 478 phrases it). For a review of the Bulgarian debate about the artwork, about the meaning of the Turkish toilet, how the discussion evolved once it became clear it was not the work of a Bulgarian artist, and about the censorship of “the cloth-covered toilet”, see Roth (2010).




Fig. 2: Snapshot from Euractiv item on the opening of *Entropa* 2009 (overview)

The catalogue published with the installation is trilingual in Czech, English and French and provides a description of the installation, an explanation, and a biography of the artists for the 27 member states (Croatia was not yet a member in 2009). The countries were presented in alphabetical order of their names in English (not in the national languages as usual in the EU protocol). It is still available on the archived website of the Czech presidency at www.eu2009.cz/assets/czech-presidency/publications/entropa.pdf. The biographies of the fictitious artists were also (and are still) available online at <http://entropa.liborsvoboda.com/entropa.htm> (accessed January 2017). These biographies also play with stereotypes of the different nationalities (names, careers, etc.), but most important is the way each country is represented in the kit.

Here follows the description of the pieces of the puzzle. The text comes from the description of the exhibition published by the Techmania Science Center (www.techmania.cz/data/fil_5512.pdf), reproduced and amended in the English language Wikipedia article devoted to the installation. The amendments are based on observation of the installation and controversies and other reactions in the media (check the Wikipedia website for the content of the footnotes; they generally refer to statements by officials and protagonists):

- “**Austria**, a known opponent of atomic energy, is depicted as a green field dominated by nuclear power plant cooling towers with vapour coming out of them at intervals.[7]
- **Belgium** is presented as a box of half-eaten Praline chocolates with the pattern of Brussels waffles.
- **Bulgaria** is depicted by a series of connected “Turkish” squat toilets with neon lights connecting and illuminating them. This piece of the sculpture was later hidden with fabric.[8][9]
- **Cyprus** is cut in half.
- The **Czech Republic’s** own piece is an LED display, which flashes controversial quotations by Czech President Václav Klaus.
- **Denmark** is depicted as being built out of Lego bricks, and some claim to see in the depiction a face reminiscent of the cartoon controversy,[10] though the resemblance has been denied by Černý.[11]
- **Estonia** is presented with power tools resembling a hammer and sickle, citing the country’s consideration of a ban on Communist symbols.[12]
- **Finland** is depicted as a wooden floor including a male with a rifle lying down, imagining an elephant, a hippo and a crocodile.[13]
- **France** is draped in a “GRÈVE!” (“STRIKE!”) banner.[8]
- **Germany** is a series of interlocking autobahns with cars moving about on them, described as “somewhat resembling a swastika”,[8][14][15] though the statement is not universally accepted.[16] Some Czech military historians also suggest that the autobahns resemble the number “18”, which some Neo-Nazi groups use as code for A.H., the initials of Adolf Hitler.[17]

- **Greece** is depicted as a forest that has been entirely burned, possibly representing the 2007 Greek forest fires or the 2008 civil unrest in Greece.[18]
- **Hungary** features an Atomium consisting of watermelons and Hungarian sausages, based on a floor of peppers.
- **Ireland** is depicted as a brown bog with bagpipes protruding from Northern Ireland. The bagpipes also play music in five-minute intervals. [citation needed]
- **Italy** is depicted as a football pitch [8] with several players who appear to be masturbating, possibly indicating what some see as the country’s “fetish for football”. [15]
- **Latvia** is shown as covered with mountains, in contrast to its actual flat landscape.
- **Lithuania** includes a series of dressed Manneken Pis-style figures urinating, with the streams of urine being illuminated by yellow glass fibres.
- **Luxembourg** is displayed as a gold nugget with a “For Sale” sign.[8]
- **Malta** is depicted as a tiny island with a prehistoric dwarf elephant, as well as a magnifying glass in front of the elephant.
- **The Netherlands** is depicted as having disappeared under the sea with only several minarets still visible.[8]
- **Poland** has a piece with priests erecting the rainbow flag of the gay rights movement on a field of potatoes in the style of the famous photograph *Raising the Flag on Iwo Jima*. [19]
- **Portugal** is shown as a wooden cutting board with three pieces of meat in the shape of its former colonies of Brazil, Angola, and Mozambique.
- **Romania** is a Dracula-style theme park, which is set up to blink and emit ghostly sounds at intervals.[8]
- **Slovakia** is depicted as a Hungarian sausage (or a human body wrapped in Hungarian tricolor).
- **Slovenia** is shown as a rock engraved with the words “First Tourists Came Here, 1213”.
- **Spain** is covered entirely in concrete, with a concrete mixer situated in the north-east.[20]
- **Sweden**, unlike the other pieces in the sculpture, does not have an outline, but is instead represented as a large IKEA-style self-assembly furniture box containing Gripen fighter planes (as supplied to the Czech Air Force).[21]
- The **United Kingdom**, known for its Euroscepticism and relative isolation from Europe, is “included” as a missing piece (an empty space) at the top-left of the sculpture.”
(<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Entropa>)

See also detailed pictures on the website of *The Guardian* at <https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/gallery/2009/jan/14/entropa-eu-art-hoax> or the Euractiv

post on YouTube *Entropa: Controversial Czech exhibit sparks debate on EU* at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k2SKLSM1cw4> (both still available in January 2017).

Entropa can be seen as a critique of the use of stereotypes as shorthand for identities in cross-cultural encounters. Moreover the kit as a whole suggests that Europe is still to be put together, that some pieces are missing, and that the result is likely to be disappointing (like the plastic model often disappoints and ends up unfinished or poorly glued in a corner of the room).

Černý's choices seem not to show how Europe looks according to the Czechs (to paraphrase Tsvkekov's atlas of prejudice), but rather various prejudices about each other. They surely reflect ongoing political debates, especially regarding European integration, but also more traditional stereotypes and individual experiences. Interestingly the linguistic elements were in English (except for the French "Grève!" in the installation (see Fig. 4), but in English in the catalogue).



Fig. 3: Snapshot from Euractiv item on the opening of *Entropa* 2009 (detail).

The very title of the artwork suggests however that it is more a comment on the EU as a whole than on its parts; on how it operates as a system, alluding to entropy, a measure of disorder in a system. Alexandr Vondra, the deputy prime minister for European Affairs, was quoted in *The Guardian* at the opening stressing that the artwork was intended as a comment on the EU, not on national stereotypes:

“Sculpture, and art more generally, can speak where words fail.”

“In line with the Czech presidency motto, ‘A Europe without barriers’, we gave the 27 artists the same opportunity to express themselves freely as proof that, in today’s Europe, there is no place for censorship.”

“In return, we got an uncommon, yet common, piece of art. I am confident in Europe’s open mind and capacity to appreciate such a project.”

(quoted in Watt 2009)

The Czech minister was too optimistic, and his government was forced to deal with requests to intervene and to choose between insulting fellow European governments or censoring. This choice was made easier when it turned out that Černý had not worked with national artists as had been agreed with the sponsor.

Knowing Černý’s track record (he painted the monument to Soviet tank crews pink in Prague in 1991), he was also surely making a statement about the Czech government, the president Klaus (as they had explicitly clashed before), and the Czechs’ self-inflated image and ambitions at the eve of their first presidency. Forcing them to mobilise most of their resources to handle the commotion – even if the diplomatic stir was probably greater than expected – was also a way of disrupting the scripting of a prefect presidency by perfect Europeans after their perfectly managed return to the West.

The art work seems to have revealed or revived musing about east-west divides in Europe: a greater sense of humour in the west (Entropa being associated with a British sense of humour like Monty Python or Sacha Baron Cohen) believed to be less current in the former Eastern Europe (but then again, think of Sveikian humour!, see Kuus 2008), or Černý’s selection of kinder and less offensive stereotypes for the older member states. The British public was reported to be rather amused at being portrayed as absent, but that was seen as rather benevolent criticism by former Eastern Europeans compared to being portrayed as a squat toilet (Bulgaria) or a sausage wrapped in the flag of their neighbours (Slovakia). Similarly the team of imaginary artists was sometimes called a joke, but more often a hoax, a fiction, a mystification, a falsification, even a forgery (Zigelyte 2012) when moving east. The controversy also addresses the role of art and political patronage, including the question of whether the artist has committed fraud and should give the money back (because he did not hire artists in the 27 member states as he claimed he did).

There is no doubt that, as an artwork, Entropa was successful in disturbing business as usual. The installation was removed earlier than planned from the Justus Lipsius building and transported to Prague and later to the Techmania Science Centre in Pilsen (and its presence – also controversial in local politics – was allegedly an asset for that city in winning the title of 2015 European Capital City of Culture; see www.techmania.cz/data/fil_4418.pdf and www.techmania.cz/data/fil_5512.pdf).

One year later, Spain took over the presidency and presented the associated installation in Justus Lipsius: this was a video installation by Daniel Canogar entitled “Travesías” (crossings). References said “Spanish Presidency unveils ‘uncontroversial’ art installation” and the artist was quoted explaining that he

was “clearly trying to avoid offering references to national symbols,” favouring instead “interpretations of the work that do not involve national colours” (Euractiv 5 January 2010, www.euractiv.com/section/languages-culture/news/spanish-presidency-unveils-uncontroversial-art-installation/). The use of stereotypes clearly had high political costs, but it does not seem to have had a negative impact on the evaluations of the Czech presidency by European circles and think tanks. The commotion was duly noted in the authoritative evaluation of the *Journal of Common Market Studies* (Beneš/Karlas 2010, 71), although it was put into perspective in the light of the challenges of the presidency: the uncertain faith of the Lisbon Treaty, the global financial crisis, the gas crisis and the lost vote of no-confidence of the Topolánek government.

4.2 EU enlargement on YouTube

The two other examples are video clips produced by the European Commission for its channel on YouTube (for some time under the label eutube). There were both posted online in early 2012: one caused a stir, while the other was less controversial but nevertheless widely circulated. Both aimed at communicating the importance of further integration and enlargement of the EU. These short videos (generally about 1 minute) target younger Europeans using social media. They feel like advertising, and rely essentially on the visual message, with a small amount of spoken or written text – in English as the language of wider communication. Although stereotypes are surely more often than not invoked implicitly or explicitly in this short vignettes on European politics and society, these two videos are particularly instructive.

The first is now known under the title **EU enlargement: growing together**. As with most videos produced for YouTube by the European Commission, it is a clearly staged scene with no text at all until the final message (in English). The clip was removed from eutube after a few hours because it was perceived as prejudiced, racist and imperialist. The clip had already been widely shared and can still be viewed on several sites.⁸

The clip (as with all the videos posted on YouTube for the Commission) targeted a young audience. It portrayed Europe as a woman in yellow – looking a bit like the Bride (Uma Thurman), the heroine of the American movie *Kill Bill* by

⁸ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9E2B_yI8jrI; <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5SYwV9034kM>; www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=aPYTx03U08 (under the title “the enlargement ad”); <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YOkYvp0Y3dw>; <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7ZW3ERcByWA&index=6&list=PLoJquNJCbEPz75LOkb6nejAxRYoa7gZE6>.

Quentin Tarantino⁹ – and fighting three non-white men. When the sequence starts, the young white woman in a yellow costume is walking in a disused warehouse. At the signal of a gong she is suddenly “attacked” by a yellow man, then a brown man, then a black man each wearing the clothes (and in one case a weapon) and demonstrating the choreography attached to a specific martial art. Connoisseurs can tell that the three men are masters of kung fu, kalaripayattu and capoeira respectively. In other words they represent the three emerging powers in the world economy: China, India and Brazil. The woman stays calm, closes her eyes, spreads her arms and multiplies herself into twelve identical clones who encircle the three men. All sit down. The camera view changes angle and now views the scene from above; the twelve clones of Europe change into yellow stars and the scene into the EU flag. The men have disappeared into thin air.

The closing statement appears in English on a dark blue background with the logo of enlargement (colourful circles representing the member states on a map of Europe):

The more we are
The stronger we are
Ec.europa.eu/enlargement
© European Union 2012



Fig. 4: Snapshot from *Growing together* (March 2012)

⁹ *Kill Bill: Volume 1* (2003), *Kill Bill: Volume 2* (2004) and the original four-hour cut, retitled *Kill Bill: The Whole Bloody Affair* (2011).

The original post was removed, but it had gone viral. According to Simic (2015b, 186) it spread across 7,000 websites, starting on March 6. The video was noticed and shared, but not in the way the makers had expected. As those who posted the video on YouTube (where it is still available) noted, the reactions were negative:

“I’m not the owner of this video. The European Commission was forced to withdraw this video in March 2012 after it was criticised as “racist.” (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YOkYvp0Y3dw>)

“This ad was launched by the EU and then immediately withdrawn because of overwhelming bad feedback. I had made a backup however and think people should be able to see it [...]” (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5SYwV9034kM>)

“White European Woman attacked by aggressive Black, Asian and Indian Men. This is the official EU enlargement commercial aired across the EU.” (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5SYwV9034kM>)

“The European Commission has issued an apology after complaints were made about an advert uploaded to YouTube advertising European Union enlargement.” (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7ZW3ERcByWA&index=6&list=PLojuNJCbEPz75LOkb6nejAxRYoa7gZE6>)

The video has been interpreted as a racist and sexist script, suggesting that Europe was superior and peaceful and that China, India and Brazil – and by extension non-white men – were violent, aggressive and threatening to (white) women. Additionally the personification of Europe is seen as excluding non-white Europeans and the personification of Brazil as black is seen as misleading in terms of the racial demographics of the country. While the relations between Europe and the challengers can easily be seen as racist, this racism is sometimes surprisingly described as reflecting racial differences *within* Europe: “Three men from ethnic minorities using martial arts skills with a possible interpretation of preparing to fight a woman” (Simic 2015a, 7) and “no other race can challenge ‘white supremacy’” (ibid., 8).

In fact the chosen script was meant to convey a completely different message. Indeed, the European Commission is generally no challenger of political correctness. The focus was on enlargement and the need for individual European states to join forces to be able to cope with the challenge of global economic competition and the emerging economies. The martial arts theme was an attempt to surf on the popularity of the genre. The choice of martial arts with a long history and a robust tradition could be read as a plea against aggression and violence and for discipline and self-control, mutual respect and collaboration. In that sense the stereotypes of Europe’s “others” might have been positive. At the same time, the *Kill Bill* reference for the Europe persona could be read as negative, since the heroine of the film is particularly violent.

According to Stefano Sannino, the director general of the Enlargement Division of the Commission, quoted in *The Guardian* (Watt 2012), the young audience, acquainted with martial arts films and video games, was positive, as was the focus

group. “We apologise to anyone who may have felt offended. Given these controversies, we have decided to stop the campaign immediately and to withdraw the video”. There was a clear mismatch between the intended stereotypes and those perceived by the audience.

The second video is entitled **Hidden Treasures of Europe**. It was posted just two weeks before the previous one and also deals with enlargement, but in a very different way. It has been available since 2012 on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R_jRjPI9iRQ&feature=plcp&context=C47da909VDvjVQa1PpcFPGOEuvWmODi-JsQgq3XBM7WvzmsU6zrMs%3D. It has been seen over a million times (as of late 2016) and can be said to have been more successful – or at least less controversial.

The video clip supports enlargement with geographical stereotypes: it displays views or scenes typically associated with a member state, naming the likely member state (in English) with a question mark and then replacing the place label with the name of the candidate member state where the clip was filmed. The video is accordingly a succession of sequences – one for each candidate member state in South Eastern Europe (i.e. the Western Balkans and Turkey) – as summarised in Table 3. The selection include candidates close to accession (Croatia), candidates negotiating accession (Turkey), declared candidates (Montenegro) and other potential candidates (such as Bosnia but also Kosovo, although several member states do not recognise its independence). It is worth noting that candidate member state Iceland is not included.




Fig. 5: Snapshot from *Hidden Treasures of Europe* 2012 (February 2012)

The sound track starts with piano music mixed with life sounds (voices, traffic) and crescendo (electronic music) and a return to piano after a little girl running in front of the Greek ruin says hello to the viewer in Albanian (with English subtitle). Then the closing statements appear: a few lines of text popping up in English on a dark blue background with the logo of enlargement (colourful circles representing the member states on a map of Europe):

So similar, so different
 So European
 Coming together
 Ec.europa.eu/enlargement
 © European Union 2012

All the stereotypes (see Table 3) are positive and they are deployed to convey a positive message about the candidate member states, suggesting they are much more similar to the old ones than is generally acknowledged – but also underlining the differences between them, similar to the differences between the member states. For that purpose it seems that the message needed the chosen member states to be “older” member states, that is member states of EU15, as none of the chosen stereotypes is associated with a new member state (i.e. Poland and the eleven others that joined in 2004 and 2007). Last but not least, the stress on cultural differences also suggests that the candidate states will support union in diversity. An (unintended?) drawback could be that the video suggests that you need to be similar to one of the existing member states to be allowed to join the club, while the absence of Iceland reflects the fact that its candidacy does not need to be explained, justified and defended, at least in cultural terms. To my knowledge no controversy has arisen from these representations (apart from the usual questioning of Turkey’s European credentials in the commentaries).

Description of the visual	Localisation (NB: names in English)	
	Old Member State?	Candidate Member State
Lake	Sweden?	Montenegro
Young women in shopping street	France?	Serbia
Old town with bridge	Italy?	Bosnia Herzegovina
Students’ graduation	United Kingdom?	Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia
Anchorwoman in television studio	Spain?	Kosovo

Description of the visual	Localisation (NB: names in English)	
	Old Member State?	Candidate Member State
Central business district with high rise towers and traffic	Germany?	Turkey
Opera hall	Austria?	Croatia*
Greek ruin	Greece?	Albania

Table 3: Siting Europe in the successive visual clips

*Croatia was then a candidate member state – it joined the Union in 2013.

4.3 Final remarks

Stereotypes remain fascinating resources for the communication of the representation of collective identities. The examples presented in this chapter show that they pertain to enduring and reinvented national stereotypes, as well as emerging stereotypes about European integration. The three European examples scrutinised in this paper used stereotypes tongue-in-cheek, but with varying degrees of success. The two video clips made for the European Commission played differently with stereotypes: the first tried to promote a European identity through stereotypes of Europe and other bigger players, but was perceived as a gross prejudice towards Europe's "others". By contrast the second clip used stereotypes of Europeans about each other. The latter seem to have been more acceptable and more effective in highlighting differences and commonalities between them. However the violent reactions that marked the reception of the Entropa exhibition suggest that "to be each other's fool" is not always that easy, even for Europeans.

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Bernd Six

Stereotype in der Sozialpsychologie

Abstract (Deutsch)

Stereotype sind Merkmalszuschreibungen (set of beliefs), die Gruppen oder Einzelnen als Mitglieder einer Gruppe zugeschrieben werden und als soziale Schemata vor allem einer vereinfachten Informationsverarbeitung dienen.

Eine Reihe nationaler Stereotype sollen nicht nur der inhaltlichen Illustration dienen, sondern auch ihrer Kontextabhängigkeit. Selten ist ein Konstrukt in der Sozialpsychologie so abhängig von seinen Messverfahren wie das Stereotypenkonzept, so dass auf enge Verzahnung von Konzept und Messung verdeutlicht wird.

Stereotype als Teil unserer Alltagstheorien, ihre scheinbare Unentrinnbarkeit aufgrund ihrer automatischen Aktivierung und ihrer Funktion, für Mitglieder jedweder "outgroup" zur Bedrohung werden zu können, sollen kurz dargestellt werden.

Abschließend soll auf Entstehungsbedingungen und Veränderungsstrategien eingegangen werden.

Abstract (English)

Stereotypes are sets of beliefs attributed to groups or individuals as members of a group that serve as social schemata first of all a simplified information processing.

A series of national stereotypes shall serve not only as illustrations of content but also their contextual dependence. Hardly any other construct of social psychology is as dependent on its measurement as the concept of stereotypes; thus the close link between this concept and its measurement devices will be clarified. Stereotypes will be briefly presented as part of our implicit personality theories which apparently cannot be avoided because of their automatic activation and their function to become a threat for members of any outgroup.

Finally the conditions for the origin of stereotypes and strategies to changing them will be discussed.

1. Eine kurze Geschichte der Stereotypenforschung und ein neues Literaturhoch seit 2000

Die ersten empirischen Untersuchungen von Stereotypen lassen sich auf die zwanziger Jahre des vorigen Jahrhunderts zurückführen (z.B. Rice 1926). Prominent und immer wieder zitiert wird als grundlegender Beitrag zur Konzeptbildung die als Definition bezeichnete Formulierung des amerikanischen Journalisten Walter Lippmann, der in seiner Publikation von 1922 Stereotype als "pictures in our heads" bezeichnet hat. Die griffige Formel in den Lehrbüchern der Sozialpsychologie sollte nicht darüber hinweg täuschen, dass damit noch wenig gesagt ist.

TABLE 1. The Twelve Traits Most Frequently Assigned to Each of Various Racial and National Groups by 100 Princeton Students

Traits Checked, Rank Order	Num- ber	Per- cent	Traits Checked, Rank Order	Num- ber	Per- cent
GERMANS			Sly	20	20
Scientifically-minded	78	78	Loyal to family ties	15	15
Industrious	65	65	Persistent	13	13
Stolid	44	44	Talkative	13	13
Intelligent	32	32	Aggressive	12	12
Methodical	31	31	Very religious	12	12
Extremely nationalistic	24	24			
Progressive	16	16	AMERICANS		
Efficient	16	16	Industrious	48	48
Jovial	15	15	Intelligent	47	47
Musical	13	13	Materialistic	35	35
Persistent	11	11	Ambitious	35	35
Practical	11	11	Progressive	27	27
ITALIANS			Pleasure-loving	26	26
Artistic	53	53	Alert	23	23
Impulsive	44	44	Efficient	21	21
Passionate	37	37	Aggressive	20	20
Quick-tempered	35	35	Straightforward	19	19
Musical	32	32	Practical	19	19
Imaginative	30	30	Sportsmanlike	19	19
Very religious	21	21	NEGROES		
Talkative	21	21	Superstitious	84	84
Revengeful	17	17	Lazy	75	75
Physically dirty	13	13	Happy-go-lucky	38	38
Lazy	12	12	Ignorant	38	38
Unreliable	11	11	Musical	26	26
ENGLISH			Ostentatious	26	26
Sportsmanlike	53	53	Very religious	24	24
Intelligent	46	46	Stupid	22	22
Conventional	34	34	Physically dirty	17	17
Tradition-loving	31	31	Naive	14	14
Conservative	30	30	Slovenly	13	13
Reserved	29	29	Unreliable	12	12
Sophisticated	27	27	IRISH		
Courteous	21	21	Pugnacious	45	45
Honest	20	20	Quick-tempered	39	39
Industrious	18	18	Witty	38	38
Extremely nationalistic	18	18	Honest	32	32
Humorous	17	17	Very religious	29	29
JEWS			Industrious	21	21
Shrewd	79	79	Extremely nationalistic	21	21
Mercenary	49	49	Superstitious	18	18
Industrious	48	48	Quarrelsome	14	14
Grasping	34	34	Imaginative	13	13
Intelligent	29	29	Aggressive	13	13
Ambitious	21	21	Stubborn	13	13
Traits Checked, Rank Order	Num- ber	Per- cent	Traits Checked, Rank Order	Num- ber	Per- cent
CHINESE			Imitative	17	18
Superstitious	54	55	Alert	16	17
Sly	29	30	Suave	16	17
Conservative	29	30	Neat	16	17
Tradition-loving	26	27	Treacherous	13	14
Loyal to family ties	22	23	Aggressive	13	14
Industrious	18	19	TURKS		
Meditative	18	19	Cruel	47	54
Reserved	17	17	Very religious	26	30
Very religious	15	15	Treacherous	21	24
Ignorant	15	15	Sensual	20	23
Deceitful	14	14	Ignorant	15	17
Quiet	13	13	Physically dirty	15	17
JAPANESE			Deceitful	13	15
Intelligent	45	48	Sly	12	14
Industrious	43	46	Quarrelsome	12	14
Progressive	24	25	Revengeful	12	14
Shrewd	22	23	Conservative	12	14
Sly	20	21	Superstitious	11	13
Quiet	19	20			

Tab. 1: Liste der 84 Adjektive zur Beurteilung der 10 Nationen durch 100 Princeton-Studenten (Katz/Braly 1933)

In den darauffolgenden Jahren ist die Zahl der Publikationen gering; das ändert sich erst – wiewohl auch nur wenig – mit der Publikation von Katz/Braly (1933), die eine Art Prototypencharakter sozialpsychologischer Stereotypenforschung hat. Die Prominenz der Untersuchung hatte zwei Konsequenzen: Stereotype werden als Zuschreibungen von Merkmalen, in der Regel durch Listen von Eigenschaften oder kurzen Verhaltensausschnitten gekennzeichnet. Das Meßinstrument, von Katz/Braly (1933) eingeführt und als Adjective List-Verfahren bezeichnet, ist über viele Jahrzehnte das Standardmessinstrument und dominiert auf diese Weise sowohl die konzeptuelle Festlegung von Stereotypen als Merkmalsliste als auch die Erhebungstechnik. In der Originalversion: “one hundred Princeton Undergraduates were asked to select the traits from this prepared list of 84 adjectives to characterize the ten racial and national groups” (siehe Tab. 1).

Weitere Ergebnisse zeigten, dass die Amerikaner die positivsten Merkmale zugeschrieben bekamen, die Türken und Schwarzen die negativsten. Am eindeutigsten, definiert über die geringste Zahl der Merkmale, die notwendig waren, um 50% der Urteile abzudecken, waren die Beurteilungen der Schwarzen, Deutschen und Juden.

Immerhin ist die Untersuchung so prominent geworden, dass sie zweimal wiederholt worden ist, und zwar 1951 und 1967 (Karllins/Coffmann/Walters 1969), was an dieser Stelle einfach deshalb von Bedeutung ist, als die Stereotype der Deutschen und Japaner bei den Studenten in Princeton 1951 deutlich negativer ausfielen und dies sich relativ einfach durch die Ereignisse der Nazi-Zeit und den Angriff der Japaner auf Pearl Harbour erklärt. In der Untersuchung von 1967 verschwinden diese negativen Einschätzungen wieder (siehe Tab. 2).

Im Vergleich zur Vorurteilsforschung, die in den folgenden Jahren eine sehr viel höhere Publikationsrate aufwies, bleibt die Anzahl der Publikationen im Bereich der Stereotypenforschung vergleichsweise niedrig. Nicht zuletzt wurde am Verfahren kritisiert, dass es zwischen der Akzeptanz eines Stereotyps und der Kenntnis eines Stereotyps nicht unterscheiden kann, und die Zuschreibung von Merkmalen sehr stark vom Kontext der übrigen Merkmale abhängig ist, wie entsprechende empirische Untersuchungen gezeigt haben.

Insgesamt bleiben die Publikationsraten bis zu Anfang der 1980iger Jahre auf einem vergleichsweise niedrigen Niveau. (siehe Abb. 1).

Dies ändert sich erst, als die Sozialpsychologie ihr Forschungsparadigma ändert und dieses Forschungsparadigma sich dann auch innerhalb der Stereotypen- und Vorurteilsforschung ab 1980 durchzusetzen beginnt. Das damit verbundene zunehmende Interesse verdeutlichen die prozentualen Zugewinne in den Publikationskurve von Abbildung 1.

Erschienen in der Zeit von 1965 bis 1985 nur ca 1-2% der Artikel zum Thema Stereotype und Vorurteile, sind es ab 1985 mehr als 10%.

Trait	Checking Trait (%)			Trait	Checking Trait (%)		
	1933	1951	1967		1933	1951	1967
Germans				Blacks			
Scientifically minded	78	62	47	Superstitious	84	41	13
Industrious	65	50	59	Lazy	75	31	26
Stolid	44	10	9	Happy-go-lucky	38	17	27
Intelligent	32	32	19	Ignorant	38	24	11
Methodical	31	20	21	Musical	26	33	47
Extrem. nationalistic	24	50	43	Ostentatious	26	11	25
Progressive	16	3	13	Very religious	24	17	8
Efficient	16	–	46	Stupid	22	10	4
Social	15	–	30	Physically dirty	17	–	3
Aggressive	–	27	30	Pleasure-loving	–	19	26
Arrogant	–	23	18				
Italians				Jews			
Artistic	53	28	30	Shrewd	79	47	30
Impulsive	44	19	28	Mercenary	49	28	15
Passionate	37	25	44	Industrious	48	29	33
Quick-tempered	35	15	28	Grasping	34	17	17
Musical	32	22	9	Intelligent	29	37	37
Imaginative	30	20	7	Ambitious	21	28	48
Very religious	21	33	25	Sly	20	14	7
Talkative	21	23	23	Loyal to family ties	15	19	19
Revengeful	17	–	–	Persistent	13	–	9
Pleasure-loving	–	28	33	Aggressive	12	–	23
				Materialistic	–	–	46
Americans				Chinese			
Industrious	48	30	23	Superstitious	34	18	8
Intelligent	47	32	20	Sly	29	4	6
Materialistic	33	37	67	Conservative	29	14	15
Ambitious	33	21	42	Tradition-loving	26	26	32
Progressive	27	5	17	Loyal to family ties	22	35	50
Pleasure-loving	26	27	28	Industrious	18	18	23
Alert	23	7	7	Meditative	19	–	21
Efficient	21	9	15	Reserved	17	18	15
Aggressive	20	8	15	Very religious	15	–	6
Straightforward	19	–	9	Ignorant	15	–	7
Practical	19	–	12	Deceitful	14	–	5
Sportsmanlike	19	–	9	Quiet	13	19	23
Individualistic	–	26	15	Courteous	–	–	20
Conventional	–	–	17	Extrem. nationalistic	–	–	19
Scientifically minded	–	–	15	Humorless	–	–	17
Ostentatious	–	–	15	Artistic	–	–	15

Tab. 2: Prozentsatz der zugeschriebenen Merkmale in den Studien von 1933, 1951 und 1967 nach Karlins/Coffmann/Walters (1969)

Die "Social-Cognition"-Forschung (Bless/Fiedler/Strack 2004) untersucht die kognitiven Strukturen und Prozesse, die bei der Informationsverarbeitung (information-processing) von Bedeutung sind, wenn es um die Wahrnehmung von Personen und Gruppen geht. und berücksichtigt dabei sowohl Gedächtnis (memory), Aufmerksamkeits (attention) und Begriffsbildungs-(concept-formation)-Prozesse. Vor allem, wenn es um die Verarbeitung von Prozessen bei der Bildung eines persönlichen Eindrucks (impression of each other's personality) geht, aber auch bei der Beurteilung von Emotionen, sozialen Rollen und sozialen Identitäten, hat

dieses Forschungsparadigma sowohl durch seine eher ganzheitliche Analyseperspektive als auch durch seine anwendungstauglichen Konstrukte einen bis heute anhaltenden Einfluß auf die Vorurteils- und Stereotypenforschung gehabt.




Figure 1.1 Percent of articles in four leading social psychology journals that use the term prejudice, stereotypes, or stereotyping in the abstract (data aggregated across journals).

Abb. 1: Prozentualer Anteil der Publikationen zu Vorurteilen und Stereotypen (nach Dovidio et al. 2010, 4)

Zu den wesentlichen kognitiven Konstrukten innerhalb der Social-Cognition-Forschung zählen soziale Kategorien. Mit Hilfe dieser sozialen Kategorien werden Gruppen von Personen nach bestimmten äußerlich sichtbaren oder nicht-sichtbaren Merkmalen gebildet. Eine der wichtigsten Funktionen sozialer Kategorien besteht darin, die Vielzahl der uns in unserem Alltag begegnenden Informationen auf eine handhabbare Zahl zu reduzieren. Soziale Kategorien erleichtern uns damit zwar die Orientierung in unserem Alltag, gleichzeitig gelingt dies aber nur dadurch, dass Informationen gebündelt und vereinfacht werden. Aber eben dieser Vorteil ist gleichzeitig auch unter dem Aspekt einer möglichst differenzierten Wahrnehmung unserer Umwelt der Beginn einer möglichen Verzerrung unserer Wahrnehmung und damit der Anfang für die Bildung von Stereotypen und Vorurteilen.

2. Die nicht-endenwollenden Definitionsversuche

Bei aller Verschiedenheit, die sich in den folgenden drei Definitionen zeigt, gibt es dann doch wesentliche Übereinstimmungen: Stereotype beziehen sich auf Gruppen und nicht auf einzelnen Personen und sie basieren auf Kategorisierungsprozessen:

- 1) "What are the essential qualities of stereotypes? The most basic definition I can offer; the one with the fewest constraining assumptions, is that stereotypes are qualities perceived to be associated with particular groups or categories of people." (Schneider 2004, 25).

- 2) "In sum, stereotypes represent a set of qualities perceived to reflect the essence of a group [...]. For the present volume, we define stereotypes as associations and beliefs about the characteristics and attributes of a group and its members that shape how people think about and respond to the group." (Dovidio/Hewstone/Glick/Esses 2010, 7).
- 3) "We define stereotypes as category-based generalizations that link category members to typical attributes. [...] There is nothing in this definition that specifies the evaluative nature of the attributes associated with category members." (Correll/Judd/Park/Wittenbrink 2010, 46).

Stereotype als kognitive Strukturen sind allerdings nicht nur eine Ansammlung von Merkmalen, sondern sind mehr oder weniger differenzierte Strukturen, die als implizite Theorien oder Alltagstheorien bezeichnet werden (Six/Wolfradt 2004). Implizite Theorien (siehe Abb. 2) beinhalten stereotype Muster, die insofern personenspezifisch sind als dass sie jeweils individuell verschiedene mehrdimensionale Merkmalskonstellationen sind.




Abb. 2: Zweidimensionale Lösung einer Impliziten Persönlichkeitstheorie (nach Rosenberg/Sedlak 1972)

Die in der Abbildung wiedergegebene Implizite Persönlichkeitstheorie auf der Basis einer Untersuchung von Rosenberg/Sedlak (1972) ist so aufgebaut, dass

die Ähnlichkeiten der Merkmale durch die geometrischen Distanzen repräsentiert sind. Ähnliche Merkmale sind nur wenig voneinander entfernt; unähnliche oder gegensätzliche Merkmale weisen größere Distanzen auf. Die hier gezeigte Implizite Theorie ist zur besseren Veranschaulichung nicht die individuelle Implizite Struktur, sondern die Struktur einer befragten Studentens Stichprobe.

Immer wieder hat es in der Vergangenheit und andauernd bis heute (Jussim/Cain/Crawford 2009) Diskussionen um die Genauigkeit von Stereotypen gegeben: Enthalten Stereotype so etwas wie ein Körnchen Wahrheit (kernel of truth hypothesis) oder in welchem Maß sind sie mit den sozialen Realitäten verknüpft, wenn überhaupt? Geht man davon aus, dass Stereotype nicht nur schlecht, sondern generell ungenau oder falsch sind, ist das Problem damit erledigt. Verändert man die Perspektive und gesteht Stereotypen einen gewissen Wahrheitsgehalt zu, dann stellt sich sofort die Frage nach dem Kriterium.

Als nächstes ist der Wahrheitsgehalt von Stereotypisierungen einzelner Personen von der Stereotypisierung von Gruppen zu unterscheiden.

Bezieht man die Genauigkeit von Stereotypen auf Gruppen insgesamt ("Männer sind größer als Frauen"), dann ist diese Aussage mit der Empirie in Übereinstimmung, also zutreffend, beim Vergleich einzelner Mitglieder einer Gruppe kann diese Aussage jedoch falsch sein, wobei in diesem Fall ein eindeutiger Standard vorliegt, anhand dessen die Aussage geprüft werden kann.

Noch schwieriger wird eine solide Beantwortung der Frage nach der Genauigkeit, wenn man in Rechnung stellen muss, dass der Beurteilungsmaßstab selbst sich ändern kann (Biernat 2012). Nach dem Shifting standards model von Biernat sind Veränderungen des Beurteilungsmaßstabes selbst abhängig z.B. von der Geschlechtszugehörigkeit oder der nationalen Zugehörigkeit, die zu veränderten Urteilen führen. Frauen werden in bestimmten Berufsrollen trotz gleicher Fähigkeiten und Tätigkeiten anders beurteilt als Männer. Je nach der historischen Situation werden Mitglieder einzelner Nationen ebenfalls grundlegend anders eingeschätzt; man denke etwa an die unterschiedliche Beurteilung der Franzosen im Zweiten Weltkrieg und als Mitglieder in der EU.

Was bleibt? Die Feststellung, dass es unterschiedliche Typen von Genauigkeit gibt: Genauigkeit im Sinne einer Korrelation zwischen den Inhalten eines Stereotyps und den Merkmalen einer Gruppe; Genauigkeit aber auch in der Beurteilung der Unterschiede zwischen Gruppen. Stereotype, in der Regel nur auf minimaler Erfahrung basierend, sind zudem noch von vielen situativen Einflüssen abhängig. Jussim et al. (2009) sind der Meinung:

In sum, accepting that stereotypes can sometimes be accurate provide the means to distinguish innocent errors from motivated bigotry, assess the efficacy of efforts to correct inaccurate stereotypes, and can reach a more scientific understanding of stereotypes. (Jussim et al. 2009, 225)

Weniger überzeugend und damit auch inhaltsleerer ist Schneider (2004):

The best we can do by way of a general summary is to say that some stereotypes held by some people for some groups are sometimes accurate. (Schneider 2004, 337)

Bei aller Alltagsrelevanz bleiben Stereotype zunächst einmal Urteilsverzerrungen, die den zugestandenen Vorteil einer optimalen, d.h. vor allem schnellen und leichten Informationsverarbeitung auf kategorialer Ebene haben. Stereotype in Form impliziter Theorien liefern uns einfache Urteilmuster über andere und enthalten vielleicht sogar schlichte Wahrheiten über soziale Gruppen, erscheinen als geradezu funktional optimale Qualitäten unserer kognitiven Struktur. Diese hoffnungsfrohe Perspektive ist allerdings von nur geringer Dauer; denn zu eben dieser kognitiven Struktur und damit zur individuellen Grundausstattung zählt das Phänomen der illusorischen Korrelation. Dieses Konzept liefert, empirisch vielfach belegt, dass es ein stabiles Muster bei der Verarbeitung vorurteilsrelevanter Informationen gibt (Hamilton/Gifford 1976), dem wir beinahe aussichtslos ausgeliefert sind. Fasst man die Zuordnung von stereotypen Merkmalen zu Gruppen als eine einfache Lernaufgabe auf, dann stellt sich sehr bald eine wichtige Eigenart dieses Lernprozesses heraus, die bei der Zuordnung von Stereotypen zu Gruppen sehr wirkungsvoll ist, wie erstmals die Untersuchung von Hamilton/Gifford (1976) gezeigt hat. In dieser Untersuchung wurden zwei Gruppen (mit fiktiven) Namen den Beurteilern vorgegeben und mit positiven und negativen Merkmalen beschrieben. Die eine Gruppe (A) bestand aus doppelt so vielen Mitgliedern wie Gruppe B, und Gruppe A wurden doppelt so viele positive Merkmale zugeordnet wie Gruppe B. Außerdem wurde Gruppe A halb so viele negative Merkmale wie Gruppe B zugeordnet. Gruppe B wurden analog auch nur halb so viele negative Merkmale zugeordnet. Da Gruppe A, wie gesagt, doppelt so viele Mitglieder wie Gruppe B hatte, ist B 'so gesehen' eine Minorität.

Die Ergebnisse in aller Kürze: Die positiven Merkmale der Majorität werden in ihrer richtigen Anzahl erinnert, bei den negativen Merkmalen erinnerte man sich an weniger Merkmale als dargeboten. Bei der Minorität wurden die positiven Merkmale ungefähr richtig erinnert, die Zahl der negativen Merkmale wurden jedoch deutlich überschätzt; es wurden mehr genannt als dargeboten wurden. Dieses Resultat steht in einer Serie weiterer Untersuchungen, die diesen Sachverhalt bestätigten (Kite/Whitley 2016, 106f.).

2.1 Arten und Funktionen

Es gibt kein Ausschlusskriterium, auf das sich Stereotype inhaltlich nicht ausrichten können:

Es gibt Berufsstereotype, ethnische oder rassische Stereotype, nationale Stereotype, Altersstereotype, Stereotype von Frauen und Männern.

Thiele (2015) hat in ihrer umfangreichen Literaturlauswertung fünf Kategorien gebildet und jeweils ein umfangreiches Literaturverzeichnis von Publikationen zu Stereotypen gegenüber a) Nationen und Ethnien, b) gegenüber unterschiedlichen Religionen, c) zu Geschlechtern, d) gegenüber älteren Mitmenschen (ageism) und e) gegenüber bestimmten Berufsgruppen, in Abhängigkeit von ihrer Geschlechtszugehörigkeit, wie z.B. PolitikerInnen oder UnternehmenInnen) vorgelegt.

Die hier als Arten beschriebenen Stereotype beziehen sich auf die häufigsten untersuchten Arten von Stereotypen:

Dies sind zum einen Stereotype, die sich danach unterscheiden lassen, ob sie, wie in der überwiegenden Mehrzahl, sich auf andere richten (Hetero-Stereotype), oder ob danach gefragt wird, welches Selbstbild in Form eines Stereotyps man von sich selbst hat (das sog. Auto-Stereotyp).

Eine dritte Variante wird als Meta-Stereotype bezeichnet, die aus Stereotypen Mutmaßungen machen, und die Überlegungen enthalten, wie man glaubt, dass andere Gruppen oder Nationalitäten vermutlich über das eigene Stereotyp bzw. über das Stereotyp der eigenen Gruppe denken. Meta-Stereotype würden dann z.B. Aussagen enthalten, wonach wir als Deutsche vermuten, wie wir Deutschen von den Italienern gesehen werden bzw., dass wir als Deutsche vermuten, dass die Italiener vermuten, dass wir uns als Deutsche stereotyp so sehen.

Immer dann, wenn Vorurteile und Stereotype negative Zuschreibungen beinhalten, wird relativ häufig eine negative Merkmalszuschreibung allein aus Gründen der sogenannten sozialen Erwünschtheit (social desirability) nicht genannt. Die offensichtlichen Merkmale werden einfach deshalb nicht genannt, weil sie in der Öffentlichkeit sozial nicht akzeptiert sind. Um aber dann doch noch zu brauchbaren, d.h. validen Ergebnissen zu kommen, versucht man sog. "subtile" (subtle) Vorurteile und Stereotype aufzulisten, die zwar ebenfalls Vorurteile und Stereotype signalisieren, bei denen aber die Zustimmung leichter fällt, weil sie augenscheinlich akzeptabler sind (Pettigrew/Meertens 1995).

Kite/Whitley (2016, Kap. 5) übernehmen eine Klassifikation unterschiedlicher Rassismus-Konzeptionen und wenden sie auf Vorurteile an, wobei wissenschaftshistorisch bedingt die konzeptuellen Unterscheidungen und auch die dazugehörigen empirischen Untersuchungen sich fast ausschließlich auf Schwarze in den USA beziehen.

Sie unterscheiden unter Bezug auf die Autoren der originären Rassismus-Konzeptionen traditionelle (old-fashioned) und gegenwärtige Formen (contemporary forms) von Vorurteilen. Die Autoren unterscheiden:

Die traditionellen Vorurteile, bestehend aus den Überzeugungen von der biologischen Minderwertigkeit und geringerer Intelligenz, führen zu einer gesellschaftlichen Diskriminierung, die sich in der Ghettoisierung von Schwarzen, der massiven Beeinträchtigung bei der Berufswahl und separaten Schulen für Weiße und Schwarze zeigt.

Zu den gegenwärtigen Varianten rechnen sie:

- a) Moderne-symbolische Vorurteile (modern-symbolic prejudices).
 In Anlehnung an Sears/Henry (2005) sind es fünf Rechtfertigungsstrategien, durch die diese Vorurteilsvariante aufrechterhalten wird:
- 1) Eigentlich gibt es überhaupt keine Vorurteile gegenüber den Schwarzen.
 - 2) Der Unterschied im ökonomischen Wohlstand zwischen Schwarzen und Weißen rührt daher, dass es den Schwarzen an der Motivation fehlt, hart zu arbeiten.
 - 3) Der Ärger der Schwarzen über ihre Ungleichbehandlung ist ungerechtfertigt, denn sie arbeiten einfach nicht hart genug, um das zu bekommen, was sie wollen.
 - 4) Anstatt zu arbeiten, um vorwärtszukommen, verlangen die Schwarzen spezielle Vergünstigungen vom Staat.
 - 5) Im Vergleich zu den Weißen haben die Schwarzen mehr bekommen als sie ökonomisch verdienen.
- b) Aversive Vorurteile (aversive prejudices) (Gaertner/Dovidio 1986). Im Unterschied zu den modernen-symbolischen Vorurteilen gibt es eine Facette, die sich für die Gleichberechtigung von Schwarzen und Weißen ausspricht; man sieht sich insgesamt als weniger vorurteilsbehaftet, weil dies ein wichtiger Aspekt des eigenen Selbst ist. Dennoch ist die Grundstruktur dieser Vorurteile negativ. Der Kontakt zu Schwarzen wird vermieden, weil jede Begegnung die aversiven Vorurteile aktiviert.
- c) Ambivalente Vorurteile (ambivalent prejudices) (Katz/Hass 1988), die aus dem Konflikt resultieren, wonach das "amerikanische Credo" die Gleichbehandlung aller Menschen verlangt, andererseits aber der protestantisch geprägte Individualismus die Position in einer Gesellschaft von dem individuellen Beitrag für die Gesellschaft in Form von Leistung abhängig macht. Dieser innerpsychische Konflikt zeigt sich dann in den ambivalenten Vorurteilen, die sich ihrerseits im Verhalten zeigen und dabei sowohl positive wie negative Formen annehmen können.

Dass Stereotype positive und negative Beschreibungsmerkmale enthalten, ist bereits in den Definitionen deutlich geworden. Es wird damit unterstellt, dass sie eine deskriptive Funktion erfüllen; sie erfüllen in vielen Fällen aber auch präskriptive Funktionen, d.h. sie beinhalten Erwartungen an diejenigen Mitglieder einer Gruppe, auf die sich das Stereotyp richtet.

Stereotype dienen der Vereinfachung, sie stellen so etwas wie Heuristiken (heuristics) dar, d.h. wir greifen bei Urteilsprozessen auf das zurück, was uns am ehesten einfällt (Verfügbarkeitsheuristik/availability heuristic) oder das, was wir für am wahrscheinlichsten und auf den ersten Blick für richtig halten (Repräsentativitätsheuristik/representativeness-heuristic).

Stereotype dienen aber auch beim Vergleich der eigenen Person mit anderen Personen oder Gruppen dazu, andere abzuwerten, um sich dadurch positiv von anderen zu unterscheiden und damit das eigene Selbstwertgefühl zu verbessern.

Im folgenden soll noch auf zwei weitere Funktionen eingegangen werden, die erst in den letzten Jahren intensiver untersucht worden sind:

2.1.1 Das sog, Attraktivitäts-Stereotyp (The physical attractiveness stereotype)

In einer Vielzahl von Untersuchungen, inzwischen zusammengefasst in mehreren Metaanalysen (vgl. Langlois/Kalakanis/Rubenstein/Larson/Hallam/Smoot 2000), hat sich gezeigt, dass es ausreichend Belege für das Sprichwort gibt "What is beautiful is good". Personen, die physisch attraktiv erscheinen, bekommen überzufällig mehr positive Merkmale zugeschrieben als weniger attraktive Personen. Sie sind demnach sozial kompetenter, erfolgreicher, beliebter, freundlicher, haben mehr Kontakt, sind in der Schule besser etc. Dieses Stereotyp gilt im übrigen ebenso für Männer wie für Frauen.

2.1.2 Bedrohung durch Stereotype (Stereotype Threat)

Stereotype sind die auf bestimmte Gruppen gerichteten Merkmalszuschreibungen, bei der in der Regel die Majoritäten den Minoritäten Stereotype zuordnen. Diese Majoritäts-Perspektive aus dem Blickwinkel der Sozialpsychologie beschreibt, analysiert und erklärt das Arsenal an Stereotypen und bemüht sich durch Entwicklung von Strategien und Interventionsprogrammen um Veränderungen von Stereotypen, die eben in jener Majorität vorzufinden sind.

Was aber ist denn eigentlich mit denjenigen, die Zielscheibe dieser Stereotype sind? Sind sie im Kern positiv, werden sie akzeptiert oder ignoriert. Sind sie negativ, dann kann aus einem Stereotyp, das sich gegen die Gruppe richtet, ein bedrohliches Stereotyp werden. Die Untersuchungen des Stereotype-Threat-Phänomens (Steele/Aronson 1995; Steele 2000) haben damit begonnen, dass die negativen Erwartungen an die Mathematik-Leistungen dazu geführt haben, dass Mädchen generell schlechtere Mathematik-Leistungen erbringen. Abgesehen davon, dass dieses Stereotyp durch viele Meta-Analysen widerlegt ist, ist eine der Konsequenzen dieser stereotypen Bedrohung, dass es massive Auswirkungen auf den Selbstwert und das Selbstwertgefühl derjenigen hat, die Zielscheibe derartiger negativer Stereotype sind. Die gilt nicht nur für bestimmte Leistungsbe-
reiche, sondern vor allem dann, wenn die Zugehörigkeit zu einer bestimmten Gruppe oder Nation Inhalt des Stereotyps ist. Schmader/Hall/Croft (2015) liefern einen Literaturüberblick über die empirischen Nachweise der Auswirkungen auf die Intergruppenbeziehungen.

Wenn also die nationalen Stereotype mit ihren diskriminierenden Inhalten von denen wahrgenommen werden, gegen die sie gerichtet sind, dann führt dies zu erheblichen Verlusten ihres Selbstwertgefühls.

2.2 Die Messung von Stereotypen und Vorurteilen (Measurement of Stereotypes)

Die Messung von Stereotypen und Vorurteilen erfolgt bis heute immer noch in der Standardvariante mithilfe von Fragebogen (Olson 2009) und die klassische Variante der Erhebung von Stereotypen ist und bleibt das Adjective-List-Verfahren, bei dem Eigenschaften genannt werden müssen. Dies und ähnliche Verfahren sind allerdings für Soziale Erwünschtheitseffekte sehr anfällig: Vor allem negative Stereotype sind in der Regel in gesellschaftlichen Kontexten normativer Kontrolle unterworfen, und die Gefahr besteht, dass die Beurteilungen positiver ausfallen, als es den wahren Beurteilungsmustern entspricht.

Nicht zuletzt aus diesem Grund werden immer häufiger sog. Implizite Assoziations-Tests (IAT; Implicit Association Tests) (Wittenbrink/Schwarz 2007) verwendet, bei denen Personen zu Substantiven (z.B. Bezeichnungen für Nationen, soziale Gruppen etc.) vorgegebene Adjektive (auf einem Bildschirm) präsentiert bekommen und so schnell wie möglich den Begriff aussuchen, der ihnen als erstes zu eben diesem Substantiv einfällt. Es wird davon ausgegangen, dass die kürzeste Reaktionszeit auch die Verbindung ist, die der Beurteiler zwischen dem Substantiv und dem Adjektiv in seinem Bewusstsein repräsentiert hat. Eine direkte Abfrage von Vorurteilen und Stereotypen gibt es dabei nicht. Allerdings bereiten die eher geringen Korrelationen zwischen den explizit abgefragten Stereotypen und Vorurteilen und den implizit ermittelten nicht unerhebliche Interpretationsschwierigkeiten. Werden hier tatsächlich die gleichen Stereotype erfasst oder muss man vielleicht dann doch davon ausgehen, dass hier unterschiedliche Inhalte ermittelt werden?

In den letzten Jahren sind neurowissenschaftliche Verfahren zur Untersuchung der Veränderung von physiologischen Hirnfunktionen eingesetzt worden, bei denen Personen die Bilder von Mitgliedern ihrer ingroup oder von outgroups gezeigt werden (Phelps et al. 2000). Diese sog. fMRI-Verfahren (functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging) registrieren Veränderungen (vor allem in der Amygdala) und bleiben so gesehen in ihren Ergebnissen erst einmal rein deskriptiv, wobei vor allem davor gewarnt werden muss, dass allein die Tatsache, dass sich Veränderungen im Gehirn nachweisen lassen, gleichbedeutend damit sei, dass Vorurteile angeboren und unveränderlich seien.

3. Entwicklung und Veränderung (Development and Change)

Als frühe Forschungen zur Entstehung oder zum Erwerb von Vorurteilen und Stereotypen werden fast immer die Arbeiten des Ehepaars Clark (Clark/Clark 1958) genannt.

Ausgangspunkt ihrer Untersuchung war die Frage, wann sich im Lebenslauf zum ersten Mal so etwas wie ein ethnisches Bewusstsein (race awareness) entwickelt, "das Bewusstsein des Selbst, zu einer spezifischen Gruppe zu gehören, die sich von anderen beobachtbaren Gruppen durch deutlich sichtbare physische Merkmale unterscheidet, die generell als ethnische Merkmale anerkannt sind".

Die dazu von ihnen verwendete Puppenwahlmethode benutzte acht Fragen:

Give me the doll ...

1. You want to play with – you like best.
2. That is pretty.
3. That looks bad.
4. That is a nice color.
5. That looks like a white child.
6. That looks like a coloured child.
7. That looks like a Negro child.
8. That looks like you.

Ihre Untersuchung von 253 **schwarzen** Kindern im Alter zwischen drei und sieben Jahren resultierte darin, dass von den 253 Kindern als Reaktion auf die erste Frage 169 die weiße Puppe wählten; als Antwort auf Frage 2 wurde 150-mal die weiße Puppe gewählt; bei Frage 3 waren es 149 Kinder, die die schwarze Puppe wählten; und bei Frage 4 zeigten 151 Kinder die weiße Puppe, 96 die farbige (im Alter von sieben Jahren zeigten jeweils 36 Kinder die farbige bzw. weiße); in Frage 5 zeigten 237 die weiße Puppe, 13 (im Alter von 3-6) die farbige Puppe. Bei Frage 6 gaben 235 Kinder die farbige Puppe ab, 15 (im Alter von 3-6) die weiße. Bei Frage 7 gaben 182 Kinder die farbige Puppe ab, 50 die weiße. Bei Frage 8 gaben 166 Kinder die farbige Puppe ab, 85 die weiße (im Alter von drei Jahren gaben 11 die farbige an, aber 19 die weiße Puppe).

Es gibt allerdings eine Reihe von Untersuchungen, die bereits vor einer sprachlichen Kategorisierung so etwas wie ein Bewusstsein von sehr basalen sozialen Kategorien wie Geschlecht, Attraktivität und Alter im Alter von 5-6 Monaten annehmen.

Ausgeprägtere Präferenzen positiver und negativer Bewertungen stellen sich dann, wie bei Clark/Clark (1958) bereits gezeigt, zwischen 5 und 7 Jahren ein.

In ihrer Metaanalyse mit 113 internationalen Studien haben Raabe/Beelmann (2011) die ethnischen Vorurteile von 2- bis 4-jährigen Kindern ausgewertet und im weiteren Entwicklungsverlauf bis zum Alter von 19 Jahren verfolgt. Das Aus-

maß der Vorurteile der meist weißen Kinder der Majoritätsgruppe variierte deutlich in Abhängigkeit von den Kontakten zu den Minoritätengruppen. Mit zunehmendem Alter wurden die Vorurteile für diejenigen Kinder und Jugendlichen größer, die nur wenig Kontakt zu Minoritätengruppen hatten. Kinder der Majorität mit der Möglichkeit zu erhöhtem Kontakt zeigten zwar anfänglich einen Anstieg ihrer Vorurteile bis zum Alter von 7 Jahren, die dann aber bis zum Alter von 19 Jahren leicht abnahmen, wobei sich ein enger Zusammenhang damit nachweisen ließ, dass bei höherem Kontakt die Vorurteile auch deutlicher abnahmen. Kinder der Minorität hatten anfänglich (ab 2 Jahren) die geringsten Vorurteile gegenüber der Majorität, dann zeigte sich bis zum Alter von 19 Jahren eine Zunahme an Vorurteilen gegenüber der Majorität, wobei die Werte immer noch geringer waren als die Vorurteilswerte selbst derjenigen Majoritätsgruppen, die Kontakt zu Minoritäten hatten. Nicht zuletzt durch die negativen Erfahrungen in der Schule und das zunehmende Bewusstsein für gesellschaftlich praktizierten Rassismus und Diskriminierung ließ sich die Zunahme an Stereotypen und Vorurteilen der Minderheiten-Kinder erklären.

Sowohl auf dem Spielplatz als auch in den oberen Klassen der Schule werden Freundschaften vor allem mit Mitgliedern der gleichen ethnischen Gruppe geschlossen, wie eine repräsentative Umfrage aus den USA gezeigt hat (Doyle/Kao 2007). Zu beinahe parallelen Ergebnissen kommen Untersuchungen zur Präferenz von Geschlechterwahlen, die bereits im Alter von 3 oder 4 Jahren einsetzen und bei denen Kinder Angehörige des eigenen Geschlechts als Spielpartner präferierten und sowohl die Mädchen wie die Jungen bereits in diesem relativ frühen Alter negative Vorurteile gegenüber dem jeweils anderen Geschlecht haben (Kite/Whitley 2016, 274f.).

Degner/Dalega (2013) haben in ihrer Metaanalyse mit 131 Studien einen relativ hohen Übereinstimmungsgrad zwischen Vorurteilen und Stereotypen der Eltern und ihren Kindern von $r = .40$ festgestellt. Dies ist zwar ein Nachweis, dass Eltern als Transmissionsinstanz von Vorurteilen und Stereotypen fungieren, wie z.B. mit zunehmendem Alter die Gruppe der peers und die genutzten Medien im Internet, es liefert allerdings nur eine Beschreibung von Sachverhalten und nicht ihre Erklärung.

Erklärungsansätze im engeren Sinne berufen sich auf:

- a) Genetische Einflüsse (genetic influences), die auf dem Umweg über die Evolution, in der die Angst vor allem Fremden die Funktion eines Schutzmechanismus übernimmt, Eingang in das Erbgut gefunden hat. Die Arbeiten von Lewis et al. (2013) belegen, dass die Abwertung von outgroups eine genetische Komponente hat, wobei diese Einflüsse sich nicht direkt nachweisen lassen, sondern über weitere physiologische und neurologische Mechanismen und generell die Umgebungsbedingungen, einschließlich von Persönlichkeitsfaktoren, den weitaus größeren Anteil an der Ausgestaltung von Vorurteilen haben.

- b) Kognitive Entwicklungsprozesse (cognitive developmental theory). Hier wird davon ausgegangen, dass der kognitive Differenzierungsgrad mit dem Alter zunimmt und damit ein besseres Verständnis der Interaktions- und Gruppenprozesse ermöglicht wird. Die Entwicklung von Vorurteilen wird somit an die kognitive Entwicklung gekoppelt, so dass aufgrund der kognitiven Entwicklung zwischen 4 und 7 Jahren es einfach deshalb nicht zur Ausgestaltung von Vorurteilen kommt, weil die dazugehörige erforderliche Differenzierungsfähigkeit fehlt. In den nachfolgenden Jahren wächst dann die Kompetenz zur Differenzierung zwischen Gruppen. Aboud (1988) hat die Entwicklung an drei Stadien geknüpft, ohne allerdings strikte Altersgrenzen anzugeben. Im ersten Stadium – zwischen 9 und 12 Monaten – kommt es zu emotionalen Reaktionen auf alles Fremde. Im zweiten Stadium werden dann von den Kindern Vergleiche zwischen der eigenen Person und anderen Personen festgestellt und unterscheidende äußere Merkmale, wie z.B. Hautfarbe, Sprache und Haarfarbe, wahrgenommen. Auf der Basis dieser differenzierten Wahrnehmung werden Personen in soziale Gruppen kategorisiert, wobei der Bedeutung von Unterschieden mehr Gewicht beigemessen wird als den Gemeinsamkeiten. Mit fortschreitendem Alter erfolgt eine differenziertere kognitive Verarbeitung und diese erhöhte kognitive Flexibilität führt als Konsequenz zu einer Verringerung der Ausprägungen von Stereotypen und Vorurteilen.
- c) Die Soziale Lerntheorie (social learning theory), die in ihrem Ursprung auf Bandura (1977) zurückgeht, ist eine Theorie des Imitationslernens, die zeigen kann, dass die Beobachtung einer Person und deren Verhalten ausreicht, um sich das entsprechende Verhalten anzueignen. Als Theorie des Beobachtungslernens oder auch Imitationslernens bezeichnet, ist die Soziale Lerntheorie vor allem dann erfolgreich, wenn das gezeigte Verhalten von einer Person gezeigt wird (einem Modell), die im jeweiligen Lernkontext besonders bedeutsam ist. Dies können Eltern, Gleichaltrige, aber auch Personen aus den Medien sein (Burgess/Dill/Stermer/Burgess/Brown 2011; Jackson 2011),
- d) Die Entwicklungstheorie der Intergruppen-Prozesse (developmental intergroup theory) von Bigler/Liben (2007) geht der Frage nach, warum Kinder Vorurteile aufgrund bestimmter Merkmale, wie ethnische Zugehörigkeit oder Geschlecht) und nicht im bezug auf andere, wie z.B. Linkshändigkeit, lernen. Wenn ab einem bestimmten Alter Kinder lernen, welche Kategorien von Personen für sie wichtig sind, dann sind dies die Resultate eines Lernprozesses innerhalb der sie umgebenden Kultur, positive oder negative Emotionen oder Bewertungen mit unterschiedlichen Kategorien von Personen zu verknüpfen.

Als zusätzliches Lernprodukt lernen die Kinder, dass derartige Kategorien mehr oder weniger stabil sind. Diese Kategorienkonstanz (category constancy) erwerben die Kinder im Alter von 5 bis 9 Jahren, wobei im späteren Verlauf,

bei zunehmender Differenzierung der kategorialen Wahrnehmung, sich Veränderungen in der Kategorienzuordnung ergeben können, nicht zuletzt multiple Kategorienzuordnung; d.h. Personen werden nicht nur einer, sondern mehreren Kategorien zugeordnet.

Stereotype scheinen unvermeidbar (unavoidable) zu sein. Bei der Unterscheidung von zwei Prozessen der Informationsverarbeitung – einem kontrollierten und einem automatischen – lässt sich zeigen, dass wir bei der Begegnung mit einer Person, die zu einer Gruppe gehört, der gegenüber Stereotype bestehen, wir automatisch diese Stereotype aktivieren (Devine 1989), die wir in dem mehr oder weniger langen Sozialisationsprozess erlernt haben und die immer dann ohne unser Zutun in unser Bewusstsein aufsteigen. Es muß jedoch nicht so sein, dass die automatische Verarbeitung unmittelbar zu einer diskriminierenden Handlung führt. Der automatische Verarbeitung – so P. Devine (1989) – ist die sog. kontrollierte nachgeschaltet, die zu einer Modifikation der automatischen führen kann. In neueren Untersuchungen kann man sogar nachweisen, dass es Strategien gibt, diese anfänglichen automatischen Prozesse zu unterdrücken (Devine/Sharp 2009).

4. Reduktion und Intervention (Reduction and Intervention)

Die Programme zur Veränderung und Reduktion von Stereotypen und Vorurteilen (vgl. Kite/Whitley 2016) sind zahlreich, aufwändig und zum Teil mit anspruchsvollen Voraussetzungen verbunden:

Die verwendeten Strategien und Interventionsprogramme lassen sich an dieser Stelle nur aufzählen:

- Persuasive Techniken, wie durch Filme und Anzeigenspots,
- Lehr- und Lernprogramme im schulischen Kontext,
- Kognitive Trainings,
- Rollenspiele,
- Änderung gesetzlicher Grundlagen.

Am wirkungsvollsten aber sind Kontaktprogramme, jedoch nur dann, so die frühformulierten Voraussetzungen von Allport (1954), wenn der Kontakt freiwillig ist, die Beteiligten einen vergleichbaren Status haben, sich gemeinsame Ziele bilden lassen und es Unterstützung durch staatliche Institutionen gibt. Die empirischen Untersuchungen lassen sich nach Allport (ebd.) auf die ethnischen Auseinandersetzungen in den USA der 1930iger und 1940iger Jahre zurückführen. Nicht zuletzt durch Allport (1954) sind hunderte von Untersuchungen in diesem Bereich durchgeführt worden.

Eine der prominentesten und umfangreichsten Metaanalysen von Pettigrew/Tropp (2006) mit 515 Studien und 713 unabhängigen Stichproben findet eine summarische negative Korrelation (je mehr Kontakt, desto weniger Vorurteile) von $r = -.22$.

Although, overall this work suggests that Allport's (1954) contact conditions are important, Pettigrew and Tropp's (2006) meta-analysis indicated that even unstructured contact reduces prejudice ($r = -.20$). The presence of Allport's conditions enhances this effect considerably ($r = -.29$) [...] (Tausch/Hewstone 2010, 545)

Natürlich ist die Wirkung in unterschiedlichen Settings unterschiedlich (Pettigrew/Tropp 2011). Offensichtlich läßt sich durch Kontakt das Ausmaß an Vorurteilen bei Kindern unter 12 Jahren und bei College-Studenten am erfolgreichsten verändern.

Was ist denn nun von allen Möglichkeiten die beste Variante zur Reduktion von Vorurteilen? 1) Die Color-blind Perspective, bei der die Gruppenzugehörigkeit überhaupt keine Rolle spielen soll, stattdessen nur die einzelnen Personen und die gruppalen Gemeinsamkeiten, oder 2) die Assimilationist Perspective, bei der die Minoritäten ihre eigene Kultur und ihre eigene Identität aufgeben sollen? Oder 3) Die Multicultural Perspective, bei die kulturellen Unterschiede akzeptiert werden und für ein harmonisches Miteinander plädiert wird, oder 4) die Polycultural Perspective, wonach die Menschen durch ihre Kulturen historisch gesehen alle miteinander verbunden sind und sich wechselseitig beeinflusst haben? Rosenthal/Levy (2010) schließen die assimilationistische Perspektive aus und plädieren für die Integration der übrigen drei Ansätze, wobei die Multicultural Perspective der Start für einen optimalen Beginn wäre.

5. Ein Rahmenmodell zur Kategorisierung von Stereotypen – das Stereotype Content Model (SCM)

Die beiden Ausgangsfragen des SCM lauten: Haben diejenigen Personen oder Gruppenmitglieder, denen ich mich gegenüber sehe, gute oder böse Absichten? Übersetzt in die Konzeption des Modells heißt das, lassen sie sich auf der "Dimensionen der Sozialen Wärme" (warmth) eher an dem Pol geringer (low) sozialer Wärme oder hoher (high) sozialer Wärme einordnen?

Die zweite Frage ist die nach der Kompetenz dieser Gruppen (Competence, high, low). Möglicherweise sind sie mir als Mitglied meiner eignen Gruppe überlegen und vielleicht stellen sie dann sogar eine Bedrohung für mich dar (Fiske et al.2002).

Die empirische Basis dieses Modells ist überwältigend. Nicht nur lassen sich in die Vierfeldertafel des Modells, wie Abbildung 3 zeigt, soziale Gruppen einordnen, sondern auch ethnische Gruppierungen.

Zwei-Komponenten-Modell (Stereotype Content Model) v. Fiske




Abb. 3: Das Zweikomponentenmodell von Fiske et al. (2002)

Abbildung 4 zeigt, dass es sehr wohl Fälle gibt, bei denen eine eindeutige Klassifikation in hoch oder niedrig nicht möglich ist. Die Einordnung europäischer Länder führt zur Anordnung von Nationen, die bezogen auf die beiden Dimensionen Wärme und Kompetenz nur mittlere Ausprägungsgrade haben.




Figure 2.4 Stereotype content model warmth by competence mapping of EU member nations rating themselves (bold) and other nations, as seen by the EU community. Source: Cuddy et al. (in press). Reproduced by permission.

Abb. 4: Verteilung der EU-Länder anhand des Zweikomponentenmodells von Fiske et al. auf die beiden Dimensionen "Wärme" und "Kompetenz" (nach Cuddy et al. 2008)

Die empirische Basis dieses Modells ist überwältigend. In die Vierfeldertafel des Modells lassen sich, wie Abbildung 3 zeigt, nicht nur soziale Gruppen einordnen (Cuddy et al. 2008), sondern auch ethnische Gruppierungen.

Darüber hinaus zeigt die Abbildung aber auch, dass es sehr wohl Fälle gibt, bei denen eine eindeutige Klassifikation in hoch oder niedrig nicht möglich ist. So zeigt sich bei der Einordnung europäischer Länder, dass es bei einigen Ländern nur mittlere Ausprägungsgrade auf den beiden Dimensionen gibt.

In einer Arbeit von Phalet/Poppe (1997) wurden vergleichsweise ähnliche Kategorisierungen vorgenommen. Die beiden von den Autoren verwendeten Dimensionen waren "Moralität" (morality) und Kompetenz (competence). "The results of the 60 national and ethnic stereotypes of 1143 secondary-school pupils between 15 to 18 years of is a cross national study with 178 Russians, 176 Byelorrussians, 206 Bulgarians, 183 Hungarians, 202 Poles and 198 Czechs" (Phalet/Poppe 1997). Die Mehrzahl der Nationen wurde von den Befragten in dem Quadranten hoher Moralität und geringer Kompetenz angeordnet.

Das Erstaunliche an diesen Studien ist vor allem, dass bei aller Unterschiedlichkeit der inhaltlichen Ausprägung von Vorurteilen und Stereotypen die generelle Bewertungsdimensionen sich auf zwei reduzieren lassen, die sich als Leistungsdimension und als Moralbewusstsein klassifizieren lassen.

6. Perspektiven und Trends

Die allgemeine Voraussetzung zukünftiger Forschung heißt: "Wir alle haben Stereotype und Vorurteile". Eine derartige Diagnose hat ihre Prämissen und ihre Konsequenzen:

- 1) Zu der wichtigsten Prämissen zählt die Feststellung, dass es neben den Stereotypen und Vorurteilen gegenüber ethnischen Minderheiten, den Frauen und den Alten (den sog. top three der klassischen Vorurteilsforschung), gleich serienweise weitere "Zielgruppen" gibt: Gruppen mit den unterschiedlichsten Bekenntnissen (religious affiliations), Gruppen aus den unterschiedlichsten Ländern und Kontinenten mit unterschiedlichen kulturellen Standards, politische Gruppierungen, aber auch Randgruppen der Gesellschaft, Gruppen mit unterschiedlichen sexuellen Orientierungen und auch Gruppen mit Behinderungen.
- 2) Die Untersuchung von Stereotypen kann nicht länger die experimentelle Untersuchung in psychologischen Laboratorien mit Erstsemester-Studierenden sein. Künftige Untersuchungen werden zeitraubender und damit auch teurer.
- 3) Einzelne Themen der Vorurteils- und Stereotypenforschung werden immer noch in psychologischen Teildisziplinen bearbeitet, so dass wichtige Ergebnisse nur unzureichend rezipiert werden. Entwicklungsprozesse der Entstehung und Veränderung finden sich schwerpunktmäßig in der Entwicklungspsychologie, Programme und Interventionen zur Reduktion häufig in der Pädagogischen Psychologie, um nur einige Beispiele zu nennen.

- 4) Stereotype und Vorurteile entwickeln sich und verändern sich, woraus sich beinahe zwangsläufig die Forderung nach Langzeituntersuchungen ergibt.
- 5) Die Untersuchungstechniken sollten mehr denn je Messverfahren einsetzen, die auf physiologischen Messungen beruhen und weniger auf Befragungen mit Skalen und Fragebögen.
- 6) “As with all-well studied phenomena, the more we have learned about prejudice, stereotypes and discrimination, the more we understand just how subtle and complex these phenomena are. And the suggestions made here for future work – more longitudinal, multi-level, interdisciplinary, and integrative research – will only complicate the picture. But the world IS complex” (Pettigrew 2010, 610).

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Klaus Reichert

French disease or maladie anglaise. Figures of contempt or of self-assertion

Abstract

This paper focuses firstly on the role stereotypes play in the emergence of nation-building in the sense of “imagined communities” (inclusion versus exclusion), using examples from the Bible, from Shakespeare, and from the German Wars of Independence (1813-1815). Secondly, stereotypes are shown as reactions against emerging new ideas or concepts that indicate a shift in traditional values (the self-determination of Shakespeare’s criminals Richard III and Iago, and Machiavelli’s “Principe” versus Erasmus’s “Institutio Principis Christiani”). Both basic kinds of stereotypes serve as safeguards against differentiation and are fact-resistant.

Abstract (deutsch)

Stereotype sind wirklichkeits- und wahrheitsresistent. Sie lassen sich nicht durch Argumente entkräften oder auflösen wie Vorurteile; sie sind prinzipiell nicht falsifizierbar. Dabei sind sie stabil, oft über Jahrhunderte. Die ‚Begründungen‘ können zwar wechseln – der Judentumshass reicht vom Antijudaismus des ‚Heilandmords‘ bis zum rassistischen Antisemitismus mit den Zwischenstufen der Hostienschändung, der Brunnenvergiftung, des Wuchers und dem Streben nach Weltherrschaft –, aber die Ausgrenzung bleibt stabil, auch wenn sie den historischen Umständen angepaßt wird. Das den Stereotypen zugrunde liegende Modell ist das von Exklusion und Inklusion als identitätsetzendem oder -stabilisierendem Existential: ‚Wir‘ und ‚die Anderen‘. Das Modell funktioniert besonders effizient in Krisenzeiten als Entlastung durch Schuldzuweisung (Seuchen im Mittelalter; ökonomische oder politische Klemmen seit dem 19. Jahrhundert). Auf einer weiter gefaßten Ebene spielen Stereotypen eine mentalitätsgeschichtlich entscheidende Rolle bei der Herausbildung von Nationalstaaten, den ‚imagined communities‘, wie sie genannt wurden, als Abgrenzung gegen andere Nationen. Das sogenannte ‚Eigene‘ funktioniert dabei verfassungsfreundlich erfolgreich gegen ‚das Andere‘ (das Undeutsche, der Erbfeind, der Ausländer; ‚positiv‘ stereotyp gewendet: die Leitkultur). Stereotypen sind stets in antiaufklärerischen Affekten fundiert, aber hilfreich als vermeintliche Sinnangebote. Das alles ist nicht neu, wie sich an historischen Beispielen zeigen läßt.

In Shakespeare’s “Merchant of Venice” a rich heiress is obliged to accept as a husband the suitor who picks the one casket out of three that contains her portrait. Portia, the heiress, lists the suitors who are waiting at her door. There is a Neapolitan prince who is only interested in horses; there is the Count Palatine, a sullen kind of philosopher; there is a Frenchman who is everything and nothing, bragging,

dancing, fencing with his own shadow; an English baron who has neither Latin, French nor Italian and buys his odd clothes in Italy, France and Germany; and a prince from Saxony who is very vile in the morning when he is sober, and most vile in the afternoon when he is drunk. These are humorous exaggerations that have their place in comedy, but underneath we find the common stereotypes of the age. Germans are either drunkards or frowning philosophers like Hamlet (who had studied at Wittenberg). The French are good-for-nothings, whiling away their time with trifles. Later in the play we see two suitors making their choice: there is Aragon, a haughty, ceremonious, conceited man, whose presence reminds us that the conflict between England and Spain did not end with the victory over the Armada. The other suitor is Morocco, a pompous, self-righteous prince with a tawny skin. A mild form of racism comes into the play here; Portia says: "Let all of his complexion choose me so".

The one character in the play with whom stereotypes are put to the test is Shylock. Of course all the age-old stereotypes are given or implied: he is rich, he is a usurer, (i.e. he thrives on the financial needs of the Christians whom he hates), he sticks relentlessly and literally to the laws of his creed. All the time he lives, though segregated, within the precincts of the Venetian republic; legally, but despised. He is a paradoxical example of simultaneous inclusion and exclusion. But the point of the drama is that he is in no way a paradigm of the stereotype Jew. He is a human being – "If you prick us do we not bleed? [...] If you poison us do we not die?" – wronged by the people he happens to live with. His daughter steals his riches – even things he is emotionally attached to – in order to elope with her Christian lover; and by legal casuistry he is tricked out of his right, codified in a contract, however atrocious. The play shows that the Jew is not inhuman "by nature", as history has it, but that society makes him act – or rather react – as he does. The malicious, revengeful Jew is a product of a society that stabilises itself by having its stereotypes confirmed (as is also the case with Othello, who is mentally tortured until his alleged "bestial nature" comes to the surface).

This is my first point: societies, political or religious communities, even individuals, construct and stabilise their identity by inventing stereotypes for difference or otherness that tend to persist tenaciously over centuries. Stereotypes of otherness work both ways – *we* are different from *them*, *they* are different from *us* – and may even develop physical markers or signs (the Jewish nose) to anchor the difference. We know this from many early or primitive societies that tattoo their faces or bodies. Let me call circumcision a stereotype in this sense: it distinguishes the Israelites from other tribes. If we accept such distinguishing markers as stereotypes – not prejudices or assumptions, but arbitrary signs that signify membership of a group, i.e. markers of *inclusion* – we may also refer to circumcision or to the wearing of the Burka as markers which serve in reverse as pretexts for *exclusion*. For example a woman wearing a Burka these days provokes

aggression in Western countries because it is seen as a symbol for the suppression of women or the refusal of integration. When Joshua, the successor of Moses, led his chosen people to the Promised Land he first circumcised them, because during their forty years in the desert the older people had died and none of the newborn ones had been marked in this way. After their installation of otherness Joshua led the people into a land that was inhabited by various tribes – Canaanites, Moabites, Arameans etc., all Semites – ransacked their cities and exterminated their people. They felt entitled to do so because they acted by the order of their God whose sign they bore on their bodies. Generations later there arose a most powerful enemy, the non-Semitic people of the Philistines who lived on the coast of the Mediterranean Sea and had founded 5 cities there, among them Gaza, Askalon and Japha . When the Israelites founded a kingdom of their own, Saul, their first king, promised his daughter to David as a wife but ordered him, by way of a dowry, to bring him 100 Philistine prepuces. David obliged and brought him 200. This is the same David who as a shepherd boy had killed the giant Goliath with a stone sling. But the Philistines were never vanquished and the Israelites never reached the sea. At some point or other they just disappeared from the stage of history. We hardly know anything about them, except that they must have been urbane tradespeople who trafficked throughout the Mediterranean. Oddly enough their name has survived and has become part of our languages; I don't know when this happened or why. Perhaps the Israelites themselves put it on the agenda – as they could not defeat them, they found an outlet by mocking them, because “Philistine” means a narrow-minded man, someone to be laughed at. So this is all that is left of a once powerful, much-feared people. Speaking of names, another one, from the New Testament, comes to my mind: the Pharisees in the time of Jesus. In our languages Pharisee has come to mean “hypocrite”. In the time of Jesus they were a very stern sect, rigidly observing the law, and Jesus himself – adhering to this attitude – said: “Think not that I am come to destroy the law, or the prophets: I am not come to destroy, but to fulfil. For verily I say unto you, till heaven and earth pass, one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the law, till all be fulfilled” (Mat. 5, 17f.). That is to say, he defines himself as a Pharisee in the original meaning of the word. But in the course of the narrative of the Gospels they bear the brunt for most things that contradict the new interpretation of the written law, belief as opposed to rationality. And in the emergence of Christianity and in anti-Jewish propaganda, the Pharisees became a favourite example for self-righteousness and hypocrisy. It is noteworthy for the ubiquitous flexibility of stereotypes that the accusation of being Pharisees was later launched by Luther against the Roman church.

The construction of otherness by way of resorting to stereotypes plays an important role in the emergence of nation building, or what has been called by Benedict Anderson “imagined communities”. My second example in this section

about inclusion and exclusion comes from English history as unfolded in Shakespeare's plays. To begin with there is the famous speech of the dying John of Gaunt, culminating in a eulogy about

This fortress built by Nature for herself
 This happy breed of men, this little world,
 This precious stone set in the silver sea,
 This blessed plot, this earth, this realm, this England,
 This dear dear land,
 Dear for her reputation through the world,
 Is now leas'd out [...] (William Shakespeare: *Richard II*, II, ii. 43ff.)

These lines played a part in recent arguments for Brexit. But England also has hereditary claims to the crown of France, which France slights. In response to English offers of negotiations, the French dauphin sends a box of tennis balls to the young king Henry V. This is the first tangible sign of the reckless flippancy, scorn and lack of political responsibility on the part of France which in the course of the play will extend to an ever denser web of stereotypes characterising French mentality and behaviour. And if it comes to war, as it does, only France will be responsible for it: “[...] tell the Dauphin”, Henry says to the Ambassador,

His jest will savour of but shallow wit
 When thousands weep more than did laugh at it. (William Shakespeare: *Henry V*, I, ii. 294f.)

(Incidentally, in the Laurence Olivier film of the play in 1944, dedicated to the Royal Air Force, the French were depicted as thinly disguised, preposterous Germans. The sneer of the Dauphin was Hitler's sneering at the Munich conference.) We first see Henry in action at the siege of Harfleur. He warns the Governour that, if he does not surrender, devastation and death will be the consequence –

Take pity of your town and of your people,
 Whiles yet my soldiers are in my command. (William Shakespeare: *Henry V*, III, iii. 28f.)

This is the speech of a “truly Christian prince”. The city surrenders because the Dauphin fails to arrive with support, as his powers were not yet ready. In contrast to noble Henry, the French are vain braggarts offering a collection of stereotypes to denigrate the English: “a barbarous people”, “Norman bastards”, “Is not their climate foggy, raw and dull?”, and many others. But in their vanity they brag

When he shall see our army
 He'll drop his heart into the sink of fear [...] (William Shakespeare: *Henry V*, III, vi. 58f.)

To be sure, the French have superior forces, whereas the English soldiers are few in number, badly equipped, starving, and in ragged uniforms. Their case seems

hopeless. But in characterising the French, Shakespeare again resorts to stereotypes: they are degenerate, more interested in the breeding of their horses than in their fitness for war, they are presumptuous and effeminate, overbearing, indulging in a “gloire” that is nothing but a soap bubble – stereotypes that time and again, not just in this play, are applied to the French from the English point of view and, for that matter, also from the German one in later centuries. In contrast, the English are down to earth, pragmatic, courageous, “fram’d of the firm truth of Valour”. Moreover, in time of need the English cling together – “We few, we happy few, we band of brothers”. This applies even to those populations that are prone to mutiny against English supremacy – the Welsh, the Irish, and the Scots, who are excluded on the grounds of their Celtic origins and their dialectal otherness, but included because of their territorial vicinity – so that the French challenge leads in the end to the Utopia of a United Kingdom. Perhaps this would also imply the hegemony of English (with its variants) over the French language. There is a funny scene where the French princess Katharine, the future wife of Henry, tries to learn English. In her first lesson she memorises: “[...] de hand, de fingre [...] de foot, de count” and comments:

ce sont mots de son mauvais, corruptible, gros, et impudique, et non pour les dames d’honneur d’user: je ne voudrais prononcer ces mots devant les seigneurs de France pour tout le monde. (William Shakespeare: *Henry V*, III, iv)

It is a final thrust at ridiculing the French by letting them parody the English tongue. This play, “*Henry V*”, is the paragon of English (or – already – British) national identity, flexible in that it can be exchanged for other exclusions: the Germans in the Second World War and in the decades following, and recently the rejection of the European Union.

Stereotypes are the simplest means to set in motion the mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion. My third example in this section comes from the German Wars of Independence in the years 1810 to 1815. The German-speaking countries had been occupied by Napoleon’s armies, the Prussian king was expelled. Heavy war contributions had to be paid, the countries had been devastated, their art collections looted, even the quadriga on top of the Brandenburg Gate was transferred to Paris. Yet Napoleon was not just a conqueror. What he had in mind was a reordering of Europe, to abolish its numerous petty kingdoms or dukedoms. A prime instrument for this was the creation of the Code Civile, a milestone in legal history, which for example conceded equal rights to Jews. Goethe, for one, appreciated Napoleon’s innovations and felt uneasy about his downfall. Anyway, the wars – fought not only by regular armies, but by many volunteer groups – led to a frenzy of enthusiasm for the German cause. This is where stereotypes come into play, stereotypes of the most chauvinist kind, in part formulated by philosophers such as Fichte or Arndt, by poets and painters. The stereotypes were not only directed against the Napoleonic occupation, but against the French in general.

It is as if the Germans wanted to take revenge on French thinking – which had dominated the 18th century even in Germany – in its totality. (In the Prussian Academy, founded by Frederick II, only French was spoken.) In the context of the impending wars the Germans discovered or rather invented their Germanness, in opposition to more or less everything French: German “Geist” against flimsy “esprit”, sincerity against flippancy, profoundness against superficiality, soul against “raison”, emotion against reasoning, Romanticism against Classicism, medievalism against modernity, feigned old-German garb against fashionable dress, etc. Of course this enumeration is a list of stereotypes. The patriotic spirit created a German fatherland, howsoever this could be invented or forged among tribes of different roots or territories. (“Oh holy heart of peoples, oh fatherland”, wrote Hölderlin.) A very telling example is the purification of the German language, which gets stripped mainly of French but also of Latin words in establishing our mother tongue – “Muttersprache, Mutterlaut”. “Fraternité” becomes “Brüderlichkeit”, “unité” becomes “Einheit” or rather “Einigkeit”, “Universität” becomes “Hochschule” etc. – honest German words against foreign infiltration or estrangement. (The word here should be “Überfremdung” for which no English equivalent seems to exist. It is this word which we hear most often these days in the context of the “flood of refugees” – another stereotype – that “haunt” (“heim-suchen” should be the word) our country.)

Most important in establishing German national identity is a distinction that sets it apart from other nations, not just from the French. Other nations are civilised, but the Germans are “cultured”, they are a “Kulturnation”. Since the Wars of Independence and for generations afterwards, “civilisation” in German understanding always had a slightly pejorative ring. Civilisation means sobriety, pragmatism, rationality, administration, economy, common sense, traffic between nations (even extending to cosmopolitanism), enlightenment. But something was felt to be lacking here, thus “culture” was intended to mean “that within which passes show”, in Hamlet’s phrase, with show in the sense of ostentation. Germany, and the German language in particular, had at last come of age, after England and France. It was the great age of philosophy, of literature, of philology. It was here that the phrase was coined: Germany is “das Volk der Dichter und Denker”. Even Shakespeare was appropriated and became – by way of Schlegel’s inspired translation – part of German culture; in fact he was promoted to the rank of the third classical German author after Goethe and Schiller. But the great cultural accomplishments were extended to claim superiority in other fields and led to the hubris of “culture” and the detraction of other nations which had only “civilisation”.

Shakespeare, and in particular Hamlet, is a nice example for our discussion of stereotypes. Goethe had interpreted Hamlet as a dreamer, an intellectual, ruminating, brooding, meditating, arguing with himself. He never comes to terms with himself, he procrastinates but never acts, even when the chance to kill the

king offers itself. Hamlet is much too noble a character, much too elevated to soil his hands by acting. This Goethean view of Hamlet was held to be a fitting description of the state of German mentality during the first five decades of the 19th century and beyond. In those years the phrase “Germany is Hamlet” was coined. After the Vienna congress the political situation had changed, but not for the better. There were revolutions against authoritarian governments – first in France, not yet in Germany – demanding reforms on various levels: against police states, against censorship, for freedom of speech etc. Against this background the Hamlet phrase was still appropriate. The poet Ferdinand Freiligrath, driven from one exile to the next, a friend of Karl Marx, wrote at the dawn of the so-called German Revolution of 1848 a poem which begins:

Deutschland ist Hamlet – Ernst und stumm
 In seinen Thoren jede Nacht
 Geht die begrabne Freiheit um
 Und winkt den Männern auf der Wacht.

Towards the end it says:

Mach den Moment zu Nutze dir!
 Noch ist es Zeit – drein mit dem Schwert,
 Eh’ mit französischem Rapier
 Dich schnöd vergiftet ein Laert!

The background is that Laertes, the brother of Ophelia, had been sent by his father to Paris to study, whereas Hamlet had studied in Wittenberg, the Lutheran city. So another set of stereotypes is evoked: the French are Catholics, the Germans Lutheran Protestants. In any event the conflict between France and Germany continued with ups and downs and was temporarily “solved” by the Franco-Prussian war, which led in 1871 to the foundation of the German Reich, with all the ensuing disasters in the next century. Six years later, in 1877, the Harvard scholar Horace Howard Furness dedicated his variorum edition of Hamlet “To the ‘German Shakespeare Society’ of Weimar / representative of a people / whose recent history / has proved / ONCE FOR ALL / that / ‘GERMANY IS *NOT* Hamlet’ / these volumes are dedicated / with great respect by / the editor”.

What I have sketched here is of course not a summary of German/French relationships. They are much more complicated. But I do believe that the German mood or mentality, in part at least, functioned along those lines of stereotypes. The French and the British people reciprocated in kind, of course.

Let me now – in the second, much shorter part of my paper – describe a totally different kind of stereotype. This kind may be split in two. The first refers to stigmatisation and exclusion derived from the political problems of those included; the second kind aims at emerging new ideas that threaten traditional values and cause fear.

The first type is the commonest and can be dealt with quite briefly. Let me remind you of the history of Jewry in Western societies. In medieval plague years the Jews were generally held responsible for it because they had poisoned the wells. In times of economic crises the international finance capital – which was “of course” Jewish – was the cause of it. In the 1880s a German theologian, preacher to the Imperial Court, coined the phrase “the Jews are our misfortune”, which was handed down to the next generations. Part of the Nazi economy was financed by the expropriation of Jewish capital, industry, real estate and other possessions which had been “stolen” by the Jews anyway. Everything German, or Germanic or Teutonic, was healthy; everything Jewish, in particular their blood, was sick or even poisonous. Once the Jews had been exterminated a sound German people and body politic could be re-established. I mention these well-known facts only in order to point out that propaganda always makes use of the mechanisms of exclusion and inclusion which rely – only and solely – on stereotypes. It is horrible to see that this primitive mechanism still functions as we watch the growth of right wing organisations throughout Europe. There is too much otherness in our countries, they argue. If we only get rid of immigrants, refugees, Muslims, the Schengen agreement, the established parties etc., we shall regain our national identity. All this works through stereotypes and is a relapse to the time of nation-building and nationalism which we had thought belonged to the past after the atrocities of the 20th century.

Secondly: emerging new ideas. Medieval and early modern societies were stratified communities existing in strict hierarchical orders. Every member had his or her predetermined place. In one’s place, one was responsible to a common or communal whole, the common weal, as the English phrase has it, held together in the last resort by Christian ethics. There was no place for individualism in the modern sense of the word. But gradually – or subliminally – a crack in the closed world picture was felt that undermined unanimous consent and was considered as a threat to traditional values. Not yet being able to recognise an upcoming change in human understanding and mentality, society responded by exclusion. New concepts such as self-assertion or self-determination – although the words did not exist in the 16th or 17th centuries – were denounced as unsettling society. It is significant that Shakespeare’s most heinous criminals – Richard III, Iago, the bastard Edmund in “King Lear” – are self-assertive individuals. “I am myself absolute”, says Richard, or “I am I” with a blasphemous ring to it. Edmund says “Nature, thou art my goddess”, appealing to a kind of survival of the fittest. Radical self-determination means a choice of evil, and aims at the destruction of everybody in its way. This individualism or self-determination becomes a stereotype of stigmatisation for new historical trends or developments not yet understood. It took about two centuries before self-determination, self-assertion and self-consciousness became primary values of enlightened human beings.

A telling example for political stereotypes in the early modern period is the theory of governance. In 1516 Erasmus of Rotterdam published his “*Institutio Principis Christiani*” (The Education of the Christian Prince). The prime requirements of a good prince are his firm adherence to the Christian faith and its undisputed ethics. He must be virtuous, wise and good. His judgments and actions must never be rash but well considered for the common good, firm but never cruel, mild and forgiving to his enemies. Erasmus constructs the picture of an ideal prince, and as ideals go, they are a collection of stereotypes, handed down since antiquity. They have nothing to do with political reality.

In the same year (1516) the Florentine diplomat and politician Niccolo Machiavelli wrote a small handbook on governance “*Il Principe*”, the contents of which spread by rumour throughout Europe, although the little book was not published until a century later. Machiavelli’s scandalous conclusion, based on close experience and observation, was that there is no such thing as a Christian prince. If it seems politically opportune in order to achieve a necessary goal, the prince may resort to Christian values without believing in them, i.e. religion may be of service if need be: the end justifies the means. Machiavelli uses the concept of virtue in the Roman sense – “*virtus*” – as mental and physical strength, the ability to analyse given situations and act accordingly. What Machiavelli has in mind is not personal power or the enrichment of the prince, but safeguarding the state against (mostly foreign) aggression for the benefit of his subjects. His word for this new concept is “*ragione dello stato*”, “*reason of state*”, “*raison d’état*” “*Staatsräson*”. In short: Machiavelli is the first truly political thinker in the modern sense of the word.

But this is not how he was understood in his own time. The stereotype of “*Machiavellianism*” is still with us today. It means cheating, deceiving, hypocrisy, treachery and a rigorous will to power. In confession-based 16th century thinking, “*Machiavellianism*” was seen as an onslaught on Christian values. But as Machiavelli’s ideas were spread by hearsay only, they were informed by anti-Machiavellian propaganda. The English punned on his name – Machevill, i.e. match evil – and in his first name, Niccolo, it was easy to detect an allusion to “old Nick”, i.e. the devil. In Christopher Marlowe’s play “*The Jew of Malta*” (ca. 1589), Machevill is brought on stage as the Prologue:

Albeit the world think Machevill is dead,
Yet was his soul but flown beyond the Alps,
And now the Guise is dead, is come from France
To view this land, and frolic with his friends. [...] I weigh not men, and therefore not men’s words.
Though some speak openly against my books,
Yet will they read me, and thereby attain
To Peter’s chair: and when they cast me off,
Are poisoned by my climbing followers.
I count religion but a childish toy,
And hold there is no sin but ignorance.

As you see, even the Pope attains his chair only by resorting to Machiavellian means. Shakespeare presents an image of a Machiavellian villain when he has his future king Richard III say:

Why, I can smile, and murder whiles I smile,
 And wet my cheeks with artificial tears,
 And frame my face to all occasions.
 I can add colours to the chameleon,
 Change shapes with Proteus for advantages,
 And set the murderous Machiavel to school. (William Shkeaspeare: 3 Henry VI,
 IV, iii, 182ff.)

Here we get all the stereotypes that are associated with the name of Machiavelli to this day. Richard is a shining example of the abominable Machiavellian prince as the early modern era thought him to be. Needless to say, this contradicts Machiavelli's true intentions at every turn of thought or action. Later generations would find that Machiavelli's observations, far from being ruthless prescriptions, mirrored quite precisely courtly, diplomatic and political behaviour: one does not always mean what one says, one's counterpart need not see one's intentions, honesty or truthfulness are not opportune means for achieving political aims. This is how political reality functions.

Machiavelli's realistic observations were formulated at the same time as the Roman church was being challenged by Luther, but its core values were never questioned as the bedrock of Western societies. Against this background it was unthinkable that Christian ethics could be degraded to a mere tool among others, an expedient if need be to reach specific aims and ends. People were not prepared to see that Machiavelli's "ragione dello stato" reached far into the future, but reacted by exclusion and stigmatisation of the most grotesque kind – stereotype as caricature, which is the case more often than not.

And this seems to me a characteristic of stereotypes in general, that they stick in the mind over centuries with a pertinacity that disallows falsification. One may argue rationally against prejudices, and have a chance to dissolve them. But one cannot argue using facts or reasoning against stereotypes, which are the safest means precisely to ignore facts or existing problems and which satisfy base instincts of assumed superiority, especially if relished in like-minded groups. The only thing that history teaches is that we do not learn from it. Civilisation has always been but a thin varnish, or perhaps a precarious balance, as in Greek democracy. But if the scales tip over or tilt, anything may happen – the varnish cracks and the "Beast of the Depths" comes to the surface again. Stereotypes thought to have become obsolete once and for all, such as nationalism, have only been slumbering, and emerge again into the open to show their heinous faces.

Loïc Depecker

Stéréotypes et préjugés: quelques idées reçues sur le français

Dans le fil de la thématique de notre colloque, j'aborderai ici quelques représentations de la langue française, d'un point de vue à la fois linguistique et politique.

En tant que "sujets parlants", nous avons tous une représentation des langues: une représentation de notre langue et une représentation d'autres langues.

Quelle est la représentation la plus répandue sur la langue française? C'est difficile à dire. Cela dépend à quoi on se réfère à ce sujet.

Est-ce à la langue littéraire, et dans la littérature française, à quel auteur se réfère-t-on pour qualifier cette langue de "littéraire": François Rabelais, Victor Hugo, Émile Zola, Marcel Proust...?

Se réfère-t-on à la langue française en tant que langue de la philosophie: Descartes, Pascal, Voltaire, Rousseau, Merleau-Ponty...?

Est-ce à la langue française comme langue de la gastronomie, langue de l'amour, langue de la diplomatie?

S'agit-il d'une autre représentation, du français par exemple comme langue difficile à prononcer, à écrire...?

Nous avons ainsi tous des représentations des langues qui s'enchevêtrent et forment autant d'appréciations et de sentiments, souvent inconscients.

Notre rapport aux langues et à nos langues est ainsi fait d'un ensemble de représentations et de jugements de valeur. Quelle est alors la valeur (*value*) qu'on attribue à une langue comme le français?

Une valeur sentimentale: on aime cette langue, sa musicalité, sa poésie.

Une valeur d'échange: langue européenne et langue mondiale, parlée sur les 5 continents.

Aussi, ai-je intérêt à l'apprendre, à l'approfondir?

Le français a-t-il donc une valeur économique?

Si on élargit le point de vue, peut-on penser que le français est une langue moderne? On tombe là sur plusieurs préjugés.

1^{er} préjugé: le français est une langue classique, académique, une vieille langue. Et c'est vrai. Le texte constitutif de sa fondation est celui des serments de Strasbourg (843), dans lesquels on note que le roman de l'époque est en passe de devenir le français des siècles suivants. Le français est donc une vieille langue, une langue millénaire.

Cela se remarque aussi dans son lexique. Qui parfois, nous fait reculer de plusieurs siècles. Ainsi du terme *breuvage*, qui se retrouve en Amérique du nord dans le sens usuel de “boisson”. Ce sens remonte au Moyen-âge français (XII^e siècle). On vous dira par exemple au Québec: “*Et comme breuvage, qu’est-ce que ça s’ra?*” Et sans doute ce sens s’est conservé en français de là-bas, ou a été restitué par l’anglais, qui a gardé ce sens sous la forme *beverage*. On trouverait nombre d’autres exemples du français en tant que vieille langue. Il suffit que du latin soit impliqué. Ainsi de *curseur* dans le domaine de l’informatique: *curseur* est en français le calque de l’anglais *cursor*, qui vient de *cursus* (latin “course”). *Curseur* et *cursor* sont modernes, *cursus* est ancien, mais nouveau dans le sens qu’il a pris en anglais puis en français. Une langue peut être à la fois ancienne et moderne. La modernité allant puiser dans le fonds gréco-latin, comme pour *domotique*, du grec ancien *domos*, dont la racine remonte elle-même à l’indo-européen **dom* (“maison”).

Le français est donc une vieille langue. Mais en même temps une langue de la modernité.

2^e préjugé: l’anglais est plus moderne que le français. Et que toutes les autres langues.

L’anglais apparaît moderne, voire plus moderne, parce qu’il est omniprésent dans le monde d’aujourd’hui. Il a non seulement avec lui la force politique, économique, scientifique des pays qui l’utilisent. Mais aussi des qualités linguistiques propres.

L’anglais est ainsi plus court: *mail, spam, chat*, etc.

L’anglais est aussi plus souple: *ship, to ship, ship route*, etc.

Mais cela n’empêche pas certaines formes analytiques en anglais: *data processing*, qui apparaît plus analytique que le terme français *informatique*, de forme plus synthétique.

L’anglais peut d’ailleurs avoir le défaut de ses qualités, étant souvent plus polysémique: le verbe *go (to)* a ainsi 297 sens répertoriés dans le *Webster!*

L’une des formes idéales pour nous est représentée par ce genre de sigle qui se développe semblablement en anglais et en français: *GPS (Global Positioning System/Géopositionnement Par Satellite)*.

Ce qui frappe donc sitôt qu’on met en regard le français et l’anglais, c’est leur étonnante proximité. Proximité historique, les deux langues ayant vécu pendant plus de trois siècles ensemble en Moyen-âge (1066-1399).

3^e préjugé: Le français est une langue très anglicisée.

C’est vrai qu’il y a une tentation de l’emprunt du français à l’anglais.

Ainsi par exemple durant les XVII^e et XVIII^e siècles:

boulingrin < *bowling green*;

paquebot < *packet-boat*;

redingote < *riding-coat*;
 rosbif < *roast-beef*;
 bifteck < *beefsteak*...

On pourrait entrer là dans des questions difficiles à résoudre, comme celle de savoir si le français est une langue riche, une langue plus riche, plus pauvre... Et en fonction de quoi pourrait-on le dire?

Une réponse pourrait être qu'une langue qui emprunte, qui assimile, qui traduit d'une autre langue se trouve du même coup plus riche de mots et de formes nouvelles.

Cela a en tout cas été la décision en France, à partir de 1970, de traduire résolument les grands termes néologiques de l'époque, grâce à la création de commissions ministérielles de terminologie.

Ainsi furent traités et officialisés, parmi d'autres:

- *software*: logiciel (1970),
- *hardware*: matériel (1970),
- *Walkman*: baladeur (1981),
- *car pool*: covoiturage (1989),
- *minivan*: monospace (1989),
- *e-mail*: courriel (création au Québec en 1989; officialisation en France en 2003)...

Il a fallu, pour réaliser ce travail, définir les concepts et trouver les désignations correspondantes. Cela n'a rien de facile: ainsi comment définir par exemple *réseau*, *sport*, *environnement*...

Du point de vue de la forme des néologismes: on a vu un peu plus haut la proximité historique de l'anglais et du français. Il est tentant de s'appuyer sur l'emprunt et de le transformer.

Sous forme de calques par exemple: *processor*/processeur; *container*/conteneur; *hamburger*/hambourgeois (Québec); *mouse*/souris...

Sous forme d'inventions néologiques: *tour operator*: voyageur; *convenience-store*: dépanneur (Québec)/supérette (France).

La conclusion qu'il convient de tirer de ces quelques exemples est que la modernité du français est à construire. Et cela, en correspondance avec l'anglais, qui offre assez souvent des formes proches du français, en raison de la parenté historique des deux langues.

D'autres préjugés abondent:

4^e préjugé: les termes français sont trop longs. Certes, les termes anglais sont souvent monosyllabiques.

Pourtant, un terme long et précis comme véhicule à motorisation hybride: "Véhicule dont la propulsion est obtenue par l'association d'un moteur thermique et d'une ou plusieurs machines électriques" se dit en anglais *hybrid vehicle* ou

hybrid. De même le français: véhicule hybride ou hybride, terme aujourd'hui bien implanté en France (*Journal officiel* du 8 juin 2011).

5^e préjugé: les termes français font vieux jeu.

C'est vrai que *causette* a un air Grand siècle face à l'anglais *chat*. Mais lorsqu'on travaille en néologie, les hésitations sont grandes. Ainsi pour traduire *pad*, pour lequel ont été proposés en 2011 *ardoise* et *tablette*... *Tablette* l'a emporté dans l'usage d'aujourd'hui, alors qu'*ardoise* s'est mal intégré, sans doute parce qu'il renvoie à l'*ardoise à crayon* de l'école primaire... Il faut donc veiller aux connotations que peuvent contenir les termes que l'on choisit de proposer comme néologismes.

6^e préjugé: le français n'a pas les mots...

Une idée très répandue est que les langues inuits ont de nombreux mots pour décrire la neige. Mais cela ne veut pas dire que d'autres langues ne décrivent pas la neige. Ainsi, la description de la neige ou de la glace est très développée en français, que ce soit en Europe ou en Amérique du nord. La météorologie, la prévention des accidents et des avalanches ont conduit à développer une terminologie très précise. Une neige peut être: fraîche, fondante, glacée, tassée, gelée en surface, pulvérulente (ou de farine, farineuse), etc. On peut de même décrire la glace très précisément. Une glace, même, peut être noire! Glace noire pour *black ice* (Alpinisme): "Pellicule de glace presque invisible qui recouvre la roche" (Commission générale de terminologie et de néologie, Vocabulaire des sports, *Journal officiel* du 21 avril 2011).

Il faut donc s'efforcer, souvent, de s'appuyer sur l'emprunt et le calque pour développer la néologie du français d'aujourd'hui. Quelques autres exemples ici:

EMPRUNTS:

– *maintenance* ⇒ maintenance; *pipeline* = pipeline; *application* = application...

CALQUES:

- *profiler* ⇒ profileur.
- *finisher* ⇒ finisseur.
- *doping* ⇒ dopage (fin XIX^e siècle).
- *container* ⇒ conteneur.
- *hamburger* ⇒ hambourgeois (Québec).
- *compact disc* ⇒ disque compact.
- *mouse* ⇒ souris.
- *birdie* ⇒ oiselet (*Journal officiel* du 20 janvier 1993).

Il faut ainsi décider d'assimiler termes, concepts et images, ce qui n'est ni toujours facile, ni possible!

Il est aussi possible d'inventer à partir de l'emprunt. C'est l'invention néologique:

INVENTION NÉOLOGIQUE:

- *Walkman* = baladeur (1982).
- *pin grid array* = boîtier fakir (vers 1990).
- *car pool* = covoiturage (*Journal officiel* du 12 août 1989).
- *minivan* = monospace (*Journal officiel* du 29 janvier 1991).
- *city car* = citadine (*Journal officiel* du 5 avril 2006)...

Voilà ce que pourrait être une langue moderne, à l'encontre du préjugé ambiant qui semble suggérer que le français est une vieille langue, classique académique et uniquement littéraire.

C'est ce sur quoi nous travaillons à la Délégation générale à la langue française et aux langues de France (Ministère de la culture et de la communication). Nous avons ainsi installé 19 collèges de terminologie qui travaillent dans les ministères à développer le français dans tous les domaines. Domaines stratégiques: informatique, techniques de l'internet, défense, chimie, sciences de la vie, médecine, etc. Domaines sociaux: justice, santé, sport, tous les aspects de la vie sociale...

Nous nous efforçons également de garder au français toute sa place dans la commercialisation des produits et services. Dans l'espace public aussi, dans la publicité, à la radio, à la télévision. En veillant notamment à sa traduction en plusieurs langues, dans les transports, les gares, les trains, le métro, mettant ainsi en œuvre de manière active l'idée de plurilinguisme, prônée par l'Europe. On entend même, dans le métro parisien, des annonces en chinois et en japonais!

Il nous faut accompagner cette politique linguistique de mesures d'incitation et de campagnes de communication appropriées, comme l'est par exemple la *Semaine de la langue française et de la francophonie* qui se déroule chaque année au mois de mars. C'est comme cela que nous pouvons aller contre les préjugés en faisant mieux comprendre au public les enjeux du français aujourd'hui. C'est là encore un travail sur les représentations de la langue.

Pour moi, le français est non seulement une langue moderne, notamment par le travail que nous faisons sur les terminologies scientifiques et techniques. Mais c'est aussi une langue de la modernité, inscrite dans le jeu de la mondialisation.

Éléments de conclusion

La question que je posais tout à l'heure d'une langue riche ou pauvre se trouve maintenant posée de façon vive. Est riche une langue qui sait dire la modernité avec des termes adéquats, adaptés d'une autre langue ou issus de son fonds propre.

Une langue riche est aussi une langue précise, une langue qui décrit la réalité avec précision, comme pour l'exemple les variétés de neige ou de glace.

Mais c'est un travail continu. Le français est une langue qu'on doit construire tous les jours, dans les milieux de travail et dans la vie professionnelle. Et cela en France et dans la francophonie.

Le français n'a pas toujours d'équivalent et c'est pour cela qu'il emprunte. *Pipeline* continue de se dire *pipeline*, même s'il s'agit ici, pour un Français ou un francophone, d'une curieuse pipe. Mais nous nous efforçons de traduire le plus possible, principalement à partir de l'anglais. Ainsi je tiens à ce que nous traduisions les termes du pétrole dans leur ensemble, y compris les multiples tuyaux et raccords, tel *junper*, devenu *bretelle (raccord flexible)* (*Journal officiel* du 3 avril 2014).

On arrive donc désormais, depuis l'évocation des représentations sur le français et des préjugés qui les accompagnent, à la question de la *valeur* d'une langue. Faire que la langue française, avec les langues européennes, continue de décrire les réalités d'aujourd'hui permet de lui conserver son statut de langue:

- internationale,
- mondiale,
- mondialisée.

Il faut en même temps construire les relations aux autres langues:

- langues de France (plus d'une centaine de langues de France actuellement),
- langues partenaires de la francophonie,
- langues de l'Europe,
- langues du monde.

Nous visons donc un aménagement du français raisonné et respectueux des usages en France et dans la francophonie, mais aussi respectueux des autres langues.

Et sans doute faut-il, tout au long de ce travail, s'évertuer à changer les représentations. En montrant, précisément, que le français est une langue ouverte au monde et aux autres sociétés, tout en préservant son identité. Elle est l'expression même de l'identité ouverte, ouverte aux contacts des langues, ouverte aux emprunts, ouverte à une création néologique réaliste, dynamique et moderne.

Pour finir, je vous propose deux exercices:

- EXERCICE 1: comment traduire *curseur* dans vos langues?
- EXERCICE 2: comment traduire *doggy bag* dans les langues, notamment en français...

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Jerzy Bartmiński

What does it mean for stereotypes to “reside in language”?

Abstract (English)

This paper presents an ethnolinguistic understanding of stereotypes, as opposed to that prevalent in sociology. While sociologists emphasise the psycho-social functions of stereotypes, linking them with prejudice, endowing them with negative characteristics and criticising them for partiality, false generalisations and resistance to change (cf. Schaff 1981), ethnolinguists follow the reasoning laid out by Lippmann (1922) and Putnam (1975) in emphasising the cognitive functions of stereotypes. In this approach, the social, integrating function of stereotypes is considered important, but secondary to the richness and multidimensionality of the stereotypical content, represented in the form of the cognitive definition. Stereotypes are thus not only images of ethnic groups but of the totality of the human experience (people, objects, and phenomena), as well as being mythological and ideological images (e.g. of freedom, equality, solidarity, etc.). Stereotypes are taken to be indispensable, as they are an integral part of natural language. They are also subjective and ethnocentric, because that is what language itself is like in its role of categorising and simplifying the experience of the world around us.

In this paper, stereotypical judgments are divided with regard to their modality into pictures (*X* is such and such); patterns or models (*X* is and should be such and such); mythological images (*X* may be such and such); and ideological images (*X* may be and should be such and such). The common feature of all stereotypical judgments is covert universal quantification instead of existential quantification (i.e. a certain property is ascribed to all, rather than to just some exemplars of a category), plus a peculiar kind of modification, limiting the judgment to typical and/or true representatives of the category. The latter property renders the judgment arbitrary.

How does one live with stereotypes? In intercultural encounters the answer might be sought in the notion of the profiling of the base image. The profiling conception is an important element of the ethnolinguistic approach, because it facilitates dialogue across political boundaries and national divisions. An important influence on the functioning of national stereotypes is found in the political attitude of subjects functioning in public space, the desire to seek mutual understanding and international cooperation. A *modus vivendi* is thus possible through a process of their “aesthetic domestication” via language games and the notion of “meta-stereotype”. Examples can be seen in anecdotes, as well as in parodical and grotesque literature.

Abstract (Polish): Co znaczy, że “stereotypy mieszkają w języku”?

Autor prezentuje etnolingwistyczną koncepcję stereotypu, odmienną od dominujących w koncepcji socjologicznych. O ile socjolodzy na pierwszy plan wysuwają psycho-społeczne funkcje stereotypów, łącząc z uprzedzeniami i przypisując im charakterystyki negatywne, krytykują za tendencyjność ocen, skłonność do fałszywych uogólnień oraz odporność na zmiany (vide Schaff 1981) – o tyle językoznawcy, idąc tropem wyznaczonym przez Waltera Lippmanna (1922) i Hilarego Putnama (1975), akcentują poznawcze funkcje stereotypów, funkcję społeczną stereotypów (integrowanie wspólnoty) uznają za ważną, ale wtórną, podkreślają bogactwo i wielowymiarowość ich treści i próbują zdać z nich sprawę za pomocą definicji kognitywnych. Pojęciem stereotypu językoznawcy obejmują nie tylko wyobrażenia grup etnicznych, lecz całej otaczającej człowieka rzeczywistości, ludzi, przedmiotów i zjawisk, także wyobrażenia mitologiczne i ideologiczne (wolność, równość, solidarność itp.). Zakładają, że stereotypy są nieusuwalne, bo stanowią integralną część mechanizmów języka naturalnego. Są subiektywne i etnocentryczne, dlatego że taki jest cały język, który zawsze kategoryzuje i upraszcza widzenie świata realnego. Autor różnicuje sądy stereotypowe ze względu na ich status modalny na: obrazy (X jest), wzory (X jest i powinien być), wyobrażenia mitologiczne (X może być) i wyobrażenia ideologiczne (może i powinien być). Stwierdza, że wspólną cechą wszystkich sądów stereotypowych jest niejawną kwantyfikacja ogólna zamiast szczegółowej (przypisanie cechy wszystkim okazom klasy zamiast niektórym) oraz dodatkowo swoista modyfikacja, ograniczająca ważność sądu do typowych i/lub prawdziwych przedstawicieli klasy, co nadaje tym sądom charakter “uznaniowy”.

Odpowiadając na pytanie “Jak żyć ze stereotypami?” autor wskazuje na szanse, jakie w relacjach międzykulturowych otwiera operowanie pojęciem profilowania bazowych wyobrażeń (koncepcja profilowania jest istotnym elementem podejścia etnolingwistycznego, bo umożliwia dialog poprzez granice narodowe i państwowe) i wyraża opinię, że przemożny wpływ na funkcjonowanie stereotypów narodowych ma wola polityczna podmiotów działających w przestrzeni publicznej, chęć szukania porozumienia i dążenie do transnarodowej współpracy. Modus vivendi ze stereotypami jest możliwy na drodze ich estetycznego osławiania przez różnego rodzaju gry językowe, operujące kategorią “metastereotypu”, czego przykładów dostarczają anegdoty i literatura utrzymana w konwencji parodii i groteski.

1. The inevitability of stereotypes

National stereotypes are inevitable; they cannot be removed from language. This is reflected in the title of the book *Stereotypy mieszkają w języku* [Stereotypes reside in language], published in Lublin in 2007, which will be referenced in my paper. Its theme is precisely that stereotypes are an integral part of natural language, because they are derived from the mechanisms of a simplifying categorisation of the world. We are doomed to live with them. The essential question is therefore: How to live with them?

I will try to answer this question at the end of my paper, but first I will critically refer to the simplified method of using national stereotypes. Subsequently, I

will turn my attention to the specificity of the semantic structure of stereotypical judgements, involving not only unauthorised generalisation, but also the use of the implicit modifiers “typical” and “true/real”; and will discuss the complexity and relativity of stereotypes raised in ethnolinguistic analyses through examining their profiling. Finally, I will formulate some practical conclusions on how to live with stereotypes and the prospects for intercultural dialogue – not so much “beyond stereotypes”, but how to use the opportunities they create.

2. Widespread practice: simplification of stereotypes (stereotyping)

In an increasingly united Europe, with the ongoing intensification of contact between cultures and people of different nationalities, the interest in national specificity has increased. The most popular search engine Google gives 258,000 search results for the (Polish) entry “stereotyp narodowe” [national stereotypes].¹ First, it shows the following definition (cf. eszkola.pl):

National stereotypes should be understood as a specific kind of **widely-held image of a given nation**, a simplified view of the national characteristics of another nation strongly encoded in the consciousness of groups and societies, fixed by tradition. [...] The consequences of negative stereotypes can be dangerous, because they lead to attitudes of intolerance and strongly rooted prejudices.

The key word in this definition is simplified. On the websites we find a large amount of information on national imagology – the simplified mutual perception of nations. The dominant tendency observed there is radical reductionism, reducing national characteristics to a few or even just one very distinctive characteristic, which is not always accurately selected, but is usually sharply stigmatising. If a stereotype simplifies perception, as the definition above claims, then the internet-based circulation of information brings about a further degree of simplification, i.e. the “stereotyping of stereotypes”.

Particularly popular here are anecdotes. We can illustrate this with a short tale attributed to Ignacy Paderewski,² known under the title “The elephant and the

¹ For the English entry “national stereotypes” this number is obviously higher – 689,000 results.

² There exist different versions of this anecdote. In 1921, the Nobel Prize winner Marie Skłodowska-Curie during a meeting of the International Committee of Intellectual Cooperation of the League of Nations told her version of the anecdote: “In a literary contest on the elephant, the Englishman submitted the work: ‘My experience in hunting elephants in South Africa’, the Frenchman wrote an essay on ‘Sexual and erotic life of elephants’, and the title of the Pole’s story was ‘The elephant and Polish National Independence’” (Wikipedia). The anecdote was popularised by Stefan Żeromski, who used its abbreviated version in his novel *Przedwiośnie* [The Coming Spring] (1925) in the following dialogue between Cezary Baryka and Gajowiec: [C.B .:] – We are born with Polishness defect. [G.]: – I’m not talking about

Polish case". Authors representing different nations submit their works for a competition on elephants. The German submits a 3-volume treatise entitled *Versuch einer Einführung in die Psyche eines Elefanten*, the Frenchman submits a brilliant essay on the sexual life of elephants, the American submits instructions explaining how to make elephants even larger, and the Pole submits a memorial entitled *The elephant and the Polish case*.

Although the Polish stereotypes of Germans, French and Americans and the self-stereotype of Poles themselves are in fact much richer, the story reduces them to one distinctive characteristic, exaggerating it (hyperbole) and contrasting it with those of other nations in order to achieve a humorous effect.³

The proper (intention-oriented) perception of such messages requires a good knowledge of the cultural context. Only the residents of Western Europe, who share national stereotypes typical of this part of the continent, will find the following anecdote about the difference between heaven and hell amusing. According to this anecdote, in paradise an ideal lover is the Frenchman, a cook the Italian, a policeman the Englishman, and a soldier the German. In hell the roles are reversed: the Englishman is a cook, the German a lover, the Frenchman a policeman, the Italian a soldier.

And conversely, only the residents of Central and Eastern Europe – and in particular those belonging to the older generation – can adequately respond to the story about why the Warsaw Pact achieved such impressive success, namely because each nation contributed to it what it was best at: the Russians, a democratic system of governance; the Poles, sober thinking and social discipline; the Germans from the GDR, a sense of humour; the Czechs, courage; and the Hungarians, a common language.

The most radical simplification of national stereotypes can be seen in the so-called nationality maps on the internet. Witty maps by Yanko Tsvetkov from 2010 were joined this year by a map drawn in faraway Japan, on which each individual European country was given a one-word label: England, "Bad Food"; the Netherlands, "Tulips"; Belgium, "Chocolate"; France, "No Fat People"; Spain, "Good at Soccer"; Switzerland, "Watches"; Norway, "Luxurious Prisons"; Germany, "Killed Jews"; Lithuania, "Loves Japan"; Poland, "Stupid People"; Czech Republic, "Not Religious"; Austria, "Classical Music"; Belarus and Ukraine, "Beautiful Women", etc. All the labels are constructed from the perspective of a tourist; they are indeed witty, sometimes even malicious, but they serve pure fun.

it that Poles are Poles, but about a significant defect in philosophical and sociological consideration, *deus ex machina* appears: Poland. There is an anecdote about "elephant". The Pole tasked, following other nations, to write an essay about an elephant wrote without hesitation: "The Elephant and Poland" (*Przedwiośnie*, Warsaw 1956, 270).

³ A Czech acquaintance of mine informed me that in the time of real socialism, he was familiar with a version of this anecdote featuring additionally a Czech who submitted an editorial for this competition entitled "The Czech elephant as the best friend of the Soviet elephant".

3. Testing of liking for others – a sociological approach

It would not be worth devoting any special attention to the simplifications found on the internet, which largely serve entertainment purposes, if it were not for the fact that they derive from the more serious practices of various agencies involved in testing the liking for individual nations. In Poland, this is done regularly by the Public Opinion Research Centre (CBOS). A recent survey conducted by CBOS in March 2016 (Communication No. 53/2016) revealed that the nations Poles like most in 2016 include the Czechs, the Italians, the Slovaks and the English, whereas the greatest aversion is observed towards Romani and Arabs. In general we learn from the survey that since 2012 the attitude of Poles towards many nations has deteriorated – especially towards Russians and Ukrainians, but also Germans and Lithuanians.

The one-sided display of liking/aversion in popular studies of national stereotypes seems to have been influenced by the analysis of experts – sociologists and psychologists – of attitudes towards other nations, and the excessive focus on the link between stereotypes and prejudice. Psychology examines the mechanisms of social perception (Wojciszke 2010) and the impact of labeling on people’s thinking and behaviour. Attention is drawn to the fact that attributing a stigmatising name to an individual or group can affect their own acceptance of certain qualities and lead to them acting in accordance with those labels.

Hilary Putnam (1975) called for an examination of the contents of stereotypes, at the same time recommending that linguists set and define them. This work was not undertaken by linguistics until the beginning of the 1970s: in Germany in the work of Uta Quasthoff (1973), and in Poland in articles by Walery Pisarek (1975) and Krystyna Pisarkowa (1976). In 1980, a trial issue of the *Dictionary of Folk Linguistic Stereotypes* (Bartmiński 1980) was published in Wrocław.

4. A linguistic approach to the problem of stereotypes

The linguistic approach to stereotypes differs from the approach of contemporary sociologists and psychologists, although their achievements are appreciated and respected by linguists and some of their methods (e.g. surveys based on Osgood’s semantic differential – see Appendix) are used. Sociologists and psychologists focus on the psycho-social functions of stereotypes and assign negative characteristics to them, criticising them for biased assessments and for a tendency to produce false generalisations and resistance to change; they also emphasise that stereotypes affect prejudices and create communication barriers (see Schaff 1981).⁴

⁴ The study of stereotypes has a long tradition in Poland dating back to the 1920s and 1930s. Jan Stanisław Bystroń (1924) and Józef Chałasiński (1935) created the forgotten “mythological school”, which fell into oblivion – perhaps because it was joined by the Nazi Kurt

Linguists and culture experts, following Walter Lippmann, the proponent of the theory of stereotype (1922), and his follower Hilary Putnam (1975), emphasise the cognitive functions of stereotypes and the richness and multidimensional character of their content using cognitive definitions; they do not equate stereotypes with prejudices.

Firstly, linguists use the notion of stereotype to refer not only to the images of ethnic, racial or gender groups, but also to objects and phenomena, i.e the **whole reality surrounding the human** (see *Dictionary of Folk Stereotypes and Symbols* [SSiSL] 1996-2012), and mythological and ideological representations. The team of Lublin ethnolinguists working for years on the *Dictionary of Folk Stereotypes and Symbols* (SSiSL) developed the folk stereotypes of heaven and earth, water and fire, meteorological phenomena and metals. This group is currently working on the stereotypes of the human body, occupations, house/home, and national stereotypes. (In 2014 Monika Łaszkiwicz defended her doctoral thesis on this subject and she will soon present an overview of the whole body of Polish research on stereotypes.) It also analyses ideological stereotypes such as FREEDOM, EQUALITY, HONOUR and WORK. The results of this work have been published (since 2015) in the *Lexicon of the Axiology of Slavs and their Neighbours*.

Secondly, as I mentioned at the outset, according to linguists, stereotypes are **indelible**, as they constitute an integral part of the mechanisms of natural language. Of course they are subjective and ethnocentric – as is language as a whole. The process of generalisation which underpins them is an elementary operation of natural language, which always categorises and simplifies the vision of the real world by transforming the image of the empirically experienced world into subjective, but socially (collectively) fixed linguistic and cultural visions of reality. There is no escape from the grammatical categories of language; there is no escape from stereotypes.

Being a colloquial theory of reality, stereotypes intentionally serve a cognitive function. Stereotypes should not be confused with prejudices, though such identification has a long tradition in the European humanities.⁵ Axiological evaluation is not their primary function, but like all linguistic means they are embedded in the world of values and can carry both a positive and negative charge; next to the malicious stereotype of the mother-in-law there is the positive stereotype of the mother and the relatively neutral stereotypes of aunt and grandfather. The social function of stereotypes (community integration) is important, but secondary.

Lück, the author of a thorough, albeit politically tendentious book about the Polish “myth” of a German (1938).

⁵ The fallacy of this identification was pointed out by Andrzej Kapiszewski (1978, 32), and it was extensively substantiated in a treatise by Zdzisław Chlewiński (1992).

In treating stereotypes as natural components of a language and cultural code, linguists are joined by artists and culture experts.⁶ The renowned film director Krzysztof Zanussi said at the conference “Nations and Stereotypes” held in 1993 in Kraków:

The feeling that stereotype in any form, including national stereotype, is a negative concept, detrimental to the mutual agreement of societies, is foreign to me. On the contrary – a stereotype is a form of reference, part of language necessary to make certain shortcuts and generalisations. [...] It is an element of synthesis, a necessary linguistic operation, particularly important for today’s dominant visual language. The only problem lies in the level of readability of a stereotype, what elements it is built from and to what stereotypes we appeal while communicating. To me a stereotype in itself seems to be neither bad nor harmful. (Zanussi 1995, 209, 218)

5. Varieties of stereotypes

From the point of view of the cognitive function of stereotypes, and according to the quality of the accompanying implicit “modifiers”, we can distinguish **four varieties of stereotypical judgments** (according to Bartmiński/Panasiuk 1993, 372):

	is	should be	can be
images	+		
models	+	+	
mythological representations	(+)		+
ideological representations		+	+

Examples:

Images: *Germans are thrifty, Poles are spendthrift, Russians are musical.*

Models: *A scout does not lie; a soldier defends his homeland; a Pole and a Hungarian – two good friends, they fight and drink their wine together.*

Mythological representations: *Where a German stands, the grass will not grow* (proverb in NKPP, quoted since 1894).

Ideological representations: *Freedom is measured by crosses* (a proverb-based fragment of a song by Feliks Konarski, *Czerwone maki na Monte Cassino* [Red Poppies on Monte Cassino]).⁷

⁶ Cf., inter alia, Bokszański (2001).

⁷ I will pass over for now the mythological and ideological representations; I would only like to note that in order to avoid negative connotations associated with the term “stereotype”, we refer to the latter also as “axiological concepts” and they are subject to special comparative

Separate national stereotypes usually synthesise the characteristics and combine them into bundles of descriptive judgements (images), evaluative judgements (models) and sometimes mythological judgements.

6. “All typical”, “all true/real” – or on the overwhelming role of modifiers

A common feature of all stereotypical judgements is implicit **general quantification** as opposed to specific – i.e. the assignment of a given characteristic to all specimens of a particular class (e.g. *Germans are hardworking*, *Poles are spend-thrift*, *Russians are musical* or “S is P” type of judgements), when in accordance with the rules of logic, only some and not all “S” are meant. This unsubstantiated generalising property of stereotypical judgements is well recognised and forms part of the definition of stereotype by a formula stressing “unauthorised generalisation”.

But that is not all, since the quantification in stereotypical judgements is subject to significant, specific **modification**⁸ recognisable in discourse. It is notoriously abused and constitutes a source of frustration for many representatives of nations who are portrayed in this way.

When accused of unauthorised generalisations, a person using stereotypical judgments about others responds: “Not all Germans/Poles/Russians are like that, but the **typical** ones are just like that”. The quantifier ‘every/all’ is hence – in the interpretation of the carrier of the stereotype – reduced to **typical** representatives of the class. Can such a judgment be subjected to verification? Confirmed or rejected? In a way yes, because what is typical or atypical can be specified and defined relatively objectively as ‘average, normal’. It can also be verified using statistical procedures – but only to a certain extent, because “typicality” by its very nature is not a clear-cut category based on categorical criteria (*yes/no*, *is/is not*), but a gradable category with a largely subjective character.

research undertaken by the team working on the *Lexicon of the Axiology of Slavs and their Neighbours*. (The first volume was published in 2015 and was centred on the stereotype of HOUSE/HOME; 4 further volumes dedicated to the stereotypes of EUROPE, LABOUR, FREEDOM and HONOUR are nearing completion).

⁸ A specific role of quantifying modification using the operators “typisch” and “richtig” was noted by Uta Quasthoff in her linguistic study of stereotypes. She wrote: “Mit der Formulierung <<der typische Deutsche>> oder <<der richtige Deutsche>> im Gegensatz zu <<allen Deutschen>> ist offensichtlich eine Unterscheidung zur Klasse aller der Deutschen intendiert, deren Elemente durch die Eigenschaft <<deutsche Staatsgehörigkeit>> gekennzeichnet sind” (Quasthoff 1973, 243). However, the author equated the roles of both modifiers – “typical” and “real/true” – which in my opinion are different; this will be elaborated on in the following section.

However, another modifier is even more characteristic of stereotypical judgements – **real/true**.⁹ It is commonly used in proverbs; for example, *True virtue is not afraid of criticism; A friend in need is a (true) friend indeed*. It often appears in online texts: *A real mother worries about her child for at least 18 years; Hans Gielen – a true German arrived in Poland! What should a true Aryan look like?* In his book *We Europeans*, which is a clear example of ethnocentric and stereotypical thinking, Richard Hill, in a comment about the Slavs, writes that he *cannot treat them as true Europeans* (Hill 2004, 270); while the notion of a *true Pole* has played a very important part in Polish public discourse in recent decades.

The modifier “true/real” is rarely revealed on the surface level of a text. When Hill states that “Poles do not like working” (Hill 2004, 275), he makes a characteristic generalisation by using the universal quantifier “each/all” instead of the logically correct existential quantifier “some”, but he also applies his opinion not to all Poles (which would be an obvious logical fallacy, of which we do not suspect Hill), but to “all *typical*” or “all *true*” Poles (in his opinion). Let us consider, based on this example, how the two modifiers work and what is the source of their “inevitability”.

The claim that someone’s behaviour is “typical” – in this case Poles, who according to Hill do not like working – can be relatively easily refuted on the basis of sociological research.¹⁰ Just recently, in the light of a European survey, it has been found that the situation is opposite to what was claimed by Hill, because

⁹ There is a culturally relevant difference between “typical” and “true/real”. It was described by Bartmiński in an article about the stereotype of a German (Bartmiński 1994) and mother (Bartmiński 1998). A typical German (according to young Poles) is hardworking and diligent, calculating, meticulous, reserved etc., a true German according to the same respondents is not only hardworking, diligent etc., but also speaks German fluently, has blue eyes and is brutal (Bartmiński 1994/2007, 250-252); a typical mother loves her children, is caring, understanding, good, also busy; a true mother also loves, cares etc., but also devotes herself to her children and is a model for them (Bartmiński 1998, 73-74). The significance of this difference was confirmed by Michael Fleischer and Marta Nowosad-Bakalarczyk on the example of woman, and by Jeremina (2016) on the example of work (manuscript in volume WORK).

¹⁰ In an editorial article entitled *Poles: diligence above all*, the “Gazeta Wyborcza” of 12 April 2011 announced, referring to a CBOS survey, that “diligence was considered a prerequisite for achieving success by 92 percent of respondents. The same numbers of Poles claim that work gives meaning to our existence. 86 percent of respondents believe that the proper performance of their duties will result in reward or success, and 85 percent think that work is a moral duty to ourselves and to other people. [...]. At the same time, 52 percent of respondents agree that a man is not able to make a fortune by honest work solely.” The weekly magazine “Polityka” (No. 18 of 28 April 2015) presents the results of a European survey according to which “Poles are almost the most hardworking persons in the world. They spend 42.5 hours per week at work [...] The richest nurture their self-portrait of workaholics. 81 percent of respondents believe that they achieved everything in their life only through their hard work, 76 percent believe that work gives meaning to life” (Wilk 2015).

(I quote): “Poles are almost the most hardworking persons in the world; they spend 42.5 hours per week at work” (although in the opinion of journalists this does not bring them glory) (Wilk 2015).

In the case of the modifier “true/real” there is in fact no possibility of verification. The thing is a foregone conclusion, because a sentence with the modifier “true/real” cannot be subjected to verification. The reason behind this is the **hidden tautology** present in the expression: “All *true* Poles (who in my opinion are characterised by the fact they do not like working) do not like working”. The use of the formulas “In my opinion”, “I think so” – precludes any discussion; it closes the case.

7. What does it mean to be a “true European” – or on the problem of values

I will stay for a while with the opinion of the British author about a “true European”, not only because Hill refused to apply this name to the Slavs, but because of an interesting motivation for this refusal which confirms the view that values underlie stereotypes (Niebrzegowska-Bartmińska 2013). Hill supports his concept of a “true European” on page 306 of his book *We Europeans* with a list of values, which he calls “a few things that are common to all European cultures”. Hill’s list includes 13 characteristics such as Christian faith, freedom of speech and tolerance, but also the shepherd dog, the garden gnome and Santa Claus. Regardless of the author’s humorous approach to this matter, the idea of searching for an answer to the question about the true X in the sphere of values is a serious one.

Thus, what we mean by *a true friend, a true German, a true European* etc., depends on the adopted prototype model of respectively a friend, a German and a European – the model embedded in a certain system of values. As the choice of values is always a matter of individual and/or collective preferences, the modifier “true/real” opens up a wide field of choice. The question arises whether there is a common canon of European values shared by all Europeans, which enable judgements to be passed on who is a “true European”? The list provided by Hill does not meet this condition. It is striking that it does not include the values mentioned in the preamble to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 2007:¹¹ human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity. None of these values was referenced on his list of European traits; could it be that he was an early exponent of “Brexit”?

It is worth recalling in this context the study results obtained by the French author Dr. Aline Viviland, a graduate of the Sorbonne in Paris, which showed a quite different perception of Europe and Europeans by young people from

¹¹ “The Union is founded on the indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity”.

Eastern Europe, specifically Polish youth. Without going into details, in her lengthy treatise from 2014 *La compréhension des gentils Polacy, Niemcy, Francuzi et Europejczycy par la jeunesse polonaise contemporaine: une étude ethnolinguistique*, a fragment of which was published in the latest volume of “Etnolingwistyka” (“E” 28), let us note that from the point of view of young Poles, the image of a European is closer to the image (autostereotype) of a Pole than to the image of a German or a Frenchman, who in the eyes of young Poles are less European than Poles. The point is that the criteria of European-ness adopted by the Polish respondents do not reflect Hill’s criteria. One of the differences is the role of religion, considered important by Hill and almost absent from the young Poles’ stereotype of Europe.¹²

In detail, according to Viviani’s survey, the characteristics attributed by young Poles to the ethnonym *Europeans* are closer to the characteristics of the ethnonym *Poles* than to the characteristics of the ethnonyms *Frenchmen* and *Germans*. Aline Viviani claims that “Polish youth associates many common features of the understanding of the name *Europeans* with the name *Poles*”. These are qualities such as creativity and intelligence, attachment to tradition, education, ability to unite, mutual aid, solidarity, friendly disposition, development, and fascination with the USA. Despite the highlighted differences, the degree of identification of young Poles with Europeans is significant. What is surprising is the perceived small number of common characteristics between Europeans and Germans (according to the Polish respondents, they have only two characteristics in common: a penchant for travel and “development”). The respondents saw more common characteristics between Frenchmen and Europeans: liberalism, *savoir-vivre*, rich culture, friendly disposition, distance from religion.

8. Four characteristics of stereotypes

Ethnolinguistic studies show the complexity and multifaceted nature of stereotypes, their relativity, moderate variability and susceptibility to ideological profiling. I will briefly analyse these properties with reference to selected examples.

8.1 The complexity and richness of stereotypical characteristics

The simplified use of stereotypes on internet forums is in contrast to the rich content of characteristics assigned to nations in the popular image of the world. The richest stereotypes belong to the nations with whom Poles have a long history of contact (Germans, Russians, Jews), and the poorer ones to more remote nations.

¹² The results obtained by Viviani are confirmed by the results of surveys ASA 1990, 2000 and 2010 (Bartmiński/Chlebda 2013, 85-87).

The linguistic descriptions of Polish stereotypes of Germans, Russians, Ukrainians, Jews and Gypsies involve a number of characteristics; for the Ukrainians there were at least 24 (Bartmiński 2009, 307-308), for Germans there were 32, and for Russians there were as many as 70 (Bartmiński 2007, 249, 295-296). Of course, there are both stronger and less fixed characteristics. This can be seen (particularly in the graphs) in the course of survey research when certain characteristics are indicated by a large number of respondents, while others are indicated by only a few, or often just by individual respondents. For instance, in a survey of characteristics of a “true” Ukrainian conducted in 2000, the responses obtained from 100 people most often referred to patriotism (21), a specific language (18), love for their own culture (12), attachment to tradition (11), trade (8), specific customs and a strong sense of national identity (6), drunkenness (5), poverty (4), the mafia and Ukrainian borscht, etc.

The ranked list of characteristics (i.e. arranged according to the frequency of responses) is evenly distributed, with no clear thresholds that would permit an unequivocal decision about which characteristics are fixed and should be classified as stereotypical. Most characteristics are indicated only once. No characteristic exceeded a 50 per cent threshold of respondents’ indications.

In a similar study of Germans, a strongly established characteristic was diligence (indicated by 30 per cent or 31 out of 103 respondents); precision and order (18), cleanliness and pedantry (10), the German language and blue eyes (8 each), brutality (7), conscientiousness (6), discipline (5), firmness and chauvinism (4). Most characteristics were indicated only once.

The list of characteristics attributed to individual nationalities in the surveys is open. All proposals for cutting off the list according to the number of indications (50, 40 or 15 per cent?)¹³ or the number of characteristics (the first 3? 10? 20?) remain a matter of convention.

8.2 Subjectivity and relativity of stereotypes

The dependence of stereotypes on the subjective mindset of speakers and their system of values can be shown most simply by comparing images of the same nationality in different countries. In 2004 our teams conducted a study on the perception of Poles and Russians in different countries. Although certain characteristics are commonly attributed to Poles (e.g. religiosity), the resulting images vary considerably from language to language. For instance, Lithuanians consider Poles to be cunning and conceited (Завьялова, Англицкене 2005); Belarusians consider Poles to be haughty and fond of power (Lappo 2005); for the Russians a Pole is traditionally Catholic and rebellious, a traitor of the Panslavic idea,

¹³ Kapiszewski (1978) was in favour of a 50 percent threshold, Sodhi and Bergius were in favour of a 40 percent threshold and Fleischer (1998) favoured 15 percent.

currently (in Kaliningrad Oblast) a dealer (Киселева 2005); for the Germans, a car thief, poor and religious (Жданова 2005); for the French, a busy Catholic alcoholic (Skibińska 2005); for the Americans, a hardworking and hospitable but stupid traditionalist (Mikos/Tieszen 2005). From earlier descriptions we know that in the eyes of the Ukrainians a Pole is conceited and despotic; for the Czechs, too pathetic, a religious nationalist; and for the English, a pretentious romantic hero with a “sarcastic sense of humour” (Hill 2004, 275-276).

There is a clear relationship between the heterostereotype of a Pole and the history of international relations and geography. The most positive stereotype of a Pole developed in remote Slovakia, separated by mountains, and far in the south, in Hungary, with whom Poland has never been at war. The least positive stereotype emerged in the nearest neighbour in the East and West (Germany), while Poles enjoy moderate liking in distant France, England and the USA.

8.3 Multifaceted nature of stereotypes

Stereotypical characteristics relate to different aspects and can be combined into bundles (syndromes and facets). It is important that characteristics belonging to different aspects are evaluated differently. Neutral, purely informational characteristics relate to appearance (blue eyes, sidelocks, slightly shaved head), typical props (a mug of beer, a bandura, an accordion) and food (beer, vodka, pasta). Axiologically marked are characteristics relating to mental and social, ideological and political, and even existential aspects. In the perception of one and the same nationality, positive characteristics can collide with negative ones. Germans are clean and hardworking (existential aspect), but also conceited and hard-faced (social aspect); Jews are cunning and sly (social aspect), but also intelligent and wise (mental aspect); Russians are overwhelmingly megalomaniac and aggressive (political aspect), but also emotional, loving music and singing (psychological and cultural aspects), Ukrainians are cruel (psycho-social aspect), but also freedom lovers, striving for independence (ideological aspect). An increasingly significant role in contemporary Polish heterostereotypes is played by descriptive, neutral characteristics, while the role of evaluative characteristics is diminishing.

Owing to the internal richness and diversity of characteristics it is possible to construct basic variants of representations functioning in intercultural communication, which we call **profiles**.

8.4 The vulnerability of national stereotypes to ideological profiling

I will explain what I mean by profiling using the example of the stereotype of a German (I have written about this in a separate article, Bartmiński 1994). The Germans and Poles have shared many experiences throughout the centuries,

both good and bad, but overall very rich, which has resulted in a multiplicity of stereotypical characteristics. In the Polish space of language and culture (“linguo-culture”) we can find at least five historically consecutive profiles of a German: as someone “fundamentally foreign”, half-demonic, with whom we cannot communicate because he is dumb (Pol. *niemy*) and does not speak our language (the traditional, prototypical folk profile); subsequently as an exotic and funny “pludrak” [someone who wears breeches], a hardworking and mean infidel (the noble Sarmatian profile); then as a military invader and simultaneously a person of high material and spiritual culture (for the 19th century Polish patriots and people of culture); then as a mortal enemy, driven by hatred and lust for murder (for the victims of the Nazi occupation); and finally, as a modern European (for the youngest generation of Poles).

Each profile is stored and has its own place in the social representation system, but the profiles are structured differently: as a vague memory of the past (“pludrak”), as a painful piece of living memory, and as a postulate of a European norm that is just being realised. Each profile has its preachers and followers in Poland, and this diversity is highly positive, as it allows partners to be found for intercultural dialogue and cooperation on both sides of the border.

9. How to live with stereotypes?

Finally, let us consider if we can overcome prejudices and stereotypes, and if so, how can it be done? Can this be achieved by knowing people better? In the opinion of many teachers, it can. Such a belief is the basis on which, among other things, exchange programmes for young people and students are built. But it is not true that closeness automatically gives rise to friendship. Rapprochement and mutual knowledge can be at most one of the factors, effective only under additional conditions. Ethnic borderlands where different nationalities live close to each other have always been sites of bloody conflict, as shown by the situation in Northern Ireland, the Balkans in the 1990s and the “ethnic cleansing” in Volyn in 1943.

We can also learn from the conclusions drawn from a recent study of the Polish-Belarusian and Polish-Lithuanian borderlands. Belarussians like the local Poles more than Poles living abroad, but in Lithuania the situation is just the opposite: the local Poles, being close neighbours, are even more disliked than the Poles living in Poland (Bartmiński/Mavrič/Rzeutska 2005).

Two factors are particularly significant for **ways of dealing with stereotypes**: firstly the **historical variability** of stereotypes with reference to their cognitive content and evaluation; secondly the **political will** of actors in the public space on different sides of political borders, the desire to seek agreement and the pursuit of transnational cooperation.

Regarding **variability**, contrary to the proponents of the mythical “national character” (Hill 2004; Lewandowski 2004), stereotypes are not static, just the opposite – they are subject to historical processes of change. An example might be the recently challenged German stereotype (inherited from the Prussian era) of Polish wastefulness (*polnische Wirtschaft*) due to the success of the Polish economy since 1989. The change of negative stereotypes can be triggered by an outstanding individual having unquestionable authority. It happened in Poland, considered by some journalists as the world centre of antisemitism; the Polish Chief Rabbi Szudrich recently posted on the Internet (retrieved 8 September 2016) that “Today Poland has a really lower level of antisemitism than in the past and I am confident that all of this is attributable to the teachings of John Paul II”.

As for the political will, the impact of official state policy on ethnic stereotypes is overwhelming. This applies in our own region of Europe to the mutual perception of Poles and Germans, Poles and Russians, Poles and Ukrainians. The Orange Revolution in Ukraine, observed in Poland with great sympathy, has led to changes in the Polish image of a Ukrainian, changing his image from an aggressive “nationalist” who is ready to mercilessly “*rezaty Lachiw*” to an admired “patriot” fighting for the “*samostijnist*” of Ukraine (Bartmiński 2007). Parallel changes took place in the 1990s in the Ukrainian stereotype of Poles as shown by Alla Kravchuk (Kravčuk 2009). Similarly (but unfortunately only temporarily), the resignation of the Russian government from the programme of political dominance in Central Europe resulted in the emergence in Russia of a new stereotype of a Pole: no longer a rebel, “*traitor of the Slavs*”, but a spokesman for human dignity (in poems by Maryna Tsvetaeva) and a relentless defender of freedom in the face of violence on the part of the authoritarian rule (in poems by David Samoilov); see Levkivskaja (2002).

Positive political relations between Poland (during the term of Donald Tusk as prime minister) and Germany (with chancellor Angela Merkel) have led to the improvement of the image of Germans in Poland and Poles in Germany. “Germans positively evaluate the relations between our countries. They consider us as religious, friendly and enterprising” “*Gazeta Wyborcza*”, 26 June 2013). According to a survey conducted by TNS EMNID in Germany, 75 per cent, 59 per cent and 48 per cent of respondents respectively indicated these characteristics; in comparison, only 7 per cent of respondents identified Poles as car thieves.

10. Is life with stereotypes possible?

Is it possible and how is it possible to deal with stereotypes in social communication in such a way that they do not interrupt communication, but on the contrary, add colour and bring mutual consensus and, above all, understanding?

Literature can boast extensive experience in this field. Novels and films have long been using stereotypical images of nationalities, professions and regions as part of a convention based on the principles of artistic realism.

A method that can be used to neutralise malicious stereotypes is their aesthetic “taming” through various “linguistic games” operating on a higher level with the category of “metastereotype”. Stanisław Barańczak presented methods of disarming malicious stereotypes using the example of Harry Graham’s poems from the volume *Verse and Worse* published in 1905. *Baedeker dla Bobasa*, included in this collection is “a series of moderately funny rhyming vignettes portraying various countries and nations”. For instance, in the poem *Russia*, xenophobia is relieved by comic effects:

The Russian lets his whiskers grow,	Ludność nie goli tu podbródka,
Smokes cigarettes at meal-times, and	Pali przy stole i przełyka
Imbibes more ‘vodki’ than ‘il faut’;	Żrący płyn znany jako “wódka” –
A habit which (I understand)	Zabiłby on Europejczyka,
Enables him with ease to tell	Lecz ludność jest rumianolicą
His name, which nobody could spell.	I nadal mówi cyrylicą.

(translated by S. Barańczak)

Excellent examples of play with stereotypes are provided by aphorisms (Stanisław Jerzy Lec) and literature in the convention of parody and grotesque (Sławomir Mrożek/Umberto Eco, *The Prague Cemetery*, 2011), and also in films, cartoons and literature for children. Czesław Miłosz found such a “collection of humorous stereotypes” in colourful children’s books by the painter Hervé: an intoxicated sea wolf, an absent-minded scholar, a coloratura singer with a big bust etc. (*Tygodnik Powszechny* 1996/4).

An example of the metatextual use of a stereotype is the story about “the elephant and the Polish case” quoted at the beginning. If it is true that the author of this anecdote is a Pole, Ignacy Paderewski,¹⁴ then we can add to the self-stereotype of a Pole yet another characteristic – self-mockery. The initiator of the international conference *Nations and Stereotypes* held in Kraków in 1994, Jacek Woźniakowski, noted that when it comes to the problem of stereotypes “it is easier to have a sincere, friendly and fruitful exchange of views in the climate of somewhat humorous irony (and self-mockery) than in so-called principled discussions” (Walas 1995, 6). Self-mockery and humour are excellent remedies for everything.

¹⁴ Such information was provided by Kurt Lück in the book *Der Mythos vom Deutschen in der polnischen Volksüberlieferung und Literatur* (Lück 1938, 19).

11. Appendix: The application of Osgood’s semantic differential in contrastive studies

A tool that allows for the comparison of national stereotypes in a systematic way is Osgood’s semantic differential.¹⁵ It puts the tested object directly between two opposing values such as enterprising/passive, economical/overspending, hardworking/lazy etc. and allows the strength of belonging to one or the other pole to be measured and determined in numbers. Despite the obvious limitations of this method (as is the case with all closed surveys), it has one advantage – it produces results which can be easily applied to various comparisons.

At one time (in 1993) I conducted a survey simultaneously in Poland and Germany,¹⁶ asking Polish students about the characteristics of 8 nationalities (Polish, German, Russian, Ukrainian, Lithuanian, Czech, Slovak and Jewish) and German students about the characteristics of 8 nationalities (German, French, Czech, Polish, American, Italian, Swedish and Jewish). Three results obtained from these studies are particularly noteworthy.

Firstly, I noted that the Polish students had more stereotypical images of other nationalities than the German students. This was manifested in the fact that the Polish respondents achieved values above the (conventional, but considered diagnostic) threshold of 40 per cent of the total points more frequently than the German ones.

Secondly, the degree of interest among the Poles in their Western neighbour was incomparably greater than the German interest in their Eastern neighbour; the Polish stereotype of a German was much richer than the German stereotype of a Pole. The Germans were described by the Polish students using as many as 16 distinctive characteristics: hard-working, enterprising, nationalist, thrifty, proud, clean, wealthy, patriotic, educated, intelligent, stubborn, aggressive, violent, intolerant, smart, cheerful; while the Poles were described by the German students using just 3 distinctive characteristics: religious, sociable, poor.

Thirdly, the view that autostereotypes are always positive was not confirmed. The Polish students assessed Poles more severely than the Germans themselves, giving 12 characteristics: patriotic, sociable, religious, brave, cheerful, intelligent, proud, emotional, open, educated, but also drunk, stubborn and (below the 40 per cent threshold) lazy, poor, aggressive, intolerant, and overspending. The German attributed to themselves only positive characteristics: clean, wealthy, hardworking, stubborn, educated etc. Interestingly, the German heterostereotype of a Pole is more positive (a hardworking, gentle, calm Pole), than the Polish autostereotype

¹⁵ Cf. Osgood/Suci/Tennenbaum (1957); Bartmiński (1988, 1995); Akimova/Gudavičius (2003).

¹⁶ Cf. data included in the book *Polskie wartości w europejskiej aksjosferze* [Polish Values in the European Axiosphere] (Bartmiński 2014, 318-332).

(a drunk, lazy, aggressive and intolerant Pole). These results correspond with the low self-esteem of Poles (attested in the literature) in the period following the political transformation in 1989.

Finally, the German stereotype of a Jew (religious, proud, educated, patriotic, intelligent, hardworking, wise etc.) turned out to be more positive, comprising only positives, than the Polish one (creative, enterprising, religious, wealthy, intelligent, smart, educated, but also – below the 40 per cent threshold – dishonest, intolerant, insincere, introverted and cowardly).

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Hans Henning Hahn

Das Selbstbild und das Fremdbild – was verbindet sie? Überlegungen zur Identitätsfunktion von Stereotypen in der europäischen Geschichte

Abstract (Deutsch)

Ausgehend von einer *Völkertafel* aus der ersten Hälfte des 18. Jahrhunderts als Beispiel deskriptiver Stereotypisierung entwickelt der Vortrag eine funktionale Definition des Begriffs 'Stereotyp': Was sind Stereotypen, warum existieren sie und wie funktionieren sie in europäischen Gesellschaften. Mit Stereotypen werden verallgemeinerte Urteile über Gruppen von Menschen zum Ausdruck gebracht, und zwar mit einer hohen emotionalen Aufladung. Geschichts- und sozialwissenschaftlich sind dabei Stereotypen in öffentlichen Diskursen interessant, entwickeln sie doch dort in Konflikten eine erhebliche Virulenz.

Die Orientierungsfunktion von Stereotypen betrifft vor allem die Unterscheidung von 'eigen' und 'fremd', von Wir-Gruppe und 'den Anderen'. Daraus folgt das Verhältnis von Autostereotyp und Heterostereotyp. Diese Relation gibt einer diskursanalytischen Forschung die Möglichkeit zu Rückschlüssen auf kollektive Identitätsvorstellungen einer Gesellschaft oder anderer Gruppen. Inhalte kollektiver Identität werden durch die in einer Gruppe/Gesellschaft funktionierenden Stereotypen zum Ausdruck gebracht.

Die stereotype Perception der Gegenwart beruht häufig auf Geschichtsbildern, die nicht selten als historisches Wissen missverstanden und in der Folge als Geschichtsbewusstsein bezeichnet werden. Letztlich rührt es daher, dass Stereotypen in beträchtlichem Ausmaß die Sprache der Politik und der Medien prägen.

Abstract (English)

Starting with a *Völkertafel* from the first half of the 18th century (a table of national characteristics of various European peoples) as an example of descriptive stereotyping, the paper develops a functional definition of the term 'Stereotype'.

What are stereotypes, why do they exist and how do they function in European societies? Stereotypes express generalizing judgements on groups of people, and this with a strong emotional load. Stereotypes in public discourses are especially interesting for the science of history and social science, because in these discourses, they develop conflicts of considerable force.

The orienting function of stereotypes regards especially the distinction between 'own' and 'foreign', between 'us-group' and 'the others'. This results in the relationship between autostereotypes and heterostereotypes. This relationship offers an opportunity for discourse-

analytic research to draw conclusions concerning the concepts of identity of a society or other groups. The contents of collective identity are expressed by stereotypes that function within a society of group.

Present stereotypical perceptions rest often on images of the past that are frequently mistaken as historical knowledge and are then regarded as awareness of history. This is the reason why stereotypes shape the language of politics and media to a considerable extent.

Wenn Historiker sich mit Stereotypen befassen, dann lautet die Grundfrage: Wie lassen sich Stereotypen von Menschen erforschen, die nicht mehr leben, und die möglicherweise in ganz anderen kulturellen, sozialen und politischen Verhältnissen gelebt haben, als wir es tun. Die Historische Stereotypenforschung als Sonderdisziplin der Wahrnehmungsgeschichte schlägt sich mit diesem Problem herum, und ihre Vorgehensweisen müssen notwendigerweise andere sein als die Methoden von Disziplinen, die mit Umfragen und Befragungen arbeiten, denn die 'Kunden' der Historiker liegen schon im Grab, und das oft seit Jahrhunderten.

Beginnen wir zur Illustrierung der historischen Dimension von Stereotypen mit einer österreichischen Quelle aus dem 18. Jahrhundert. Danach sind die Polen in ihren Sitten "bäurisch", "in Natur und Eigenschaften" "Nochwilder" als die Schweden; der "Verstand" erfreut sich keiner großen Wertschätzung ("gering achtend"); ihre "Eigenschaften" schätzt man als "mittelmäßig" ein; Wissenschaft betreiben sie "in unterschiedlichen Sprachen"; ihre männliche Bekleidung ist "langröckig"; ihre "Untugend" besteht darin, dass sie prassen ("Brasser" sind); sie "Lieben" "Den Ad[e]l"; als Nationalkrankheit leiden sie am Durchfall ("an den Durchbruch"); ihr Land ist "waldich"; ihre "Kriegstugente" sind "Un Gestimt"; vom religiösen Leben ("Gottesdienst") heißt es, der Pole "Glaubt Allerley" (das Stereotyp der *polak-katolik*, des polnischen Katholizismus, gab es damals offensichtlich noch nicht, zumindest nicht im katholischen Österreich); die Polen "erkennen für ihren Herren" jemanden, den sie gewählt haben ("einen Erwelden") – ein deutlicher Hinweis auf das Wahlkönigtum in der Republik Polen-Litauen vom 16. zum 18. Jahrhundert; ihr Reichtum ("Haben Überfluß") besteht vor allem aus Pelzen ("Böltzwerch"); "die Zeit vertreiben" sie am liebsten im Streit ("Mit zanken"); unter den Tieren ähneln sie am meisten einem Bären ("einen Bern") – interessant ist hier, dass der Bär nicht – wie später gerne – mit Russland verbunden wurde, sondern zu Beginn des 18. Jahrhundert noch mit Polen; "Ihr Leben Ende" spielt sich "im Stall" ab. Diese wenig schmeichelhafte Charakteristik der Polen finden wir auf einer sog. *Völkertafel*; die hier abgebildete bekannteste stammt aus Österreich, genauer aus der Steiermark und entstand wohl zwischen 1720 und 1730.¹

¹ Zu Völkertafeln siehe vor allem Stanzel (1997).

Kurze Beschreibung der Nationen		Kurze Beschreibung der Nationen											
Spanier	Spanisch	Wäلتش	Engländer	Schwab	Polack	Unger	Wulwarisch	Türkisch	Italienisch	Frankreich	Dänisch	Polnisch	Pollnisch
Italienisch	Italienisch	Italienisch	Italienisch	Italienisch	Italienisch	Italienisch	Italienisch	Italienisch	Italienisch	Italienisch	Italienisch	Italienisch	Italienisch
Frankreich	Frankreich	Frankreich	Frankreich	Frankreich	Frankreich	Frankreich	Frankreich	Frankreich	Frankreich	Frankreich	Frankreich	Frankreich	Frankreich
Polnisch	Polnisch	Polnisch	Polnisch	Polnisch	Polnisch	Polnisch	Polnisch	Polnisch	Polnisch	Polnisch	Polnisch	Polnisch	Polnisch
Ungarisch	Ungarisch	Ungarisch	Ungarisch	Ungarisch	Ungarisch	Ungarisch	Ungarisch	Ungarisch	Ungarisch	Ungarisch	Ungarisch	Ungarisch	Ungarisch
Wulwarisch	Wulwarisch	Wulwarisch	Wulwarisch	Wulwarisch	Wulwarisch	Wulwarisch	Wulwarisch	Wulwarisch	Wulwarisch	Wulwarisch	Wulwarisch	Wulwarisch	Wulwarisch
Türkisch	Türkisch	Türkisch	Türkisch	Türkisch	Türkisch	Türkisch	Türkisch	Türkisch	Türkisch	Türkisch	Türkisch	Türkisch	Türkisch
Italienisch	Italienisch	Italienisch	Italienisch	Italienisch	Italienisch	Italienisch	Italienisch	Italienisch	Italienisch	Italienisch	Italienisch	Italienisch	Italienisch
Frankreich	Frankreich	Frankreich	Frankreich	Frankreich	Frankreich	Frankreich	Frankreich	Frankreich	Frankreich	Frankreich	Frankreich	Frankreich	Frankreich
Dänisch	Dänisch	Dänisch	Dänisch	Dänisch	Dänisch	Dänisch	Dänisch	Dänisch	Dänisch	Dänisch	Dänisch	Dänisch	Dänisch
Polnisch	Polnisch	Polnisch	Polnisch	Polnisch	Polnisch	Polnisch	Polnisch	Polnisch	Polnisch	Polnisch	Polnisch	Polnisch	Polnisch
Pollnisch	Pollnisch	Pollnisch	Pollnisch	Pollnisch	Pollnisch	Pollnisch	Pollnisch	Pollnisch	Pollnisch	Pollnisch	Pollnisch	Pollnisch	Pollnisch
Italienisch	Italienisch	Italienisch	Italienisch	Italienisch	Italienisch	Italienisch	Italienisch	Italienisch	Italienisch	Italienisch	Italienisch	Italienisch	Italienisch
Frankreich	Frankreich	Frankreich	Frankreich	Frankreich	Frankreich	Frankreich	Frankreich	Frankreich	Frankreich	Frankreich	Frankreich	Frankreich	Frankreich
Dänisch	Dänisch	Dänisch	Dänisch	Dänisch	Dänisch	Dänisch	Dänisch	Dänisch	Dänisch	Dänisch	Dänisch	Dänisch	Dänisch
Polnisch	Polnisch	Polnisch	Polnisch	Polnisch	Polnisch	Polnisch	Polnisch	Polnisch	Polnisch	Polnisch	Polnisch	Polnisch	Polnisch
Pollnisch	Pollnisch	Pollnisch	Pollnisch	Pollnisch	Pollnisch	Pollnisch	Pollnisch	Pollnisch	Pollnisch	Pollnisch	Pollnisch	Pollnisch	Pollnisch
Italienisch	Italienisch	Italienisch	Italienisch	Italienisch	Italienisch	Italienisch	Italienisch	Italienisch	Italienisch	Italienisch	Italienisch	Italienisch	Italienisch
Frankreich	Frankreich	Frankreich	Frankreich	Frankreich	Frankreich	Frankreich	Frankreich	Frankreich	Frankreich	Frankreich	Frankreich	Frankreich	Frankreich

Abb. 1: Völkertafel

Solche Völkertafeln geben kollektiv zugeschriebene Charaktereigenschaften mehrerer Nationen wieder. Sie sind für Kulturhistoriker die ersten vergleichenden Quellen für die unterschiedlichen Stereotype europäischer Nationen. Wir kennen sie seit dem Beginn des 18. Jahrhunderts. Im vorliegenden Fall haben wir es mit einer relativ breiten Charakterisierung und Stereotypisierung europäischer Nationen von Spanien bis Moskau und Istanbul, also dem Russischen und dem Osmanischen Reich, zu tun. Eine solche Aufzählung von 10 Nationen, wobei Türken

und Griechen (“Tirk oder Grich”) zusammengenommen wurden, ist offensichtlich reichlich oberflächlich und rein phänomenologisch, d.h. es geht um die bloße äußere Wahrnehmung. Es handelt sich um rein deskriptive Stereotypen, auch wenn sie gelegentlich aufeinander Bezug nehmen, wenn z.B. der Ungar als “Veräther” erachtet wird, der Russe (“Muskawith”) als “gar verätherisch” und der Türke und Grieche als “noch verätherischer” bezeichnet werden. Oder wenn in religiösen Fragen (“Gottesdienst”) der Russe als “Ein Abtriniger” (also ein Renegat, einer, der vom richtigen Glauben abgefallen ist), der Türke und Grieche daneben als “Ewen ein solchen” gelten.

Derartige multilaterale Zusammenstellungen finden wir noch heute gelegentlich bei Enqueten der öffentlichen Meinung – meist von recht eingeschränkter inhaltlicher Aussagekraft. Sehr populär sind sie in Witzen, die in Westeuropa wohl verbreiteter sind als im ostmitteleuropäischen Teil unseres Kontinents. Der folgende Witz sei auf Englisch wiedergegeben, denn er stammt wohl aus diesem Sprachraum:

Heaven is where the police are British, the cooks French, the mechanics German, the lovers Italian and it's all organized by the Swiss.

Hell is where the chefs are British, the mechanics French, the lovers Swiss, the police German and it's all organized by the Italians.

Stereotypisierungen finden am häufigsten in Bezug auf Nationen statt; dementsprechend sprechen wir dann von nationalen Stereotypen. Aber schon die Kategorie, nach der stereotypisiert wird, hier also die Nation, stellt keineswegs eine überall gemeinsame Größe dar. Denn darüber, was eine Nation sei und wie sie in diversen europäischen Ländern verstanden und konzeptualisiert wird, besteht keineswegs Einigkeit. Es lassen sich kaum zwei Länder in Europa finden, in denen die Diskursgeschichte auf gleiche Nationskonzepte hinauslaufen würde. Wir kennen politische und ethnische Nationskonzepte, Auffassungen von Kulturnation und Sprachnation, ein religiös oder gar konfessionell gefärbtes Nationsverständnis, imperiale Nationsmissionen u. ä. in Europa und darüber hinaus. Solche unterschiedlichen Nationsbegriffe sind nicht das Thema dieses Beitrags. Allerdings – da nationale Identität in nicht unbeträchtlichem Ausmaß geprägt ist von der Perzeption und Bezeichnung derer, die als nicht zur eigenen Nation zugehörig betrachtet werden, als *der Anderen*, ist es nicht von der Hand zu weisen, dass auch nationale Stereotypisierungen geprägt sind davon, was unter Nation in der jeweiligen nationalen Diskursgemeinschaft verstanden wird. Für eine Erforschung nationaler Stereotypen ist es also wichtig, das Nationskonzept des Subjekts, also der stereotypisierenden Gruppe, zu kennen wie auch die soziale Zugehörigkeit der stereotypisierten Objekte zu berücksichtigen.

Zunächst gilt es allerdings zu versuchen, eine präzise Eingrenzung des Begriffs Stereotyp vorzunehmen. Nicht selten werden mit dem Begriff alle Verall-

gemeinerungen in Bezug auf die Wahrnehmung menschlicher Gruppen gemeint. Kurz nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges machte ich während einer wichtigen internationalen Konferenz,² auf der das Phänomen nationaler Stereotypen angegangen wurde, die Erfahrung, dass im Laufe der Konferenz der Begriff ‘Stereotyp’ immer häufiger als Synonym für nationale Zugehörigkeit, sei es als Wahrnehmung, sei es als Nationalgefühl, benutzt wurde. Es handelte sich in meinen Augen damals und auch heute um eine erhebliche und unzulässige Inflationierung des Begriffs Stereotyp, was auf lange Sicht den Begriff unbrauchbar als wissenschaftlichen Begriff und damit als analytisches Instrument macht.

Wenn wir das Phänomen Stereotyp näher betrachten wollen,³ dann müssen wir uns fragen: was versteht man unter diesem Begriff, welche Varianten können wir feststellen, welche Funktionen üben und üben sie im Zusammenleben unterschiedlicher Gesellschaften aus; also mit anderen Worten: Was sind Stereotypen, warum existieren sie und wie funktionieren sie? Hier soll weder eine Abhandlung lexikalischer Bedeutungsgeschichte noch eine historische Semantik entwickelt werden, daher kurz und bündig: Das Wort ‘Stereotyp’ kommt ursprünglich aus der Sprache der Drucker; als sozialwissenschaftlicher Begriff tauchte es zum ersten Mal in dem Buch *Public Opinion* des amerikanischen Publizisten Walter Lippman 1922 auf, wo der Autor Stereotypen *pictures in our head* nannte.⁴ Seitdem werden mit diesem Begriff verallgemeinernde Aussagen bezeichnet, die auf der einen Seite auf menschliche Gruppen oder auf Individuen als Mitglieder solcher Gruppen angewandt werden, und die andererseits als verallgemeinernde Aussagen positive oder negative, von starken Überzeugungen getragene Wertzuschreibungen darstellen. Diese Gruppen können unterschiedlich definiert werden – rassistisch, ethnisch, national, sozial, politisch, religiös, konfessionell, nach Genderzugehörigkeit, nach sexueller Orientierung, professionell usw. Wir haben es also mit einer spezifischen Variante von Verallgemeinerungen zu tun: sie betreffen menschliche Gruppen und stellen Werturteile dar.

Was das Verhältnis von Stereotyp zu empirischen Erfahrungen betrifft, so verhalten sich viele Sprecher entsprechend der Aussage: “Obwohl er ein Türke ist, hat er das Abitur bestanden” – beruhend auf der Vorannahme, bzw. auf dem Stereotyp, dass ein Türke zu wenig intelligent sei, um das Abitur zu bestehen. Wenn ich also einen Türken mit Abitur treffe, dann korrigiere ich nicht mein Türkenstereotyp, sondern ich deklariere das Phänomen ‘Türke mit Abitur’ zur Ausnahme.⁵ Oder ein anderes Beispiel: Als ich vor 48 Jahren durch Polen reiste, wurde ich häufig gefragt, ob ich denn wirklich ein Deutscher sei, denn ich sei doch so

² Es handelt sich um die Konferenz *Narody i Stereotypy*, die 1991 in Krakau stattfand. Siehe dazu Walas (1995),

³ Vgl. Zum Folgenden Hahn (2007).

⁴ Lippmann (1949 [1922], S. 95 und 104). Vgl. Hahn/Hahn (2002, S. 25).

⁵ Vgl. Mirga (1984, S. 60), wo dies am Beispiel von Zigeuner-Stereotypen demonstriert wird.

völlig anders als ein normaler Deutscher. Es stellt sich allerdings die Frage: Was ist das, ein normaler Deutscher? Menschen lieben ihre Stereotypen, sind an sie gewöhnt, also konnten sie einen Deutschen mit menschlichen Verhaltensweisen nur als Ausnahme wahrnehmen und in ihrem Weltbild zulassen. Wenn die reale Erfahrung nicht mit dem Stereotyp übereinstimmt, ja mit den Bildern in unseren Köpfen in Konflikt gerät, dann wird nicht etwa das Stereotyp verändert, sondern *tant pis pour la réalité*. Hier lässt sich der Unterschied zwischen einer normalen Verallgemeinerung und einem Stereotyp festmachen: Normale Verallgemeinerungen stützen sich auf Erfahrungen – ihr Zusammenhang mit der Realität beruht darauf, dass ihr Informationsgehalt nachprüfbar, also falsifizierbar bzw. verifizierbar ist. Stereotypen dagegen sind spezifische Verallgemeinerungen, in denen der emotionale Faktor dominiert, die emotional aufgeladen sind und deren Emotionalität einen wichtigen, wenn nicht den wichtigsten Informationsgehalt darstellt. Empirische Erfahrungen sind daher nicht in der Lage, herrschende Stereotype zu widerlegen oder grundlegend zu verändern. Die oft erstaunliche Beharrlichkeit von Stereotypen beruht auf ihrer emotionalen Aufladung, auf dem Umstand, dass sie emotional verwurzelt und daher resistent gegen kognitive Argumente und abweichende Erfahrungen sind.

Daraus ergibt sich allerdings die Frage: Wie verändern sich Stereotype? Oder konkret anhand des eben angeführten Beispiels: Im Laufe der 48 Jahre meiner Polenreisen hat sich nach meiner Wahrnehmung das polnische Deutschenstereotyp erheblich verändert. Ob auf der Basis irgendwelcher konkreten Erfahrungen? Da wäre ich vorsichtig, denn präzise Aussagen über kollektive Erfahrungen haben immer eine etwas spekulative Färbung. Aber eines können wir sicherlich aus der Tatsache, das sich die Deutschenstereotype in Polen verändert haben, schlussfolgern: Weder die Polen (als bezeichnende Subjekte) noch die Deutschen (als bezeichnete Objekte) haben sich als Gruppen grundsätzlich verändert. Offensichtlich haben sich die Emotionen gegenüber den Deutschen verändert, und nur auf der Grundlage solcher veränderter Emotionen verändern sich Stereotypen und entstehen neue Stereotypen. Emotionen ändern sich, aus unterschiedlichen Gründen, und erst auf dieser Basis verändern sich Stereotypen. Daraus ergibt sich: Um Stereotypen zu bekämpfen, brauchen wir so etwas wie eine neue *éducation sentimentale*. Allerdings sollte man immer beachten: alte Stereotypen bleiben, auch wenn sie vergessen werden – sie können jeder Zeit wieder zurückkehren.

Warum interessieren sich Wissenschaftler für Stereotype? Dass Stereotype häufig im Alltag vorkommen, ist interessant, auch wenn die meisten von uns das kaum bemerken; aber nicht alles, was in unserem Alltag auftaucht, wird deshalb Gegenstand wissenschaftlichen Interesses gleich mehrerer Disziplinen. In drei Bereichen wird derzeit versucht, Stereotype zu erforschen:

- 1) Zum einen interessieren sich Sozialpsychologen u.a., wie die Individuen an ihre Stereotypen kommen und wie sie in ihren Köpfen mit ihnen umgehen.

- 2) Zum anderen interessieren sich Historiker und andere Kulturwissenschaftler für die Geschichte einzelner (meist inhaltlich oder durch das stereotypisierte Objekt festgelegter) Stereotypen – so die Geschichte des (vor allem in Deutschland verbreiteten) Stereotyps der “polnischen Wirtschaft”, oder des Stereotyps des “perfiden Albions”, oder der deutschen Polenstereotypen, der britischen Irenstereotypen, islamophober Stereotypen, antisemitischer Stereotypen, westlicher Russlandstereotypen usw.
- 3) Schließlich erforschen Historiker, Soziologen und Politikwissenschaftler die Funktion von Stereotypen in einzelnen Gesellschaften: Warum brauchen und gebrauchen Gesellschaften ‘ihre’ Stereotypen, Heterostereotypen und Auto-stereotypen, welche Rolle spielen sie im Identitätshaushalt einer Gesellschaft, wie sieht die Stereotypenküche einer Gesellschaft aus, was geschieht in einer Gesellschaft, wenn sich Stereotypen in ihr verändern? In welchen Epochen können wir eine verstärkte Produktion von Stereotypen feststellen? In welchem Ausmaß korreliert die Stereotypenproduktion, -benutzung und -wirksamkeit mit innergesellschaftlichen und intragesellschaftlichen Kommunikationsformen und -techniken?

Viele Wissenschaftler interessieren sich, und das betrifft vor allem von den hier genannten die zweite und dritte Variante, für Stereotype in öffentlicher Kommunikation, in aller Art öffentlichen Diskursen. ‘Private’ Quellen sind selten Forschungsobjekte, es sei denn, wir fragen nach den Stereotypen einzelner Individuen und wie sie sie erhalten (haben) (Variante 1).

Manche sind der Ansicht, Stereotypen in öffentlichen Diskursen seien repräsentativer als andere; andere weisen darauf hin, dass die bloße Existenz und Deskription nicht reichen, um sie interessant zu machen, und dass man sich auf ihre Wirkung in der Öffentlichkeit konzentrieren müsse. Gerade dort funktionieren auch alle Phänomene der aktuell wieder diskutierten öffentlichen Xenophobie nur durch die Benutzung von Stereotypen – ob es um die Stigmatisierung fremder Migranten, ethnischer, konfessioneller und religiöser Minderheiten oder um Gruppen mit anderen sexuellen Orientierungen geht. Im Zusammenhang mit xenophoben Erscheinungen erweist sich als interessant, dass solche Minderheiten in einer Mehrheitsgesellschaft zwar immer mit einem gewissen Minimum stereotyper Zuschreibungen lebten und leben, die dieses Zusammenleben meist nur wenig störten oder stören; plötzlich aber werden sie ein Problem, werden als Problem wahrgenommen, und in Konfliktsituationen werden Stereotypen wichtig, gewichtig und giftig bzw. vergiftend. In solchen Momenten stellt man fest, dass diese Stereotypen schon immer existiert haben und erst dann zu Konfliktfaktoren werden. Was man zuvor als vernachlässigungswert hielt, steht plötzlich im Zentrum der öffentlichen Wahrnehmung und des öffentlichen Diskurses.

Das Stereotyp als Instrument politischer Propaganda ist für die meisten Wissenschaftler und Publizisten das überzeugendste Beispiel für die Schädlichkeit

von Stereotypen. Sowohl rassistische und ethnische als auch politische und kulturelle Stereotype finden wir in der nationalsozialistischen Propaganda, ebenso wie politische, kulturelle, soziale und Klassenstereotypen in der Propaganda kommunistischer Regime. Beide Regime verband ein hoher Stereotypisierungsgrad von der Mehrheit abweichender sexueller Orientierungen. Daraus darf man jedoch nicht den Schluss ziehen, dass in demokratischen Gesellschaften weniger Stereotypen auftreten. Xenophobe Erscheinungen, die Stigmatisierung verschiedener Minderheiten und negative Gruppencharakterisierungen finden wir genauso in demokratischen wie in undemokratischen Systemen. Mit jeder etwas tieferen Analyse von Wahlkämpfen in irgendeinem europäischen oder außereuropäischen Land lässt sich aufzeigen – in der letzten Zeit sogar in gesteigerter Form –, dass alle politischen Richtungen sich ohne irgendwelche Hemmungen einer Rhetorik voll emotional aufgeladener Stereotypen bedienen und auch früher bedient haben. Als 2008 im US-amerikanischen Wahlkampf Barak Obama als Moslem stigmatisiert wurde, hatten wir es mit einem doppelten Stereotyp zu tun: erstens, dass ein Mensch mit einer schwarzen Haut nicht Christ sein kann, und zweitens, dass ein Moslem nicht ‘zu uns’ gehört, negativ konnotiert ist, kein normaler Bürger ‘unseres’ Landes sein kann – alles klassische Argumente einer negativen Stigmatisierung.

Die Wirksamkeit solcher Stigmatisierungen ändert sich mit der Zeit, und das nicht nur durch den Wechsel politischer Systeme, sondern vor allem mit Veränderungen im Wertesystem der jeweiligen Gesellschaft. Hier zwei Beispiele aus der Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: In den Wahlkämpfen der Jahre 1961 und 1965 wurde Willy Brandt als ehemaliger politischer Emigrant gebrandmarkt, was damals in einem nicht unbeträchtlichen Teil der deutschen postnationalsozialistischen Gesellschaft dem Stereotyp des Vaterlandsverrätters gleichkam. Zu Beginn funktionierte diese Stereotypisierung, doch 1969 gewann Brandt die Wahlen. Das zweite Beispiel: Der frühere bundesdeutsche Außenminister und Bundesvorsitzende der Freien Demokratischen Partei Guido Westerwelle (1961-2016) machte keinen Hehl aus seiner Homosexualität und dass er in einer gleichgeschlechtlichen Partnerschaft lebte. Trotzdem spielte dieser Umstand in Wahlkämpfen keine Rolle, d.h. keiner der politischen Gegner Westerwelles missbrauchte dessen Zugehörigkeit zu einer Minderheitengruppe, was die sexuelle Orientierung betraf. 30 Jahre zuvor wäre das noch unmöglich gewesen.⁶

Warum eigentlich entwickeln Stereotypen, also emotional aufgeladene Bilder anderer Gruppen oder von Mitgliedern anderer Gruppen, eine so starke Wirksamkeit, dass nur wenige Politiker sich dem entziehen können? Das betrifft übrigens

⁶ Nach einer repräsentativen Umfrage der Antidiskriminierungsstelle der Bundesregierung vom Januar 2017 stimmen inzwischen 83% der Bevölkerung einer Ehe zwischen Homosexuellen beider Geschlechter zu – www.sueddeutsche.de/leben/antidiskriminierungsstelle-des-bundes-homosexualitaet-ja-aber-nicht-in-der-eigenen-familie-1.3329885 (Stand: 17.1.2017).

nicht nur Politiker. In meiner akademischen Laufbahn habe ich in vielen Sitzungen gegessen, deren Teilnehmer ausschließlich Professoren waren – in ihnen tauchten oft recht spezifische Stereotypen von Studenten auf; Studierende haben mir in Gesprächen zugestanden, dass in Studentenversammlungen auch entsprechende Professorenbilder vorkommen. Warum brauchen Menschen derartige Stereotypisierungen?

Die Fachliteratur unterstreicht häufig die Orientierungsfunktion von Stereotypen. Sie sollen einem “natürlichen Orientierungsbedürfnis” entsprechen, ja “das Bedürfnis nach einer raschen Außenorientierung”⁷ befriedigen. Eine solche Orientierung spielt sich auf zwei Ebenen ab: zum einen sachbezogen, d.h. die Stereotype ordnen bzw. ich ordne mit Hilfe der Stereotypen mir diffus erscheinende Wahrnehmungen und reduziere dadurch Komplexität; zum anderen sozialbezogen, d.h. ich orientiere mich sozial, indem ich Gemeinsamkeit mit anderen in einer Kommunikationssituation feststelle (oder auch nicht feststelle) und damit auch mich und meine Umwelt festlege; die Stereotypen brauche ich also, um zwischen dem ‘Eigenen’ und dem ‘Fremden’ unterscheiden zu können, also mich (und die Anderen) zu verorten. Diese sozialbezogene Ebene führt direkt zu den beiden Varianten von Stereotypen, nämlich dem Autostereotyp, also dem Bild, das man von sich selbst oder von der eigenen Gruppe macht (samt den Werturteilen, die damit verbunden sind), und zu dem Heterostereotyp, dem Bild, das man von den anderen hat. Beide diese Varianten, das Selbstbild und das Fremdbild, hängen unmittelbar miteinander zusammen. Manchmal entsprechen sie sich, d.h. funktionieren parallel: So z.B. entstand das Stereotyp des *deutschen Drangs nach Osten* vor 160 Jahren in den 1850er Jahren als positives deutsches Autostereotyp zur (historischen und aktuellen) Rechtfertigung einer deutschen zivilisatorischen und gleichzeitig imperialen Ostmission fast gleichzeitig mit dem negativen Heterostereotyp in einigen slawischen Gesellschaften, die damit ihre Bedrohungsängste zum Ausdruck zu brachten, zugleich auch mit den Funktionen der Gegnerdefinierung und der Selbstmobilisierung.

Die wechselseitige Bedingtheit von Autostereotyp und Heterostereotyp geht jedoch noch weiter und muss nicht unbedingt verbal ausgeführt werden. Es lässt sich folgende Regel aufstellen: Fast jedes Mal, wenn ein negatives Heterostereotyp benutzt wird, wird gleichzeitig das positive Autostereotyp mitgedacht. Der Krakauer Ethnologe Andrzej Mirga meint dazu:

⁷ Rudolf Jaworski betont dies vor allem für die gemischtnationalen Gebiete Ostmitteleuropas, vgl. Jaworski (1987, S. 66); von linguistischer Seite betonte das schon früher Quasthoff (1973, S. 125): “‘Stereotype’ erleichtern oder ermöglichen sogar dem einzelnen die Orientierung in einer immer komplexer werdenden Welt [...]” mit weiteren Hinweisen auf die konkreten Aspekte dieser Orientierungshilfe. Vgl. auch das Kapitel “Das Vorurteil als Grundproblem der sozialen Orientierung” in Heintz (1957, S. 28-34).

Das Heterostereotyp verweist uns jedes Mal *explizit* oder *implizit* auf das Autostereotyp. Man darf die Behauptung wagen, dass es für eine Gruppe [so] wichtig [ist], sich selbst zu definieren, dass das Heterostereotyp hingegen der Vorwand und die Form ist, um das Autostereotyp zu explizieren. (Mirga 1984, S. 64; Übersetzung HHH)

Die *polnische Wirtschaft* als deutsches Polenstereotyp⁸ behauptet unausgesprochen, dass in Deutschland besser und rationaler gewirtschaftet werde; das französische Stereotyp der *anarchie polonaise*⁹ spiegelt das französische Konzept zentralisierter Staatlichkeit wider. Und umgekehrt: In den Diskursen einiger slawischer Gesellschaften funktionieren Heterostereotypen, die Deutsche als plumpe Roboter mit automatisierten Reaktionen schildern – sie dienen als Gegenbild zu den Vorstellungen von ‘natürliche’ zwischenmenschlichen Verhaltensweisen in den eigenen Gesellschaften. Etwas anders funktioniert dieses Verhältnis bei positiven Heterostereotypen. Das zu evozierende Autostereotyp mit negativer emotionaler Wertigkeit gilt dann nicht als affirmative Aussage, sondern als Warnung bzw. Aufforderung; das positive Heterostereotyp hat also einen appellativen Charakter: ‘Wir sind leider so bzw. nicht so, aber wir sollten so sein oder so werden’; die Anderen werden praktisch als Vorbild empfohlen. Darauf beruhte Lech Wałęsas berühmte Forderung “Wir bauen in Polen ein zweites Japan” (“zbudujemy w Polsce drugą Japonię!”¹⁰) – Japan als das Stereotyp einer disziplinierten Gesellschaft, als ein stereotyper Weg zu Wohlstand und technischer Perfektion, sowie gleichzeitig an Appell an sich selbst bzw. an die eigene Gruppe: “Seien wir so!”.

Man mag dies als ein interessantes und vielleicht sogar lustiges Tischtennispiel ansehen; obendrein erfährt man so einiges über menschliche Träume und Phantasien. Dahinter versteckt sich aber noch mehr, nämlich dass das Stereotyp mit seiner verborgenen komparativen Funktion, also Fremd- und Eigenbild miteinander abgleichend, uns (Stereotypenforscher) immer auf die Identität derjenigen Person verweist, die dieses oder jenes Stereotyp zum Ausdruck bringt, bzw. zur Identität der Gruppe, in der diese Stereotypen funktionieren. Stereotypen haben also eine deutliche Funktion für die Konstruktion kollektiver Identitäten. Über Autostereotypen und Heterostereotypen bringen wir absichtlich oder (meist) unabsichtlich die Inhalte unserer Identität zum Ausdruck, deren unterschiedliche Aspekte und Varianten. Und das voller Emotion, denn unsere Emotionen bringen, ja verführen uns dazu, unsere Identität zu enthüllen, ja bloßzustellen. Es lohnt sich, sich dessen bewusst zu werden, dass wir, wenn wir Stereotypen benutzen, uns entblößen, Einblick in unsere Identität, in unsere Emotionen geben. Die ganze Ironie, deren sich Intellektuelle bei der Benutzung von Stereotypen oft befleißigen, hilft da nichts. Wenn wir Stereotypen benutzen, ziehen wir uns aus, und zwar

⁸ Siehe dazu die ausführliche Abhandlung des Posener Germanisten Hubert Orłowski (1996).

⁹ Beauvois (1985, S. 134-147).

¹⁰ Lech Wałęsa: Moja Japonia. www.tygodnik.com.pl/japonia/walesa.html (Stand: 9.1.2017).

ganz. Für den Stereotypenforscher, der solche Einblicke gewinnt, sind solche Begegnungen mit entblößten, ja nackten Identitäten keineswegs immer lustig.

Eine interessante Variante wirksamer Stereotypen stellt die stereotypisierende Verwendung von Himmelsrichtungen dar. Jedoch – obwohl heute ständig vom Nord-Süd-Konflikt (= ‘entwickelte’ vs. angeblich ‘unterentwickelte’ Welt, zugleich der wichtigste Weg aktueller Massenmigrationen) die Rede ist, dominiert zweifellos noch immer im europäischen Diskurs¹¹ das Beziehungspaar ‘West’ und ‘Ost’. Sowohl die Publizistik und politische Sprache als auch die Alltagssprache sind in fast allen europäischen Ländern davon geprägt. Dabei waren und sind, von russischen Slavophilen¹² einmal abgesehen, die qualifizierenden emotionalen Konnotationen so eindeutig, dass kaum jemand freiwillig zum ‘Osten’ gehören will, wo immer in Europa er auch wohnen mag, heute wohl mit Ausnahme der Mehrheit der Bewohner Russlands und der Ostukraine. Letztlich handelt es sich um ein interessantes Beispiel dafür, wie Stereotypen das “mapping in our head” herstellen – egal wo wir beheimatet sind, aber sicherlich wollen wir nicht im ‘Osten’ wohnen, ganz im Gegenteil, höchstens in Mitteleuropa, und Gott sei Dank haben französische Wissenschaftler ja 1989 festgestellt, dass geographisch der Mittelpunkt Europas in dem litauischen Dorf Purnuškes bei Vilnius zu lokalisieren sei.

Nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges hätte man erwarten können, dass eine solch negative Stereotypisierung des ‘Ostens’ zu Ende gehen oder zumindest sich ändern werde. Ganz im Gegenteil – alle verlangten vom ‘Osten’, dass er ‘Westen’ werden solle, und sie waren empört, dass der ‘Osten’ der ‘Osten’ blieb. Es interessiert hier nicht, wer oder was für eine solche Perzeption verantwortlich sei. Auf jeden Fall sind Kontroversen über politische und wirtschaftliche Interessen üblicherweise mit Emotionen und alten Bildern aufgeladen; emotionale Dämonisierungen wurden und werden wirkungsvoll eingesetzt. Kulturelle, konfessionelle und religiöse Unterschiede führen noch heute nicht zu wechselseitigem Respekt, sondern zu Beschimpfungen.

Die Stigmatisierung des ‘Ostens’ hat eine lange Geschichte. Sie hängt damit zusammen, dass der Osten ursprünglich im Orient angesiedelt wurde, während die von uns heute als geographisches Osteuropa wahrgenommenen Gebiete als der ‘Norden’ angesehen wurde.¹³ Von manchen Autoren wird der Beginn der ‘Ost’-Stereotypisierung schon mit den Perserkriegen der Griechen im 5. vorchristlichen Jahrhundert angesetzt. Im Mittelalter und in der frühen Neuzeit gab es sowohl für die Menschen des Orients wie für die in unserem heutigen Osteuropa beheimateten Menschen ähnliche, wenn auch nicht unbedingt die gleichen

¹¹ Eine ‘Ost’-‘West’-Relation existiert ebenfalls, wenn auch mit umgekehrter Bewertung, im inneramerikanischen Diskurs. Auf sie kann hier nicht eingegangen werden.

¹² Vgl. Glazkova (1995).

¹³ Vgl. Lemberg (1985).

Stereotypen – eine differenzierte Ähnlichkeit samt einem Übergang, die bisher noch keineswegs genügend erforscht worden sind. Der religiöse (Heiden) oder konfessionelle (Häretiker) Unterschied wurde meist in den Vordergrund geschoben, an den kulturelle und ethnische Alteritätsbilder andocken konnten.

Seitdem ist die Wahrnehmung des ‘Ostens’ unablässig mit der Frage verbunden: “Warum können sie und wollen sie nicht so sein wie wir? Wenn ‘wir’ schon alle Europäer sein sollen, dann sollen sich ‘die im Osten’ an uns Westler angleichen, denn wir sind – nach unserem Selbstverständnis – die ‘eentlichen’, ‘echten’, ‘wesensmäßigen’ Europäer.” Letztlich geht es in diesem imaginären westlichen Monolog um eine Debatte, wie offen oder eng wir den Begriff ‘Europäer’ definieren. Diese Wahrnehmungen des ‘Ostens’ als der Andere, der Fremde ist also älter als Peter der Große oder Katharina II.¹⁴ Entsprechend meinen obigen Ausführungen über die Rolle von Stereotypen für die eigene Identität ist klar: Der ‘Osten’ ärgert uns, weil er nicht der ‘Westen’ ist, weil er selbst ist und sich nicht dessen schämt, dass er anders ist. Wir ‘Westler’ wollen durch die Stereotypisierung des ‘Ostens’ hervorheben, dass wir und unsere Werte besser sind als die von denen da.

Natürlich dürfen wir unsere Werte lieben und mit ihnen zufrieden bzw. auf sie stolz sein; aber warum führt ein solches Bekenntnis zum eigenen Wertesystem zu negativen Stereotypen von Menschen, die anders sind und größtenteils auch anders bleiben wollen? Und die sich bei näherem Kennenlernen meist nur wenig von uns unterscheiden? Man kann behaupten, dass dies die Spielregeln bei der Benutzung von Stereotypen sind – meinerwegen, aber dann sollen wir zugeben, dass ‘Westen’ und ‘Osten’ Stereotypen sind, und dass hier die Wahrheit nicht wie sonst üblich in der Mitte liegt, sondern dass es in der Welt der Stereotypen einfach keinerlei Wahrheit gibt.

Stereotypen sind allgegenwärtig. Mit ihnen kann man Menschen, sogar Massen mobilisieren, und zwar in jedem politischen System, von totalitären oder autoritären bis zu demokratischen politischen Ordnungen. Das soll nicht heißen, dass es keine Unterschiede zwischen demokratischen und nichtdemokratischen Systemen gebe, sondern nur, dass in allen von ihnen Stereotypen funktionieren. Natürlich ist es ein Unterschied, ob beispielsweise politische Stereotypen in einer Auseinandersetzung mit politischen Gegnern während eines Wahlkampfes in einem demokratischen Staat, ob ethnische oder xenophobe Stereotypen gegen eine Minderheit im Inland oder ob nationale bzw. politische Stereotypen gegen äußere Feinde benutzt werden. Auch ist zu berücksichtigen, ob wir es mit einer relativ freien, d.h. von staatlichen und politischen Institutionen wenig kontrollierten Presse, mit einer Regimepresse oder mit Regierungspropaganda zu tun haben.

¹⁴ In welchem Ausmaß ältere kulturelle und konfessionelle Stereotypen auch nach 1991 wieder aufgegriffen wurden, davon zeugt das seinerzeit aufsehenerregende Buch von Huntington (1996).

Die Allgegenwart von Stereotypen lässt sich in sehr alltäglichen Situationen beobachten, sogar wenn niemand ein Stereotyp formuliert. Dazu eine kleine Grenzgeschichte, die sich 1998¹⁵ in einem Zug auf der Eisenbahnverbindung Dresden-Prag abspielte. Eine Studentengruppe aus Oldenburg fährt nach Prag zu einem schon seit zwei Semestern vorbereiteten Seminar mit tschechischen Studenten. Es stellt sich heraus, dass der Personalausweis einer Studentin abgelaufen ist (und sie auch keinen Reisepass mitgenommen hat). Der bundesdeutsche Passkontrolleur erklärt, er könne kein Ersatzdokument ausstellen, und ansonsten gehe ihn die Sache nichts an. Der kurz darauf erscheinende tschechische Passkontrolleur erklärt, die junge Dame müsse den Zug verlassen und könne die tschechische Grenze nicht überschreiten, da sie kein gültiges Ausweispapier mit sich führe. Die weitere Unterhaltung spielt sich auf Tschechisch ab, geführt von meiner Frau. Sie bittet den tschechischen Beamten, ob er nicht in diesem Fall eine Ausnahme machen könne, schließlich habe die Studentin sich auf diese Reise ein Jahr und dafür einen Vortrag vorbereitet, man werde dann ja in Prag in der deutschen Botschaft ein gültiges Ausweispapier besorgen. Die Antwort lautet: “In diesem Fall eine Ausnahme? Wissen Sie, was hier passiert, wenn ein Tscheche ohne einen gültigen Ausweis erscheint und nach Deutschland einreisen will? Da sind die Deutschen mitleidlos, die machen nie eine Ausnahme”. Darauf folgt die appellative Frage meiner Frau: “Aber Sie werden sich doch wohl nicht mit den Deutschen auf eine Stufe stellen?”. Die junge Dame konnte ihre Reise nach Prag fortsetzen.

Explizit wurde hier kein direktes Stereotyp ausgesprochen, scheinbar lief das ganze Gespräch auf der Ebene der konkreten Situation und des anstehenden Sachproblems ab und verließ nicht den Boden der Realität. Trotzdem hätte die Geschichte ohne die in den Köpfen existierende Stereotypenwelt nicht diesen Ausgang nehmen können. Dank der Existenz der in der konkreten Situation nicht ausgesprochenen Stereotypen verlief die Geschichte so wie hier erzählt, und man könnte sagen: “Gott sei Dank gibt es Stereotypen”. Als ich diese Geschichte einem deutschen Kollegen, Professor für Politologie, erzählte, reagierte er lachend: “Typisch altes Österreich!” – und hatte sie damit in seine Stereotypenwelt eingeordnet.

Nicht selten wird die Frage nach der Rolle von Stereotypen in der näheren Zukunft gestellt. Dahinter verbirgt sich die Hoffnung, dass in unseren angeblich aufgeklärten Zeiten es uns gelingen werde, Stereotypen zu überwinden und sie weitgehend loszuwerden. Der Autor dieser Zeilen schreibt sich als Historiker keine Kompetenz zu, Aussagen über die Zukunft zu machen. Für die Vergangenheit haben wir Quellen und eine historische Methodologie – das ist nicht viel, aber etwas, auf was man sich stützen kann. Als Zukunftsprophet haben wir bei Aussa-

¹⁵ Die Jahreszahl ist insofern wichtig, weil die geschilderte Begebenheit sich vor dem EU-Beitritt Tschechiens 2004 abspielte.

gen über kulturelle und soziale Entwicklungen in der Zukunft nur die Hypothese, dass die Evolution so verlaufen werde, wie wir es in der jüngeren Vergangenheit gewohnt sind – und das ist eine recht unsichere Hypothese.

Unser 21. Jahrhundert begann konfliktreicher und blutiger, als zuvor zu erwarten stand, und es gibt wenig Anzeichen, dass die nähere Zukunft ruhiger verlaufen werde. Konflikte generieren Stereotypen, produzieren sie, vermehren und verschärfen sie. Was die kollektive Identität angeht, so gilt es noch vorsichtiger zu sein, wenn es um Voraussagen geht. Es muss völlig offen bleiben, ob die heutige Dominanz nationaler Identitäten sich auf unserem Erdball, zumindest war Europa angeht, erhält, ob sie von einer europäischen Identität, oder umgekehrt von einer regionalen Identität, oder von anderen Identitäten wie z.B. von einer religiösen Identität ergänzt oder gar ersetzt wird – in der islamischen Welt werden wohl heute in einigen Ländern die nationalen Identitäten von religiösen Identitäten und oft gar von konfessionellen Identitäten ersetzt.

Jede identitäre Veränderung hat Einfluss auf Stereotype, denn Identität findet ihren Ausdruck in Stereotypen, gleichzeitig sind Stereotypen Emanationen von Identität. Konflikte bringen Menschen einerseits dazu, sich an ihren bisherigen Identitäten festzuhalten, andererseits beschleunigen sie bei anderen Menschen solche Veränderungen. Als Stereotypenforscher sollte ich mich darüber freuen, denn Stereotype sind in einer konfliktreichen Welt aktueller und wahrnehmbarer als in einer friedlichen Welt, in der Stereotype die Menschen bedeutend weniger stören. Als Bürger dieser Welt und dieses Kontinents hege ich viele Zweifel und Befürchtungen in einer Situation, in der sogar demokratische Staaten immer rascher zu Gewaltanwendung neigen. Konflikte gebären Stereotypen, und der verstärkte Gebrauch von Stereotypen gebiert Konflikte oder verschärft sie zumindest. In diesem Sinne kann man voraussagen (und Sie sehen, dass auch ich trotz meiner zuvor zum Ausdruck gebrachten Skepsis dieser Versuchung unterliege), dass wir, wie angeblich ein altes chinesisches Sprichwort behauptet, “in interessanten Zeiten leben werden” – sicherlich zumindest in aufregenden...

Stereotypen sind mit der Geschichte jedoch darüber hinaus in einer recht spezifischen Weise verknüpft.¹⁶ In der breiteren Gesellschaft lebt die Geschichte in ‘Geschichtsbildern’, und wenn wir sie zusammenstellen, dann sprechen wir gerne von ‘Geschichtsbewusstsein’. Solche ‘Geschichtsbilder’, gemalt oder imaginiert, werden häufig zu Stereotypen. Gesellschaften mit imperialen Angewohnheiten wie die englische oder deutsche sprechen beispielsweise gerne von der Balkanisierung Europas, und darunter verstehen sie, dass kurz vor und vor allem direkt nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg eine ganze Reihe unabhängiger Nationalstaaten von Finnland über Polen bis nach Albanien auf den Trümmern alter und angeblich so stabiler Imperien wie Österreich-Ungarn, Russland, das Deutsche Kaiserreich und das Osmanische Reich entstanden sei. Balkanisierung ist so ein eindeutig

¹⁶ Vgl. Hahn (1994); ebenfalls Hahn (1995).

negatives Stereotyp geworden, emotional aufgeladen mit dem Vorwurf, sie habe Unordnung und Chaos, unnötigen Aufruhr und Revolutionen verursacht; hinter diesem Stereotyp verbarg und verbirgt sich noch immer die Auffassung, dass in dieser Region ein ordentliches Imperium hätte aufrecht erhalten werden und für Ordnung sorgen müssen, dass die heute auf der Existenz von Nationalstaaten beruhende internationale Ordnung nicht legitim und vor allem immer weniger praktikabel sei, dass heute ein Imperium vonnöten sei, das mit seiner Hegemonie dieses Chaos in Schranken halten könne. Zwar wird dies meist nicht so wortwörtlich zum Ausdruck gebracht, aber ohne die Kenntnis dieser Sichtweise, d.h. ohne diese ‘Geschichtsbilder’ lässt sich die Politik der Großmächte gegenüber Ostmitteleuropa seit 100 Jahren kaum verstehen. So kann eine saubere Analyse des Stereotyps Balkanisierung dazu führen, mentale Einstellungen heraus zu sezieren, die mehr aussagen als die Lektüre vieler diplomatischer Dokumente.

‘Geschichtsbewusstsein’ kann man höchst mannigfaltig verstehen; häufig ist damit einfach das allgemeine historische Wissen einer Gesellschaft gemeint. Man kann weitere Fragen anschließen, wie z.B.: Woher stammt dieses Wissen? Wie wird ‘Geschichtsbewusstsein’ zum Ausdruck gebracht? Woher stammen die und was ergibt sich aus den in unserem ‘Geschichtsbewusstsein’ gesammelten ‘Geschichtsbilder[n]’ (ich erinnere an Walter Lippmans *pictures in our head*)? Wie sehen solche ‘Geschichtsbilder’ aus? Kann man von der Geschichtserfahrung einer ganzen Gesellschaft sprechen, und wenn ja, wie wird eine solche Geschichtserfahrung den nächsten Generationen tradiert?

Schon der Begriff ‘Geschichtsbilder’ suggeriert eine Ähnlichkeit zu Stereotypen. Solche ‘Geschichtsbilder’ funktionieren oft als konstante und verwurzelte Elemente, die weder einer Diskussion noch einer Veränderung unseres Bewusstseins unterliegen, von hoher emotionaler Färbung sind und gerne mit Personifizierungen und starken Identifikationen arbeiten. Je mehr wir ‘Geschichtsbewusstsein’ als ein geschlossenes System betrachten, als ein Steinbruch kollektiver Erfahrungen, als etwas, von dem wir glauben, dass wir es genau kennen, als endgültige Lehre, die wir aus der Vergangenheit ziehen können, umso mehr haben wir es mit unveränderlichen ‘Geschichtsbildern’ zu tun. Sie geben vor, ein quasi objektives Wissen über die Vergangenheit zu enthalten, sagen aber in Wirklichkeit, wie diese Vergangenheit eingeschätzt und beurteilt werden soll, erhalten also unmerklich eine normative Funktion. Da aus solchen ‘Geschichtsbildern’ sich eine eindeutige Bestimmung der Identität ergibt, Schlussfolgerungen aus der Geschichte aber als etwas Definitives gelten, werden solche ‘Geschichtsbilder’ zu Stereotypen. In der Konsequenz unterliegt die Art und Weise, wie wir die Gegenwart wahrnehmen, den Einflüssen jener ‘Geschichtsbilder’. Bilder, die man für wahr hält (sogenannte objektive Geschichte), üben einen großen Einfluss auf die Wahrnehmung laufender Ereignisse aus oder entscheiden letztendlich über diese Wahrnehmung. Nichts drückt das besser aus als ein anachronistischer Witz aus den 70er Jahren des vergangenen Jahrhunderts:

Ein Fleischerladen in Warschau, in der späten Gierek-Zeit, also Ende der 1970er Jahre. Im Geschäft hängt deutlich sichtbar ein Schild mit der Aufschrift: "Kombattanten der Schlacht bei Tannenberg (poln. Grunwald [1410]) werden außerhalb der Reihenfolge bedient". Ein graubärtiger alter Mann kommt in den Laden und stellt sich nicht in die Schlange, sondern geht direkt zur Ladentheke.

"Was machen Sie da?" fragt die Verkäuferin ärgerlich, "warum drängeln Sie sich vor? Warum stellen Sie sich nicht an wie alle anderen?"

"Ich bin Kombattant", sagt der Alte heiser und weist auf die Aufschrift hin, "und wir haben gesiegt. Deshalb brauche ich nicht Schlange stehen und warten".

"Und wo haben Sie gekämpft?", fragt die Verkäuferin.

"Nun, das ist lange her, ich war noch bei Tannenberg dabei".

"Was erzählen Sie mir da? Können Sie das beweisen? Haben Sie Papiere darüber?"

"Papiere? Liebe Frau, woher soll ich denn Papiere haben? Damals, im 15. Jahrhundert, konnte doch kaum jemand lesen oder schreiben, und das Papier war doch noch gar nicht erfunden worden. Woher sollte ich denn da irgendwelche Papiere haben?"

"Was reden Sie da! Erzählen Sie mir doch keine Märchen – hier erscheinen fast täglich Kreuzritter, und die haben alle ihre Papiere in Ordnung".

Gegenüber einer rein 'präsentistischen' Vorstellung von der Wirksamkeit der Stereotypen macht die doppelte Zielrichtung dieses Witzes deutlich, dass einerseits Historiker ohne die Einsicht in die stereotype Wirkung von Geschichtsbildern nur unvollkommen mit ihrem Handwerkszeug umgehen können, und umgekehrt nichthistorische Stereotypenforscher ohne den Vergangenheitsbezug von Stereotypen die kulturellen und sozialen Dimensionen von Stereotypisierungen rasch missverstehen können. Denn die mehrfache 'Historizität' dieses Witzes macht deutlich, dass die Absurdität des Wahrheitsanspruchs von Stereotypen kaum besser zum Ausdruck gebracht werden kann als durch auch krassen (und hier doppelt ausgespielten) Anachronismus. Dieser Witz holt seine stereotypen Bezüge nicht nur aus dem späten Mittelalter und spielt damit mit dem Zeitunterschied, sondern auch aus den nationalen Mythen Polens und Deutschlands sowie aus dem Propaganda-Reservoir des kommunistischen Polen.¹⁷ Seine exakte Platzierung und genaue historische Verortung wirkt wie eine höhnische Reminiszenz – armselige Gegenwart contra mythologisierten Sieg.

¹⁷ 'Grunwald' wurde in den 1980er Jahren mit der in der herrschenden kommunistischen Partei Polens einflussreichen nationalistisch-kommunistischen Gruppierung "Zjednoczenie Patriotyczne 'Grunwald'" ("Patriotische Vereinigung 'Grunwald'") assoziiert; vgl. Gasztold-Señ (2012).

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Reports on different countries

Monika Łaszkiewicz

National stereotypes in Polish studies and research

Abstract

Za prekursora polskich badań nad stereotypami należy uznać Jana Stanisława Bystronia, który w 1923 r. w studium pt. *Megalomania narodowa* wprowadził termin „zbiorowe wyobrażenia”. Temat stereotypów narodowych jest w Polsce od tego czasu przedmiotem zainteresowania różnych dyscyplin naukowych. Badania prowadzone na gruncie etnologii, socjologii, psychologii, językoznawstwa, literaturoznawstwa i kulturoznawstwa są zróżnicowane pod względem stosowanych metod i wykorzystanych źródeł. W dużym stopniu wynika to z różnic w teoretycznych założeniach dotyczących istoty stereotypu. Na podstawie dokonanego przeglądu wybranych podejść w badaniach nad stereotypami narodowymi można stwierdzić, że nurty badawcze nie korespondują ze sobą i nie respektują wzajemnych ustaleń. Różnice można ująć w kilku punktach. 1) Pierwszą zasadniczą różnicą jest zakres przedmiotu stereotypizacji. Socjologowie, psychologowie, politolodzy zajmują się stereotypami ludzi (grup zawodowych, etnicznych, narodowych), podczas gdy językoznawcy włączają w krąg swoich zainteresowań także przedmioty, rośliny, zwierzęta, zdarzenia i zjawiska, zgodnie z koncepcją stereotypu przedstawioną w pracach Lippmanna i Putnama. 2) Drugą różnicą jest różny nacisk kładziony na poznawczy charakter stereotypu. 3) Ze względu na nacechowanie emocjonalne stereotypów, badacze dopuszczają istnienie stereotypów neutralnych (Wilska-Duszyńska 1975; Kapiszewski 1978; Bartmiński 1985), chociaż dominuje pogląd o silnym związku stereotypów z emocjami. Obserwuje się zarazem większe zainteresowanie badaczy stereotypami negatywnymi niż pozytywnymi. Odróżnia się jednak stereotypy od uprzedzeń (Chlewiński 1992). 4) W polskich badaniach utrwała się przekonanie, że stereotypy są nieuchronne i trzeba z nimi żyć (Bartmiński 2016). 5) Językoznawcze rozumienie stereotypu (szczególnie w swej etnolingwistycznej odmianie) kładzie nacisk na zmienność, ambiwalencję i kontekstualność stereotypów (Bartmiński 1994, 2006; Panasiuk 1998; Niewiara 2000, 2010; Bartmińska 2009; Paclawska 2009), co znalazło przedłużenie w koncepcji profilowania wyobrażeń bazowych.

Ethnic and national stereotypes have been of interest to various scientific disciplines¹ in Poland, where research on these subjects has a long and rich tradition. The theory of stereotypes has been considered on the basis of ethnology (Bystron 1935/1995; Obrębski 1936/2005a, b; Mirga 1984; Stomma 1986; Benedyktowicz 1988, 2000); sociology (Chalański 1935; Gostkowski 1959; Kapiszewski 1978; Schaff 1978, 1981; Bokszański 2001; Błuszkowski 2003, 2005, 2006); psychology (Kurcz 1992; Chlewiński 1992; Kurcz 1992, 2001; Kofta 1996; Maison

¹ As noted by Wojciech Chlebda, in scientific discourse the term ‘stereotype’ loses its accuracy and functions as an ambiguous term (Chlebda 1998, 31), compare Wajland (1991, 10-11)

1997; Weigl 1999; Kofta/Jasińska-Kania 2001; Grzesiak-Feldman 2006); literary science (Mitosek 1974; Święch 1977; Walas 1995);² and linguistics (Pisarek 1975; Pisarkowa 1976, 2002; Bartmiński 1980, 1985, 1994, 1995, 1998a, b, c, 2002, 2006, 2007a, 2011, 2016; Niewiara 1998, 2000, 2006, 2010; Dźwigoł 2008; Wasiuta 2008, 2009; Niebrzegowska-Bartmińska/Wasiuta 2009; Niebrzegowska-Bartmińska 2012; Tyrpa 2011).

Jan Stanisław Bystron, who introduced the term “collective imaginaries” in the article *Megalomania narodowa* (“National Megalomania”) and later in his book with the same title (1935/1995), is considered a forerunner of research on stereotypes. Bystron listed the stereotypical features of a ‘stranger’, namely animal and demonic characteristics: being black, being born blind, being born in a strange way, having an odour, being considered cannibals, being of lowly birth, and being sorcerers. This list (supported by source materials) was used to illustrate the phenomenon of megalomania, which explains why the concept of a ‘stranger’ in Bystron’s work is one-sided.

It is worth mentioning that this book was published at almost exactly the same time as the well-known book by Walter Lippmann entitled *Public Opinion* (1922), and it could be seen as exemplifying some of the theoretical considerations presented in the American author’s work³. Some commentators have drawn attention to this (Benedyktowicz 1988; Waliński 1982). However the main difference is clearly the evaluative nature of ‘imaginaries’, which Bystron treated as negative, wrong and dangerous, putting them in the category of ‘the psychology of hate’. This treatment of ‘collective imaginaries’ by the author resulted in him appealing for us to free ourselves from their impact through, *inter alia*, intellectual effort (Walczyńska 1992, 306; Niewiara 2010, 171-172).

This trend in research on stereotypes (the so-called Poznań School) was also developed by two outstanding sociologists, Florian Znaniecki and Józef Chałasiński, who were engaged in the more general concept of ethical-cultural

² Grzegorz Grochowski writes that “there is no specified research trend, and there is no, in fact, theory of stereotype in literary science. This issue remains rather in the area of individual, distributed research initiatives [...]. In research on literature, which for centuries cherished the idea of originality, we can more often find critical approaches towards stereotypes, emphasising their inert character, and sometimes even a directly formulated belief in their social harmfulness. It seems that creative works are mainly seen as an arena for challenging stereotypes.” (Grochowski 2003, 51).

³ Marzena Walczyńska draws our attention to this fact, as she writes that the main merit of Bystron “is first and foremost that he underlined the role of imaginaries in society and tried to explain their role, as well as collecting an enormous amount of documents. Although he does not formulate *explicitly* the theory of stereotype, and his discourses are mainly intuitive, *Megalomania narodowa* may provide great evidence for *Public Opinion*”. (Walczyńska 1998, 306).

strangeness.⁴ Florian Znaniński in his *Studia nad antagonizmem do obcych* (1931) tried to answer the question of who strangers are and what proves their strangeness. He questioned whether the attributes of a 'stranger' can be objectively determined and claimed that strangeness originates from features which are selected subjectively and liable to change depending on the circumstances. Józef Chałasiński emphasised the crucial role of stereotypes in ethnic conflict in his 1935 dissertation *Antagonizm polsko-niemiecki w osadzie fabrycznej „Kolonja” na Górnym Śląsku*.

Before World War II this ethno-sociological trend was also represented by Józef Obrębski, who carried out research in Polesia in the years 1934-1937, with subsequent material published by Anna Engelking. According to Obrębski, the image of the group which is being described is constructed from features of appearance (clothing and outfit, physical posture, height, body build, movements, pigmentation, physical efficiency), language, psychological traits and group culture (e.g. the type of economy, marriage customs, and standard of living).

After World War II the ethno-sociological trend was developed by anthropologists. One follower was Ludwik Stomma, who in *Antropologia wsi polskiej XIX wieku* (1986) selected eight aspects around which folk imaginaries on strangers focused: 1) physical anthropology, 2) language, 3) geographical origin, 4) religion, 5) intellectual and spiritual values (including ethics and acting according to principles of morality), 6) material resources, 7) origin and social position, 8) occupation (Stomma 1986, 29).

1. Sociology

Polish research on stereotypes entered a new phase in the 1960s, when the subject was addressed by sociologists. A. Sosnowski and J. Walkowiak distinguished three trends in research on stereotypes in sociology (Sosnowski/Walkowiak 1979). I will mention them briefly. The first trend emphasises the results of cognition, and the clue is understanding a stereotype as 'imaginaries on a given group' (Wilska-Duszyńska 1971; Kapiszewski 1978); the second trend emphasises the way of perceiving reality, and treats a stereotype as a representational pattern (Chałasiński; Kłoskowska; Ossowski; Schaff); the third 'context-opinion' approach identifies a stereotype as an opinion or view, and was criticised by researchers for lacking

⁴ Stereotypes originate from the opposition of local versus stranger, which determines thinking about the world and categorising of phenomena (Znaniński 1931; Mróz 1979; Mirga 1984; Stomma 1986; Benedyktowicz 2000). Current discussions (inter alia within the framework of *Etnolingwistyki* vol. 19 and vol. 20, 2007-2008, in which the operation of local versus stranger opposition in Slavic languages and cultures was analysed) prove that this division should not be treated as a binary opposition, but rather as a gradual one, neither absolute nor treated as impossible to exceed. Categorising and assigning somebody to a given group is 'contextual' – dependent on the circumstances.

theoretical bases during the empirical analysis of various data types (Sosnowski/Walkowiak 1979, 216). The main (though not the only) subject in sociological research on stereotypes is ethnic stereotypes (Sosnowski/Walkowiak 1979, 213).

Sociologists recognise competition in interests, differences in economic conditions, class diversity and cultural diversity as key factors in creating a stereotype. According to Stefan Nowakowski, the conditions conducive to creating stereotypes are competition and/or a feeling of threat. They arise through generalisation, when members of one group “tend to allocate to all members of the other group these negative traits, which appear only in a few members of the latter” (Nowakowski 1957, 65-67).

The work of the philosopher Adam Schaff has had a significant influence on the understanding of stereotypes in Poland. He assumed that stereotypes include generalisations, which may be completely in contradiction to reality (distorting it), but may also contain ‘a grain of truth’ (Schaff 1978, 69). Discussing the features of a stereotype, Schaff stated that it is linked to the name; its subject is groups of people; it has a social genesis, and an emotional charge (which differentiates stereotypes from neutral concepts) which creates the illusion of complete truthfulness; it is long lasting and resistant to change, and seeks to achieve social goals (1978, 76-77). He repeated these theses in his synthetic book *Stereotypy a działanie ludzkie* (1981). He emphasised that apart from helping people to perceive the world, the function of a stereotype is to protect group interests.

Sociological trend in research on stereotypes		
<p>'results' approach</p> <p>a stereotype is imaginaries on ethnic group</p>	<p>'cognitive' approach</p> <p>a stereotype is the way of perceiving reality, representational pattern</p>	<p>'context-opinion' approach</p> <p>a stereotype is an opinion, view</p>

Table 1: Diversification in sociological trend in research on stereotypes (Sosnowski/Walkowiak 1979)

Like Schaff, Jan Błuszkowski defined stereotypes and their function in his book entitled *Stereotypy narodowe w świadomości Polaków: studium socjologiczno-politologiczne*, in which he made a critical analysis of partial definitions of a stereotype and described representatives of 22 nations based on experimental research.

2. Psychology

The approach to stereotypes in psychology is strongly influenced by research and conclusions made by western researchers, especially American ones. As noted by Doliński, psychological research focuses around two trends. The first one concerns the “content” of stereotypes, meaning what group x thinks about group y and vice versa. Papers from this trend ignore the origins of stereotypes and their function; research aims rather at presenting the results of conducted experiments. The second trend concerns origin, the conditions under which a stereotype is strengthened, what functions it has from the perspective of an individual and whether it influences the behaviour of an individual towards others (Doliński 2001, 130-131).

There are many different ways of understanding the concept of a stereotype depending on the sub-disciplines of psychology (cf. e.g. Boski 2009, 491).

Three approaches to stereotypes in psychology		
<p>macropsychology</p> <p>a stereotype is "an opinion widely spread in a given group on what other groups are"</p>	<p>social cognition</p> <p>a stereotype is "representations, cognitive pattern of a social group and its members in the mind of an individual"</p>	<p>cultural psychology</p> <p>a stereotype is "wrong, inadequate pseudo-knowledge on other ethnic groups (or national)"</p>

Table 2: Three approaches to stereotypes in psychology

In the opinion of Mirosław Kofta, stereotypes are characterised by the fact that they are highly general and over-simplified, they do not allow the differentiation of individuals within a group, and they are activated automatically, which is why it is difficult to challenge them, even when we are aware of using them; stereotypes go hand-in-hand with negative emotions (Kofta 1992; Łukaszewski, Weigl 2001). In psychological research, stereotypical traits were originally associated with negative traits and false representation. From that perspective stereotypes not only prevent us from learning about the world, but also distort reality. However with time (after conducting research aimed at comparing the stereotypical traits of members of a given ethnic group with the national character of this group

as specified by a researcher) it was stated that stereotypes are accurate to some extent (cf. Kurcz 2001, 5). Therefore stereotypes started to be understood more broadly as “a combination of opinions on social groups – opinions that may be *accurate* or not, positive or negative” (Kurcz 2001, 5).

Mirosław Kofta and Grzegorz Sędek (1992; 1995) introduced two types of stereotypes: exemplary stereotypes, which refer to a typical representative of a given category, and conspiracy stereotypes (originally ‘stereotypes of a group soul’⁵), which treat an unfamiliar group as an enemy. As it turned out, ‘conspiracy’ stereotypes are universal (regardless of the specific subject of the stereotyping) and show resemblance across different cultures, which – in the opinion of Grzesiak-Feldman – may indicate the “evolutional, original character of conspiracy stereotypes” (Grzesiak-Feldman 2006, 48).

In cognitive psychology, stereotypes are recognised as cognitive patterns and are treated as an indispensable mechanism helping with orientation in a complex world, as they accelerate cognitive processes. What is more, stereotypes help to predict people’s behaviour, which gives us a sense of security. Stereotypes play social, group-creating functions, as they heighten a sense of community. Stereotypes integrate a group and facilitate communication within it, but at the same time hinder communication with other groups. Stereotypes are at the very heart of conflicts; they contribute to aggression, and show themselves in acts of discrimination and the humiliation of others (Chlewiński 1992, 18-19; Kofta 1992, 198). This understanding of a stereotype, which treats it as something harmful, implies demands to prevent their occurrence or – when it is too late – to challenge them and strive to overcome them (Kofta 1992, 214; Boski 2009, 501). On the other hand their existence as something inevitable, embedded in human nature, can be accepted – provided, however, that their content changes (Kurcz 1994, 2001).

3. Linguistics

Linguists consider the problem of stereotypes in a completely different way. The trend in linguistic research on stereotypes in Poland was initiated by Walery and Krystyna Pisarek. Walery Pisarek’s interest in regional imaginaries began in 1975, and Krystyna Pisarkowa, in her pioneer work *Konotacja semantyczna nazw narodowości* (1976), treated a stereotype as an excess of meaning. In her opinion stereotypes amount to the semantic connotation of national names, which accompanies their original meanings, and is reflected 1) in the secondary meanings of national names (e.g. *Cygan/cygan*; *Kozak/kozak*), 2) in idiomatic phrases; 3) in existing derivatives of national names (e.g. *ocyganić*); 4) in the meaning of some proverbs; and 5) in names used as an insult: *Niemiec/Szwab* (Pisarkowa 1976).

⁵ Compare Kofta/Jasińska-Kania (2001).

Pisarkowa's analyses, based on systematic data and proverbs, disclosed emotional characterisation and evaluation, at the root of which lay individual opinions, experience and prejudice. These papers are seen as the beginning of Polish research on stereotypes in the field of linguistics.

Cognitive linguists associate stereotypes with the linguistic image of the world and the concept of a stereotype covers not only people, but also – as in W. Lippmann and H. Putnam – object and events. This interpretation of a stereotype is the basis for *Słownik ludowych stereotypów językowych* (1980), in which the sun, a horse and an ox, and a brother and mother are described, and for *Słownik stereotypów i symboli ludowych* (published in Lublin from 1996), in which the sun, stars, the moon, fire, stone, soil, water, meteorological phenomena, metals, and the world are described. Plants are now being elaborated⁶, followed by the linguistic-cultural image of a human being in physical, psychological and social states. During the period 1982-2015 J. Bartmiński and S. Niebrzegowski-Bartmiński finished their Ph.D. theses on the stereotypes of metals, crops, herbs, trees, homes and folk temples. I am myself the author of a paper on folk national stereotypes.

Bartmiński continued the work of Krystyna Pisarkowa and, making reference to Uta Quasthoff and Hilary Putnam, defined a stereotype as

a subjective imaginary of an object, including both descriptive and evaluative features, and resulting from the interpretation of reality within social cognitive models. This understanding of a stereotype takes into consideration both semantic and formal aspects, and it does not oppose linguistic (formal) stereotypes against mental ones, but rather – on the contrary – puts them together to the greatest possible extent. (Bartmiński 1998a, 64)

From this perspective a stereotype is an indispensable mechanism for perceiving the world, and words are the medium of stereotypical content, so that a name

inevitably activates a specified type of behaviour, cognitive model and evaluation, and then a pattern for perception and interpretation [...]. Meta-linguistic knowledge about the world and knowledge imprinted in language and in word meanings influence each other, which results in the image of an object linguistically and culturally specified. (Bartmiński/Panasiuk 1993/2001, 374)

Bartmiński described three types of stereotypical opinions: 1) topics, including semantic units without stable linguistic form; 2) formulas, meaning stable connections with fixed formal structure; 3) idioms, meaning purely formal stable connections, which have lost their clear semantic motivation for users (cf. Bartmiński 1985).

⁶ Within the framework of the project 'The world of plants in folk and colloquial Polish language (trees, crops, flowers, herbs, mushrooms etc.). The ethno-linguistic dictionary 2015-2020', under the academic supervision of Prof. Jerzy Bartmiński.

Co-workers of the EUROJOS project have recently started comparative studies on ideological stereotypes. However, in describing *home*, *Europe*, *freedom*, *work* and *honour* they use the term *concept*, not stereotype (in this case it would be an ‘ideological stereotype’⁷). This is for two reasons: 1) because stereotypes are persistently treated as something negative, which was not accepted by the team working on *Leksykon Aksjologiczny*; 2) because of the international context. Researchers (especially those from Eastern Europe) jointly agreed that the Lublin-ethnolinguistic program of research on stereotypes corresponds to the international research on concepts,⁸ namely that a concept = logical notion + cultural connotation + evaluation, cf. Gryshkova (2014).

Considering which nations were subject to stereotyped descriptions by Polish authors – regardless of trends and applied methodologies – it is worth paying attention to the research of the Institute of Political Science, University of Warsaw from the year 1999, which Błuszkowski presented in his article. He pointed out 21 nations which were known to and significant for Poles, together with their traits. On this basis it was shown that Poles distinguish five main types of nations:

- 1) Demiurgic nations – modern, active, innovative and rich: American and Japanese;
- 2) Nations which are good hosts: Swedish, German, Canadian, Dutch, Austrian;
- 3) Ludic nations which like fun and social life, cheerful nations: French, Italian, Spanish, Hungarian, Czech, Slovak;
- 4) Nations based on tradition from which they derive their sense of power and importance: English, Jewish;
- 5) Poor and backward nations: Belarusian, Lithuanian, Russian, Ukrainian, Turkish, Chinese (Błuszkowski 2006, 97-99).

The summary of scientific works relating to descriptions of particular Polish stereotypes shows however that the most common subjects of research in Poland were the stereotypes of Jews, Germans, Russians and Ukrainians (which was probably influenced by complicated relationships and a shared, difficult history, as well as territorial proximity).⁹

⁷ About the project itself, see Bartmiński/Bielińska-Gardziel (2016).

⁸ The issues, studied in Lublin as stereotypes, come under the research of conceptology in Europe.

⁹ A stereotypical Jew was described in detail by Alina Cała in the book entitled *Wizerunek Żyda w polskiej kulturze ludowej* (1992). Based on materials from field studies, she presented the diversity present in the approaches of Poles towards Jews, and concluded that anti-Semitism in the country came from the city. Irena Kamińska-Szmaj in the book entitled *Judzi, zohydza, ze czci odziera. Język propagandy politycznej w prairie* (1994, 105-132), based on materials from the Polish press from the years 1919-1923, reconstructed a stereotype of a Jew and compared her observations with a literary stereotype (which was more positive and more friendly towards Jews); Sylwia Grodzka (2001), Irena Seiffert (2004)

Summing up different Polish trends in research on stereotypes it can be concluded that they do not correspond with each other, do not respect mutual arrangements, and differ in some crucial aspects.¹⁰

The very first difference between sociology, psychology and linguistics is the scope of the subject of stereotyping. Sociologists, psychologists and political scientists deal with stereotypes of people (occupational, ethnic, national groups). Linguists, as well as people and social groups, also deal with objects, plants, animals, notions, phenomena, etc., following the concept of the stereotype presented in the works of Lippmann and Putnam.

The second difference is the extent of emphasis put on the cognitive character of a stereotype. Polish research presents the view that stereotypes do not comply with facts and thus they are harmful due to the fact that they distort reality (Kofta 1996; Boski 2009); theories that they comply with facts (to some extent); opinions that stereotypes include 'a kernel of truth' (Schaff 1981); through to approaches that treat stereotypes as colloquial concepts with a primarily cognitive function (Bartmiński 1980 and next; Quasthoff 1998).

reconstructed a stereotype based on proverb materials. Research conducted within the framework of *Oral History*, in which I participated, presents different approaches towards Jews, including ones connected with sympathy towards 'our' Jews and neutrality (Bartmiński 2011; Łaskiewicz 2011). A stereotype of a German was of interest to many researchers, among others described in the collective volume edited by Kazimierz Wajda *Polacy i Niemcy. Z badań nad kształtowaniem heterostereotypów etnicznych* (1991). Wojciech Wrzesiński reconstructed a stereotype of a German and his observations are summarised in his detailed book *Sąsiad, czy wróg?: Ze studiów nad kształtowaniem obrazu Niemca w Polsce w latach 1795-1939*, Wrocław (1992), and later in an article in an abridged version (1995). Tomasz Szarota presented descriptions of stereotypes in his book *Niemcy i Polacy. Wzajemne postrzeganie i stereotypy* (1996). Jerzy Bartmiński pointed out changeability in the ways of perceiving Germans and different profiling of their image (1994). A stereotype of a Russian can be found in the book of the literary scientist Kępiński: *Lach i Moskal. Z dziejów stereotypu* (1990) and the monograph of the linguist Aleksandra Niewiara: *Moskwićin – Moskalka – Rosjanin w dokumentach prywatnych*. Two texts on this stereotype appear also in volume 14 of the 'Etnolingwistyka' (J. Bartmiński/I. Lappo/U. Majer-Baranowska: *Stereotyp Rosjanina i jego profilowanie we współczesnej polszczyźnie*; I. Lappo: *Profilowanie stereotypu Rosjanina w polskim kręgu językowo-kulturowym*). Regarding a stereotype of a Ukrainian, Helena Sojka-Masztalerz published *Rusini czy Ukraińcy? Językowy obraz nacji ukraińskiej w prasie polskiej*, based on press materials and many articles (proverbs, propaganda press, satirical drawings, literature and history textbooks). A stereotype of a Ukrainian was also analysed by Lublin researchers Jerzy Bartmiński (2009), who reconstructed a new profile of a Polish stereotype of a Ukrainian, and Ewa Paclawska (2009), who on the basis of comparative surveys proved that a stereotype is determined by the residence place of respondents and its changeability.

¹⁰ This thesis is also supported by the model presented by Błuszkowski that includes multi-dimensional typological analysis of stereotypes (Błuszkowski 2003, 51).

When it comes to stereotypes and their emotional character, researchers accept the existence of neutral stereotypes (Wilska-Duszyńska; Kapiszewski; Bartmiński); however humanistic research supports the view that “stereotypical knowledge about strangers is rarely ‘unemotional’” (Kofta 1996, 206). Thus negative stereotypes are of interest more often than positive ones.

It should be noted that the initial dislike shown by researchers towards national stereotypes (Bystróż 1935/1995) and the ‘stereotyping’ of the concept itself have evolved towards a belief that stereotypes are inevitable and we have to live with them (Kurcz 1994; Bartmiński 2016).

The opinion that stereotypes last a long time and are constant is accepted in various ways: there are views that stereotypes are hard to change, although cognitive psychology describes circumstances which contribute to such change (hypothesis of contact, cooperation on equal terms, working on ourselves, getting rid of bad habits). However the linguistic understanding of stereotypes (especially ethno-linguistic one) proves their changeability, ambiguity and contextuality (Bartmiński 1994/2007, 2006; Panasiuk 1998; Niewiara 2000, 2010; Bartmińska 2004; Paławska 2009). This has given rise to developing the concept of profiling of basic imaginaries in different intentionally-targeted discourses (Bartmiński/Niebrzegowska 1998; Niebrzegowska-Bartmińska 2015). The concept of profiling of national stereotypes is important, as it opens the way to intercultural dialogue.

Polish researchers share the view that a stereotype is associated with words, which trigger its content. However linguistics confirms a thesis that, although stereotypes cannot be cured or avoided, it is possible to find a way to live with them (cf. Bartmiński 2016).

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Stereotypes and attitudes in a pluricentric language area. The case of Belgian Dutch

Abstract (Nederlands)

Tegenwoordig wordt het Nederlands algemeen beschouwd als een voorbeeld van een pluricentrische taal, met het Belgisch Nederlands, Nederlands Nederlands en Surinaams Nederlands als gelijkwaardige variëteiten. Dat was echter vroeger allerminst het geval: tot vrij recent werd Belgisch Nederlands beschouwd als het insignificante kleine broertje van het ‘echte’ Nederlands, zoals het in Nederland werd gesproken. In deze bijdrage bekijken we hoe de positie van het Belgisch Nederlands geëvolueerd is, en hoe daarmee ook de taalattitudes van Vlamingen ten opzichte van hun eigen (standaard)taalgebruik en dat van Nederlanders volop aan verandering onderhevig zijn.

Abstract (English)

Nowadays Dutch is generally considered to be an example of a pluricentric language, with Belgian Dutch, Dutch Dutch and Surinamese Dutch as equal varieties. Formerly, this has not been the case at all; until quite recently, Belgian Dutch was considered a rather insignificant annex of ‘real’ Dutch as spoken in the Netherlands. In this contribution we discuss the position and evolution of Belgian Dutch, and how the attitudes of Flemings are changing towards their own (standard) language and towards the Dutch spoken in the Netherlands.

1. Introduction

More often than not a language is spoken in more than one country or region; for example, world languages such as English, French or Spanish. The same goes for Dutch, which is the official language in the Netherlands, Belgium, Suriname, Aruba, Curacao and Sint-Maarten, and according to the *Taalunie* (‘Language Union’) is “een standaardtaal met drie poten”¹ (a standard language with three ‘legs’ or varieties) – Dutch Dutch, Belgian Dutch and Surinamese Dutch. The topic of this chapter is the position of Belgian Dutch compared to Dutch Dutch; we will elaborate on the evolution of Belgian Dutch from being a rather insignificant annex of Dutch Dutch to being an equal variety.

¹ <http://taalunivesum.org/inhoud/feiten-en-cijfers> (last accessed 31/03/2017).

In section 2 we sketch the history of the standardisation of Dutch in Flanders.² Initially, Flanders took Dutch Dutch as its norm, and large-scale standardisation initiatives were taken to stimulate the spread of Dutch Dutch. In section 3 we describe the evolution from Dutch as a monocentric language to Dutch as a pluricentric language, and in section 4 the attitudes of Flemings towards people from the Netherlands and their language are discussed. This section shows that Flemings attribute high status to Dutch (standard) Dutch, but they do not particularly like the variety, and most of them do not want to speak like people from the Netherlands. We end with a conclusion and brief discussion in section 5.

2. Standardisation of Dutch in Flanders

2.1 Dutch Dutch as the model

Flanders is traditionally considered to be a country with a delayed standardisation process compared to the Netherlands. Dutch became a standard language in the Netherlands much earlier than in Flanders.

Standard Dutch was established in the Netherlands from the 16th century onwards, and mainly during the 17th and 18th centuries. The dialects from the province of Holland acted as a model in this standardisation process, but due to large-scale emigration from Flanders, many Flemings lived in the neighbourhood of Holland too, and their dialects also influenced the standardisation process. While standardisation proceeded in the Netherlands, Flanders was dominated by the Spanish, the Austrian and the French, holding back the development of Standard Dutch there. In 1830, when Belgium was founded, French became the dominant and most prestigious language. Alongside French, Dutch dialects were also spoken and written, but these dialects were considered mutually divergent: many different dialects of Dutch were spoken and written in Flanders at the time, which led to the perception of ‘normative chaos’ in Flanders (Willems 1819-1824; Wils 1956).³

From the 19th century onwards, the so-called ‘Flemish Movement’ (*Vlaamse Beweging*) fought against the supremacy of French and discrimination against the Dutch language in Belgium. This movement focused on the legal recognition of Dutch in Flanders and eventually played an essential part in the ‘Dutchification’

² In this contribution, *Flemish* and *Flanders* are used to refer to the political area of Flanders and not to the dialectological area of Flanders, which roughly contains the provinces of West Flanders, and East Flanders in Belgium as well as the northwestern corner of France, and Zeeland Flanders in the Netherlands.

³ At least, that is what is traditionally assumed about Dutch in 19th century Flanders. Recent research has questioned the ‘normative chaos’, and the alleged corruption and regional fragmentation of the language of the Flemings. According to Vosters et al. (2010) Dutch in Flanders was no less uniform than Dutch in the Netherlands.

of Flanders. On an ideological level, a dichotomy existed within this movement between ‘particularists’ and ‘integrationists’. The first argued for an autonomous Flemish standardisation process, based on the supraregional Dutch spoken in Flanders at that time (and elements of regional dialects). The integrationists, on the other hand, wanted to introduce Dutch Standard Dutch as the official language of Dutch-speaking Belgium. Eventually, in the 19th century the integrationist agenda was decided upon and in 1898, with the ‘Law of Equality’ (*de Gelijkheidswet*), Dutch Dutch was recognised as an official language alongside French.⁴ Briefly, the choice of Dutch Dutch was based on the following principles. Firstly, the integrationists believed that the spoken language in Flanders was no more than a mishmash of dialects, which were too affected by French to serve as the basis for a standard language. The Dutch Dutch standard language, on the other hand, was a modern language, with enough prestige to compete with French. The choice of Dutch Dutch was also seen by the integrationists as a choice for their own language, because their Flemish ancestors had influenced the northern standard language. Flanders would thus connect with its past (cf. Van Hoof 2015, 40).

2.2 Standardisation initiatives

The average Fleming was unfamiliar with Dutch Dutch, so to disseminate the variety in Flanders, a programme of language purification arose in the 19th century, growing in intensity during the 20th century and reaching its peak in the 1950s, 60s and 70s. From 1950 until 1980 Flanders went through a period of hyperstandardisation, involving ‘a fiercely propagandistic, large-scale, extensively broadcasted, scientifically supported and enduring ideologisation of language use in all corners of Flemish society’ (Jaspers/Van Hoof 2013, 332). During that period of extreme linguistic purification, an almost complete assimilation to the northern standard norm was pursued – except for pronunciation, where deviations from Dutch Dutch pronunciation were allowed. The Flemish media contributed actively to this massive propaganda exercise by giving linguists the opportunity to address their audience and spread their views. Radio and television channels broadcast language-related programmes, and almost every newspaper in Flanders had a daily column to help Flemings gain proficiency in the northern standard language.

Following the title of one of the newspaper columns, the umbrella term for all of these activities was ‘language gardening’, the gardeners mostly being established linguists and university professors. With ‘Standard Dutch’ being part of the mission of the Dutch-speaking public broadcasting channel VRT (*Vlaamse Radio- en Televisieomroeporganisatie*, ‘Flemish Radio and Television Broad-

⁴ Only the vocabulary and morphosyntax were taken over from the Netherlands; the pronunciation of Flemings could differ to some extent from Dutch in the Netherlands.

casting Organisation’), linguists kept close control over the language used by presenters of radio and television programmes, and programmes dedicated specifically to Standard Dutch were broadcast in prime time (Van Hoof 2015). In schools Standard Dutch was heavily propagated as well, by the means of so-called ‘ABN kernen’ (*ABN clubs*),⁵ youth clubs where the main objective was to fanatically propagate the use of ABN, while simultaneously suppressing the dialects. As Willemyns (2013, 147) indicates, these young people, after becoming parents, started to socialise their children in Standard Dutch and paved the way for the massive wave of dialect loss that was soon noticed. The Flemish media and schools were thus the two main public institutions through which Standard Dutch was enforced and reproduced.

3. Dutch as a pluricentric language

Until 1970 the aim of Flemish language policy was the adoption of Dutch Dutch. Dutch was a monocentric language, with one authoritative centre: Dutch as it is spoken in the Netherlands. From 1970 onwards though, linguists and language advisors no longer considered the language situation in Flanders to be exclusively derived from the language situation in the Netherlands (cf. Geeraerts 2002). In the second half of the 20th century, Flanders became the dominant economic and political region in Belgium, and Flemings gained more self-awareness, including linguistic self-awareness. The language variety used on the Flemish public-service broadcasting station VRT— often referred to as VRT-Dutch – gradually took over the position of Dutch Dutch. With Belgian Dutch following its own course, Dutch is now considered to be a pluricentric language, in the sense defined by Clyne of a language ‘with several interacting centres, each providing a national variety with at least some of its own (codified) norms’ (Clyne 1992, 1); one national variety is spoken in the Netherlands, while the other is spoken in Flanders.⁶

One example of this evolution towards a pluricentric language is evident from the way Belgian Dutch and Dutch Dutch words are treated in dictionaries. Before 2005, words also (or only) used in the Netherlands were considered to be the norm, while Belgian Dutch words were deviations from that norm. Words only occurring in Flanders were often labelled as non-Standard Belgian Dutch, while words only used by people in the Netherlands were considered Standard Dutch

⁵ ABN stands for *Algemeen Beschaafd Nederlands*, which can be rendered in English as ‘General Cultivated Dutch’, although others speak of ‘General Civilised Dutch’ or ‘General Educated Dutch’ (see Willemyns 2013, 143).

⁶ In addition to Belgian Dutch and Dutch Dutch, the *Taalunie* also recognises a Surinamese Dutch variety. Dutch is the only official language in Suriname and is the mother tongue of 60% of its inhabitants. Dutch Dutch was the norm for a very long time there, but since 2004 Suriname is an associated member of the *Taalunie*, and a separate variety is recognised.

(and were not labelled ‘Dutch Dutch’). Nowadays, we see a more equal treatment of Belgian and Dutch Dutch words.

- 1) Firstly, words only occurring in Belgium are less often labelled as non-standard. Many Belgian Dutch words (or certain meanings of these words) used to be labelled as non-standard Dutch, but nowadays they are labelled as Belgian Standard Dutch (sometimes in combination with a register label such as ‘formal’, ‘spoken language’, etc.). Examples are *op punt stellen* (make perfect, finalise), *zich verwachten aan* (expect), *weerhouden* in the meaning of ‘take into consideration’ and *quasi* in the meaning of ‘nearly, almost’.
- 2) Secondly, dictionaries apply the same procedure for words which only occur in the Netherlands as for words which only occur in Flanders: all standard Dutch words which are limited to either Flanders or the Netherlands are labelled respectively as Belgian Dutch or Dutch Dutch.

Prisma handwoordenboek Nederlands was the first to apply this equal treatment (Martin/Smedts 2009), but nowadays *Van Dale* applies the same policy (Grote Van Dale 2015). This evolution towards more Flemish individuality is also clearly visible in the policy of the *Taalunie*. In the 1980s policy documents mainly focused on the spread of Dutch Dutch in Flanders, and (northern) Standard Dutch was considered to be the vehicle for Dutch and Flemish unity, but recent years have brought more scope for geographical variation, and the standard language is considered to be an instrument, rather than an untouchable, fixed norm (De Vries 2000).⁷

This evolution did not occur without resistance, however. ‘Early’ sociolinguists like Kas Deprez and Koen Jaspaert, who suggested in the 1980s that Flemings should focus on their own norm (cf. Deprez 1981; Jaspaert 1986), received considerable criticism from old-fashioned linguists and language professionals who wanted to preserve linguistic unity between Flanders and the Netherlands.

Even today, the acceptability of Flemish words continues to provoke controversy, especially when they are used by language role models. In November 2014, the newspaper *De Standaard* published the results of a large-scale language study of over 3,000 Flemish language professionals such as actors, lawyers, journalists, teachers, and linguists, called *Hoe Vlaams is uw Nederlands?* (‘How Flemish is your Dutch?’) (De Schryver 2015). In the study, participants were asked to assess the standardness of sentences containing a few typical Flemish words or constructions (as opposed to words that are used and accepted as Standard Dutch in both the Netherlands and Flanders), by answering the question, “Do you think the following sentence is acceptable as standard in, for example, a newspaper or the news?” The results showed that 58% of the language professionals did not object to the presence of such Flemish words or constructions in genres typically

⁷ See also <http://taaladvies.net/taal/advies/tekst/85> (last accessed 14/03/2017).

reserved for Standard Dutch. The results led to a steady stream of newspaper headlines and opinion pieces: “More ‘Flemish’ Dutch no longer a taboo” (standaard.be, November 3, 2014), “*Mutualiteit, vuilbak* and *autostrade*? Should be possible!”⁸ (deredactie.be, November 3, 2014), “Language test: Standard Dutch is considerably Flemish” (deredactie.be, November 7, 2014), and “Stop cooing about Flemish!” (*De Standaard*, November 8, 2014).⁹

4. Opinions about people from the Netherlands and their language

This specific history of standardisation has led to a distinct mutual relationship between Flanders and the Netherlands, and more specifically to distinct stereotypical ideas and attitudes between the two. These attitudes go beyond language alone, and are linked to issues of identity. According to Geert Hofstede, a social psychologist well known for his model of cultural dimensions, “no two countries [...] with a common border and a common language were so far apart culturally [...] as Belgium and the Netherlands” (2001, 61). These cultural differences are reflected in quotes such as *We verstaan Belgen, maar begrijpen ze niet* (‘We understand the language of the Flemings, but we don’t get them’) (NRC Handelsblad, 8/04/2011). There are indications that cooperation between Flemings and people from the Netherlands does not always pass off smoothly. For example, there are several organisations dedicated to stimulating cooperation between Flanders and the Netherlands:

Het Algemeen-Nederlands Verbond brengt Nederlanders en Vlamingen samen om elkaar beter te leren kennen, de belangstelling voor elkaar te vergroten en de samenwerking te verbeteren. De *Orde van den Prince* zet zich in voor de taal en cultuur van de Nederlanden, dat wil zeggen Vlaanderen en Nederland. De *Belgisch Nederlandse Vereniging* heeft tot doel de samenwerking tussen Vlaanderen en Nederland en het begrip voor elkaar te bevorderen. (Gerritsen 2014, 26)

(*Het Algemeen-Nederlands Verbond* brings people from the Netherlands and Flanders together to get to know each other better, increase mutual interest and enhance cooperation. *De Orde van den Prince* dedicates itself to language and culture in Flanders and the Netherlands. *De Belgisch Nederlandse Vereniging* aims to improve cooperation and understanding between Flanders and the Netherlands [our translation]).

⁸ *Mutualiteit* ‘health service, health insurance’, *vuilbak* ‘garbage can’, and *autostrade* ‘motorway, highway’ are three examples of Flemish lexical items that were often judged as Standard Dutch in this study. The “correct” Standard Dutch equivalents are *ziekenfonds*, *vuilnisbak*, and *autosnelweg*, respectively.

⁹ The original Dutch headlines were “*Vlaamser’ Nederlands geen taboe meer*”, “*Mutualiteit, vuilbak en autostrade? Moet kunnen!*”, “*Taaltest: Standaardnederlands is behoorlijk Vlaams gekleurd*” and “*Hou op met dat gekir over Vlaams*”.

Furthermore, for both people from the Netherlands and Flemings who want to work across the border, courses are available to learn certain rules of conduct (Gerritsen 2014).

Flemings also generally tend to have stereotypical ideas about the Netherlands and its inhabitants, stereotypes which might not be all that different from the way people from other countries feel about the Netherlands. A quick browse through the internet yields the following stereotypes:

- People from the Netherlands are verbally brutal and unmannered; while Flemings are afraid to say how they actually feel about something or someone, people from the Netherlands are said to be very direct and open in their communication;
- People from the Netherlands are very noisy, and Flemings often get annoyed by them if they meet them abroad, for example in a hotel;
- People from the Netherlands are mean with money.

In our view the stereotypes focus on the Dutch population rather than the country as such. However Flemings do seem to have a rather stereotypical view of the country and its landscape as dull and uninteresting, with lots of tulips and windmills.

Flanders also seems to differ significantly from the Netherlands when it comes to the dominant language ideologies. Flanders' perspective on language is strongly norm-oriented and essentialist, comparable to France for example, widely known for the *Académie Française* and its centralistic language policy. On the other hand, the Netherlands have a more instrumentalist take on language, and therefore a far less vigorous obsession with the Standard Dutch norm. Initiatives to unite the (Standard) Dutch used in Flanders and the Netherlands are far stronger in Flanders, whereas people from the Netherlands are generally not that involved in the 'Flemish' used by their Belgian neighbours. However, ordinary, non-linguistically educated Flemings do not generally feel the need to speak like people from the Netherlands either. By asking questions about a TV quiz show with both Flemish and Dutch participants, Geerts et. al. (1977) studied the attitudes of Flemings towards Dutch Dutch compared to Dutch as it is spoken in Flanders. They asked their Flemish respondents if they preferred to speak like the Flemish or the Dutch participants of the quiz, and which variety they liked the most. 64% wanted to speak like the Flemish participants. Deprez (1981) observed similar results in his study: most Flemings did not want to speak Dutch Dutch, but wanted to express their own Flemish identity.

A couple of decades later, those attitudes have not really changed. Impe (2010) studied the attitudes of Dutch-speaking subjects from Flanders and the Netherlands towards several regionally coloured colloquial varieties of Dutch and towards Belgian and Dutch Standard Dutch on four dimensions: beauty, friendliness, usefulness and value. Generally speaking, the attitudes towards Belgian Standard

Dutch and Dutch Standard Dutch are quite positive, especially when compared to the colloquial varieties (cf. numerous other studies, e.g. Heijmer/Vonk 2002; Smakman/Van Bezooijen 2002; Van Bezooijen 2004). If we break the results down into respondents from Flanders and the Netherlands though, the respondents judge their own national standard variety to be more beautiful than the other national standard variety: on the ‘beauty’ axis, respondents from the Netherlands are all much more positive towards Dutch Standard Dutch, while Flemings are more positive towards Belgian Standard Dutch. Both Flemings and people from the Netherlands seem to prefer their own variety. To Belgian subjects, Dutch Standard Dutch does have high status though: Belgian subjects appreciate Dutch Standard Dutch better for usefulness and value, than for beauty and friendliness (see also Heijmer/Vonk 2002).

In previous research, the first author of this contribution mapped the attitudes of Flemings towards intralingual variation in Flanders, as they were expressed during in-depth interviews (Lybaert 2014a). During the interviews, the respondents sometimes expressed their attitudes towards Dutch Dutch too, even though this was not the focus of the study. For instance, the idea that northerners speak a more perfect kind of Dutch was expressed on a couple of occasions. After listening to a Belgian Standard Dutch fragment, one of the respondents said: ‘als ’t zo Hollands begint te klinken maar geen Hollands is dan is ’t zo ’t perfecter Nederlands’ (‘When it starts to sound like Dutch Dutch, but it’s not really Dutch Dutch, then it is more perfect Dutch’). Where does this idea come from? Flemings sometimes feel inferior to Dutch Dutch and its speakers. They envy people from the Netherlands because they have a more thorough command of the standard variety of Dutch and can speak it spontaneously and naturally, whereas to Flemings Standard Dutch feels like a variety which requires a lot of effort (Lybaert 2014b) and to some it is even felt to be a foreign language (Delarue 2016). However, Flemings do not really want to speak Dutch Dutch. They simply want to be fluent in their own national variety of Standard Dutch, just like people from the Netherlands.

5. Conclusion and discussion

At first sight, the case of Dutch as a common language, with Belgian and Dutch Dutch as the two most notable national varieties, seems to be a textbook example of how language pluricentricity works – no different from, for example, the German or English contexts. However, despite an officially common language and, to some extent, a common language policy (with the *Taalunie*), the dominant language ideologies in Flanders seem to differ significantly from those present in the Netherlands. In an attempt to explain this different perspective on language, Van Splunder (2015) points out that “the Dutch *pragmatic* or *instrumentalist* attitude to language resembles the Anglo-Saxon attitude, while the Flemish *essentialist*

attitude is indebted to the German romantics, but ironically also ties in with French language beliefs” (2015, 102, our translation and italics). Although this strict dichotomy seems a bit exaggerated, there appears to be an element of truth in it: for instance, the Dutch stance on the use of English in higher education differs from the Flemish opinion on the subject, which is rather mixed (cf. Bollen/Baten 2010, 429).

The fact that Flemings still attach a strong importance to the Standard Dutch norm, more so than their northern counterparts, can be explained by this different perspective on language. As mentioned earlier, initiatives to unite the (Standard) Dutch used in Flanders and the Netherlands are (or were) far stronger in Flanders, and Flemings still attach a substantial level of status to Dutch Standard Dutch – even though they do not really like the variety on an aesthetic level.

At the same time, however, Flanders seems to increasingly choose its own path towards an endogenous language norm, with a tendency to codify the typical Belgian Dutch vocabulary (see §3) and the functional elaboration of non-standard varieties and variants, usually dubbed *tussentaal* (‘in-between-language’). In doing so, language focus in Flanders appears to be shifting gradually from aspects of correctness, status and prestige to notions of identity, dynamism and (fluent) communication, for which the narrow Standard Dutch norm is no longer the only or even the most appropriate choice. It should therefore be expected that Flemings will grow more supportive of their own ‘typically Flemish’ language use – with an ensuing debate on which features and words are part of the Belgian Standard Dutch norm and which are not – and this emancipation will undoubtedly influence the way Flemings perceive the language use of people from the Netherlands. As such, the Dutch language area will remain an interesting playground for (socio) linguists, as it is far from clear how these processes of pluricentricity, a strong (yet weakening) standard language ideology and a growing focus on identity will play out in Flanders, and how they will affect the linguistic ties between Flanders and the Netherlands.

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Jutta Ransmayr

Insiders' and outsiders' views on German from Austria's perspective: Austrian Standard German and German Standard German – the odd couple

Abstract (German)

Spracheinstellungen gegenüber einer Sprache und ihren Sprechern sind meist mit stereotypen und auch emotionalen Einschätzungen verknüpft – umso mehr, wenn es sich um eine Sprache handelt, die in mehreren aneinandergrenzenden Ländern wie Österreich und Deutschland gesprochen wird und unterschiedliche Varietäten ein und derselben Sprache im Spiel sind.

Der vorliegende Beitrag möchte anhand verschiedener Perspektiven die Standardvarietäten Österreichs und Deutschlands näher in den Blick nehmen. Während erstere als eine nicht dominante Varietät gilt, kann letztere als die dominante Varietät auf der Ebene der Standardsprache betrachtet werden – ein Phänomen, das in vielen Sprachen auftritt. Ausgehend von Studien, die sich bisher mit diesem Szenario des Deutschen in Österreich und in Deutschland beschäftigt haben, werde ich über Ergebnisse zu Spracheinstellungsforschungen über Deutsch und insbesondere österreichisches Deutsch aus zwei Perspektiven berichten:

- (1) Außerhalb Österreichs: Einstellungen gegenüber österreichischem Deutsch und “deutschem Deutsch” aus der Sicht der Auslandsgermanistik: Wie nehmen Lehrende und Deutschstudierende an Germanistikinstituten in Großbritannien, Frankreich, Tschechien und Ungarn österreichisches Deutsch und “deutsches Deutsch” wahr?
- (2) Innerhalb Österreichs: Wie sehen Österreicherinnen und Österreicher die deutsche Sprache?

1. Introduction

When it comes to language perception and stereotypical attitudes towards a language and its speakers, things often get emotional and rather subjective – even more so, when neighbouring countries share a language, like (among others) Austria and Germany.

This article focuses on language conceptualisation, language perception and stereotypical attitudes towards the standard varieties of German as used in Austria and Germany. While the former is one of several non-dominant varieties, the latter is considered the dominant variety – a phenomenon which is quite common globally.

Based on several recent studies on this “Austrian-German/Standard-German scenario”, I discuss language attitudes towards German and Austrian Standard German (ASG) from various perspectives: (1) Outside Austria: attitudes towards Austrian Standard German and German Standard German (GSG) from the perspective of teaching/learning German as a foreign language abroad: how do university teachers and students of German at universities in Britain, France, the Czech Republic and Hungary perceive GSG and ASG? (2) Inside Austria: Austrians’ views on Standard German as used in Austria compared to Standard German as used in Germany.

2. Conceptualisation of the German language

At the *Internationale Deutschlehrertagung* in Bern in 1988, Peter von Polenz stated that the monocentric era was definitely over. With this proclamation of the end of monocentrism, which assumed a geographically localisable “best” standard language, two different conceptualisations to describe the nature of the German language and its varieties have come into use: the “pluricentric” concept (by Clyne 1995, among others, also referred to as “plurinational”), and the “pluriareal” concept. Researchers generally agree that German is a language particularly rich in variety. In Germany, standard language use still has regional characteristics despite the process of standardisation and the loss of dialects in many areas (Eichinger 2001). The two major concepts mentioned above both try to conceptualise German, from different perspectives.

The pluricentric concept assumes that there are equal, national varieties of German, influenced by state borders, and that a number of characteristic features of German can also be found in so-called half-centres (South Tyrol, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg and Belgium). Ammon (1995) and Clyne (1992) were the first to fully describe and develop this model in terms of theory and terminology. The *Variantenwörterbuch* (Ammon et al. 2004)¹ not only documents pluricentric variation, but also cross-national and regional phenomena. The *Varietätsgrammatik* project adds to this research on the conceptualisation of German by looking at variation in the field of national and cross-border grammatical phenomena.

The pluriareal concept (see Ammon 1998), which is sometimes quite emotionally discussed (Scheuringer 1996, Seiffter/Seiffter 2015), has been written about since the 1990s. It argues against the pluricentric approach by referring to the linguistic differences within Germany (between north and south) and within Austria (between east and west), as well as the numerous commonalities across borders, e.g. consistencies between south Germany, Austria and Switzerland, or between west and south Austria. Elspaß/Niehaus (2014) argue in favour of the

¹ A new edition was published in 2016: *Variantenwörterbuch NEU*.

pluriareal concept; Pohl for his part has recently preferred a “combination of the pluriareal and the pluricentric approaches” (2014, 14).

Most publications with substantial empirical foundations have adopted the pluricentric concept as the underlying concept for describing linguistic variation on the level of standard language (Ransmayr 2005; Markhardt 2005; Hägi 2005 and 2015; Pfrehm 2007 and 2011; Wissik 2014), since the pluriareal concept, although perfectly adequate for describing variation based on dialectal spaces and boundaries, at the same time negates the actual effect that national borders impose on certain domains of the language, i.e. on the language of administration, laws and regulations; the media; high-frequency words and word-patterns; and above all the large domain of education.

3. The status of ASG at non-German-speaking universities abroad – looking at ASG from the outsiders' perspective

In the realm of lexical, grammatical, phonetic and pragmatic differences among the varieties of German, which have been the subject of extensive research, Ammon (1995) and Clyne (1995) have pointed out striking asymmetries in the relationship between these varieties and their speakers and their attitudes towards each other, respectively. Until the end of the 1990s, most studies focused on the German-speaking countries. However, no data on language attitudes towards the varieties of German in the non-German-speaking, academic field were available. A PhD-thesis (Ransmayr 2005) tried to fill this gap. This study (later published in 2006), conducted at German institutes in France, Great Britain, the Czech Republic and Hungary, attempted to investigate the status and prestige associated with ASG in the domain of teaching and studying German abroad.

By means of contrasting stereotypes and prejudices associated with ASG in the four countries mentioned above, the study offers a country-specific portrait of language attitudes towards ASG. The statistical data analysis showed that the Austrian variety of German has severe problems regarding its prestige at universities abroad: both university students and lecturers tend to regard ASG as a non-standard variety of German and consider German German to be the only standard variety and norm.

3.1 Sample and methods used

University lecturers (n = 129: British, French, Czech, Hungarian, German, Austrian) and students (n = 780) studying German in France, Great Britain, the Czech Republic and Hungary participated in this study. Data was collected via questionnaires and interviews, and analysed using statistical methods. The domains examined in the survey and the interviews were general attitudes towards and

knowledge about ASG; if and how ASG was dealt with in German language classes; recommendations given for or against spending a year abroad in Austria for language fluency; and dealing with ASG when marking and assessing student work in exams. In this article, only a small proportion of the many results can be presented (Ransmayr 2006, 126ff.).

3.2 Results of survey and interviews

In interviews, university lecturers were asked what they associated with ASG and how they perceived ASG. Answers varied slightly between the four countries; here are some typical statements (Ransmayr 2006, 135ff.):

“Well, the Austrians’ pronunciation – from my point of view – is somehow sunnier, not so uptight.” [laughs]² (German lecturer in France)

“A very, very beautiful dance-like rhythm. And the other thing is the melody of speech. Harmonious, and very beautiful.”³ (German lecturer in France)

“We teach Standard German here. The Austrian lecturers really only add a bit of decoration.”⁴ (German lecturer in the Czech Republic)

“What do you call ‘Austrian German’? Is it all the different dialects or is there a predominant dialect? Maybe it doesn’t exist at all, this so-called ‘Austrian German’!”⁵ (French lecturer in France)

“Rural.”⁶ (German lecturer in France)

“Charming, but wrong.”⁷ (French lecturer in France)

What we notice is a common pattern, especially among French and German university lecturers: ASG is often given positive attributes initially, but this is usually followed by pointing out its irrelevance for university teaching, or a reference to its alleged non-standard status. Consequently, these attitudes are transferred to students of German, who often regard Austrian German as a dialect. This assumption is found above all among British students (just under 60%), followed by Hungarian, French and Czech students (approximately 50%) (Ransmayr 2006, 240).

² “*Also die Aussprache, ganz subjektiv mal, das ist eine sonnigere Aussprache, eine weniger verklemmte [lacht].*”

³ “*Ein sehr, sehr schöner, tänzerischer Rhythmus. Und sonst, was mir auffällt, ist die Sprachmelodie. Harmonisch, und sehr schön.*”

⁴ “*Wir lehren Binnendeutsch, Standarddeutsch. Die österreichischen Lektoren geben wirklich nur die Verzierung dazu.*”

⁵ “*Was nennen Sie das österreichische Deutsch? Also sind das diese verschiedenen Dialekte oder gibt es einen vorherrschenden Dialekt? Vielleicht gibt es das gar nicht, dieses österreichische Deutsch.*”

⁶ “*Ländlich.*”

⁷ “*Charmant, aber falsch.*”

Austrian German = "dialect"(students)




Fig. 1: ASG is a dialect

Therefore it is not surprising that students mostly refrain from using “Austriacisms” in assessed work. Roughly 90% of French and British students, just under 80% of Czech students and about two thirds of Hungarian students state that they would not use specifically Austrian terms in written examinations (Ransmayr 2006, 261):

Would you use “Austriacisms” in an exam? (students)




Fig. 2: Use of Austriacisms in exams

Similar notions apply to the situation of oral exams. The majority of students do not believe that a distinct Austrian accent would have any effect in an oral exam, but there are still more than twice as many students who believe that an Austrian accent might have a negative effect as those who believe that it might have a positive effect (Ransmayr 2006, 257):

What can be the effect of an Austrian accent in an oral exam?




Fig. 3: Effect of Austrian accent in oral exam

Correctness of Austrian and German expressions (lecturers)




Fig. 4: Preference and correctness of ASG/GSG expressions

It also seems that there is a shared belief among students and lecturers that the correctness of specifically Austrian terms is dubious. Presented with a set of paired items with a German German standard expression and the corresponding

Austrian standard expression, the German German item is in all cases preferred, while the Austrian expression is in many cases regarded as incorrect (Ransmayr 2006, 184) (see Fig. 4).

The following quotation from a French lecturer illustrates this: “Deviations [from the “German German” norm] are strictly counted as mistakes.”⁸

To interpret this data we also need to take a look at the knowledge about ASG and variation within the German language, especially among lecturers, since teaching and knowledge are obviously closely linked. In the survey, lecturers were asked how much they knew about Austrian German on a scale from one to six (1= little, 6=a lot). Interestingly enough, after the French lecturers, who stated that they knew very little about ASG, we also find that German lecturers have very little knowledge about ASG according to their personal estimation. The self-estimation of the Hungarians and Czechs concerning their knowledge about ASG was above average. Naturally, Austrians teaching abroad state that they know quite a lot about their national variety (Ransmayr 2006, 164):




Fig. 5: Knowledge about ASG among lecturers

Finally, when it comes to recommendations for students concerning where to spend their year abroad, it is not surprising that lecturers predominantly advise students to choose Germany – not only French and British lecturers, whose preference for Germany seems plausible with regard to geographical proximity and their linguistic reservations towards ASG (“There is the danger of acquiring an Austrian accent.”⁹), but also from German lecturers:

“Maybe in Germany, to be on the safe side.”¹⁰

⁸ “Abweichungen [von der Norm] werden streng als Fehler gewertet.“

⁹ “Es besteht die Gefahr, dass man einen österreichischen Akzent erlernt.“

¹⁰ “Vielleicht zur Sicherheit doch besser in Deutschland.“

4. FWF-research project “Austrian Standard German as a language of instruction and education” – looking at ASG from the insiders’ perspective

Empirical studies in this field (Ransmayr 2006; Markhardt 2005; Martin 1995; Pfrehm 2007) have all noticed an imbalance between the representation of the German varieties and a somewhat blurry picture among speakers of the non-dominant variety of one’s own variety. In many other linguistic publications, references have been made to a linguistic inferiority complex among Austrian speakers of the German language compared to German speakers from Germany (e.g. Clyne 1995; Muhr 1989, 2005). In addition, literature also provides evidence of an ambivalent attitude among Austrians towards their own variety and a less marked language loyalty¹¹ in comparison to speakers of the German variety. In some publications the feelings of inferiority have been linked to a lack of knowledge about and vague concepts of the pluricentric variation within the German language. Linguists also presume that pluricentric variation is only rarely a point of discussion in school teaching and teacher training. Until recently, no valid data had been available to prove this.

4.1 Brief project description

Therefore, the research project “Austrian Standard German as a language of instruction and education” (FWF-Project No. P23913–G18) has focused on the question of whether and how both students and teachers at Austrian schools encounter variation within the German language during their education and teacher training (de Cillia/Ransmayr 2014, 59ff.). The project was conducted from September 2012 to April 2015 and is based on the theory of pluricentric languages. Not only did it look into the role of the Austrian standard variety of German (ASG) in the context of schools and the level of knowledge about the pluricentricity of German and Austrian German among teachers of German in Austria, but it also aimed to capture the attitudes of Austrian teachers/pupils towards ASG and depict the prevailing concepts of linguistic norms among Austrian teachers and pupils (pluricentric/monocentric).

4.2 Sample and methods applied

In order to achieve this, a set of data was collected in this study (Ransmayr/Fink 2016); both qualitative and quantitative surveys were conducted. Firstly, curricula

¹¹ Groups can be more or less language loyal under the impact of socio-political, socio-economic and socio-cultural factors (de Cillia/Dressler 2006). Wolf Peter Klein (2001) defines language loyalty as the fact that speakers do not abandon their language in favour of another despite a certain pressure (e.g. language contact situations).

for teaching German at primary and secondary level, curricula for teacher training at universities and pedagogical institutes (*Pädagogische Hochschulen*), and the most commonly used German course books were examined with regard to the representation of linguistic variety. Secondly, a survey was carried out among 164 teachers of German and 1,253 students at upper secondary level throughout Austria, examining the language attitudes of both students and German teachers, and the role of Austrian Standard German in everyday school teaching routines.




Fig. 6: Location of schools where teachers and students took part in survey

Furthermore, 21 interviews with German teachers, 2 group discussions with teachers and students, and 7 participatory observations in class were conducted.

School curricula:	primary school, secondary level I and II
Curricula for teacher training:	(German) at universities and pedagogical institutes
German text books used at schools:	basic level, secondary level I and II
Questionnaires:	pupils (secondary level II), n=1253 teachers (primary level, secondary level I and II), n=164 in all federal states
Interviews:	n=21 with teachers of all school types in all federal states
Group discussions:	1 teachers' group, 1 pupils' group
In-class participatory observation:	7 classes

Tab. 1: Data sets

SPSS was used to analyse the data, and content and discourse analyses of the data were conducted.

4.3 Results of the survey concerning the conceptualisation of German by Austrian German teachers and pupils

A survey was conducted among 1,253 pupils at secondary level II at 27 schools in all of Austria's federal states (2-4 schools per federal state). 85.3% of students were native German speakers, 3.4% BCS, 2.5% Turkish and 8.8% had other languages of origin. In addition, 164 teachers at various types of schools – primary schools, *Hauptschulen* (general secondary schools)/*NMS* (new secondary schools), grammar schools at secondary levels I and II, vocational training schools – in all federal states took part in the survey. The results show that the vast majority of teachers (89.6%) and pupils (79.2%) consider German to be “a language with differences in its standard form between the German-speaking countries” (Fink 2016):




Fig. 7: How would you describe German?

Moreover, a clear majority of the teachers (80.5%) and more than half of the students (59.4%) are convinced that Austrian Standard German/“Austrian High German” as such exists (see Fig. 8).

These results clearly point to a pluricentric view, despite the fact that the “pluricentric concept” as such was only known to a small percentage of the participants in the survey: only 14.7% of the teachers and 8.1% of the students stated that they had previously heard of the concept of pluricentric languages (Ransmayr 2015).




Fig. 8: Does Austrian Standard German exist?

4.4 Perceptions of correctness of ASG among Austrian German teachers and pupils

When it came to assessing the “correctness” of ASG compared to GSG in normative terms, attitudes towards ASG proved to be ambiguous. First, teachers and pupils were asked if they considered Standard German as used in Austria to be as correct as the German counterpart. The majority of both teachers (86%) and pupils (67.7%) chose the politically correct answer “yes” (de Cillia/Ransmayr/Fink, in print):




Fig. 9: Is ASG as correct as GSG?

The answers to a subsequent control question, however, gave a different result. Presented with a 4-point scale, teachers and students were asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed with the statement “German German is more correct than Austrian German”. With the 4-point scale option (agree very strongly – agree strongly – agree to some extent – disagree), only 44.1% of teachers and 31.9% of pupils disagreed with the statement that GSG was more correct than ASG – an interesting twist, bearing in mind that previously a clear majority had stated (with a yes/no/don’t know option) that ASG was as correct as GSG. Even more surprisingly, 16.1% of the teachers and 33.3% of the students agree “strongly” or “very strongly” with the statement, and therefore believe GSG to be more correct than ASG (de Cillia/Ransmayr/Fink, in print):




Fig. 10: GSG is more correct than ASG

The participants in the group discussions were confronted with these inconsistent results, which led to lively debates, both in the teachers’ and in the students’ group. These discussions basically confirm the ambivalent and conflicting attitude among Austrians towards their own variety of German, as mentioned above. For example, a student states: “Well, in terms of grammar, I would almost say that Austrians are incorrect, but apart from that actually not at all.”¹² Even some teachers believe that Germans stick to grammar rules more than Austrians: “Ah, I guess that ... er ... people in Germany ... er ... obey grammatical rules probably a little more. Well, I think of sentence structure, er..., a subordinate clause which begins with ‘because’, I guess that most Austrians construct it the wrong way.

¹² “Also grammatisch würd ich fast sagen, dass die Österreicher inkorrekt sind, aber sonst eigentlich gar nicht.”

Grammatically incorrect, so to speak.”¹³ A statement made by a teacher from lower Austria in an interview also shows an ambivalent attitude towards Austrian German: “Well, the Germans are lucky in that their dialect has been proclaimed the standard language by accident. This is what I tell my students. They should not feel ashamed, it’s such a big language space, there are so many varieties, and East-Central German was selected as the standard language and in that sense the Germans appear to be more eloquent when they use what they have grown up with in a natural way. And we always sound like peasants.” (Fink 2016).¹⁴

4.5 ASG in textbooks and curricula

The results of the analysis of the curricula show that there is no systematic use of terminology when referring to “norms”. No reference is made to a linguistic codex, varieties are dealt with unsystematically, and pluricentric variation is not mentioned as such at any point. With few exceptions, the same applies to teacher training curricula. The texts which are printed in the analysed textbooks contain country-specific standard variation, but specific and unspecific Austriacisms/Helvetisms/Deutschlandisms remain uncommented-on for pupils. In addition, there are no references to dictionaries (*Österreichisches Wörterbuch*; *Duden*; *Variante Wörterbuch* etc.) or to more extensive materials or theoretical background information on ASG/GSG or standard linguistic variation within German in the ancillary teaching material.

Austrian German is only mentioned in one of the analysed course books (*Deutschstunde, 8. Schulstufe, Basisteil plus*). It contains a chapter about language comparison “Austria-Germany”. Unfortunately, it does not provide factual information: instead, dialect and colloquial expressions are presented next to standard expressions. The instruction reads: “Try to teach Austrian German to a German step by step.” Some examples of dialect (or colloquial) expressions (marked with a red circle in the picture below) and their standard German equivalents presented in this chapter are: “*Gschlader*” – “*ungenießbares Getränk*” (unpalatable drink); “*Gstätten*” – “*ungepflegtes Grundstück*” (neglected plot of land); “*Gschrapp*” – “*Kind*” (derogative for child); “*Dippel*” – “*Beule*” (bump) and “*Jauckerl*” – “*Injektion*” (injection):

¹³ “Ah, ich glaub [...] dass, äh, Menschen in Deutschland, äh, sich eventuell ein: w:enig stärker an die Grammatikregeln halten. Aso, ich denk jetzt an Satzbau, ah Nebensatz, der mit *weil* beginnt, ich glaub, dass ein Österreicher oder eine Österreicherin den eher folsch baut. Sozusagen nicht grammatikalisch korrekt.”

¹⁴ “Naja, die Deutschen haben das Glück, dass ihr Dialekt zufällig zur Standardsprache erklärt worden is. Sog i a meine Schüler. Sie brauchen si net genießen, das is so ein großer Sprachraum, da gibt’s viele Varietäten und die ostmitteldeutsche is hoit gewählt worden ois Standardsprache und insofern wirken die Deutschen dann eloquenter wenn sie des womit sie aufwochsn donn a natürlicherweise onwenden. Und unsaans klingt immer wie so a Bauer.”

Ausdrücke in Deutschland und Österreich

Wir Österreicherinnen und Österreicher sprechen zwar Deutsch – aber vieles hört sich doch ganz anders an als in Deutschland. Während wir von einem „Sessel“ und einem „Kasten“ sprechen, sagen die Deutschen zu denselben Möbelstücken „Stuhl“ und „Schrank“.

5 Versuche einer/einem Deutschen das „österreichische Deutsch“ Schritt für Schritt beizubringen!

Für Anfängerinnen und Anfänger: ... heißt auf gut Deutsch ...

„Extrawurst“ – _____	Dippel – _____
Flasche – _____	Beistrich – _____
Nickerchen – _____	Grant – _____
Gschaffthuber – _____	Gschau – _____
Gschlader – _____	Gschrapp – _____
Gstätten – _____	Gupf – _____
Häferl – _____	Hutsche – _____
Jaucklerl – _____	Kampel – _____
Bartwisch – _____	Bosnigel – _____

üble Laune, Blick, Spaß,
kurzer Schlaf, Komma,
Ohrfelge, Beule,
Wichtigtuier, Ausnahme,
Erhebung, Kind, Kamm,
Injektion, kleiner Besen,
boshafter Mensch,
Tasse, Schaukel, unge-
nießbares Getränk,
ungepflegtes
Grundstück

Fig. 11: Deutschstunde, Basisteil plus

Apart from this book, Austrian Standard German is not dealt with in any of the course books examined in this research project. Therefore, making students aware of the varieties of the German language and providing clear and correct information is left entirely to teachers, who hardly ever come across this matter in their teacher training – a vicious circle.

4.6 “Language loyalty” towards ASG

A number of questions tried to obtain a picture of how “loyal” teachers and students were towards ASG and whether they notice and care about GSG occurring in daily situations in Austria. Some of these questions explored the subject of the preference of certain “Austriacisms” to their corresponding “Deutschlandisms” or vice versa. Other questions tried to elicit the reactions of teachers and students to linguistic GSG influence occurring in common everyday situations. Recent research conducted on the influence of GSG on ASG vocabulary (Wiesinger 2015) has shown that there is substantial influence. One example of a set of questions in this project’s survey is presented here:




Fig. 12: Reactions to German expressions on menu

We can see that the overwhelming majority of teachers (94.5%) actually do mind when they happen to come across GSG expressions for food on an Austrian menu in a restaurant: reactions vary from being very irritated (44.8%) to being rather irritated (30.7%) or a little irritated (19%). Only just over 5% do not mind at all. However, students seem to react differently. As with many other questions in the survey, students tend to avoid extremes in their answers and appear to be more tentative than their teachers in most matters. The reason for this tendency is most likely the fact that school students are still in the process of fully developing their “linguistic identity” and can be considered linguistic “lay people”, whereas teachers of German could be considered “norm authorities” with strong linguistic awareness. This also shows in the result on the question at hand. Even though a majority of school students react with varying degrees of irritation to GSG expressions for food on an Austrian menu in a restaurant, a fifth of students state that they do not mind.

4.7 Language attitudes towards spoken ASG and GSG

Both teachers and students were asked to rate spoken ASG and GSG in a set of adjectives (opposites) on a scale of 1 to 6. Not very surprisingly, teachers and students clearly rated ASG more positively when it came to adjectives from the domains of likeability, familiarity and intimacy (*likeable, melodious, soft, pleasant, natural, beautiful, comfortable*). However, in some domains – let us call them “matter-of-fact domains” represented by adjectives like *correct* or *educated* – GSG was rated more positively (Ransmayr 2015, 187):

Language attitudes of Austrian teachers towards spoken ASG and GSG




Fig. 13: Attitudes towards spoken ASG and GSG

5. Media reactions to new teaching material for teachers

One of the key findings of the study “Austrian German as a language of education and instruction” was that teachers generally complained about the lack of suitable teaching material and information for dealing with the issue of linguistic varieties of German in class in a satisfactory manner. Another result was that the most frequently used text books do not depict linguistic variety correctly and sufficiently, since this is not an issue in syllabi and curricula for schools and university courses. Therefore the Ministry of Education produced a booklet containing games for all age groups and abilities of pupils, combined with informative articles to give teachers some theoretical background. This booklet was distributed to schools free of charge. Reactions by teachers in Austria were overwhelmingly positive, and the Austrian media reported on this initiative in a generally positive way. However, reactions (mostly) in Germany were astoundingly strong, using a distinctly martial choice of words and portraying the matter in a rather alarming and defensive light. Here are some newspaper headlines:

- “How Austrians fight off ‘High German’” (Augsburger Allgemeine/Germany);
- “Austria declares war on High German” (Die Welt/Germany);
- “Austria fights against German German” (Spiegel/Germany);
- “Dialect protection in Austria. Austria wants to defend its dialect against German” (Tagesanzeiger/Switzerland).

This booklet doesn’t aim to “fight off”, “fight” or “declare war” on “High German” in the least, nor is “dialect protection” a motivation at all. It simply aims to

provide information that is not easily found in common text books or offered during teacher training. Teachers cannot be expected to teach content with no material whatsoever at hand. Therefore a simple demand was met. The media reactions expose the journalists' unreflective use of terminology, since this initiative is not about Austrian *dialect* (it is about the *standard varieties* of German – actually *all* of them), nor is the term “High German” used correctly. Clearly, the purpose of such a booklet and the necessity for such a teaching aid has not been fully understood abroad. This is, however, not surprising, bearing in mind the asymmetries between speakers of the dominant vs. speakers of the non-dominant variety as outlined by Ammon (1995, 494ff.) and Clyne (1995, 22): Speakers of the dominant variety fail to fully comprehend the position of speakers of the non-dominant variety and have significant difficulty understanding a pluricentric view of German at all.

6. Résumé

Reactions as strong as those discussed above show that language matters a lot to people. They also illustrate quite clearly how much language is part of our identity. And as soon as a part of our identity is at stake, we tend to move from being rationally driven to being emotionally driven. Linguistic stereotypes and prejudice are touchy subjects which therefore need to be addressed carefully. It appears crucial to clearly dissociate linguistic initiatives, language policies and research projects from linguistic nationalism or chauvinism, such as the examples presented in this article.

We need to emphasise the benefits and underlying purpose of dealing with linguistic variety. It is all about creating more language awareness: making people – to start with in the field of education – aware of diversity within the German language, its regional/national varieties, the respective functions and domains of each variety.

What it really boils down to is linguistic enrichment: with proper knowledge about more than just one variety, everyone can reach out much further and mutual understanding is enhanced.

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Renata Coray

Stereotype und sprachliche Vorurteile in der Schweiz

Abstract (Deutsch)

In der offiziell viersprachigen Schweiz – einem Grenzland mit zahlreichen sprachlichen Kontakt- und Reibungszonen – werden regelmässig Debatten zu Sprachenfragen geführt. Diese sind wahre Fundgruben für Stereotypen und sprachliche Vorurteile. Die den Stereotypen inhärenten Vereinfachungen und Übertreibungen machen sie zu beliebten Sujets von Karikaturisten. Verschiedene Umfragen verdeutlichen, dass Auto- und Heterostereotypen recht gut übereinstimmen und dass die Deutschschweizer und ihr Schweizerdeutsch am schlechtesten abschneiden. Ausgehend von Karikaturen und sozialwissenschaftlichen Studien zum Thema werde ich in meinem Beitrag die verbreitetsten sprachbezogenen Stereotypen und Vorurteile sowie deren Beitrag zu kollektiven Identitätskonstruktionsprozessen erläutern.

Abstract (English)

Debates on language issues have a long tradition in Switzerland, a country which officially recognises four languages and has a number of different linguistic contact and conflict zones. These debates are rich sources for stereotypes and linguistic prejudices. As simplifications and exaggerations are inherent in stereotypes, they are also favorite subjects for cartoonists. As different studies show, the auto- and hetero-stereotypes are quite similar, and the German-speaking Swiss with their Swiss German dialects come off worst. Based on cartoons and on sociolinguistic studies I will present the prevailing stereotypes and linguistic prejudices in Switzerland and their contribution to the creation of collective identity.

In der Schweiz herrscht eine lange Tradition von gegenseitigen Charakterisierungen und Stereotypisierungen der verschiedenen Sprachgruppen und ihrer Sprachen. Die staatsrechtliche Anerkennung und Gleichberechtigung von mehreren Sprachen auf einem kleinen Staatsgebiet bringt mit sich, dass sich deren Sprecherinnen und Sprecher immer wieder miteinander auseinandersetzen haben. Sprachendebatten werden mit schon fast ritualhafter Regelmässigkeit geführt, so z.B. zur Sprachengesetzgebung, zum Schutz der sprachlichen Minderheiten oder zum Stellenwert von Englisch im Fremdsprachenunterricht. Diese Debatten sind wahre Fundgruben hinsichtlich der in der Öffentlichkeit dominierenden Vorstellungen, Stereotype und Vorurteile zu Sprachen und Sprachgemeinschaften. Die Schweiz als sprachliches Grenzland, mit zahlreichen sprachlichen Kontakt- und Reibungszonen, eignet sich deshalb vorzüglich zur Erforschung dieses Themas. Im vorliegenden Beitrag werden, nach einer kurzen Darstellung des soziolinguisti-

schen Kontexts und einer Begriffsbestimmung, anhand von historischen Quellen, wissenschaftlichen Untersuchungen und Karikaturen die verbreitetsten Stereotype und Vorurteile zu den vier nationalen Sprachgemeinschaften und Landessprachen der Schweiz erläutert.

1. Sprachen in der Schweiz

Sprachliche Stereotype und Vorteile sind nicht unabhängig vom Entstehungs- und Verwendungskontext zu verstehen, weshalb hier kurz die wichtigsten Informationen zur Sprachensituation in der Schweiz in Erinnerung gerufen werden.¹



Abb. 1: Territoriale Verbreitung der vier Landessprachen in der Schweiz (2000)

Die Schweiz anerkennt offiziell vier Landessprachen, Deutsch, Französisch, Italienisch und Rätomanisch (vgl. Artikel 4 der Bundesverfassung), die ersten drei sind Amtssprachen des Bundes (Art. 70 Abs. 1 BV).² Wegen der föderalistischen Struktur und dem geltenden sprachlichen Territorialitätsprinzip funktioniert die Mehrheit der 26 Kantone und Halbkantone in einer einzigen Sprache: entweder auf Deutsch (17 Kantone), auf Französisch (4 Kantone: Genf, Jura, Neuenburg, Waadt) oder auf Italienisch (Tessin). Die drei Kantone Freiburg, Bern und Wallis


¹ Eine kurze und zusammenfassende Übersicht findet sich z.B. in Haas (2006).

² Vgl. Systematische Sammlung des Bundesrechts SR 101.

sind offiziell zweisprachig, Deutsch und Französisch, der Kanton Graubünden dreisprachig mit Deutsch, Rätoromanisch und Italienisch.

Die territoriale Verbreitung der Sprachen hat sich, mit Ausnahme des Rätoromanischen, in den letzten 100 Jahren kaum verändert (vgl. Abb. 1). Deutsch ist die Amts- und Schulsprache in der Ostschweiz und im Mittelland, Französisch in der Westschweiz, die auch als Romandie oder Welschland bezeichnet wird,³ Italienisch in der Südschweiz. Rätoromanisch ist noch in einigen Tälern von Graubünden die Amts- und Schulsprache.

Als Hauptsprachen genannte Sprachen, 2015



¹ oder Schweizerdeutsch

Ständige Wohnbevölkerung, die in Privathaushalten lebt. Die Befragten konnten mehrere Sprachen angeben.

Quelle: BFS – Strukturerhebung (SE)

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Abb. 2: Deutschsprachige Mehrheit in der Schweiz (2015)

Deutsch wird von einer grossen Mehrheit der über 8 Millionen Einwohnerinnen und Einwohner als Sprache angegeben, in der sie denken und die sie am besten beherrschen (vgl. Abb. 2): 63% geben Deutsch als Hauptsprache an, rund 23% Französisch, 8% Italienisch und nur gerade 0,5% Rätoromanisch. Ein ansehnlicher Anteil von gut 23% gibt eine andere Sprache als Hauptsprache an, wobei v.a. Englisch und die Sprachen der iberischen Halbinsel und aus Südosteuropa dominieren. Dabei ist zu beachten, dass mehr als eine Hauptsprache angegeben werden konnte, wovon v.a. die Sprecherinnen und Sprecher dieser anderen Sprachen Gebrauch gemacht haben.

Angesichts dieser vielfältigen “Sprachenlandschaft” erstaunt es kaum, dass die sprachliche Verständigung und der Austausch zwischen den Sprachgemeinschaften ein politisches Dauerthema darstellen (vgl. dazu auch Widmer et al. 2004).

³ “Welsch” ist eine in der Deutschschweiz gängige, nicht pejorative Bezeichnung für das Französische, “Welsche” für die Romands bzw. Französischsprachigen.

2. Begriffsbestimmung

Die sozialwissenschaftliche Sekundärliteratur zu Stereotypen und sprachlichen Vorurteilen in der Schweiz kann grob unterteilt werden in eine eher sozialpsychologisch orientierte Einstellungsforschung und in eine eher soziolinguistisch orientierte Forschung zu “sozialen Repräsentationen”, “imaginaires linguistiques”, “Sprachmythen” und “Sprachideologien”. Diese verschiedenen Konzepte weisen einige Gemeinsamkeiten auf: Stereotype, Einstellungen, Vorurteile, Mythen, Ideologien und andere gesellschaftliche Denk- und Orientierungsmuster, kollektive Repräsentationen und Vorstellungsbilder (die sich nicht nur auf Personen[gruppen] beschränken)

- sind Verallgemeinerungen und Vereinfachungen von komplexen sozialen Wirklichkeiten,
- umfassen kollektives Wissen und bieten Orientierungshilfe,
- dienen der Identifizierung und Abgrenzung gegenüber anderen,
- können positiv oder negativ konnotiert sein,
- sind oft bildhaft und einprägsam, dauerhaft und gleichzeitig elastisch,
- umfassen kognitive, emotionale und konative bzw. handlungsrelevante Aspekte.⁴

Reden über andere ist in der Regel gar nicht möglich ohne ein Minimum an Vereinfachung und Verallgemeinerung, kurz: ohne Stereotype. Stereotype sind folglich integraler und überlieferter Teil sozialer Beziehungen, sie erlauben die Konstruktion von individueller und kollektiver Identität durch Abgrenzung gegenüber anderen und schaffen Gemeinsamkeiten.

Die Anerkennung einer gemeinsamen Sprache spielt eine wichtige Rolle im kollektiven Identitätskonstruktionsprozess. Eine gemeinsame Sprache erlaubt Verständigung und gilt spätestens seit der Romantik als zentraler Indikator einer gemeinsamen Kultur und Mentalität und als wichtiges Element im Prozess der Nationalstaatenbildung (Hobsbawm 1991; Gardt 2000). Die seither verbreitete Gleichung *eine Sprache = eine Kultur = eine Nation* führt dazu, dass Sprache oft als hervorragendes Identitätsmerkmal einer Gruppe, z.B. einer Sprachgemeinschaft oder einer Nation, bezeichnet wird. Sprachbezogene Stereotype betreffen deshalb in der Regel nicht nur die Sprache, sondern auch die mit dieser Sprache assoziierte Sprachgruppe und Sprachregion (und vice-versa).

⁴ Für eine ausführliche Darstellung zu Stereotypen aus sozialpsychologischer Perspektive, vgl. den Beitrag von Bernd Six im vorliegenden Band, zu nationalen Stereotypen z.B. Gülich (1997), Hahn/Hahn (2002) und Roclawski (2000). Zur Erforschung von Sprachideologien, vgl. z.B. Blommaert (1999), Kroskryty (2000) und Schieffelin et al. (1998). Für eine zusammenfassende Darstellung zur Spracheinstellungsforschung in der Schweiz, vgl. Fischer/Trier (1962) und Schwarz et al. (2006); zum Spannungsfeld zwischen Ethnisierung, sprachlichen Stereotypen und Sprachenfrieden in der Schweiz, vgl. Späti (2012), zu den im rätoromanischen Metadiskurs dominierenden kognitiven kulturellen Modellen und Sprachmythen, vgl. Berthele/Coray (2010) und Coray (2008).

3. Stereotype zu Deutsch- und Französischsprachigen in der Schweiz

Die wissenschaftliche Literatur zu Spracheinstellungen und sprachlichen Stereotypen in der Schweiz fokussiert v.a. die Beziehungen und die gegenseitigen Ein- und Wertschätzungen sowie Abgrenzungen zwischen Deutsch und Welsch. Stereotype Fremd- und Selbstzuschreibungen zu diesen beiden grösseren Sprachgruppen finden sich schon sehr früh, z.B. schon in politischen Debatten im 19. Jahrhundert (vgl. z.B. Widmer et al. 2004, 109ff.). Ein pointiertes Beispiel aus den 1930er-Jahren stammt vom Westschweizer Jurist und Politiker Henry Vallotton. Dieser hat kurz vor Ausbruch des Zweiten Weltkriegs einen Artikel mit dem Titel “Confédérés et Romands” veröffentlicht, in welchem er die Deutsch- und Westschweizer dazu aufruft, näher zusammenzurücken und gegen aussen Widerstand zu leisten. Die darin formulierte Charakterstudie “des” Welschen und “des” Deutschschweizers – mit den definiten Artikeln einher geht auch die Verabsolutierung der Beschreibungen – stellt ein paradigmatisches Beispiel für die bis heute verbreiteten Stereotype und Vorurteile dar:

Der Welsche ist intuitiv; er hat den Hang zu Grosszügigkeit; er ist wählerisch, aber lenksamen Geistes; der Welsche ist sehr anpassungsfähig, aber er ist manchmal oberflächlich; es mangelt ihm an Ausdauer in seinen Bestrebungen; er versteht es, seine Anschauungen mit Feuer vorzutragen, aber er geht nicht für sie durchs Feuer. Der Deutschschweizer hingegen ist viel kompakter in seiner Beharrlichkeit; er geht den Problemen auf den Grund, verliert sich bisweilen in Einzelheiten und richtet damit etwelche Verwirrung an, aber er verfolgt sein Ziel mit einer gleichmässigen Willenskraft. Der Welsche besitzt Phantasie, Vorstellungsvermögen; dem Deutschschweizer ist Sinn für Organisation eigen, bis in die kleinsten Details getrieben. (Vallotton 1938, 2f.)

3.1 Lebensfreude und Fantasie versus Beharrlichkeit und Macht

Die stereotype Charakterisierung des Romands als lebensfreudig, fantasievoll und leger und des Deutschschweizers als beharrlich, gründlich und ordentlich sind bis heute verbreitet (und belegen damit die den Stereotypen zugeschriebene Dauerhaftigkeit). Sie stellen auch einen beliebten Fundus für Karikaturisten dar, welche diese vereinfachenden Selbst- und Fremdzuschreibungen gerne zuspitzen und in einprägsamen Bildern darstellen.⁵

Eine Karikatur kann die verbreitete dichotome Stereotypisierung von Deutsch und Welsch mit einfachsten Mitteln auf den Punkt bringen: Das in Abbildung 3 verwendete französische Verb “vivre” kennzeichnet den Romand, das deutsche

⁵ Zu (nationalen) Stereotypen in Karikaturen und anderen bildlichen Darstellungen siehe z.B. Handl (1991), Krüger (2009), Meyer (2003) und Pümpel-Mader (2002), spezifisch zur Schweiz: Brohy (1997, 2005).

Verb “leben” den Deutschschweizer. “Vivre” und “leben” fühlt sich jedoch bei weitem nicht gleich an: Während der Romand mit seinem vivre-Ballon lachend und frei in die Lüfte schwebt, geht der Deutschschweizer gebeugt unter der Last seiner Lebens-Kugel, an welche er gekettet ist. Diese Karikatur erinnert an die Redewendung, dass der Romand arbeite, um zu leben, und der Deutschschweizer lebe, um zu arbeiten (Pedretti 1994, 95). Sie ist auch beliebt, wenn es ganz allgemein darum geht, eine “nordländisch-germanische” und “südländisch-romanische” Lebensphilosophie zu charakterisieren.



Abb. 3: Die lebensfreudigen Romands
(Quelle: “Nebelspalter” 17.6.1986)⁶




Abb. 4: Die paternalistischen mächtigen
Deutschschweizer (Quelle:
“Nebelspalter” 17.6.1986)

Andere Karikaturen heben das ungleiche Grössenverhältnis und ökonomische Potenzial zwischen Deutsch und Welsch hervor (vgl. Abb. 4): Während der als Weinbauer gekleidete Romand auf einem Fass sitzt, zwei quasi leere Flaschen neben sich, protestet ihm der vornehm gekleidete und Zigarre rauchende Deutschschweizer Bankdirektor von oben herab, auf einem Geldtresor sitzend, zu.

⁶ Vgl. auch: <http://forum-helveticum.ch/de/2016/10/karikatur-klischees/> (Stand: 14.02.2017).



Abb. 5: Die ignoranten Deutschschweizer (Quelle: “Nebelspalter” 17.6.1986)

Ebenfalls mit den unterschiedlichen Grössen- und Machtverhältnissen spielt eine Karikatur von zwei prototypischen Schweizern: von zwei Bauern und Sennen, die auf dem Bänklein Confoederatio Helvetica sehr unterschiedlich viel Platz und Gewicht einnehmen (vgl. Abb. 5). Aber der Deutschschweizer scheint gar nicht zu verstehen, weshalb “ces Welches” nie zufrieden sind... Die Arroganz und Ignoranz der Deutschschweizer Mehrheit stellen ebenfalls ein verbreitetes Vorurteil dar.

3.2 “Röstigraben” und “Vernunftfehe”

Aufgrund des Territorialitätsprinzips lässt sich eine klare Grenze zwischen der deutsch- und der französischsprachigen Schweiz ziehen – mit Ausnahme einiger zweisprachiger Gemeinden an der Sprachgrenze (vgl. Abb. 1). Diese Sprachgrenze wird in Spannungs- und Krisensituationen zwischen diesen beiden Sprachgruppen auch als “Graben” oder “Kluft” bezeichnet und bildet die Grundlage für eine kulinarische Metapher, für den “Röstigraben” (Büchi 2000, 2015). Die Röstli ist ein Kartoffelgericht, das zwar schon seit Jahrhunderten auf beiden Seiten der Sprachgrenze gekocht und gegessen wird, das aber hartnäckig als Deutschschweizer Gericht gilt. Auch der “Röstigraben” ist ein beliebtes Sujet von Karikaturisten, die sich mit den Beziehungen zwischen Deutsch und Welsch befassen. Zudem dient er nicht selten auch als Erklärung für sprachregional unterschiedliches Abstimmungsverhalten, welches unterschiedlichen Wesenszügen und Mentalitäten dies- und jenseits des “Röstigrabens” zugeschrieben wird. Selbst wenn in der Regel die Differenzen zwischen Alt und Jung oder Stadt und Land signifikanter sind, um ein Abstimmungsresultat zu erklären, so werden doch immer wieder sprachregionale, ethnolinguistische Lektüren vorgenommen und die Stereotype zwischen Deutsch und Welsch mobilisiert und bekräftigt.



Abb. 6: Welsches “Laissez-Faire” und Deutschschweizer Kleinkariertheit (Quelle: “Migros-Magazin” 25.7.2011⁷)

Eine neuere Karikatur (vgl. Abb. 6) zeigt die Schweiz als Erdkugel (analog zum Stereotyp der Schweiz als selbstbezogene Insel). Sie illustriert den Graben zwischen West- und Deutschschweizern mit den bereits bekannten Stereotypen: Die Welschen (möglicherweise auch stellvertretend für die “Lateiner” und “Südländer”) liegen im Liegestuhl, geniessen und trinken, sind auch etwas unordentlich, aber dafür kreativ und anarchisch, wie Feder und Papier auf dem verwilderten Rasen suggerieren. Die Deutschschweizer hingegen (möglicherweise auch stellvertretend für die “Germanen” und “Nordländer”) arbeiten und putzen den ganzen Tag und leben kleinkariert, nach genauen Vorgaben und Regeln, wie die blitzblanken, streng quadratischen Bodenplatten nahelegen.

Die Dauerhaftigkeit dieser Stereotype belegt auch eine sozialpsychologische Studie aus den 1960er-Jahren: Fischer und Trier (1962) haben (mittels der Profilmethode bzw. Methode des semantischen Differenzials) Selbst- und Fremdeinschätzungen von Deutsch- und Westschweizern erhoben und analysiert.⁸ Dabei stellen sie fest, dass die Auto- und Heterostereotype recht gut übereinstimmen,

⁷ Vgl. auch: <http://forum-helveticum.ch/de/2016/10/karikatur-klischees/> (Stand: 14.02.2017).

⁸ Zur Kritik an dieser Methode, welche zwar Einstellungen indirekt zu ermitteln versuche, jedoch Adjektive vorgebe und zu semantischen Begrenzungen und teilweise willkürlichen Interpretationen tendiere, siehe z.B. Schneider/Weil (1996, 218f.). Heute wird die Methode der Diskursanalyse bevorzugt: Die Erforschung von (nationalen, ethnischen, kulturellen etc.)

d.h. dass die Selbst- und Fremdzuschreibungen nahe beieinander liegen. Bei den Zuordnungen von Adjektiven dominieren für die Westschweizer Attribute wie glatt, warm, rund, froh, laut veränderlich, offen und liberal, für die Deutschschweizer hingegen stark, rau, gesund, eckig, gespannt, stetig und eher konservativ. Fischer und Trier resümieren ihre Resultate folgendermassen: “Deutlich sind in unserem Falle die Zuordnungen Westschweizer, weiblich, eher passiv, gegenüber dem Deutschweizer, männlich, eher aktiv-aggressiv” (Fischer/Trier 1962, 78).



Abb. 7: “Vernunfttehe” (Quelle: Titelblatt Büchi 2015)

Derartige Zuschreibungen bilden wohl auch die Grundlage für die beliebte Ehe-metapher im Diskurs über das Verhältnis zwischen Deutsch- und Westschweiz, wobei eine grössere Zuneigung des einen Teils – des Deutschschweizer Ehemanns seiner französischsprachigen Ehefrau gegenüber – ausgemacht wird. Deshalb ist auch mehr von einer Vernunft- als von einer Liebeshe die Rede – wie eine jüngst erschienene Publikation zum Thema auf dem Titelblatt illustriert (Büchi 2015; vgl. Abb. 7).

Die Frauen aus der französischsprachigen Schweiz gelten zwar gemäss einer Befragung von jungen Wehrmännern aus den 1980er-Jahren als schöner als die Deutschschweizer Frauen, jedoch auch als damenhaft und für den Haushalt nicht

Stereotypen mittels Analysen von (Alltags-, Medien- etc.) Diskursen erlaubt die Erforschung ihrer diskursiven Produktion und Reproduktion (Gülich 1997, 36ff.).

zu gebrauchen (Pedretti 1994, 95f.). Dieses Stereotyp hatte schon der Schweizer Autor Jeremias Gotthelf im 19. Jahrhundert genährt, als er sich abschätzig über die Deutschschweizer Mädchen äusserte, die nach dem damals gebräuchlichen Haushaltlehrjahr im Welschland zurückkehrten und nicht nur die französische Sprache, sondern auch französische Manieren gelernt hatten und zu “Modepuppen” geworden seien, die als Bäuerinnen nichts mehr taugten (vgl. Ris 1991, 91).

3.3 “Sprache der Träume” und “Sprache des Realismus”

Wie eingangs erwähnt, kommt der Sprache ein wichtiger Stellenwert bei der Konstruktion von sozialer Identität zu und ist die Grenze zwischen sprecher- und sprachbezogenen Stereotypen fließend. Analog zur Vorstellung des soliden Deutschschweizers und des legeren Welschen finden wir denn auch wiederholt Beschreibungen ihrer Sprache als grob und rau bzw. als elegant und schön. Es vermag deshalb kaum zu erstaunen, dass Französisch in der deutschsprachigen Werbung dann dominiert, wenn es um Eleganz, Mode und gutes Essen geht, und dass Deutsch in der französischsprachigen Werbung eher im gesundheitlichen und technischen Bereich zu finden ist.⁹ Ausgehend von diesen Beobachtungen ist Deutsch auch schon als “Sprache des Realismus” und Französisch als “Sprache der Träume” charakterisiert worden (Broggini/Vernex 1989, 35).

Die Diglossie-Situation der Deutschschweiz wird sehr unterschiedlich bewertet: Die Frankofonen beurteilen die Deutschschweizer Mundart grossmehrheitlich als negativ (Haas 2006, 1780) und bezeichnen sie etwa auch abschätzig als “barbarische Sprache” und “Halskrankheit”. Die verbreitete Verwendung des Schweizerdeutschen wird regelmässig als Grund für Verständigungsprobleme und schlechte Beziehungen zwischen West- und Deutschschweiz angeführt, auch wenn diese in der Regel nicht auf die Sprache, sondern auf politische und sozio-ökonomische Entwicklungen zurückzuführen sind (vgl. z.B. Kolde 1986, 134f.; Watts 1999, 97). Der deutschen Standardsprache wird in der Westschweiz hingegen als “la langue de Goethe” und damit als Kultursprache mehr Respekt gezollt (vgl. z.B. Kolde 1986, 143).

Umgekehrt erfreut sich in der Deutschschweiz das Schweizerdeutsche grosser Beliebtheit, v.a. mündlich, und dies immer mehr auch in ehemals dem Standard- oder Hochdeutschen vorbehaltenen Domänen. Das Schweizerdeutsche gilt als spontaner, intimer und familiärer (vgl. z.B. Lüdi 1997, 89), was auch dazu führt, dass immer mehr Radio- und Fernsehsendungen Mundart einsetzen, um sich gegenüber dem grossen elektronischen Massenmedienangebot aus Deutschland abzuheben. Hochdeutsch wird als formaler, distanzierter und weniger heimisch empfunden. Es wird von erstaunlich vielen Deutschschweizern sogar als ihre

⁹ Zum bewussten Einsatz von Fremdsprachen bzw. zum sprachlichen “Branding” in der Werbung, siehe z.B. Haarmann (2005), Kelly-Holmes (2000), Li (2007) und Piller (2003).

erste Fremdsprache bezeichnet (vgl. Werlen et al. 2011). Nebst negativer schulischer Erfahrungen (vgl. z.B. Häcki Buhofer/Studer 1993, 189f.; Schwarz et al. 2006, 19; Watts 1999, 89ff.) haben auch historische Gründe zu einem ambivalenten Verhältnis der Deutschschweizer gegenüber der Sprache des mächtigen Nachbarlandes Deutschland geführt (vgl. z.B. Amstutz 1996, 152ff.). Deshalb erstaunt es wenig, dass in Befragungen zur Beliebtheit und Schönheit verschiedener Sprachen Englisch und Französisch auch bei den Deutschschweizern noch vor Hochdeutsch genannt werden (vgl. Schwarz et al. 2006, 15f., 58).

4. Stereotype zu Italienisch- und Romanischsprachigen in der Schweiz

Interessanterweise gibt es viel weniger Karikaturen und Studien über Stereotype und Vorurteile zu den beiden kleineren nationalen Sprachen und Sprachgruppen in der Schweiz. Diese Fixierung auf die jeweils grössere und einflussreichere Sprachgemeinschaft ist in der Literatur auch schon als “Einweg-Solidarität” bezeichnet und illustriert worden (vgl. Abb. 8). Dass beide Sprachen mit beliebten Feriendestinationen (Tessin und Italien bzw. Graubünden) assoziiert werden, mag mit ein Grund dafür sein, dass die vorhandenen Stereotype und Vorurteile eher positiv ausfallen.



Abb. 8: Vernachlässigte Sprachminderheiten in einer “Einweg-Solidarität” (Quelle: Pedretti 1994, 108)

4.1 Die aufgestellten Italienischsprachigen

Die Beziehungen zu den in der Regel sehr sprachgewandten italienischsprachigen Schweizern geben allgemein kaum zu Reden. Hin und wieder wird – in Analogie zum “Röstigraben” – schmunzelnd von einem “Polenta-” oder “Spaghetti-Graben” gesprochen. Eine Reihe von stereotypen Aussagen zu Tessinern finden wir in der bereits erwähnten Rekrutenbefragung aus den 1980er-Jahren: Sie werden als aufgestellt, unternehmenslustig, temperamentvoll, locker, kinderfreundlich, grosszügig, diskussionsfreudig und trinkfest beschrieben, aber auch als stolz, aggressiv, liederlich, arbeitsscheu, unordentlich und wehleidig. Da nur wenige Befragte schon Kontakte mit Tessinern oder italienischsprachigen Bündnern gehabt hatten, gehen die Autoren davon aus, dass diese Stereotype von denjenigen über die Italiener abgeleitet wurden, welche die Befragten von den Baustellen her kannten (Pedretti 1994, 96).



Abb. 9: Die aufgestellten und trinkfreudigen Italienischsprachigen (Quelle: SRF/Kati Rickenbach, www.srf.ch/kultur/im-fokus/landesteile-vorurteile, Stand: 14.02.2017)

Die italienische Sprache ist in einer Studie zu sprachlichen Vorlieben und ästhetischen Einschätzungen von Schweizern aus dem Jahr 2006 unisono als sehr schön bezeichnet worden (Schwarz et al. 2006, 57). Sie gilt als besonders melodiose Sprache, was hin und wieder auch mit dem Hinweis auf die zahlreichen italienischsprachigen Opernlibretti untermauert wird.

4.2 Die urwüchsigen Rätromanen

Die Rätromanen, die Sprechenden der kleinsten Landessprache, werden in der Restschweiz noch weniger zur Kenntnis genommen als die Italienischsprachigen. Gemäss Rekrutenbefragung (Pedretti 1994, 96) sind sie naturverbunden, traditionsbewusst, urchig, bescheiden, freundlich und schüchtern, aber auch eigenwillige Bergbauern, engstirnig, verknorzt, eigenbrötlerisch und stur (vgl. Abb. 10).



Abb. 10: Die urwüchsigen rätromanischen Bergbauern (Quelle: Dürmüller 1996, 99)



Abb. 11: Rätromanisch als vierte Landessprache im Alpenbollwerk Schweiz (Quelle: "Nebenspalter" 4.3.1938)

Die rätoromanische Sprache ist seit 1938 als Landessprache in der Bundesverfassung der Schweiz verankert und wird gemeinhin als einzige wirklich schweizerische Sprache, ohne sogenanntes sprachliches Hinterland, bezeichnet. Nicht zuletzt aus diesem Grund wurde die staatsrechtliche Anerkennung dieser Sprache, kurz vor Ausbruch des Zweiten Weltkriegs, zu einem symbolischen Akt, in welchem die schweizerische Autonomie, der Gotthardmythos und das uneinnehmbare Alpenbollwerk Schweiz zelebriert und demonstriert wurden.

Eine Illustration von 1938 (vgl. Abb. 11) verdeutlicht das Stereotyp der “*quarta lingua naziunala*” als alte, ungeschliffene, widerstandsfähige und unverrückbare Alpensprache. Die Rätoromanen selbst betonten die Zuneigung zu ihrer Sprache, indem sie diese nicht nur als Muttersprache, sondern als leibhaftige “*mumma romontscha*” (rätoromanische Mutter) bezeichnen und Romanisch als “Herzsprache” gegenüber Deutsch als “Brotsprache” abgrenzen, auf die sie jedoch existenziell angewiesen sind (Coray 2008). In der Deutschschweiz gibt es hingegen auch die abschätzigste Bezeichnung des Rätoromanischen als “Kuhspanisch”, “Bauernlatein” oder “Geröllhaldenenglisch” und damit als minderwertige Bauernsprache und exotische Sprache der alpinen Steinwüsten (Solèr 1997, 1881).

5. Englisch

Seit ein paar Jahren mischt eine weitere Sprache die Sprachendebatte auf: Nach den drei Amtssprachen ist Englisch die verbreitetste Hauptsprache in der Schweiz (vgl. Abb. 2). Zurzeit wird gerade heftig darüber debattiert, ob eine andere Landessprache oder aber Englisch als erste Fremdsprache in der Primarschule unterrichtet werden solle, wobei auch auf sprachliche Stereotype zurückgegriffen wird. Englisch wird von den Befürwortern von *English first* als nützlichste Sprache und Weltsprache, als einfache und bei den Kindern sehr beliebte Sprache bezeichnet. Sie wird auch als “neutrale” Sprache begrüsst, die keinen der Landessprachensprechenden bevorzuge. Aus den öffentlichen Debatten geht hervor, dass Englisch als Sprache der Zukunft, der Karriere und des modernen digitalen Zeitalters gilt (vgl. Coray 2001; Brohy 2012, 59). Auch in wissenschaftlichen Umfragen schwingt Englisch weit obenaus, wenn es um die nützlichste, prestigeträchtigste und angesehenste Sprache geht, und zwar in allen Sprachregionen (vgl. z.B. Apothéloz/Bysaeth 1981; Werlen 2012, 167f.). Diejenigen hingegen, die sich für eine andere Landessprache als erste Fremdsprache in der Schule aussprechen, verweisen darauf, dass Deutsch- und Französischkenntnisse für die Schweizer Wirtschaft ebenso oder noch wichtiger seien, dass die Landessprachen für den nationalen Zusammenhalt von grosser Bedeutung seien und dass Englisch als hegemoniale Sprache der Globalisierung zu Uniformisierung und Einebnung kultureller Eigenheiten führe.




Abb. 12: Föderalistische Blutsprache Französisch oder Ketch-up-Weltsprache Englisch?
(Quelle: Peter Gut "Neue Zürcher Zeitung" 28.8.2014)

Auch hier bringt eine Karikatur die sprachlichen Stereotype auf den Punkt (vgl. Abb. 12): Sollen die Kinder in der Deutschschweiz zuerst mit der eidgenössischen, föderalistischen Blutsprache Französisch genährt werden, die zur besseren gegenseitigen Verständigung und Stärkung der nationalen Kohäsion beiträgt, oder aber mit der weltweit verbreiteten Ketch-up- und McDonalds-Einheitsprache Englisch, die beruflich und wirtschaftlich unabdingbar ist? – Die Kinder scheinen beide mit demselben Eifer zu lernen.

6. Fazit

Stereotype und soziale Repräsentationen transportieren geteilte Wissensstrukturen und bieten vereinfachende kognitive Schemata. Die soziale Kategorisierung mittels Stereotype unterstützt die Abgrenzung gegenüber der Fremdgruppe und die Bestätigung der Eigengruppe und trägt damit zur Festigung der eigenen sozialen Identität bei (Petersen/Six 2008). Sprachbezogene Inklusions- und Exklusionsprozesse

betreffen je nach fokussierter Ebene nicht nur Nationen oder Sprachgemeinschaften, sondern auch Dialektgruppen innerhalb einzelner Sprachgemeinschaften.¹⁰

Die im vorliegenden Beitrag präsentierten sprachlichen Stereotype und Vorurteile in der Schweiz sind verbreitet und beliebt. In öffentlichen Debatten und Karikaturen, aber auch in wissenschaftlichen Untersuchungen zum Thema stehen in erster Linie die beiden grösseren Sprachen und Sprechergruppen, die Deutsch- und Französischsprachigen, im Zentrum. Dabei wird deutlich, dass sprachliche Stereotype auch Macht- und Abhängigkeitsverhältnisse zum Ausdruck bringen. Sie stellen eine vereinfachende, ethnolinguistische Lektüre von komplexen sozialen Realitäten dar, in welchen nicht selten Probleme politischer oder wirtschaftlicher Natur als Sprachprobleme verhandelt werden. Stereotype zu den Sprachgruppen fungieren quasi als Seismograph für die regelmässig debattierte nationale Kohäsion, die in der Schweiz primär als sprachregionale Kohäsion diskutiert wird.



Abb. 13: Identitätsstiftende Abgrenzung und Vorurteile (Quelle: “Femina” Juni 1997)¹¹

Das fragile Gleichgewicht zwischen sprachlichen Inklusions- und Exklusionsprozessen, welches die Schweiz als mehrsprachiger Staat zu halten hat, findet einen pointierten Ausdruck in der Aussage eines Alt-Bundesrates: “[L]a Suisse est un pays où on s’entend bien parce qu’on ne s’y comprend pas” (die Schweiz ist ein Land, wo man gut miteinander auskommt, da man sich nicht versteht)

¹⁰ Sprachliche und ethnische Kategorisierungen und Stereotype eliminieren immer auch die Diversität innerhalb der betreffenden Gruppe (vgl. z.B. Berthele 2016). So gibt es beispielsweise nicht den Deutschschweizer *per se*, was sich nicht zuletzt auch anhand der in der Deutschschweiz kursierenden Stereotype zu den verschiedenen Dialekten aufzeigen lässt (vgl. z.B. Hengartner 1995).

¹¹ Vgl. auch: <http://forum-helveticum.ch/de/2016/10/karikatur-klischees/> (Stand: 14.02.2017).

(Chevallaz 1983, 140). Zwar gelten die Anerkennung von vier Landessprachen und ein friedliches Zusammenleben von vier Sprachgemeinschaften als wichtiges Element der nationalen Identität. Aber das Zusammenleben scheint gemäss dieser Aussage einfacher, wenn man sich nicht versteht bzw. nicht zu viel voneinander weiss und deshalb ungestört die gegenseitigen Stereotype und Vorurteile pflegen kann. Allzu viel Nähe und gegenseitige Kenntnis würden, wie die letzte Karikatur suggeriert (vgl. Abb. 13), die für die soziale Identitätskonstruktion wichtigen Unterschiede einebnen. Augenzwinkernd wird dazu aufgefordert, sich weiterhin nicht zu verstehen, um seine Identität zu bewahren.

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Tony Jones / John Simpson

When does a stereotype become a prejudice? The UK perspective

Abstract

This short paper looks at how language use reflects national stereotypes both within the UK and more widely, and examines different types of positive and negative stereotypes that have in the past become embedded in the language. As England is the predominant nation demographically and economically within the UK, it is not surprising that it supplies the majority of the documentary examples of usage: though catalogued carefully in dictionaries, many usages are outmoded and/or derogatory and should be approached with caution by speakers of English whether native or non-native. The paper concludes with a summary of recent legislation in the UK against prejudice and notes similar efforts being made in the education system.

The examples provided were found in the media and elsewhere and are presented neutrally and for the benefit of the study of stereotypes and prejudice in language use. They are for the purposes of comparison only, and should not be represented as the opinions of the compilers of this report – which they are not.

Every country has a history, and that history necessarily involves its international relations. But although the public face of international relations consists of treaties, trade agreements, political alliances, and other high-level diplomatic associations, our international relations are also enshrined in our very language. Nationalism is a powerful force, and each country – and often different regions within a country – discloses its sense of international and national identity through its language. We adopt linguistic stereotypes to protect us, to bond with our fellow citizens, and to assert our nationalism.

In terms of linguistic stereotypes, we most often caricature our near neighbours. Historically, and especially before the age of mass communication, these are the people with whom we have most contact. Neighbours are not us: they have different customs, and the way they manifest their lifestyle and aspirations traditionally offers scope for the formulation of stereotypes. These stereotypes are not aggressive or dismissive, but are just our way of coping with difference. Stereotypes change over time as we change, and as our international and national relationships change. What is a conventional stereotype in one century may give a false impression in a new reality.

There are dangers in stereotypes, of course. Language changes slowly, and what was acceptable in the nineteenth century may no longer be socially acceptable in the twentieth or twenty-first. We erode false stereotypes, but slowly. They hang over into the new reality, and often embarrassingly so. The principal danger of stereotypes occurs when they turn into prejudice, which can then become a social disease. In the twenty-first century, societies have in general become much more alert to the dangers of prejudice, and its eradication is a watchword of most societies. But again it can be a slow business. Prejudice cannot be dismissed by political edict, and only gradually by social engineering. Societies need to change before prejudice can be eradicated.

This paper looks at words and expressions which have been used in the UK, and particularly in England, in the past to stereotype those in other countries. They give us an insight not only into international relations, but into the psyche of the English – the good and the bad. The examples given here are found in the media and elsewhere, and are presented neutrally and for the benefit of the study of stereotypes and prejudice. They are presented for the purposes of comparison and scholarly research, and should not be represented as the opinions of the compilers of this report – which they are not. The tendency nowadays to decry stereotypes as prejudice-by-stealth is widespread, and is as prevalent in the UK today as it is in other countries. But we benefit from an awareness of the situation in the past, as it helps us come to terms with the modern reality.

Each section below started life as a response to a questionnaire circulated to members within EFNIL. We have tried to retain the original structure of the questionnaire, whilst attempting to integrate the responses and commentary naturally into the flow of the article. We conclude with some general remarks on stereotypes and prejudice not just in the UK but throughout Europe and elsewhere.

1. Beliefs and opinions concerning neighbouring countries

Generally, stereotypes show that countries neighbouring England have both positive and negative profiles: the positive ones typically involve flair and creativity in language and song. Countries slightly further away geographically (and hence less familiar to speakers and writers) are stereotyped by apparent characteristics taken to an extreme, but again literary and musical features can be admired.

Fortunately national stereotypes are much less common in the media than they were twenty years ago, and can attract accusations of racism.

In expressions relating to *Scotland*, the country is felt to be beautiful (*bonny Scotland*) and yet also be distant and remote, with a wild landscape; the English find some customs strange and unfamiliar (e.g. haggis, kilts, and bagpipes).

While only part of the whole island of *Ireland* is in the UK, cultural stereotypes typically pre-date the division of the country into the Republic of Ireland

and Northern Ireland. Ireland is the most stereotyped of the countries immediately adjacent to England – different, admirable, and yet puzzling. The self-designation “the Emerald Isle” typifies Irish dreaming. Ireland is regarded as being a beautiful country, with an attractive ancient Celtic heritage. Some outmoded expressions, now known principally from dictionaries, relating specifically to the country, rather than to the people, include *Irish bull* (= “nonsense”), *Irish hubbub* (= “uproar”), *Irish mile* (“a long distance”). Much of the cultural stereotyping of Ireland and the Irish can be traced to nineteenth-century discourse. Hollywood/ Broadway added to this process in the twentieth century, ignoring modern Ireland while attempting to preserve an idealised emigrant vision of the old country.

Wales is typically and endearingly regarded as a country populated more by sheep ranging the hills and valleys than by people. It is characterised by its beautiful scenery, with a strong culture of singing and passion, especially for rugby-playing. It may be seen as remote and hilly, and also by being badly affected by the loss of industry (especially coal). Expressions recorded include: *Welsh comb* (“the fingers”), *Welsh mile* (“something, esp. a distance, that feels long and tedious”).

France has long been criticised and admired by England and the English. An old name, *Frogland*, possibly derives from the frog-like shape of the ‘*fleur de lys*’ on French royal banners and not from the (relatively rare) habit of eating ‘*les cuisses de grenouilles*’. France is admired for its creative flair in sport, but is sometimes stereotyped by the British media as inefficient in business, insular or over-nationalistic. Dictionary expressions include: *French disease* (etc.) = “venereal disease, esp. syphilis”; sexual expressions (*French kiss*, etc.); *French cricket* (an informal, children’s form of the game); *French letter* (“condom”). Needless to say the French language contains similar expressions: *le vice anglais* (homosexuality); *la capote anglaise* (condom); *filer à l’anglais* (to take French leave = “unpermitted absence”).

Germany is allotted characteristics of efficiency, impersonality, in business and sport – of a type that the English might aspire to if they overcame their natural politeness and diffidence. Archaic dictionary expression: *German gold* (= “imitation gold leaf”).

2. Stereotyping of citizens of neighbouring countries

Nicknames for *Scots* include *Jock*, *Scotty* (usually familiar rather than antagonistic). Scots may be regarded as disliking spending money – some resentment and mistrust between Scotland and England has arisen from present and historical political events, e.g. during and after the recent devolution referendum. Positive traits – the Scots are generally regarded as canny (shrewd), dependable, resilient. The words ‘Scotland’, ‘Scottish’ are used as positive attributes in the UK financial and insurance sectors (e.g. Bank of Scotland, Scottish Widows).

Nicknames for the *Irish* include *Mac*, *Paddy*, *West Briton* (historical), *Pat*, *Mick*. The Irish are variously regarded as characteristically musical and fun-loving, and as very friendly and helpful. Other perceived traits: gregarious, witty, literary, lucky; see, for example, *the luck of the Irish*.

Nicknames for the *Welsh* (typically familiar and friendly) include *Taffy*, *leek*, *Taff*, *Welsh wizard* 'nickname given to any talented or celebrated Welsh person'. General attributes are both positive and negative: the Welsh are variously regarded as being kindly, ineffectual, or long-winded. Further perceived traits: musical, poetic, passionate.

Phrases and nicknames for the *French* include *Frenchy*, *frog*, *frog-eater*, *froggy*, *parleyvo*. The French have been generally regarded as inimical to the English, and generally distrustful of foreigners. A general survey of national attitudes may be found here: www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jan/26/french-stereotypes-arrogant-good-in-bed.

Phrases and nicknames for *Germans* (generally negative or neutral) include: *Fritz*, *Jerry*, *sausage-eater*, *kraut*. Some opinions, especially among the older generation, are still coloured by WWII: Germans are regarded as highly efficient, rather impersonal, and yet supremely technologically competent. A general survey of national attitudes may be found here: www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jan/26/german-stereotypes-dont-mention-towels.

3. Opinions concerning languages of neighbouring countries

The English generally are considered to be poor learners of other languages, and this doubtless influences their view of other tongues. This is partly because they have no land borders with continental Europe, and so are less familiar with the styles of multicultural interchange common within much of mainland Europe. In addition, the proportion of students (both in school and university) electing to study modern foreign languages for examination has been falling in recent years, and the school syllabuses tend to reduce the period over which modern foreign languages must be learnt.

In *Scotland*, Edinburgh is regarded as having a polite, refined accent; Glasgow is perceived as possessing a more industrialised, urban accent. Generally, the English regard Lowland Scots as a variety of English, even though some scholars now regard Scots as a separate language within the West Germanic group. Scots Gaelic is not well known to the English.

In *Ireland*, the language is admired for the beautiful accent (even though many regional accents exist within Ireland itself), and for the songs and literature in Irish Gaelic and Irish English.

The *Welsh* language is regarded as sweet (lilting, smooth), but complex.

The *French* are regarded as poor speakers of English and sometimes intolerant of foreigners speaking poor French. The French language can be regarded as unintelligible, or as a beautiful, poetic tongue.

The *German* language is sometimes perceived to be harsh and guttural, with many long words. Despite the high prestige in England of German literature and poetry in the nineteenth century, it is now less highly regarded.

4. How the English see themselves

England is regarded as proudly independent (or – negatively – insular) in the profile it presents to the world. It is perceived to be less powerful globally than it has been in the past, but it is popular with immigrants from within and outside the EU because of its prestige culture (a feature it shares with the USA), and for what is regarded as its generous benefit system. However, many of its major institutions and cultural identifiers have been acquired by companies based in other countries (EDF, etc.) or are in the process of coming under foreign control, leaving worries about the independence of its underfunded infrastructure. Its historical parliamentary system, its football, and various other features are still regarded commonly as world-beating. It suffers from a north/south economic divide, an urban/rural divide, a public/private education divide.

A general summary of national attitudes may be found here: www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jan/26/british-stereotypes-please-mention-war.

Different regional groups are separately characterised, and fiercely supported in their own region, while being ridiculed by others.

English is variously the pride of the world (the language of Shakespeare), difficult to use well as spelling is irregular and increasingly unrelated to pronunciation; the preposition/adverb system is opaque; there is tension between reformers (simplifiers) and traditionalists.

Goidelic and Brittonic languages are not taught in the English educational system, but Welsh as a subject is compulsory in Welsh state schools at Key Stage 4 (15-16-year-olds). Approximately 25% of schoolchildren in the principality receive Welsh-medium education. As the English are uncomfortable learning foreign languages, they tend to prefer to learn those neighbouring and European languages which are regarded as “easier” to learn: Spanish, then French, before German – which is less popular.

5. Measures or projects to cope with prejudices in the UK

The UK’s Equality Act of 2010 covers England and Wales, with legislation for Northern Ireland provided locally. Scotland likewise has its own legislation. With this Act of Parliament in place the legal climate recognises that people can cause

or take offence because of ethnicity issues and provides redress for victims experiencing racism. As a result, racism – including casual racism (e.g. in so-called ‘banter’) – is increasingly less acceptable. Many for-profit organisations are instigating unconscious-bias training to help mitigate prejudice or any affinity bias they may have. Other organisations have taken this step too in addition to general awareness-raising programmes to help reduce prejudice and to support inclusion. The UK education system, through curriculum, policies and practices is actively tackling (with the aim of ultimately eradicating) racism and promoting inclusion.

6. Conclusion

This examination of stereotypical expressions that have been used of neighbouring countries in the UK and elsewhere highlights perceived difference of culture, sometimes – for effect and reinforcement – taken to extremes. The examination also shows that the level of stereotypical description today is considerably lower than in previous centuries, in keeping with a general notion in societies that as stereotypes can lead to prejudice, they are best avoided. The situation cannot be controlled, but social changes have led to an overall diminution of stereotypical expressions for other nationalities, and an increase in the celebration rather than the castigation of difference. Discussions within the conference indicated that there was a widespread sense that stereotypes would, at least at some background level, be preserved and were a necessary by-product of expressions of nationalism, but that overt prejudice, leading to racism, sexism, and other extreme positions, should be and actually was on a sharp decline. Some countries within Europe hope to control or balance stereotypical language by influencing social change, whereas others have a more *laissez-faire* attitude. But overall, the wave of attitudinal shift currently in evidence in societies, whether state-engineered or the result of natural adjustments, was regarded as a positive sign for the weakening of national stereotypes and the reduction of social and institutional prejudice in the future.

František Čermák

Gypsies among Czechs: An anti-stereotype view

Abstract

Refusing to fit Gypsies under sociological and ill-founded labels, i.e. stereotypes, these remarks try to show a somewhat different picture. After positioning Czech Gypsies numerically among other European countries, and offering some remarks on the current state of the Gypsy community today, it is noted that a new general phenomenon of a lack of adaptability is starting to become prominent. In conclusion, data from a large representative Czech corpus of 100 million words producing an impression of *cikán* is presented, with conclusions drawn from this.

1. Introduction

In the book by the Czech classical author Božena Němcová (1855, *Babička* (The Grandmother)), roving tinkers and Jews are always welcomed by the kindly heroine and given something to eat, whereas she detests the stealing and migrant gypsies. While her attitude may have reflected the stereotypical view of Gypsies (Romanies) in the 19th century, it is no longer tenable today. In fact there is insufficient evidence to justify these old and widespread stereotypes; they seem essentially unsubstantiated, vague and almost mystical, and should be avoided.

The aim of these brief notes is to comment on some aspects of the image of Gypsies in the Czech community today – trying, at the same time, to point out that subsuming these under stereotypes is mistaken and false. Even the traditional view of Gypsies as thieves, implied by the classical writer mentioned above, cannot be statistically supported: there may be some Gypsies who steal, but they are not in the majority and the stereotype, if applied to all, is false and offensive. In fact, nobody has investigated how many Czechs steal in comparison, and one must, then, wonder, why there is no such stereotype used about Czechs, or indeed Germans, French, etc, as thieves, too. So it all boils down to knowledge of facts and numbers and their un/justifiable generalisation. This is not to conceal some of the less palatable features of Gypsy life today, but simply to refuse the ill-chosen term stereotype. In fact, in addition to petty theft and *stealing*, there is a new feature, not recorded in the classical literature, namely a widespread *lack of social adaptability*, which is due both to traditional Gypsy culture and to today's social conditions, including poverty, unemployment, etc. This can hardly be called a stereotype.

Gypsies have been present for centuries. Wikipedia provides the following estimates of their presence in some European and non-European countries:

Bulgaria, 700-800,000; Spain, 650-800,000; Romania, 535,000; Hungary, 310-990,000; France, 300,000; Poland, 250-300,000; Italy, 120-180,000; UK, 90-300,000; Czechia, 40,000; Netherlands, 32-48,000; Finland, 10-15,000; Denmark, 2-12,000; Lithuania, 3,000; USA, 1,000,000; Turkey, 500,000; Russia, 220,000, etc.

However reliable these figures may be, they have to be taken at face value, although it is generally accepted that Gypsies are sometimes reluctant to admit their real nationality in censuses and polls. Anyway, at least one conclusion may be drawn from this, namely that Czechs are statistically somewhere in the middle.

All other views of Gypsies, in addition to the two mentioned above are similar in that they are overgeneralised and, hence, not strictly true. Some journalists still choose to see Gypsies as romantic, traditional, family-oriented and highly musical, extolling their dance in particular. These views, arising from historic stereotypes, are no longer tenable and acceptable. In fact, Gypsies seem to have become resigned to their traditional values being displaced in our complex modern society, a substantial problem for them being how to escape social marginalisation and isolation. A partial consequence of this, found in their *lack of adaptability* – reinforced by traditional isolation – is to be seen in their frequent avoidance of work and reliance on state social allowances and benefits. Since these are paid out as lump sums, some of them, not used to budgeting, turn to initial overspending when getting the money, to gambling and drinking, linked to the return of a modern form of usury. Another consequence is that a few, officially registered as unemployed but slightly better-off than the rest and attempting to impress their neighbours, may come to collect their benefits from stupefied state officials in a Cadillac or Mercedes. Although these stories are mostly anecdotal, such things have happened, though statistically they are negligible.

Hence, any attempt to use the problematic and – for a linguist – unacceptable term *stereotype* for Gypsies has to be rejected, as it is simply not based on sufficient convincing evidence. This will be explored further using corpus data.

2. Today's stereotypes or badly interpreted and reported problems?

The situation of Romani or Gypsies differs widely among European countries, reflecting different histories. In Czechia, only a small number of the original old ethnic groups of Sinti (German Gypsies) are preserved, along with a few of the old original Czech and Moravian Gypsies. Until the Second World War, these groups made up a Gypsy community which was relatively integrated into Czech society. Unfortunately, most of this community perished during the war, leaving very few alive. The postwar situation, dictated and formed by the Communist regime, was largely aimed at settling Gypsies in selected villages and city areas

and stopping their migratory tradition. The situation has deteriorated significantly since Czechoslovakia was officially abolished and replaced by two new states, Czechia and Slovakia, in 1993. Since this change had been anticipated for some time, many East Slovak Gypsies, not having much in common with those in Bohemia, officially opted for Czech citizenship and moved over to Czech territory, bringing with them new (somewhat lower) ways of life and standards of living. In consequence, a new balance and integration has been sought ever since. There is no research available on this, but a study from just after the war speaks of there being some 6-7 times more Gypsies in Slovakia than in the Czech speaking territory. Many of these moved around 1992-1993 and this has given rise to new problems and contributed to unexpected turmoil and social tension. Generally speaking, all Gypsies (belonging to several distinct groups, in some cases with their own dialects) face now the problem of how to get to grips with the mainstream society. Nevertheless, Gypsies are not a well-defined social group, being very diverse due to different social level, education, etc.

Naturally, this has been reflected – not favourably – in the views of the majority community. According to a recent opinion poll (see Wikipedia), 68% of Czechs have some antipathy towards Romani and 82% of Czechs reject any form of special protection of Roma rights, which the present government is trying to introduce. According to a 2010 survey, 83% of Czechs consider Romani to be asocial and 45% would like to expel them out of the Czech Republic. Unfortunately, this attitude remains virtually unchanged. Police statistics from the early 1990s showed that the crime rate among the Romani population in Czechoslovakia was high, especially with respect to burglaries. A particularly disturbing fact is that some newcomers, often noisy and untidy, coming from destitute villages without electricity and sewage to large city blocks of flats, resort to plundering and ransacking them to the extent that anything wooden (furniture, stairs, etc.) is burned in open fires ignited inside the flats, making them virtually uninhabitable.

The *negative* aspects of the behaviour of some Gypsies can be reported in a somewhat distorted way in newspapers and the press in general. Due to an official journalistic protocol for reporting these acts (sometimes criminal in nature), a misguided and inappropriately used political correctness has crept in. Thus, reporting that a burglary or theft has taken place may look innocuous enough, indicating that these could have been perpetrated by anyone – were it not for TV reports showing faces easily recognisable as belonging to Gypsies. But this is just one foolish example of political correctness and the clumsiness of some journalists.

All in all, let us repeat, these are just some aspects of Czech-Gypsy coexistence which are not really very important and are often exaggerated in the interests of sensationalism. It is often television that is responsible and, as one journalist has put it, any news that sells well is alright and acceptable, at least at the moment, and that includes crime. Gypsies, shown in a negative light, fit the bill perfectly. Let us add that part of the blame for not helping Gypsies may be directed towards

the Czech state itself, which has not been able (or willing enough) to move or abolish a factory pig farm from the site of a former Nazi concentration camp for Gypsies (Lety).

However, on a more *positive* note, one must realise that most of the members of this ethnic group, or rather groups, try to make a living as well as they can, though often hampered by a lack of expertise and qualifications. Culturally, the Czech community has so far been able to offer at least some basic cultural and educational amenities and facilities, hopefully to be followed by others. These include a Romani/Gypsy Radio station (Romea.cz) and Romani journals (the popular *Amaro Gendalos*, the cultural and linguistic *Romano džaniben*, the children's journal *Kéreka*, etc.). There is also a Gypsy department at Charles University where the language and culture can be studied; several small Gypsy political parties and other groups (who tend to quarrel between themselves); dance ensembles, etc.

3. Let's try to be a bit more objective: What a large corpus has to say

Any serious judgment and conclusion has to be based on reliable facts rather than partial polls and the views of journalists, often driven by their own goals. A detailed examination as reflected by a large corpus of contemporary Czech (SYN2010, see korpus.cz) – which cannot be accused of partiality, political bias or of being skewed – does offer a different picture. A responsible and representative corpus, reflecting many types of discourse, provides evidence which cannot be found anywhere else at present.

842 examples of the word or rather forms of the word *cikán* (Gypsy) and its less common variant *cigán* have been found. Some concordance examples are given below.

Jak děláš , když máš vozík prázdný ! " A < *cikán* > si povzdechne : " Juj , máme tak vysokou normu

Barman měl kolem hlavy uvázaný kus hadru jako < *cikán* > . Unaveně kývl na Harald , který nepřipomínal Zněla pohřební hudba . Za hlavou mu stál < *cikán* > , kterého denně potkávali na dálnici . Vedle něj medvěd

Vypadal jsem jako zarostlý < *cikán* > . Starý jeden seržant nám zaopatřil i to a netrvalo

Dežovy obchody nebyly z nejčistších , že byl < *cikán* > , nehraje v tom žádnou roli .

Obchodoval s cikány

že ty hodinky ukradl < *cikán* > jemu . Výborné - ta zpověď byla ovšem neúplná .

se starý < *cikán* > po chvíli otočil a nafoukaným houpavým krokem zašel zpět za

že pánům v necestu byl . Klel < *cikán* > : " Jaká slabost mi v ty staré hnáty vlezla

tvář od Medvěda , < *cikán* > v kostkované košili , hluchoněmý opilec zmateně

gestikulující , věčně

Ke konci usazený < *cikán* > vzal Mohamedovu hlavu do dlaní , zadíval se mu do mě pustil sednout postarší < *cikán* > , četl jsem o chlapci , který zachránil tonoucího kamaráda

Starý < *cikán* > hbitě zaklapl medailon obrovskou rukou a strčil jej zpět pod jak < *cikán* > půjdu dlouho , dlouho podél hranic , v nesmírné Přírodě

V Osvětlení začínal plešatě . Vypadal jako < *cikán* > , ale chtěl vypadat jako Árijec – a to se

Cikáni si libují ve vtípech o cikánech , například jak < *cikán* > ukradl motorku připadá si bez domova jako < *cikán* > . I takový byl osud mimořádně nadaných a citlivých lidí

Nesmysly Koumá < *cikán* > kolem domu dupá botou s holinkou lze ho trestat kvůli

Tu ten < *cikán* > co mě znal pokoj v hospodě najal ! Leč jak

křesťanská ctnost vůbec býti možnou , " povzdychl < *cikán* > , " musí se také přece

Inspection and comparison of various contexts reveals today's usage of the word in quite a positive light.

Looking in the immediate lexical vicinity of the word *Gypsy* (*cikán*) and selecting only some obvious examples, we obtain ***cikán/cikáni***: *ukradnou* 4 x (will steal), demonstrating that stealing does in fact not figure much. The four occurrences of *steal* seem to be a very poor basis for any sweeping conclusion, let alone a stereotype.

The rest of the interesting collocates are even lower, all having just two, i.e. they have been found only twice in 100 million words: *zmlácení* (beating), *kočující* (migrating), *bída* (poverty), *tábor* (camp), *ukradl* (stole), *ubodán* (stabbed to death), *smradlavej* (stinking), *zarostlý* (unshaven) which tells us even less about the word's usage.

A telling figure is that of the corpus genres where the word *cikán* is found. Most belong to fiction (511), followed by journalism (209), while the lowest percentage, not unexpectedly, come from professional and scientific texts (122).

Although a detailed analysis of the full usage of the word *Gypsy* would tell much more, it is possible and maybe interesting to note at least one observation. Over one third of its usage (deduced from its nominative case form) signals that the word for Gypsy is used as agent, doer, in a active role and not in the passive way that one might perhaps expect from journalistic reporting.

These few brief remarks can only provide a partial illustration of a complex and rich problem, with one proviso. The corpus data, discussed at the end, do point to stereotypes as an ill-conceived idea which is unacceptable, at least in linguistics.

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Nuala Ní Scolláin

Stereotypes and linguistic prejudices in Ireland

Abstract (English)

What sort of images does the word Ireland conjure up for you? A land of saints and scholars, or a mystical land of leprechauns and fairies? A recent Google search on 'Irish Culture' conjured up some 137 million results containing everything from potatoes, pints of Guinness, rural cottages, Irish dancers, musicians and of course our beloved Saint Patrick. Just some of the stereotypes perceived by the world, or at least by Google, of what being Irish entails. But what of we, the Irish ourselves? And what of our views on our own native language? Do these stereotypes merely exist in the minds of those living outside of the Emerald Isle, or are they present in the minds of the Irish themselves?

Abstract (Gaelic)

Cén cineál íomhánna a thugann an focal Éire chun cuimhne duitse? Tír na naomh agus na n-ollamh, nó tír thaibhseach na leipreachán agus na síog? Bhí de thoradh ar chuardach Google ar 'Irish Culture' le deireanas 137 milliún toradh ina raibh, idir eile, prátaí, piontaí Guinness, títhe beaga faoin tuath, damhsóirí Gaelacha, ceoltóirí agus, ar ndóigh, Naomh Pádraig ionúin is ansa linn.

Níl ansin ach cuid de na steiréitíopaí is dóigh leis an tsaol mhór, nó le Google ar a laghad, maidir lena bhfuil i gceist más Éireannach thú. Ach cad é fúinne, na Gaeil féin? Agus cad é faoinár dtuairimí i leith ár dteanga dhúchais féin? An bhfuil na steiréitíopaí seo in intinn na ndaoine a chónaíonn lasmuigh den oileáinín ghlas, nó an bhfuil siad in intinn na nGael féin?

Just some of the stereotypes perceived by the world, or at least by Google, of what being Irish entails. But what of we, the Irish ourselves? And what of our views on our own native language? Do these stereotypes merely exist in the minds of those living outside of the Emerald Isle, or are they present in the minds of the Irish themselves?

When we speak about stereotypes in Ireland it is important to look at the historical context and how that has evolved over time, before and after the political divide of Ireland into North and South in 1921. Partition, or Irish independence – and it is referred to as both, depending on where you live and your outlook – came about as a group of Irish Nationalist Republicans fought to free Ireland from British Rule, which led to the unsuccessful militant attempt in 1916 known as The Easter Rising. Although this particular attempt was unsuccessful it led to The War of Independence which was fought in the years after The Easter Rising,

and resulted in Ireland being divided into two jurisdictions. It was agreed that the six predominantly unionist counties in the North of Ireland would remain under British Rule and that the remaining twenty-six counties would form an independent state known as the Irish Free State (and after the constitution of 1937 as the Republic of Ireland).

The stereotypes of a particular group – such as Irish speakers – have an impact on how all members of that group are viewed and treated by society, and on their status in that society. Yet in a divided society such as Ireland, both North and South, this is a particularly interesting and complex issue due to the linguistic journey of both jurisdictions and the social and political standing of the Irish language in both jurisdictions.

Written stereotypes of the Irish people can be found as far back as the 12th century when Gerald of Wales compiled his *Topography of Ireland*, an account of the landscape and people of Ireland written around 1188, soon after the Norman invasion. The text is reputed to have played a central role in shaping English colonial attitudes towards the Irish people, with images of the Irish such as this:

The Irish are a rude people, subsisting on the produce of their cattle only, and living themselves like beasts – a people that has not yet departed from the primitive habits of pastoral life. (Cambrensis, 70)

Although there is little or no reference in the above-mentioned text to the language of the people, the Irish language remained the majority tongue as late as 1800 despite various attempts to ban it (such as the Statutes of Kilkenny in 1366), but it became a minority language during the 19th century.¹ A combination of political factors together with the Great Irish Potato Famine and the emigration that occurred in subsequent years contributed to this.

Due to the introduction of the National Schools system in 1831, the Irish language was banned from school premises by order of the British Government; in fact children who spoke their native tongue were routinely punished and made to wear a “tally stick” around their neck which counted the number of times they had accidentally reverted to their mother tongue. This led to the stereotyping of the Irish language as backwards and associated with the lower classes. In fact, one of Ireland’s most prominent politicians at the time, Daniel O’Connell, although a native Irish speaker himself, encouraged the Irish to learn English to better themselves (Boylan 1998, 306).

More than half a century would pass before the Irish language experienced a revival led by Irish language activists and scholars, which saw the foundation of The Gaelic League in 1893 – whose main objective was to encourage the use of

¹ According to the 1841 census Ireland had 8,175,124 inhabitants. In 1841 4 million people in Ireland spoke Gaelic. (O’Beirne Ranelagh 1994, 118).

the Irish language in everyday life – and a revival of Irish culture and music. These activists founded a weekly Irish language newspaper in which poetry, song, and short stories were published in the Irish language, something which was at odds with the cultural norm at the time. Authors such as Pádraig Pearse and Pádraig Ó Conaire were given a platform to share their works in a style akin to European Romantic literature, written in their native tongue.

In this literature, a view emerges of the Irish language as something natural, elemental and expressive in its purity. After partition in 1921 a refined version of this romanticised stereotype begins to be recorded, in literature at least – one that links the Irish language to an idyllic setting in rural Ireland with a noble peasant class struggling against the elements to eke out a living. This stereotype is to be found extensively in the autobiographical literature from the Gaeltacht (Irish speaking) areas from the first half of the 20th century, in which the people are portrayed as impoverished, hard done-by peasants with nothing to offer the world but the richness of their tongue. This viewpoint was challenged and satirised in Flann O'Brien's novel *An Béal Bocht*, published in 1941, which was a parody of these autobiographies, playing on the comedic effect of the peasants' tales of misfortune.

In the Irish language, to put on the *Béal Bocht* (the “poor mouth”) is to exaggerate the unfortunate situation you have found yourself in in order to gain sympathy and perhaps charity. The book is set in the stereotypical surroundings of rural Ireland where it never stops raining, and everyone is destined to be poor as long as they continue to speak “the smooth Gaelic” and live off the state grants provided for Irish speakers. In fact, the only time life is injected into this quiet, rural community is when hordes of another type of stereotype, the wealthy Dublin Gaeilgeoirí, who are learning Irish mainly from books, descend upon the area to experience an authentic “Irish native existence”.

These stereotypical Gaeilgeoirí are still perceived to exist in Dublin to this day, to be found with a notebook in the pocket of their tweed jackets with pens poised at the ready to record the phrases and idioms of native Irish speakers and seen as a learned, middle-upper class whose children attend Irish-medium schools as a sign of their status in society.

In the 21st century in the Republic of Ireland, the Irish language is officially the first language of the state, with protection offered under both the Constitution and The Official Languages Act 2003; and to the English-speaking majority, this leads to the stereotype of Irish speakers as privileged individuals who benefit from an excessive advantage over their English-speaking peers with regards to state funding and services. Indeed some non-Irish speakers see Irish speakers as cranks who are always complaining, and are often heard saying “Sure they all speak English, why do they need services in Irish?” The reality unfortunately is very different, as the previous Irish Language Commissioner, Seán Ó Cuirreáin, stated in his annual report in 2013:

In too many instances the provision of services through Irish is conditional on “available resources”, which suggests that such services may be perceived as optional extras rather than fundamental rights. In one such scheme, commitment to the provision of services through Irish, detailed over 3 pages, has the condition “subject to available resources” listed 11 times.

The Language Commissioner resigned from his post not long after this report, citing disillusionment with the lack of adequate resources being provided for Irish speakers.

The teaching of the Irish language is compulsory in all schools in the Republic of Ireland, and the 2011 census reported an increase in the percentage of Irish speakers of 7% since 2006. There has also been significant growth in the number of Irish-medium schools within the Republic of Ireland, with 332 recognised primary and post-primary schools operating solely or mainly through the Irish language, both in Irish-speaking areas and in non Irish-speaking areas. These facts and figures challenge the perception and stereotype of Irish being a dead language.

The aforementioned Gaelic League, founded in 1893 and charged with preserving the Irish language, was founded by a Protestant, Douglas Hyde, the son of a Church of Ireland minister. Hyde is quoted as saying, “The Irish language, thank God, is neither Protestant nor Catholic, Unionist nor Separatist”. When the Belfast branch of The Gaelic League was set up in 1895 it was founded in a predominantly Unionist area on the Beersbridge Road in Belfast. However, due to the impact of partition in Ireland, both political and socio-economic factors meant that after 1921 the Irish language took a very different path in Northern Ireland to that in the Republic of Ireland.

Some members of The Easter Rising in 1916 were also Irish language activists who believed that the revolution was not just political, but that all symbols of Britishness should be rejected, including the use of the English language. Northern Ireland, a unionist majority wishing to remain part of the United Kingdom in 1921, became a volatile environment for Irish language speakers, as this was increasingly seen as a symbol of Irish republicanism.

This stereotype led to nationalists in the North of Ireland clinging on to their Irish identity and learning Irish as a means to express their cultural identity, along with things such as playing traditional Irish music and the native sports of hurling, handball and Gaelic football. Although not exclusive to nationalists, these were all methods used to rebel against British rule. Many Catholic schools taught the Irish language, whereas Protestant schools tended to shy away from it. This only furthered the cultural stereotype of the Irish language belonging to nationalists only. As stated in the research commissioned by Foras na Gaeilge in 2016 and completed by The Economic and Social Research Institute of Ireland entitled *Attitudes of the non-Catholic population in Northern Ireland towards the Irish Language in Ireland*:

Attitudes towards the Irish language in Northern Ireland have traditionally reflected the political differences between its two divided communities, with non-Catholics having more negative attitudes towards the language. Recent figures by DCALNI (2014) reveal that a higher proportion of Catholics (30%) have knowledge of Irish than both those with other or no religion (12%) and Protestants (3%) which is not surprising, given that it is mostly the Catholic schools that offer Irish alongside other modern languages. (Darmody 2016)

It was not in the formal education system alone that the Irish language was being taught, however; classes for adults ran several nights a week in the Ardscoil in Divis Street in Belfast, and in 1936 Cumann Chluain Árd in Belfast was founded. Cumann Chluain Árd is an Irish language club which not only teaches language classes in the direct method, but holds many social events for Irish language speakers and learners alike. From this, a new breed of Irish language activists was born who enforced an Irish-only rule in the building and who held on to the vision of an Irish-speaking Ireland. Although idealistic, in reality many of them married other Irish speakers they had met in the Cumann Chluain Árd and they decided to extend the language outside of the club building and founded an Irish-speaking community where the houses, which they built themselves, contained only Irish speakers. Raising their families to speak Irish in urban Belfast in the 1960s was not standard practice, and led to the stereotyping of these families as eccentric extremists whose motto was “Ná habair é, déan é”, “Don’t say it, do it”.

Belfast in the 1960s and 1970s was a place of huge social unrest. The Civil Rights movement was in full swing, petitioning for equality for Catholics in terms of employment, social housing and the perceived discrimination against them in comparison to their Protestant counterparts. The burning of Bombay Street in 1969 by a sectarian mob, where Catholic houses were burnt to the ground with residents left homeless, provided an opportunity for these Irish-speaking eccentrics to put their motto into action. They proceeded to rebuild the houses in Bombay Street themselves, which helped soften their image as Irish-speaking elitist extremists and showed them in a new light as community activists.

As their children approached school age, these community activists decided that their children should have the right to Irish-medium education and in 1971 they built and opened Bunscoil Phobal Feirste, the first Irish-medium primary school in the North, with just 9 children. Ignoring threats of illegality and imprisonment from the state, the parents kept the school afloat for 13 years with voluntary fundraising alone, creating their own resources and school books. In 1984 the state recognised and funded the school, and it became the first recognised Irish-medium school in the North.

Irish-medium education has not been without its own stereotypes, however, as more pre-schools and subsequently primary schools were founded in Republican areas due to popular demand. When the first Irish-medium secondary school was founded in Belfast in 1991, it was increasingly difficult to find qualified teachers

who had fluent Irish in the North of Ireland. Many of the teaching staff were volunteers who were former Republican prisoners, some of whom had learnt the language while in prison and who had read extensively on Irish history, inspired by the vision of Pádraig Pearse and his contemporaries to build an Irish-medium education system where children would excel academically with a social conscience.

The learning of Irish during internment or imprisonment was not a new phenomenon; during the Irish language revival of the late 19th century; many prisoners taught and learned the Irish language while imprisoned. In the 20th century in Crumlin Road Gaol in Belfast, in Armagh Jail and in Long Kesh in County Antrim, prisoners were learning to read, write and speak Irish and learning about Irish history and culture. During the 1980s, several Irish language enthusiasts, including hunger-striker Bobby Sands, came together to form an Irish-speaking wing of Long Kesh in which Irish was the predominant spoken language. Bobby Sands wrote many of his poems and diary entries in Irish and openly promoted and encouraged parents to send their children to Irish-medium education. His contemporaries were among the volunteers who taught within Meánscoil Feirste, the first Irish-medium secondary school in Northern Ireland, and in the years following his death in 1981 due to hunger strike, the numbers of children attending Bunscoil Phobail Feirste and other Irish-medium schools increased dramatically.

Irish-medium education today is a growing sector in both the North and South of Ireland. In the North alone, there are 45 pre-schools, 36 primary schools, and 5 post-primary schools providing Irish-medium education to over 5,000 children. Despite many of these schools being located in what are traditionally nationalist areas, most schools identify themselves as being either non-denominational or inter-denominational schools. The children who attend and attended Irish-medium schools still struggle to shake off religious and social prejudices about their religious backgrounds, and often find themselves labelled as Republicans and Catholics, which is often not the case. This new generation of Irish language speakers are largely secular, confident and outspoken on human rights and language issues. Many have gone on to work as young professionals, community activists, youth workers, politicians and workers in both the public and private sectors.

The modern day Irish speaker in Northern Ireland uses a wide variety of services through the Irish language despite there being no formal legislation from the state. The Irish language is recognised as a minority language in the European charter, but not as an official language in the North of Ireland. The people themselves have built a community-orientated Irish language infrastructure which avails itself of limited funding and voluntary contributions and is driven by and led by the community themselves.

Following the success of Irish-medium education, a vibrant youth work sector has emerged to support the growing numbers of young Irish-speakers who enjoy a packed calendar of social and sporting events throughout the year. Among the 13 Irish Language cultural centres in the North, five are located in Belfast alone. These centres provide Irish language classes along with a variety of cultural events.

Returning to the roots of the foundation of the Gaelic League in East Belfast in 1895, one Protestant woman was inspired to set up one of these Irish language centres – Turas, meaning journey – in November 2011 on the loyalist Newtownards road. The wife of the former Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) leader Brian Ervine, and the sister-in-law of David Ervine, also a former leader of the PUP and a member of the Ulster Volunteer Force (a loyalist paramilitary group), Linda Ervine was an unlikely candidate to become a promoter of the Irish language, but her research into the 1911 census in Ireland revealed that her ancestors, despite being Protestant, were fluent Irish speakers.

Liberated from her own cultural stereotypes, she began learning Irish in the longest established cultural centre in Belfast, the aforementioned Cumann Chluain Árd. Beginning with just one class a week, she quickly progressed to attending several nights, then intensive courses, then immersion courses in the Gaeltacht, and finally is now completing her Diploma in Irish with a view to obtaining a degree. Her determination has seen Turas flourish with more than 10 classes a week in the heartland of loyalism; Turas has more than 120 members, including ex-loyalist paramilitaries and British army officers, and indeed members of the security forces, including the Police Service of Northern Ireland.

This is at odds with the notion of the Irish language being (as Democratic Unionist politician Sammy Wilson dismissed it), a “Leprechaun language”. Linda Ervine herself has strongly criticised her own community’s stereotypes and prejudices towards the Irish language, saying:

I didn’t find a lot of politics in the Irish-language community; it’s such a diverse community. Of course different languages become politicised. People want to use language as a badge [...]. But for me the language itself is the innocent in all that.

There have been several occasions where Unionist politicians have mocked the Irish language. In 2014, another DUP politician, Gregory Campbell, imitating the Irish language phrase which is often used by nationalist assembly members in Stormont “Go raibh maith agat a Cheann Comhairle” (meaning “Thank you, Chairperson”) said “Curry my yoghurt, can coca coayler”. Upon being challenged about his comments and asked what he thought about a proposed Irish Language Act, he went on to say he would treat it as “no more than toilet paper.”²

² <http://www.thejournal.ie/gregory-campbell-curry-my-yoghurt-1803414-Nov2014/>.

Aside from these few individuals, attitudes have changed with regards to the Irish language, North and South. In the most recent survey conducted by the Economic and Social Research Institute on behalf of Foras na Gaeilge in 2013, it was shown that support for the Irish language has increased by 18% in the Republic of Ireland and 16% in the North of Ireland and opposition to the Irish language has decreased by 9% in both jurisdictions.

With regards to the Irish language being taught in the school system as a compulsory subject, there was a notable increase of 26% in the number of people in agreement in the North of Ireland and an increase of 7% in the Republic of Ireland since 2001. This statistic alone shows that while Irish remains a minority language, support for it as an important aspect of Irish cultural heritage in both North and South has increased.

Thankfully, while some of the old stereotypes regarding Irish speakers and the Irish language remain, the outlook is much more positive than in previous years. The negative stereotypes and prejudices held by some in the North are dissipating as people learn that the language is just that, a language – a means of communication which is fundamentally linked to our cultural heritage. In the South there remains a view held by a minority that those speaking the language and asking that the state provide services in the language are linguistic cranks – it is interesting to note however that many of this minority also feel that the state should provide services for the new generation of Irish speakers and provide extra resources to help them.

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Tore Kristiansen

The *hows* and *whys* of language-related stereotypes: A discussion based on Scandinavian examples

Abstract (English)

The article compares widely shared attitudes (stereotypes) which appear in analyses of language-related evaluative data that have been elicited by using two different methodological approaches: questionnaire-based elicitation and speaker evaluation experiments. Results obtained in three survey studies in Scandinavia are reported and discussed. The results indicate, on the one hand, that *overt* stereotypical judgements – as propagated in ‘learned’ public discourse – have an immense impact on ‘lay’ people who readily reproduce them in answers to direct questioning about language, as in an interview or a questionnaire. At the same time, all three studies indicate, on the other hand, that ‘lay’ people share opposite, *covert* stereotypical judgements, which reflect ‘lived experience’ and may appear in speaker evaluation experiments. In any attempt at intervention in the domain of language-related stereotypes and prejudice (in terms of education, policies and politics), it will be wise to take into account the possible divergence between *overt* and *covert* stereotypical judgements.

Abstract (Dansk)

Artiklen sammenligner vidt udbredte holdninger (stereotypier) som fremkommer ved brug af to forskellige metodologiske tilgange til elicitering af sproglaterede holdningsdata: spørgeskemabaseret elicitering og sprogbrugerevalueringseksperimenter. Der rapporteres og diskuteres resultater fra tre survey-undersøgelser i Skandinavien. På den ene side tyder resultaterne på at *overt* stereotype vurderinger – som udbredes i ‘lærd’ offentlig diskurs – har enorm indflydelse på ‘almindelige’ mennesker, som beredvilligt reproducerer dem når de fx i interview og spørgeskemaer udsættes for direkte udspørgning om sprog. På den anden side synes alle tre studier samtidig at vise at ‘almindelige’ mennesker er fælles om modsatte, *covert* stereotype vurderinger, som genspejler ‘levet erfaring’ og viser sig i sprogbrugerevalueringseksperimenter. Ethvert forsøg på at ville påvirke sproglaterede stereotypier og fordomme (i form af pædagogiske og politiske tiltag) gør klogt i at regne med at der kan være forskel på *overt* og *covert* stereotype vurderinger.

1. Introduction: stereotypes – consciousness – behaviour¹

1.1 Stereotypes

As suggested in the invitation to this EFNIL conference on *Stereotypes and linguistic prejudices in Europe*, a ‘stereotype’ can be defined as a generalising

¹ I am grateful to Frans Gregersen for helpful comments on an earlier version of this article.

opinion or belief which is widely shared by the members of a community.² Fundamentally, stereotyping is a categorisation process which helps us to ‘orient’ ourselves in the world by turning chaos into order, shades of grey into either black or white. According to social psychologists, an important aspect of categorisation is that the process involves comparison and evaluation (e.g. Hogg/ Abrams 1988). Thus, there is evaluative up- and downgrading involved in categorisation, just as there is both *positive* and *negative* evaluation involved in ‘prejudice’ (as noted in the EFNIL invitation).

1.2 Stereotypes and consciousness

A more tricky issue is how we should see stereotypes in relation to consciousness or awareness. Within sociolinguistics, the term *stereotype* is used technically (in the Labovian, variationist tradition) to refer to *variables* which are “the overt topics of social comment” (Labov 1972, 180; 1994, 78) – for instance, the presence or absence of ‘r after vowels’ in the pronunciation of English words like *car*, *her*, *door*, etc. But *stereotype* is also used in its everyday sense (e.g. in studies of language attitudes (Garrett 2010) and ‘folk linguistics’ (Niedzielski/Preston 2003)) to refer to the *comments* which may target particular variables (‘car with an r sounds awful’) as well as whole varieties (‘American English sounds awful’). Thus, the core aspect of both uses of *stereotype* refers to particular ways of talking about language that are common and shared, in the sense that they are readily available in public discourse.

However, ‘overt commenting’ was not included in our definition of stereotype (in Section 1.1). If we stay with a definition of stereotypes as generalising opinions and beliefs which are widely shared – but not necessarily represented in public discourse – there are substantial theoretical and methodological implications to be considered. In terms of theory, we need to consider how stereotypes may exist at another (lower?) level of consciousness/awareness than the level which is sustained by and materialises in ‘talk’. For us to be entitled to argue for the existence of another ‘hidden’ or ‘implicit’ set of shared values (corresponding to Labov’s notion of ‘covert’ values (Labov 1972, 249; 2001, 196, 222)), we will have to establish empirically that common language-related judgements may differ depending on whether they are readily available in public discourse (i.e. *overt*) or not (i.e. *covert*).

In terms of methodology, the hypothesised existence of language-related values that are shared but not necessarily present in public discourse seems to necessitate the use of other data-gathering methods than those which are purely language-based, such as interviews and questionnaires (which is not to deny, of

² See Stickel in this volume.

course, that analyses can extract ‘implicit’ attitudes from what people say and write). In the Scandinavian investigations reported below, we have made use of various ‘speaker evaluation experiments’ (SEE).

1.3 Stereotypes and behaviour

Another tricky issue we need to consider concerns the complex relationship between stereotypes and behaviour. Although it has been a well-established fact since LaPiere’s famous 1934 study that stereotypical attitudes do not necessarily predict people’s behaviour in concrete encounters, there is little doubt that stereotypes, beyond their fundamental cognitive function, have consequences ‘in practice’. In the domain of language, there are certainly consequences for the evaluative hierarchisation and use of language varieties in society, and also for how people treat each other in interpersonal and intergroup encounters. The complexity of the stereotype-behaviour relationship can only be augmented by the possible existence of a complex stereotype-consciousness relationship. It seems reasonable to suspect that *overt* and *covert* stereotypical judgements (may) play different roles in ‘the practice’ of everyday life of speakers in their societies. In any case, I want to argue that any attempt at influencing judgments and behaviours in the societal domain of language – in terms of politics, policies, education – should take into account the potential existence of two modes of stereotypical judgement – *overt* and *covert* – with potentially different roles and consequences in societal life.

1.4 Structure of the article

The suggestion that *overt* and *covert* language-related shared values (stereotypes) may diverge, with different practical consequences, is derived from empirical evidence established in two survey studies of attitudes – towards varieties of Danish, and towards English influence in the Nordic countries – carried out within the frameworks of the LANCHART and MIN projects. These studies operationalised the distinction between *overt* and *covert* stereotypes in terms of consciously and subconsciously offered judgements – i.e. judgements offered by subjects being aware or non-aware of judging (an aspect of) language. In what follows, I summarize the theoretical/methodological approaches and findings of the LANCHART and MIN studies as an introduction to the presentation of survey results from longitudinal studies of the language-ideological situation in the Øresund region, carried out within the framework of a third project: the DASVA project.

2 The evaluative hierarchisation of Danish varieties (the LANCHART studies³)

2.1 The accents of contemporary Standard Danish

Differences of a ‘dialectal’ nature at linguistic levels other than phonetics are practically non-existing among present-day Danish adolescents (Pedersen 2003); in accordance with quite common sociolinguistic terminology, we may say that all speak *accents* of Standard Danish.

The phonetic variation in question includes segments (both vowels and consonants) and prosody. The segmental variation spreads to all corners of the country from Copenhagen; the linguistic standardisation (homogenisation) of Denmark is a ‘pure Copenhagenisation’ (Maegaard et al. 2013). Some of this variation used to be linked to social class stereotypes and therefore referred to as ‘high vs. low Copenhagen’ in much Danish sociolinguistic literature (Brink/Lund 1975), but today the social class associations are clearly less predominant. In consequence, it has become common to say in more recent literature that adolescent segmental variation today consists of ‘conservative’ variants (some of which used to be ‘high’) and ‘modern’ variants (some of which used to be ‘low’). To the extent that Standard Danish is heard as ‘local’, this will typically be due to prosodic features that differ from Copenhagen prosody (Kristiansen/Pharao/Maegaard 2013). Speech with the characteristics mentioned above will be called CONSERVATIVE, MODERN and LOCAL respectively in what follows.

2.2 Subconsciously offered judgements of Danish accents (SEE results)

The described phonetic variation can be assumed to be part of social-grouping and identity-formation processes among adolescents in any community in contemporary Denmark. In a nation-wide study, the LANCHART centre investigated how a representative sample of some 600 9th graders (age 15-16) evaluated audio-recorded adolescent speakers of CONSERVATIVE, MODERN and LOCAL in a speaker evaluation experiment (SEE) which was designed and administered in a way that prevented listener-judges from becoming aware of its purpose in respect of attitudes to language variation.

³ The LANCHART centre (<http://lanchart.hum.ku.dk/>) was initiated and financed by the Danish National Research Foundation (grant DNR63) for the ten year period 2005-2015 and directed by Professor Frans Gregersen, University of Copenhagen. The centre continues as part of UCPH’s Department of Nordic Research. LANCHART investigates ‘LANguage CHAnge in Real Time’ and has re-interviewed as many as possible of the informants who participated in sociolinguistic studies in Denmark in the 1970-1980s. Many kinds of language-ideological data have also been collected.

The speakers (four per accent) were evaluated on eight seven-point scales representing ‘personality traits’. Results showed the MODERN accent to be strongly upgraded, compared to the other two accents, on *dynamic* values (‘fascinating’, ‘interesting’, ‘cool’, ‘nice’), while CONSERVATIVE did as well or better on *superiority* values (‘intelligent’, ‘conscientious’, ‘goal-directed’, ‘trustworthy’). LOCAL was the sure loser on all values. In other words, in all research sites outside of Copenhagen (the SEEs carried out in Copenhagen proper included only CONSERVATIVE and MODERN), adolescents strongly downgraded what in most cases would represent their ‘own’ LOCAL way of speaking, i.e. Standard with a touch of local prosody.

While the LOCAL speakers used in the SEEs did of course differ between research sites, the CONSERVATIVE and MODERN speakers were the same (adolescents from Copenhagen). An important finding with regard to the issue of shared values (stereotypes) was that the non-Copenhagen listener-judges ascribed the same amount of ‘personality value’ to the CONSERVATIVE and MODERN voices as their Copenhagen peers. The evaluative patterns obtained in our SEEs look like copies of each other across Denmark. Thus, the linguistic variation which is relevant to social identifications among Danish adolescents is indeed subject to subconscious stereotyping. *The covert values are indeed shared.* The practical consequences are plain to see in the domain of language usage: in recent decades, ‘local’ features have largely disappeared from the speech of young non-Copenhageners (more and more even in terms of prosody); Standard (i.e. Copenhagen) speech is taking over, predominantly in its MODERN version.

2.3 Consciously offered judgements of Danish ‘dialect names’ (LRT results)

In contrast, when the same adolescents (after having assessed the SEE voices in a *non-awareness* condition) were given a list of Danish varieties, designated by their commonly known ‘names’, and were asked to rank them according to their own preference in terms of ‘liking’, they (now in the *awareness* condition of a so-called ‘label ranking task’, LRT) turned the evaluative hierarchisation upside down: their own *local dialect name* was ranked in top position, followed by *rigsdansk* (corresponding to Standard Danish in common parlance, and in our terminology to CONSERVATIVE), and with *københavnsk* (corresponding to Copenhagen ‘working class’ dialect in common parlance, MODERN in our terminology) further down in the ranking – with the exception of the Copenhagen adolescents who, following the principle of favouring the local dialect name, gave top position to *københavnsk*. (A detailed presentation of the LANCHART attitudes studies can be found in Kristiansen 2009.)

Thus, the evaluative principle behind the results obtained in our LRTs appears to be the same across Denmark. The linguistic variation which is relevant to social

identifications among Danish adolescents is indeed subject also to conscious stereotyping. *The overt values are indeed shared as well.* However, as LOCAL is disappearing while MODERN spreads, it is plain to see that the consciously professed attitudes have no practical consequences in the domain of language usage in Denmark. (We may, however, suspect that they do have practical consequences in other domains of Danish societal life.)

2.4 Why the difference between SEE and LRT results?

In sum, Danish adolescents produce opposite evaluative hierarchisations depending on whether they are aware or non-aware of offering language attitudes. Notwithstanding the clarity of this picture, there is no obviously correct answer to *why* this is so; but we do have suggestions along the following lines:

In respect of the adolescents' *overt* evaluative hierarchisation – shared nationwide – it seems to reproduce the way in which the 'norm and variation' issue has been treated in 'official' language ideology since the 1960s. In various instantiations of 'elite discourse', *rigsdansk* (CONSERVATIVE) and *dialekterne* ('the dialects') are interchangeably extolled depending on whether the evaluative perspective is 'communicative effectiveness' or 'social identity', while *københavnsk* (MODERN) retains its traditional stigma. This is the case not least in the domain of primary schooling, where teachers work under directives and guidelines for mother tongue education that explicitly construe the (vital and spreading) MODERN accent as a 'generational problem' to be dealt with by teachers, while 'tolerance, respect and love' is required for the (dying or dead) LOCAL forms of language, 'the dialects' (Kristiansen 1990).

As to the adolescents' *covert* evaluative hierarchisation – again shared nationwide – it is hard to see how it can result from anything other than shared experience of how the 'norm and variation' issue is treated in the modern media, where 'local' colouring of speech hardly exists (except to provoke ridicule), while MODERN has become increasingly frequent on broadcast radio and TV since the 1960-70s, arguably as the language of 'dynamic' informality. (Both production and perception aspects of this development are studied in Thøgersen and Phrao 2013; Thøgersen 2016. Kristiansen 2014 discusses the media's role in the development of the very different language-ideological situations in Denmark and Norway.)

3. The ‘purism profiles’ of Scandinavian speech communities (the MIN studies⁴)

3.1 The ‘purism ranking’ of Nordic speech communities in public discourse

Resulting from long-standing historical relationships of domination and subordination in the Nordic area – with Denmark dominating Iceland, the Faroes and Norway in the west, and Sweden dominating Finland in the east – the Nordic speech communities have developed ‘official’ language politics which show considerable differentiation in terms of ‘external purism’: measures taken to limit and eradicate linguistic influence from the outside. The perception of ‘purism’ differences involved is largely shared by linguists engaged in language politics, who easily agree on ranking the Nordic communities from more to less purist as follows: ICELANDIC > FAROESE > NORWEGIAN > FINNISH > FINLAND-SWEDISH > SWEDEN-SWEDISH > DANISH (see Lund 1986, 35; Vikør 1995, 181).

This agreement about ‘Nordic purism’ among ‘experts’ can be taken to reflect a shared acquaintance with the realities of language politics. But how do we explain that ‘lay people’ in all of the communities – in responses to a questionnaire-type approach to the ‘Nordic purism’ issue as part of qualitative interviews – by and large (re)produce the ‘expert’ ranking (see Fig. 2 in Kristiansen/Sandøy 2010, 4)? The ‘lay’ ranking can hardly result from generally existing first-hand acquaintance with language politics across the whole Nordic area from Iceland to Finland. It must be understood as resulting from generally existing acquaintance with ‘expert’ discourse about purism in Nordic language politics, which in itself is surprising. However, the shared nature of this acquaintance, together with the ability and readiness to reproduce it, once again (as in the case of the ‘official’ evaluation of Danish varieties, see 2.4) testifies to the significant impact of ‘expert’ discourse on what people consciously have ‘to say’ about language.

3.2 ‘Purism profiles’ emerging from consciously offered data (Interview)

Even more intriguingly, when we hired professional polling organisations to conduct telephone interviews with representative population samples (total N about 6000) and ask some questions (constructed to be the ‘same’ as far as this is possible across different languages and communities) about people’s own opin-

⁴ The MIN project (Modern Import words in the languages in the Nordic countries; <http://folk.uib.no/hnohs/MIN/>) was initiated by the then existing Nordic Language Council (*Nordisk Språkråd*), was led by Professor Helge Sandøy, University of Bergen, and was financially supported by various sources in the period 2000–2010. For detailed presentations of the MIN attitudes studies, see Kristiansen/Vikør (2005), Kristiansen (2005); Kristiansen (2010).

ions about the influence of English in their respective languages and communities, comparative analyses of the answers again reproduced the same ‘purism’ ranking.

Unless this finding is a strange coincidence, it indicates that the relative level of ‘purism’ which is ascribed to each of the Nordic communities in comparative meta-discourse (among experts and lay people alike) exists in each community in a way which makes its population produce exactly that level when offering their own opinions about the English influence. If that indeed is the case, it certainly testifies to an amazing level of effectiveness of ‘official’ language-ideological discourse, which is able to instil a particular level of language-ideological purism in people and prompt them to reproduce that level ‘correctly’ in talk about language (as the population average in comparison with the other population averages). In the face of such effectiveness in establishing shared (stereotypical) views in a population, there is no reason for institutions with language-related responsibilities (in terms of politics, policies, education) to be pessimistic about their potential for ‘governing’ the language-ideological sphere of society – the *overt* part of it, that is.

3.3 ‘Purism profiles’ emerging from subconsciously offered data (SEE)

When we turn to the *covert* part, as we also did in the MIN project, things look different. In SEEs with roughly 600 participants in each community (with a broad range in terms of background factors, although not strictly representative as in the telephone survey), we used the ‘matched guise technique’: the same speaker appeared twice in the audio-recorded stimulus material, reading the same news text on an IT-related theme (with presumably ‘naturally occurring’ English colouring), once in a ‘pure’ national guise (voice) and once in a slightly English-coloured guise. The matched guises were ‘concealed’ in-between three filler voices who also read the same text with some minor variation included. The cover-story presented to the respondents said that the five speakers (four in reality) were applicants for a position as news reader at a radio station, and that they had been given ten minutes to edit the text and prepare it for presentation to the radio audience. The task of the respondents was to assess the applicants on eight scales (*ambitious, intelligent, independent, efficient, pleasant, trustworthy, interesting, relaxed*) before ranking them according to their suitability for the job.

The text was translated into all the languages involved, and we made efforts to make the ‘English-colouring’ the ‘same’ in all languages – which is impossible, of course. There are clear differences among the languages and communities in question with regard to how ‘natural’ ‘English-colouring’ sounds, especially in news being read on the radio. This is no doubt the reason why we only succeeded in avoiding arousing awareness among the SEE participants of the purpose of

the experiment (i.e. attitudes to English influence) in the ‘central’ Scandinavian-language communities, i.e. the Norwegian, Danish, Swedish, and Finland-Swedish communities, but were less successful in the Icelandic, Faeroes and Finnish communities. Comparison of *overt* and *covert* shared attitudes towards English influence is therefore limited to the ‘central’ Scandinavian-language communities. In these communities, the SEE results showed the opposite picture of the one which emerged from consciously offered answers: Danes, followed by Swedes, turned out to be far more negative to the English-coloured guise than to the ‘pure’ national guise, whereas Norwegians and Finland-Swedes showed no difference, or even a tendency to react more positively to the English-coloured guise than to the ‘pure’ national guise.

In order to explain the existence of this difference in *covert* (subconscious) tolerance of English influence, we may again (as in the case of Danish varieties, see 2.4) consider the impact of the media on *covert* language ideology in a society. For Norwegians, comprehensive dialectal variation is the normal everyday media experience. For most Finland-Swedes, living with two languages (Swedish and Finnish) is part of their everyday life, including media usage. Even if these everyday experiences have little to do with English, it seems likely that the habituation to variation and difference as the normal media situation makes people more accepting and tolerant of variation and ‘accented’ speech in general, including English-colouring. If that is a correct interpretation, our findings sustain the view that *covert* language ideology can be influenced through policies for language use in the media.

With regard to the issue of practical consequences in terms of language use, we may notice that another MIN sub-project found that Norwegian newspapers (editorial texts) in 2000 had the highest frequency of English words compared with newspapers in any of the other six communities, and also that this frequency had increased most in Norwegian newspapers since 1975. Again, then, we see that *covert* attitudes correspond to changes in use in a way that *overt* attitudes do not.

4. Stereotypes across Øresund (the DASVA studies⁵)

4.1 Purpose and design of the DASVA attitudinal studies

Øresund is the belt which separates Eastern Denmark from Sweden. The first (and so far only) bridge across the belt was opened in the summer of 2000. In accordance with the European Union’s ‘cross-border cooperation’ policy, which aims to “exploit the untapped growth potential in border areas” (http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/policy/cooperation/european-territorial/cross-border/#9), the joint Danish/Swedish political aim was, and is, for the bridge to contribute to developing the Øresund-region into an economical stronghold in Northern Europe.

⁵ For a general presentation of the DASVA project, see Gregersen (2003).

In the longitudinal project called DASVA (Danish/Swedish Accommodation), the idea is to follow the language situation in the Øresund region as it develops after the opening of the bridge in terms of (i) linguistic *production*, i.e. how the neighbouring languages, Danish and Swedish, are used in various encounters between Danes and Swedes, (ii) mutual linguistic *intelligibility*, i.e. how well Danes and Swedes understand each other's languages, and (iii) *attitudes*. Only the latter aspect, attitudes, will be illuminated in what follows. Attitudinal data has been collected twice, first in 2001, and again in 2014.

With the aim of constructing as representative a sample as practically possible, data has been collected in a variety of social contexts where many people come together (workplaces, choir sessions, rotary meetings, educational settings). Only people who reported having either Danish or Swedish as a first language are included in the analyses below. There were 569 of these in 2001, and 683 in 2014. (In both years, 6.6 per cent of the total sample either reported having 'another' first language or did not give any information about themselves in this respect.)

Exactly the same methods were used for the 2001 and 2014 data collections. Informants first participated in a SEE (Speaker Evaluation Experiment) where they reacted to three degrees of linguistic accommodation by speakers of both their own language and the neighbour's language. Then, in a short questionnaire, they expressed their degree of agreement with a number of statements concerning the cross-border situation in the Øresund region.

As it would hardly be possible to design and administer a SEE with Danish and Swedish voices, whether accommodating or not, in a way that prevents subjects from becoming aware of the language-attitudes purpose of the experiment, the DASVA SEE differed from the SEEs used in the LANCHART and MIN studies by being designed without the aim of eliciting subconsciously offered attitudes; participants in the experiments were aware of giving away attitudes towards language. Thus, the rationale behind the use of two data elicitation methods is not to tap into a possible difference between *overt* and *covert* values in terms of consciously and subconsciously offered judgements, but to allow for registration of a possible difference in how lived experience affects language-related evaluations which are offered, on the one hand, as answers to questions about language beauty presented 'abstractly' in terms of language names (questionnaire), and on the other hand, as answers to questions about the functionality and beauty of 'concrete' speech (SEE). Perhaps lived experience 'after the bridge' promotes the development of new values which, without (yet?) having entered public discourse, may be trackable in reactions to 'concrete' speech? We may find that the *overt* values of public discourse are just not reproduced in the SEE data (although consciously offered); in which case we will say that the SEE judgements reflect *covert* values.

4.2 The DASVA Questionnaire study

As we think that the language-ideological situation should be seen as one of several dimensions of the general ‘attitudes-across-Øresund’ situation, the informants were presented with 9 evaluative assertions, of which 3 related to *integration* in the Øresund region, 3 related to the *neighbour* (Swedes in the case of Danes, and Danes in the case of Swedes), and 3 related to *language*. The informants signalled their degree of agreement/disagreement by ticking off on five-point scales from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’.

4.2.1 Attitudes towards *integration*

The assertions⁶ exploring attitudes towards cross-border *integration* were: (1) Danes and Swedes in the Øresund region should work closer together. (2) It is good that the bridge brings Danes and Swedes closer together. (3) It is good that we have got the bridge. The results showed Swedes to be the more positive on the *integration* dimension, both in 2001 and 2014 ($p < .001$ on all three items). This pattern no doubt reflects the asymmetric job market situation in the Øresund region, which leads Swedes to see job opportunities (on the Danish side), whereas Danes see threats to their jobs (from an incoming Swedish workforce).

The three *integration* items were intended to represent a gradual change of perspective – from a focus on Swedish-Danish cooperation ‘abstractly’ (item 1), through a focus on the cooperation-promoting role of the bridge (item 2), to a focus on the ‘concrete’ bridge (item 3). The 2001 results showed that both Swedes and Danes were more enthusiastic about cooperation in the abstract than about the ‘concrete’ bridge (with scores on the cooperation/bridge-combining item 2 lying in between). Interestingly, the 2014 results produced the reverse ordering. Now, on both sides of the belt, people were more enthusiastic about the ‘concrete’ bridge (item 3) and its role in promoting cooperation (item 2) than about cooperation ‘abstractly’ (item 1). This reversal resulted from divergent developments in the scores on the three *integration* items: compared with 2001, we found more positive scores in 2014 (i.e. more agreement with the positively formulated assertions) on items 3 and 2 in both populations (all 4 p 's $< .001$) whereas item 1 yielded less positive scores in 2014 in the Danish population ($p < .01$) and no change in the Swedish population.

Although these reactions to the *integration* assertions may not qualify as stereotypical opinions about the *neighbour* and their *language* (the theme of the EFNIL conference), I include them here because they clearly illustrate my main

⁶ The assertions are shown as they appeared in the Danish version of the questionnaire; the Swedish version was the same with the appropriate rearrangement of Danes/Danish and Swedes/Swedish. In the questionnaire, the assertions appeared in another ordering, not grouped into the three dimensions as in this presentation.

point about the permanent potential of discord between opinions which result from exposure to public discourse and opinions which result from lived experience. Prior to and during the construction of the bridge, opposing views and various warnings – primarily concerned with possible negative consequences for the marine environment – were strongly present in public discourse on both sides of the belt, and that may well explain the relative caution with which people praised the benefits of the bridge in 2001. By 2014, the lack of manifest negative consequences had ousted such opposition completely from public discourse, and most people had time and again experienced ‘how easy and beautiful’ it is to take the bridge across the belt.

In addition, the development of a less positive view of Dano-Swedish cooperation among Danes (item 1) may arguably result from lived experience of the increasing number of Swedes who do in fact commute across the bridge to work on the Danish side – an experience which Danes may well perceive as a growing threat to their jobs. In any case – and importantly for the argument about the disharmony between stereotypes resulting from public discourse and stereotypes resulting from lived experience – if we take it that the increased negativity towards cooperation with Swedes is experience-based, it is contradicted by an increased positivity towards Swedes as *neighbours* (as we shall see in Section 4.2.2), a development which no doubt is rooted in public discourse rather than lived experience.

4.2.2 Attitudes towards the *neighbour*

The characterising adjectives used in the questionnaire assertions which focused on attitudes towards the *neighbour* were the same (here in Danish spelling): (4) Swedes are *usympatiske*; (5) Swedes are *sympatiske*; (6) Swedes are *dygtige*. The meaning of *sympatisk* is ‘pleasant, nice, likeable’, whereas *usympatisk* means the opposite. By asking in this way for assessments of pleasantness/unpleasantness, we wanted to see if people are more prone to express disagreement with a negative characterisation of the *neighbour* than to express agreement with a positive characterisation. To be *dygtig* is to be ‘clever, able, capable’.

Regarding ‘pleasantness’ (items 4 and 5), it turned out that both Danes and Swedes expressed more disagreement with the negative characterisation (*usympatisk*) than agreement with the positive characterisation (*sympatisk*), both in 2001 and 2014. However, an intriguing change occurred in the evaluation pattern. In 2001, Swedes were more positive than Danes in seeing their *neighbour* as ‘pleasant’, whether expressed as disagreement with the negative characterisation (*usympatisk*) or agreement with the positive characterisation (*sympatisk*) ($p < .001$ on both items). This difference did not reappear in 2014, due to an opposite development in the two populations: whereas Swedes were ranked higher on ‘pleasantness’ by Danes, Swedes now saw Danes as less pleasant than in 2001.

This change appeared on both ‘pleasantness’ items, but, interestingly enough, in an asymmetrical way in terms of statistical significance: whereas Danes found it easier to express agreement with the view of Swedes as *sympatiske* ($p < .05$), Swedes were less prone to express disagreement with the view of Danes as *usympatiske* ($p < .01$). Arguably, this relative re-evaluation from 2001 to 2014 is likely to reflect a more general trend in this period with regard to how the neighbours see each other as ‘friendly and open’ (the Swedes) versus ‘hostile and closed’ (the Danes) as a consequence of how the two countries’ strongly diverging politics with regard to fugitives and migrating people in general have developed in public discourse.

With regard to how the neighbours see each other in terms of ‘cleverness’ (item 6), there was no difference in 2001, whereas Swedes had become more positive than Danes in 2014 ($p < .001$). This greater positivity among Swedes may reflect more positive experiences in actual cooperation, but it should be noticed that the development *within* the Swedish group (from the 2001 to the 2014 sample) is not statistically significant.

4.2.3 Attitudes towards *language*

The 3 statements relating to *language* were: (7) Danish is a beautiful language; (8) Swedish is a beautiful language; (9) Danish children should learn more Swedish in school. The term used for ‘beautiful’ language was *paent* in Danish, *snyggt* in Swedish.

Figure 1 presents a comparison of first the 2001 results and then the 2014 results across the two national groups. Grey shading highlights the more positive group. We see that Swedes by far surpass Danes in finding their own language beautiful (item 7), whereas Danes by far surpass Swedes in finding the neighbour’s language beautiful (item 8) – both in 2001 and 2014.

As to the issue of whether their own children should learn more of the neighbour’s language in school (item 9), we notice that Swedes expressed more readiness than Danes in that regard in 2001, but that this difference had disappeared in 2014.

The presentation of the same results in Figure 2 focuses on the difference across years (2001 and 2014) within each of the national groups, and thus indicates whether the development is positive or negative (to the extent that we take a stronger agreement with the assertions in 2014 than in 2001 to represent a positive development). In the Swedish population, there is no change in how Swedish and Danish are seen (items 7 and 8), and less support for the view that Swedish children should learn more Danish in school (item 9). In contrast, Danes have become stronger in their conviction that Swedish is a beautiful language (item 8), and that Danish children should learn more Swedish in school (item 9). At the same time, they have become less convinced that Danish is a beautiful language (item 7).

	Swedes	Danes	sign.
2001	Nmax=216	Nmax=353	
(7) [own] is a beautiful language	1,82	2,62	***
(8) [neighbour's] is a beautiful language	2,83	2,43	***
(9) learn more of neighbour's lang. in school	2,39	2,99	***
2014	Nmax=118	Nmax=565	
(7) [own] is a beautiful language	2,03	2,93	***
(8) [neighbour's] is a beautiful language	2,85	2,06	***
(9) learn more of neighbour's lang. in school	2,83	2,76	ns

*** = $p < .001$, ns = non-significant (test: Mann-Whitney)

Fig. 1: Comparison *across* Swedes and Danes *within* years on the language items
(The lower the mean score (on 5-point scales), the stronger the agreement with the assertions. Grey shading highlights the more positive group)

	2001	2014	sign.
Swedes	Nmax=216	Nmax=118	
(7) Swedish is a beautiful language	1,82	2,03	ns
(8) Danish is a beautiful language	2,83	2,85	ns
(9) Sw children should learn Da in school	2,39	2,83	**
Danes	Nmax=353	Nmax=565	
(7) Danish is a beautiful language	2,62	2,93	***
(8) Swedish is a beautiful language	2,43	2,06	***
(9) Da children should learn Sw in school	2,99	2,76	**

*** = $p < .001$, ** = $p < .01$, ns = non-significant (test: Mann-Whitney)

Fig. 2: Comparison *within* Swedes and Danes *across* years on the language items
(The lower the mean score (on 5-point scales), the stronger the agreement with the assertions. Grey shading highlights the more positive year)

Although the increased positivity among Danes towards learning Swedish corresponds to their stronger upgrading of Swedish as a beautiful language, there is probably no interesting connection to be noted here. Reality actually shows the opposite development in the level of interest in learning more of the neighbour's language. A variety of Danish language courses and classes have developed on the Swedish side, whereas nothing similar has happened on the Danish side.

By focusing on the scores on items 7 and 8 within Swedes and Danes, we notice that Swedes, not surprisingly, think better of their own Swedish language than of the neighbour's Danish language, both in 2001 (1,82 vs. 2,83) and in 2014 (2,03 vs. 2,85) – but we also notice, more intriguingly, that the Danes follow the Swedes in this upgrading of the Swedish language relative to their own Danish language, both in 2001 (2,43 vs. 2,62) and in 2014 (2,06 vs. 2,93) – and that Danish 'outgroup favouritism' is increasing in the *language* dimension of 'Øresund attitudes'.

How are we to understand the very different evaluations of their own language and their neighbour's language that we have found on the two sides of Øresund? It is fairly straightforward to explain the Swedes' evaluative pattern. Besides being triggered by 'normal ingroup favouritism', the relatively strong downgrading of Danish in terms of 'beauty' is beyond doubt induced from strong public discourse stereotypes which declare, in all the Scandinavian countries, that 'Danish sounds like a throat disease', 'Danes talk with a warm potato in their mouth', and so on.

But how can we explain the fact that Danes embrace this 'outsider view' of Danish and rate their own language low on 'beauty'? I think the explanation has to be sought for in the fact that the 'outsider view' has in fact been a regular ingredient of Danish elite public discourse about the Danish language and the Danes as speakers for a long time, probably accelerating from the 1970s onwards. Danes are rebuked for mumbling and talking indistinctly, and even the language itself is sometimes characterised as indistinct. This kind of discourse explicitly draws on comparisons with Norwegian and Swedish. It hinges on the fact that Danish looks very much like Norwegian and Swedish in how the words are written, but sounds very different when the words are pronounced – a situation which results from many sound changes in Danish which did not happen in Norwegian and Swedish. The strong influence of this discourse in education is demonstrated in our data by the fact that the more educated Danes are, the more strongly they downgrade Danish and upgrade Swedish on the 'beautiful' item. The strongest version of this evaluative pattern is actually found among students of Danish at Copenhagen University.

If it indeed is the case that the bridge and the integration processes in the region do have an impact on the Danes' *overt* stereotypes about the aesthetic value of their own language in comparison with Swedish, we must conclude that it is for the worse, not for the better. However, even if it may well be true that public discourse stereotyping of Danish as an indistinct language and Danes as slovenly speakers has intensified in recent years in Scandinavia, Denmark included, a specific impact of the Øresund bridge in that connection seems questionable. It seems more likely that the bridge connection has an impact on the linguistic situation in terms of accommodation – and on how linguistic accommodation is evaluated.

4.3 The DASVA Speaker Evaluation Experiments

Since Danish and Swedish are more or less mutually intelligible, most communication between Danes and Swedes will include some degree of accommodation – depending on factors such as experience and attitudes. In a Speaker Evaluation Experiment (SEE), we investigated how people on both sides of the Belt evaluated 3 degrees of accommodation, both in their own language and in the neighbour's language. Figure 3 gives a schematic positioning of the six audio-recorded voices in a Danish-Swedish continuum.




Fig. 3: Schematic positioning of the 6 voices in a Danish-Swedish continuum

The voices talked for about 25 seconds each. Subjects listened to the voices in the order from minimal to maximal accommodation (as indicated by the numbers 1, 2, and 3 in Figure 3). Danish subjects listened to the Danish voices before the Swedish voices; Swedish subjects listened to the Swedish voices before the Danish voices.⁷ The evaluation was made on 5-point scales as answers to questions about (1) FUNCTIONALITY, and (2) AESTHETICS:

- (1) What do you think of this way of talking to a [Swede/Dane]: good /_/_/_/_/_/ bad
 (2) How do you think it sounds: nice /_/_/_/_/_/ ugly

Figures 4-5 show the results for Danes, Figures 6-7 show the results for Swedes. The voices are inserted at their mean scores on the 5-point scales (given in the Figures). A lower mean is a more positive assessment. Significant differences are marked with asterixes – *** = $p < .001$ ** = $p < .01$ * = $p < .05$ – both *witnin* years and *between* years (test: Mann-Whitney).

⁷ Four of the stimulus clips (D1, D2, S2, S3) were taken from naturally occurring accommodation on the radio program *Øresund Direkt* (a weekly one-hour program, established in 1999 as a cross-border cooperation between radio channels on both sides of Øresund; discontinued in 2003 because of few listeners.) As we were not able to find voices in the radio material that accommodated in a way we would classify as D3 and S1, these had to be produced for the experiment by a Dane and a Swede who master maximal and minimal accommodation 'naturally'. (We were fortunate not to have to ask someone produce the 'mixed' version, which might have been more difficult to do 'naturally'.)

4.3.1 Danish accommodation evaluated by Danes

If we begin by looking at the Danes and how they react to the three degrees of accommodation in their own Danish language (Figure 4), we see – for both 2001 and 2014 – that maximal accommodation (D3) is judged to FUNCTION better than mixed (D2), which in turn is judged to FUNCTION better than minimal accommodation (D1). The evaluations of D3 and D1 on AESTHETICS by and large seems to reproduce the evaluations on FUNCTIONALITY, but the very different evaluation of D2 shows that the distinction between the two dimensions has been clear enough to the participants. As mixing of languages often has a bad reputation of being ‘ugly’ – a negative stereotype, indeed – it is not surprising that D2 is judged to sound ‘ugly’. What could be seen as surprising, though, is that D1 (minimal accommodation, i.e. speech close to ‘pure’ Danish) is judged to be almost or just as ‘ugly’-sounding as mixing (the difference is not significant in 2014). But based on what we learned in the questionnaire study about the Danes’ opinion about their own language, we are not surprised.




Fig. 4: **Danish** accommodation (D1min–D2mix–D3max) evaluated by **Danes** in terms of FUNCTIONALITY and AESTHETICS in 2001 and 2014

Looking at the arrows which connect D3, D2 and D1 across years in Figure 4, we mainly see a picture of *stability*. All arrows point towards the left, indicating a general trend towards more positive evaluations in 2014 than in 2001, but the differences are small and statistically mostly non-significant (significant in the case of D3 on FUNCTIONALITY and D2 on AESTHETICS).

4.3.2 Swedish accommodation evaluated by Danes

In Figure 5, we see that when Danes evaluated the Swedish voices, they again rated maximal accommodation (S3) highest, in terms of FUNCTIONALITY and AESTHETICS alike, but in contrast to their evaluation of the Danish voices, they relegated mixing (S2) to a secure bottom position on both evaluative dimensions. As for developments from 2001 to 2014, we see that the arrows in Figure 5, as in Figure 4, point to the left and indicate a tendency to general upgrading of the voices. Yet, *stability* is again a dominant feature of the picture except in so far as S1 is concerned: on both dimensions, minimal accommodation fared much better in 2014 than in 2001. It seems reasonable to speculate that this development among Danes is a consequence of more contact with Swedes and Swedish. We may also notice that the upgrading of S1 (i.e. speech close to ‘pure’ Swedish) on AESTHETICS can be seen as the SEE parallel to the Danes’ upgrading of Swedish as a ‘beautiful’ language in the questionnaire study (see Figure 2, item 8 under Danes).




Fig. 5: Swedish accommodation (S1min–S2mix–S3max) evaluated by Danes in terms of FUNCTIONALITY and AESTHETICS in 2001 and 2014

4.3.3 Swedish accommodation evaluated by Swedes

When we move on to looking at how the Swedes evaluated the voices (Figures 6 and 7), we see that in 2001 they produced the same ordering of the Swedish voices as the Danes on both FUNCTIONALITY and AESTHETICS: S3 > S1 > S2 (Figure 6), and a similar ordering to the Danes of the Danish voices: D3 > D2 > D1 (Figure 7), with an even stronger relative downgrading of D1 (i.e. the voice close to ‘pure’ Danish).




Fig. 6: **Swedish** accommodation (S1min–S2mix–S3max) evaluated by **Swedes** in terms of FUNCTIONALITY and AESTHETICS in 2001 and 2014




Fig. 7: **Danish** accommodation (D1min–D2mix–D3max) evaluated by **Swedes** in terms of FUNCTIONALITY and AESTHETICS in 2001 and 2014

However, while the 2001-2014 comparison of the Danes' assessments gave a general impression of *stability*, the same impression is repeated only for maximal accommodation (S3 and D3) in the Swedes' reactions. In contrast, the arrows connecting minimal accommodation (S1) and mixing (S2) across the years in Figure 6 exhibit a clear cross-over pattern on both FUNCTIONALITY and AESTHETICS. The ordering in terms of positive assessment has changed radically from a statistically secure S1 > S2 order to a statistically secure S2 > S1 order. If this is a 'bridge effect', Swedes seem to have learned from increased contact with Danes that mixing (S2) functions much better than minimal accommodation (S1), and they even upgrade S2 to more 'nice' sounding than S1.

Figure 7 shows another, complete opposite, re-evaluation among the Swedes of minimal Danish accommodation (D1) in comparison with mixing (D2). Again, if this is a ‘bridge effect’, Swedes seem to have learned from increased contact that communication FUNCTIONS just as well when Danes speak more or less ‘pure’ Danish (D1) as when they ‘mix’ (D2). Also interestingly, while they downgrade D2 on AESTHETICS in 2014, the Swedes upgrade minimal accommodation (D1, or maybe just ‘pure’ Danish) to be just as ‘nice’ sounding as maximal accommodation (D3, or maybe just ‘pure Swedish’). In the questionnaire data we saw no trace of a parallel upgrading among Swedes of Danish as a ‘beautiful’ language (see Figure 2, item 8 under Swedes).

Indeed, if we consider how the stereotypical view of Danish as an ‘ugly’ language fares in our data, the results from the questionnaire study and the SEE study present a very different picture for Danes and Swedes.

In the questionnaire data, both Swedes and Danes reproduced the public discourse’s stereotypical view of Danish as a less beautiful language than Swedish. The Swedes strongly preferred Swedish to Danish; so did the Danes, i.e. preferred Swedish to Danish. We found this pattern to be stable with the Swedes, while among the Danes the pattern strengthened between 2001 and 2014 (see Figure 2).

If we allow the SEE assessments of the minimal accommodating voices, D1 and S1, to count as assessments of Danish and Swedish (and thus be comparable with the assessments of the language ‘names’ Danish and Swedish in the Questionnaire study), we must say that the Danes also reproduced the stereotypes of public discourse in the SEE. D1 was judged more negatively than S1 in 2001 (see year 2001 under AESTHETICS in Figures 4 and 5), and this difference was not only reproduced but strengthened in 2014 by a more positive assessment of S1 (see year 2014 under AESTHETICS in Figures 4 and 5).

In addition, the Swedes reproduced the stereotypical view of Danish as more ‘ugly’ sounding than Swedish in 2001 (see year 2001 under AESTHETICS in Figures 6 and 7), but in contrast to the Danes, the Swedes reversed the difference in 2014 by downgrading S1 and upgrading D1 (see year 2014 under AESTHETICS in Figures 6 and 7).

5. Conclusion

The main point of this paper has been to compare widely shared views (stereotypes) which appear in analyses of language-related evaluative data elicited by the use of two different methodological approaches: *direct* questioning about language, and *indirect* questioning about language (indirect in the sense that people are asked to react to speakers/voices). In all three reported studies (LANCHART, MIN, DASVA), the results of various kinds of questionnaire-based direct elicitation were compared with the results of Speaker Evaluation Experiments (SEEs).

In the LANCHART and MIN studies, the two approaches operationalised a theoretical distinction between consciously and subconsciously offered attitudes. In both studies, we found that the consciously-offered attitudes (in the questionnaire-based approach) simply reproduced the stereotypical hierarchisation of public discourse in respect of the linguistic varieties in question. In contrast, we found that the subconsciously-offered attitudes (in the SEEs) turned the public discourse's hierarchisation upside down, and we argued that this shared opposite evaluative pattern must have been 'learned' from lived experience (rather than public discourse); in particular from experience of how language is treated in the modern spoken media.

The aim of the longitudinal DASVA approach is to study the possible effect of lived experience over time on language-related attitudes (as one dimension of the more complex 'Øresund attitudes'). A possible difference between *overt* and *covert* values in that respect could not be investigated in consciously versus subconsciously offered data. All data was consciously offered. We did speculate, however, that the use of both a questionnaire approach and an SEE approach might allow for registration of a possible difference in how lived experience affects language-related evaluations.

In the questionnaire study we found that both Swedes and Danes reproduced public discourse's negative stereotyping of Danish as a less 'beautiful' language than Swedish – and we found no change in that regard from 2001 to 2014. In the SEE study, the Danes' evaluative reaction to the voices did not differ from their questionnaire assessments of Swedish and Danish and once again reproduced the stereotypes of public discourse. This was also true of the Swedes in 2001.

But in 2014, the Swedes strongly downgraded S1 (close to 'pure' Swedish) and strongly upgraded D1 (close to 'pure' Danish), both in terms of FUNCTIONALITY and AESTHETICS. Since the DASVA SEE evaluations are consciously offered – and all our evidence so far strongly indicates that the stereotypes of public discourse 'govern' what people say when they are aware of giving away language attitudes – the Swedish 2014 SEE results invite us to ponder whether readily available 'talk' about Danish and Swedish has changed from 2001 to 2014 on the Swedish side of the belt. However, since there is no trace of a similar development in the Swedish 2014 questionnaire results, we can be fairly sure that the registered re-evaluation is not something the Swedes have 'learned' from public discourse; it seems reasonable to argue that they must have 'learned' it from practical experience in the new cross-border reality created by the bridge. In view of the asymmetrical work migration patterns across the belt, it also seems plausible that such re-evaluation is found among Swedes and not among Danes.

The DASVA results do indeed suggest that the two methodological approaches, the SEE and the questionnaire, show a different ability to reflect *attitudinal change* that stems from lived experience. Such change seems to have occurred

among the Swedes and is reflected in their SEE results, in contrast to the *attitudinal stability* (permanence of stereotypes) which characterises public discourse and is reflected in the questionnaire data.

I think all three studies sustain the view that elite public discourse has an immense impact on lay stereotypes, which are readily reproduced in direct answers, as in a questionnaire. These are *overt* stereotypical judgements. But I also think, on the other hand, that all three studies sustain the claim that lay people are likely to share other and more *covert* stereotypical judgements, which may appear when other methods of data elicitation, such as Speaker Evaluation Experiments, are used. In any case, for any attempt at intervention in this domain (in terms of education, policies and politics), I think it will be wise to take the possible divergence between *overt* and *covert* stereotypical judgements into account.

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Panel discussion

Sabine Kirchmeier / Harriet Kowalski / Pirkko Nuojärvi /
Åse Wetås / Moderator: Tamás Váradi

Nordic Panel discussion

Representatives of the Nordic countries were invited to share their views on linguistic prejudices and stereotypes, and especially to reflect on prejudices and stereotypes about each other's languages and countries. The major questions discussed were as follows.

- 1) You have all read about the prejudices and stereotypes held by the Nordic countries about each other. Since you are all neighbouring countries and belong to the same region, it would be interesting to know how you react to the prejudices and stereotypes regarding your own country. Were these things familiar to you, were you surprised, and do you agree or disagree?

The panelists stated that most of the expressions used about each other's languages and people were well known and not considered as deeply offensive, but rather as humorous. Similar expressions and jokes about each other are sometimes coined just by substituting one language or nationality for another. Friendly joking about each other's peculiarities is something that binds people together in the Nordic countries.

- 2) Do you see any patterns in the way that prejudices and stereotypes are expressed in the Nordic region compared to other regions?

There are some jokes about the landscape; Norwegians are called mountain apes by the Danes, and Danes are in turn called flatlanders, and there is probably a bit of envy on both sides. All the other Nordic countries have jokes about the Danish language due to its non-distinct pronunciation, and some have jokes about Finns and alcohol, or mock the Swedes for their excessive political correctness. On the other hand, Swedes are acknowledged for their work ethics, Finns for their design, and Danes are known for enjoying themselves and for coining the word *hygge*. The patterns seem the same as the ones we see elsewhere.

But most expressions are understood in the tradition of friendly competition and cooperation between the countries in the Nordic region, for instance facilitated by the Nordic Council of Ministers. The Nordic countries seem to have a strong sense of unity in spite of many differences, and this is reflected in the way they talk about each other.

- 3) Are there any particular measures taken against prejudices and stereotypes in your country? What is the effect?

In most Scandinavian schools, there are strong measures in place against discrimination and bullying. From the start, young people are taught to respect each other and to cherish diversity. Furthermore, there is a strong public debate about political correctness. The panelists agreed that jokes about the other Nordic countries, their language and their people have become less frequent during the last 20 years, and that this might be a result of these measures.

- 4) From your point of view: What are prejudice and stereotypes needed for? Why do they exist at all? Couldn't we just do without them?

The panel agreed that stereotypes and prejudices are fundamental human mechanisms that help us to understand the world. The strong relations that are shared in the Nordic countries help to facilitate the existence of positive stereotypes, and allow expressions that might otherwise be considered as prejudice to be interpreted from a more amicable point of view.

Appendix

European Federation of National Institutions for Language (EFNIL): Members and associate member institutions

For detailed information on EFNIL and its members see www.efnil.org

Member institutions grouped by country

Austria	<i>Österreichisches Sprachen-Kompetenz-Zentrum</i> , Graz Austrian Centre for Language Competence <i>Austrian Centre for Digital Humanities, Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften</i> , Wien Austrian Academy of Sciences
Belgium	<i>Service de la langue française</i> , Bruxelles French Language Service <i>Nederlandse Taalunie</i> , Den Haag Dutch Language Union (Flanders and The Netherlands)
Bulgaria	<i>Българска академия на науките, Институт за български език</i> , Sofia Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Institute for the Bulgarian Language
Croatia:	<i>Institut za hrvatski jezik i jezikoslovlje</i> , Zagreb Institute of Croatian Language and Linguistics
Cyprus:	<i>Πανεπιστημίου Κύπρου</i> , Nicosia University of Cyprus
Czech Republic	<i>Ústav Českého národního korpusu Univerzity Karlovy</i> , Praha Institute of the Czech National Corpus, Charles-University
Denmark	<i>Dansk Sprogævn</i> , København Danish Language Council
Estonia	<i>Eesti Keelenõukogu</i> , Tallin Estonian Language Council <i>Eesti Keele Instituut</i> , Tallin Institute of the Estonian Language

278	<i>EFNIL Members and associate member institutions</i>
Finland	<i>Kotimaisten kielten keskus / Institutet för de inhemska språken</i> , Helsinki/Helsingfors Institute for the Languages of Finland
France	<i>Délégation Générale à la langue française et aux langues de France</i> , Paris General Delegation for the French Language and the Languages of France
Germany	<i>Institut für Deutsche Sprache</i> , Mannheim Institute for the German Language <i>Deutsche Akademie für Sprache und Dichtung</i> , Darmstadt German Academy for Language and Literature
Greece	<i>Κέντρο Ελληνικής Γλώσσας</i> , Thessaloniki Centre for the Greek Language
Hungary	<i>Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, Nyelvtudományi Intézet</i> , Budapest Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Research Institute for Linguistics
Ireland	<i>Foras na Gaeilge</i> , Dublin (the all-island body for the Irish language)
Italy	<i>Accademia della Crusca</i> , Firenze (the central academy for the Italian language) <i>CNR – Opera del Vocabolario Italiano</i> , Firenze The Italian Dictionary
Latvia	<i>Valst valodas komisija</i> , Riga State Language Commission <i>Valsts valodas aģentūra</i> , Riga State Language Agency
Lithuania	<i>Lietuvių Kalbos Institutas</i> , Vilnius Institute of the Lithuanian Language <i>Valstybinė Lietuvių Kalbos Komisija</i> , Vilnius State Commission for the Lithuanian Language
Luxembourg	<i>Institut Grand-Ducal, Section de linguistique</i> , Luxembourg Grand Ducal Institute, Linguistic Section
Malta	<i>Kunsill Nazzjonali ta’l-Ilsien Malti</i> National Council of the Maltese Language

Netherlands/ Belgium	<i>Nederlandse Taalunie</i> , Den Haag Dutch Language Union
Poland	<i>Rada Języka Polskiego</i> , Warszawa Council for the Polish Language
Portugal	<i>Instituto Camões</i> , Lisbõa (The institution for the promotion of Portuguese language and culture)
Romania	<i>Academia Româna, Institutul de Lingvistica</i> , Bucureşti Romanian Academy, Institute of Linguistics
Slovakia	<i>Jazykovedný ústav Ľudovíta Štúra Slovenskej akadémie vied</i> , Bratislava Slovak Academy of Sciences, Ľudovít Štúr Institute of Linguistics
Slovenia	<i>Ministrstvo za kulturo – Sektor za slovenski jezik</i> , Ljubljana Ministry of Culture, Section for the Slovenian Language
Sweden	<i>Språkrådet</i> , Stockholm The Swedish Language Council
United Kingdom	<i>Oxford English Dictionary</i> , Oxford <i>The British Council</i> , London

Associate member institutions

Iceland	<i>Íslensk málnefnd</i> , Reykjavík Icelandic Language Council
Norway	<i>Språkrådet</i> , Oslo Norwegian Language Council